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Abstract 
This study analyses the effect of stigmatisation – the process of marking certain actors, 
behaviours or attributes as deviant in order to reinforce the norms of a social order – on 
Russian-Western relations from 1991 to 2016 and the broader normative fabric of post-
Cold War international society. Building on the stigma literature in Sociology and recent 
applications of stigma theory in International Relations, stigmatisation is conceptualised 
as a relational process central to how international politics works, most notably in terms 
of what it means to be a ‘normal’ state.  
The study makes two overall contributions. First, to the literature on Russian-Western 
relations, it provides a critical-theoretical, relational account of the co-constitutive 
relationship between the two that goes beyond the blame game of much recent work. 
Second, to the literature on international society and international norms, it provides an 
account of the contestation that takes place over norms to shape expectations of 
‘normality’ in international society. In the process, it also offers to the IR stigma literature 
a sociological conceptualisation of stigmatisation that challenges structural, 
psychological conceptualisations.  
The study adopts a fourfold definition of the components of stigmatisation (stereotyping, 
labelling, separation and status loss), and a fourfold definition of stigma management 
strategies (stigma recognition, stigma evasion, stigma rejection, counter-stigmatisation). 
It uses these foundations to analyse Russian-Western relations in respect of four norms 
of state behaviour deemed central to contemporary international society: (liberal) 
democracy, human rights, non-aggression, (liberal) capitalism. It gauges how 
stigmatisation and stigma management work in relation to each norm, and what that says 
about the norm’s importance in contemporary international relations. In conclusion, the 
study considers the extent to which stigmatisation in Russian-Western relations has 
made international society ‘hang together’, that is whether Western stigmatisation of 
Russian behaviour and Russian stigma management has served to strengthen or weaken 
international society’s norms. 
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Introduction 
 
Kindly consider the question: what would your good do if evil did not exist, and what would the 
earth look like if all the shadows disappeared from it? … Do you want to skin the whole earth, 
tearing all the trees and living things off it, because of your fantasy of enjoying bare light?  
You're a fool. 
– Woland (Satan) to Jesus’s apostle Levi Matvei (Matthew the Evangelist)  
in Mikhail Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita (1997, 360) 
 
The Bear of the future will be whatever we make of him… Do we leave the Bear to rot? – 
encourage him to become resentful, backward, an over-armed nation outside our camp?  
Or make a partner of him in a world that’s changing its shape every day? 
– George Smiley to a cohort of British spies-in-training, ca. 1990, 
 in John Le Carré’s The Secret Pilgrim (2011, 391) 
 
More than two decades on from George Smiley’s (admittedly fictional) warning about the 
Russian Bear to the first post-Cold War generation of British spies, on 24 September 
2014, United States President Barack Obama addressed the United Nations General 
Assembly in New York: 
[T]here is a pervasive unease in our world -- a sense that the very forces 
that have brought us together have created new dangers and made it 
difficult for any single nation to insulate itself from global forces. As we 
gather here, an outbreak of Ebola overwhelms public health systems in 
West Africa and threatens to move rapidly across borders. Russian 
aggression in Europe recalls the days when large nations trampled small 
ones in pursuit of territorial ambition. The brutality of terrorists in Syria 
and Iraq forces us to look into the heart of darkness. … We will impose a 
cost on Russia for aggression, and we will counter falsehoods with the 
truth. And we call upon others to join us on the right side of history… 
(Obama 2014k) 
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Here was the leader of the proverbial free world, juxtaposing the threat to international 
peace and security of Russian aggression against its neighbour, Ukraine, with that of a 
deadly virus epidemic and the vicious, head-chopping brutality of the Islamic State. The 
statement offers a microcosm of the operation of stigmatisation processes in 
international relations, which are the focus of this study. In linking Russian actions in 
Ukraine to a virus, terrorism and the bad old days of the past when large nations trampled 
on small ones, Obama contributed both to the growing stigmatisation of Russia as an 
international pariah, a breaker of norms, and to the construction of an ‘audience of 
normals’1 – those law-abiding states on the right side of history, who had put such 
practices as aggression and annexation behind them and followed the civilised norms of 
international society. 
This distinction was not just rhetorical. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 
2014 and subsequent support for rebels in eastern Ukraine had led to economic sanctions 
in the form of travel bans and asset freezes against key individuals, trade embargoes on 
whole sectors of the Russian economy and diplomatic sanctions in the form of the 
suspension of Russia from the G8 and of summits between Russia and the EU, NATO, the 
US and others. The ‘audience of normals’ supporting this status loss for Russia was 
overwhelmingly Western, including the EU and other European states such as Norway 
and Switzerland, the US, Canada, Australia, Japan and New Zealand. In return, Russia had 
denied any transgressive behaviour and implemented its own sanctions, banning the 
import of agricultural products from Western states. 
 The empirical question driving this study is straightforward: how did we get here? 
How did the cautious optimism of the early post-Cold War period in Russian-Western 
relations become replaced by the mutual recriminations and distrust of 2014, with Russia 
every bit the ‘resentful’ and ‘over-armed’ nation of Smiley’s caution? This empirical 
puzzle is paired with a theoretical concern, reflected in Woland’s comments to Levi 
Matvei, with the constitutive role of stigmatisation in the ongoing contestation of 
international norms. The claim is that stigmatisation – the process of marking certain 
actors, attributes or behaviours as ‘deviant’ in order to reinforce the norms of a given 
society – is central to the constitution of international society, and that Russian-Western 
 
1 As will be elaborated below, an ‘audience of normals’ is the group of actors that takes part in the 
stigmatisation of another actor(s). 
9 
 
relations offer a good case through which to investigate its role. Rather than a story of 
socialisation – the stripping of all shadows to enjoy the fantasy of bare light – this is a 
story of stigmatisation: the co-constitution of shadow and light, deviance and normality. 
 The study seeks to make two overall interventions: one theoretical, one empirical. 
To the International Relations (IR) literature on norms and international society, the 
study contributes an account of the ongoing constitution and contestation of the 
normative fabric that holds international society together (and drives it apart) that takes 
seriously the power relations at the core of international relations. In the spirit of the 
thick constructivist, poststructuralist, critical theory and Historical IR traditions’ 
critiques of the thin constructivist IR norms literature and the English School’s 
international society literature, it challenges these literatures’ overly consensual and 
‘good’ view of norms and society as well as their tendency to treat norms and/or societies 
as substantialist entities. Drawing specifically on the recent introduction of Erving 
Goffman’s work on stigma (1963) to IR (primarily, Adler-Nissen 2014b; Zarakol 2010; 
2014), it conceives of stigmatisation as an ongoing relational process shaping and 
reshaping international norms and international society. These critiques as well as the 
theoretical and methodological framework of the study are further elaborated in chapters 
1 and 2, including its relational ontological wager and conceptualisation of stigmatisation 
as a bundle of discursive practices. 
 The empirical intervention is in the literature on Russian-Western relations and 
Russian international relations in general. To this sprawling and multifaceted body of 
work the study seeks to provide, first, a critical, theoretically-inspired interpretation of 
Russian-Western relations since the fall of the Soviet Union, and second, an explicitly 
relational analysis that interprets the impasse in relations not through a substantialist 
focus on the internal dispositions of either side but on the ongoing relational processes 
between them. Before delving deeper into the theoretical arguments in subsequent 
chapters, both these arguments are worth unpacking further to set the empirical scene. 
The next section therefore reviews some of the main trends in the literature, situating the 
study’s contribution and exploring some of the normative questions that its approach 
raises. 
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I – Russia and the West: situating the study 
To situate the study and explain why a critical, theoretical and relational interpretation 
of recent Russian-Western relations is worthwhile, this section briefly reviews the 
existing literature with these three aspects in mind. It highlights how both academic and 
policy writing on Russia has become polarised and politicised in recent years, making 
‘critical’2 work a challenge, how much of the most balanced and reflective work is 
produced by area specialists and journalists with no theoretical agendas, and how much 
of the literature focuses on internal ‘Russian’ or ‘Western’ dispositions to the exclusion of 
the interaction between the two. At the outset it should be noted that the literature on 
Russian-Western relations is large, and while every effort has been made to provide a fair 
and comprehensive picture below, it is necessarily stylised rather than exhaustive. 
 
The challenge of being critical in a polarised debate 
Debates about Russian-Western relations have become increasingly polarised over the 
past several years, especially since the 2014 Ukraine crisis and Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea, with much discussion focused on who is to blame for the deterioration in 
relations that led to these events. Subsequent accusations of Russian interference in the 
2016 US presidential election, the UK’s Brexit referendum and other elections as well as 
the poisoning of Sergey and Yuliya Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 have contributed further 
to an environment in which any writing on Russia that deviates from the dominant 
narrative increasingly comes with the risk of being labelled an apologist for Russian 
aggression and subversion of democracy. In Gerard Toal’s (2017, 11) words, ‘any 
empathetic representation of Russian geopolitical discourse in the West today faces 
social opprobrium’. The division is most visible in Western media and in policy-making 
circles, where accusations of acting as Putin’s or the Kremlin’s ‘useful idiots’ or ‘Trojan 
horses’ contribute to a politicised environment in which being ‘pro-Russian’ has become 
a stigma of its own worthy of further study.3 However, academic debates (which to a large 
 
2 ‘Critical’ is meant here and throughout the study in the general, ‘small-c’ sense of being critical of dominant 
explanations or interpretations rather than a specific commitment to Frankfurt School-style Critical 
Theory. 
3 For an illustrative case, see the Atlantic Council’s series of reports on ‘The Kremlin’s Trojan Horses’, 
identifying supposedly ‘pro-Russian’ influencers in several Western countries (Polyakova et al. 2016; 2017; 
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extent overlap with media and policy debates) have also on occasion deteriorated into a 
similar form of blame game, with scholars focused on attributing fault through the 
establishment of the ‘real’ causes of events. 
 This ‘blame game’ scholarship was most prominent in the immediate aftermath of 
the Ukraine crisis, with several articles and books appearing blaming one side or the 
other. Prominent examples include, on the side putting the West at fault, Richard Sakwa 
(2014a), Andrei Tsygankov (2015) and John Mearsheimer (2014). Each in their own way, 
these works sought to establish the West’s (i.e. the US, EU and/or NATO) primary 
responsibility for the crisis, be it because of its (and Ukraine’s) ‘monist’ vision of 
European (or Ukrainian) identity in Sakwa’s case or the way its leaders ignored basic 
realist principles of power politics in Mearsheimer’s. In either case, Russia had merely 
reacted to the exclusionary and expansionist policies of the West, which was pushing up 
against its borders and ignoring Russia’s ‘legitimate concerns’. On the opposite side, 
Andrew Wilson (2014), Roy Allison (2014), Michael McFaul (2014), Stephen Sestanovich 
(2014) and others detailed how Russia had ‘broken the rules’ when annexing Crimea 
(Allison), attributed the crisis to Russia’s expansionist ambitions (Wilson) and 
emphasised how this was Moscow’s ‘choice’ and had nothing to do with realist power 
balancing (McFaul). In this way, battle lines were drawn that have remained largely 
unchanged ever since. The polemics are in many ways a replay of earlier, Cold War 
debates, in which ‘people who proposed trying to understand the USSR and exploring 
possibilities of cooperation … were pilloried as “fellow travellers”, while those who took 
the opposite view were branded as ideologues and philistines’ (MacFarlane 2016, 342). 
This type of analysis has serious drawbacks – as Paul D’Anieri puts it, ‘[w]e are naturally 
driven to assign blame, in part because doing so is necessary to formulating policy 
prescriptions, but future research will need to focus more on explanation if we are to 
improve our understanding of these events’ (2016, 502–3; see also Kuzio 2018). The 
politicisation and polarisation of the debate has been an obscuring rather than 
illuminating factor. 
 
2018). A similar polarisation has of course also taken place in Russia, where, as will be analysed further in 
the following chapters, any ‘pro-Western’ organisation risks being labelled a ‘foreign agent’ or generally 
part of the Western ‘fifth column’. 
12 
 
  The polarisation also poses a challenge for critical academic analysis. While an 
analysis like Sakwa’s can certainly be described as critical on account of its opposition to 
the dominant Western narrative of Russian aggression and general maliciousness, it 
follows a ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’ logic that makes it singularly uncritical of the 
official Russian version of events. From a critical perspective favouring the subalterns 
and downtrodden of this world, this would make some sense if Russia was indeed as 
oppressed and marginalised as the official Russian discourse claims, but becomes 
problematic when seen in light of the Russian state’s own trampling on its inferiors, be it 
the Ukrainian state, Crimean Tatars or the LGBT community in Russia (for an excellent 
discussion of the challenges of applying critical perspectives to Russia, see Morozov 2015, 
4, 8–37). Critical accounts of Russian-Western relations should thus eschew the ‘blame 
game’ altogether and seek balanced, nuanced accounts of how the sides ended up in the 
current impasse. In Toal’s (2017, 16) words once more: ‘the issues are too important, the 
current crisis too serious, to not strive for deeper intellectual and moral understanding’. 
‘Balance’ in this case should not mean simply giving equal weight or consideration to the 
arguments of each of the above ‘sides’, but seeking explanations and increased 
understanding that takes account of both Russian and Western self-perceptions and puts 
events in the context of wider processes without necessarily passing judgment on who is 
at ‘fault’.4 This study aims to accomplish such a task, albeit with an acute appreciation 
that no analysis is ever apolitical. 
 
Comprehensive explanations, but relative dearth of theory 
The study is not alone in this endeavour. After the events of 2014, several works have 
attempted to provide nuanced explanations of both the Ukraine crisis itself and the 
broader deterioration of Russian-Western relations of which it is both symptom and 
contributing cause, joining an already substantial literature on Russian foreign policy, 
national identity and Russian-Western relations in general. Some aim for broad, 
synthesising analyses (e.g. Legvold 2016; MacFarlane 2016; Charap and Colton 2017; 
Wood 2018), some explore part of the puzzle, most often on the Russian side of things, to 
 
4 As one analyst put it at a 2017 event attended by the author, balance does not mean simply including 
Andrew Wilson and Richard Sakwa on the same panel. 
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explain why certain decisions were made and things happened the way they did (e.g. 
Treisman 2016), some provide insightful analysis of certain aspects of national identity, 
for example the rise of Russian nationalism and its impact on foreign policy (e.g. Kolstø 
and Blakkisrud 2016; Laruelle 2018), and some zero in on particular relationships such 
as that between Russia and the EU (e.g. Haukkala 2015; Forsberg and Haukkala 2016; 
Casier 2016; Maass 2017). Overall, the literature provides comprehensive accounts of the 
empirical story and suggest numerous different causes (what happened and why?).5 
 This study does not set out to rival these explanations. It differs from these works 
in that its aims are both empirical and theoretical, even if the empirical takes precedence 
in the analysis. As noted above, it is interested both in providing a new theoretical 
perspective on Russian-Western relations and, secondarily, in using Russian-Western 
relations as a case through which to explore stigmatisation processes in international 
relations and their impact on the wider international society. Much of the literature on 
Russia, Russian foreign policy and the country’s relationship with the West comes from 
an Area Studies tradition that is primarily interested in explaining the case at hand and 
as a rule has little interest in theorising beyond it. Some of the most balanced and 
informative works are written by journalists, focusing for example on the increasing 
glorification of the victory in WWII and a particular version of history as a source of 
tension with Ukraine (Walker 2018; for a related argument theorised around ‘soft power’, 
see Feklyunina 2016), the need to look beyond Vladimir Putin to the collective around 
him when trying to understand Russian policy (Zygar 2016), or the sources and effects of 
the leadership’s increasingly authoritarian and conservative policies (Gessen 2017). Such 
works usually have no explicit theoretical agenda but provide detailed empirical accounts 
that this study does not aim to rival. 
 
The need for interactionist and relational analysis 
The third drawback of much of the literature on Russia’s relationship with the West, even 
its more theoretically minded parts, is its internalist, substantialist and sometimes 
 
5 For overviews of the literature and competing explanations for both Russia’s conduct in the Ukraine crisis 
and its assertiveness in the post-Soviet space more generally, see Götz (2016; 2017). See also Toal (2017, 
16–33) for the stock liberal and realist answers to the question ‘why does Russia invade its neighbours?’. 
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essentialist focus. The three are not the same. Internalist analyses focus mainly on factors 
‘internal’ to Russia, thereby bracketing international dynamics. Substantialist analyses 
rely on an ontology whereby the ‘unit’ or actor whose actions are to be analysed, i.e. the 
state in this case, is seen as a coherent unit with certain substantive properties (e.g. 
certain immutable national interests, or characteristics like ‘democratic’, ‘authoritarian’, 
etc.) that in turn can be used in co-variance analyses to identify and explain patterns of 
action. Essentialist analyses see such properties as inherently ‘Russian’ (or Western, or 
Chinese, etc.), rooted in some ineffable cultural tropes. 
 The internalist and sometimes substantialist biases are particularly prevalent in 
much of the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) literature on Russia, given the sub-field’s 
generally positivist epistemological approach and focus on explaining the outward-
looking foreign policy of units (states) that are generally taken as given, albeit with 
internal rivalries and competing identities. For example, in Elias Götz’s (2017) review of 
the literature, three of the four arguments he identifies as explanations for Russia’s 
assertiveness are rooted in predominantly internal factors: decision makers’ worldview, 
domestic political concerns (regime security) and identity discourses, with only the 
fourth explanation, geopolitical considerations, foregrounding the international 
dimension – and even then focusing on the more or less rational reaction of the unit 
(Russia) to external international pressures. Given the tendency of much analysis to 
reduce Russia to the person of Vladimir Putin, Russia in many ways offers the clearest 
and most extreme example of IR’s tendency to treat states as individuals.6 Analyses of 
individuals need not be substantialist or essentialist – the stereotype of Putin as 
essentially a KGB thug propagated by John McCain among others is in stark contrast to, 
for example, the nuanced and thorough analysis of his composite identity offered by 
biographers like Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy (2013) or even the more critical, effacing 
Masha Gessen (2012). Overall, however, the tendency to ascribe Russia’s assertiveness to 
Putin and other Russian decision makers’ worldviews or rational survival instincts is 
problematic in that it focuses primarily on Russia and downplays the constitutive 
dimension of its interactions with the rest of the world. 
 
6 A tendency so strong that even some works that call for a less Putin-centric analysis end up to some extent 
reproducing the narrative by explaining why we need to ‘talk about Putin’ (Galeotti 2019) or look at ‘Russia 
without Putin’ (Wood 2018). For a critical discussion of the tendency to treat states as people, see Wendt 
(2004) and the forum on his article (Jackson 2004a; 2004b; I. B. Neumann 2004; C. Wight 2004). 
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 The more constructivist and historically oriented literature on Russian foreign 
policy and/or Russia’s place in the world is closer to the relational commitment and 
theoretically-inspired approach of this study, but several of the key works still fall short 
on full interactionism. For example, Iver Neumann’s (2016) work on Russian discourses 
of Europe or Ted Hopf’s (2013; 2016; see also 2002) work on Russian elite discourses 
and ‘mass common sense’ provide thorough analyses of the discursive landscape in 
Russia and its link to foreign policy (the third category of explanation identified by Götz) 
that are relational in their understanding of Russian identity as socially constructed vis-
à-vis a constitutive ‘other’ (see also Tsygankov 2013). However, they do not as a rule 
incorporate the ‘other’s’ actions into the analysis on an equal footing, given the primary 
focus on explaining the Russian context. Separate, reverse analyses of Russia as Europe’s 
‘other’ are thus needed to complete the interactional picture of ‘mutual othering’ (e.g. I. 
B. Neumann 1999; Morozov and Rumelili 2012). Meanwhile, works that draw on the 
social-psychological framework of Social Identity Theory (SIT) to analyse Russia’s quest 
for status (for example Clunan 2009; 2014; Larson and Shevchenko 2010; 2014; see also 
I. B. Neumann 2008 for a non-SIT analysis of Russia’s specific quest for great power 
status) capture well the various ways in which Russia has sought to improve its 
international prestige and its frustration with its inferior position in international status 
hierarchies. However, as Reinhard Wolf (2019, 16–19) argues, these works tend to 
underestimate the role of interaction and the extent to which Russia’s frustration is not 
with the lack of substantive recognition of its supposed prestige markers but with what 
he calls ‘role status’: the lack of ‘respect’ shown to it and its desire to be treated as an 
‘equal partner’.  
In perhaps the most theoretically rich and ambitious analysis of Russia’s historical 
development and contemporary position in recent years, combining post-colonial theory 
with neo-Gramscian theories of hegemony, Viatcheslav Morozov (2015) theorises Russia 
as a ‘subaltern empire’, a semi-peripheral entity in the Eurocentric world order both 
materially and normatively dependent on the Western core (see also Hopf 2013; Etkind 
2014; Magun 2016 for analyses of Russia’s semi-peripherality and/or normative 
dependence on the West). However, for all its relational and theoretical sophistication, 
there is very little interaction in Morozov’s analysis – the Western core does not do much 
besides being the core in relation to which the (semi) peripheries are constituted through 
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macro-processes of capitalist colonisation. In this way it is similar to Ayşe Zarakol’s 
(2010) structural analysis of stigma and stigmatisation, where the latter becomes a 
process induced in the stigmatised through their internalisation of the normative 
hierarchy and their inferior position in it, but without the stigmatising agent(s) always 
being obvious. 
 There are a handful of works with similar interactionist ambitions to this study. 
One of the closest is the practice-focused work of Vincent Pouliot (2010), though its focus 
on the micro-politics of Russia-NATO diplomacy makes it more ethnographic than the 
following analysis. Also closely related is the application of a similar Bourdieusian 
framework to the longue durée of Russian-European relations by Pouliot and Neumann 
(2011), highlighting the ‘hysteretical’ lack of fit between Russian practices and 
dispositions and the practices of the European diplomatic field it has sought to join. 
However, as with much Bourdieusian analysis, this approach tends to highlight the 
reproduction of conflictual relations rather than a more dynamic, uncertain process of 
relative stabilisation and destabilisation (see Schindler and Wille 2015 for a critique of 
Pouliot on this point). A similar focus on incompatibility can be found in another 
theoretically rich and interactionist work on EU-Russia relations, by Sergey Prozorov 
(2006, 2), who posited that the source of conflictual relations between the two was down 
to the ‘fundamental opposition between sovereign and integrationist paradigms of 
international relations’ and ‘the existence of genuine political divergences’. Finally, Toal’s 
(2017) critical geopolitics-inspired work on Russian interventionism in its ‘near abroad’ 
and the current impasse in US-Russian relations is closely aligned with this study in its 
ambition to provide a theoretically informed and critical reading of the empirical story. 
Toal’s positing of relatively coherent, albeit contested, US and Russian ‘geopolitical 
cultures’ verges on substantialism. However, his analysis of the dynamic interplay 
between the post-Soviet ‘geopolitical field’ (defined amongst other things by its 
postcolonial nature and the close presence of the Western ‘normative great power 
centre’), the mentioned geopolitical cultures, and the technologically-defined 
‘geopolitical condition’ shaping the way geopolitics is ‘experienced, understood, and 
practiced’ provides for a rich and nuanced analysis (on these concepts, see Toal 2017, 8–
14). This study builds on and engages these works and arguments by showing how 
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Russian-Western conflictual relations are partly the product of ongoing contestations of 
normality in international society. 
 
II – Structure of the study 
The study has two parts. In the first part, consisting of chapters 1 and 2, the study’s 
theoretical framework is elaborated. Chapter 1 critically interrogates the English School 
literature on international society as well as the IR literature on norms and identifies two 
related issues. First, the literatures’ treatment of societies and/or norms as bounded 
entities-with-essences, and second, their neglect of power relations. The chapter then 
reviews a collection of theoretical approaches inspired by Antonio Gramsci, Pierre 
Bourdieu and Michel Foucault that have been employed in IR to highlight the central role 
of dominance and power to normative orders and show how the process of norm 
contestation revolves around the ongoing struggle over what constitutes ‘normal’ and 
‘deviant’ behaviour. Chapter 2 builds on these approaches to introduce the study’s 
analytical framework, stigma theory, arguing that it offers the kind of relational and 
power-political lens needed for investigating the ongoing co-constitution of international 
society, its norms and the identities of the actors acting within it. The chapter presents 
the four-component conceptualisation of stigmatisation that will be used throughout the 
study – labelling, stereotyping, separation and status loss/discrimination, all of which 
must be present for stigmatisation to occur – as well as the four different stigma 
management strategies available to actors on the receiving end of stigma imposition: 
stigma acceptance/recognition, stigma rejection, stigma evasion and counter-
stigmatisation. It also draws a distinction between direct and diffuse stigmatisation. The 
former is targeted directly at an actor, the latter is the result of the more diffuse 
promotion of certain standards of behaviour that makes actors discreditable rather than 
necessarily discredited. The chapter also outlines the study’s methodological approach, 
including its case selection and conception of stigmatisation as a discursive practice that 
can be analysed through discourse analysis. 
The second part, chapters 3-7, is the empirical core of the study. Chapter 3 sets the 
scene by outlining the four norms that, it is argued, constituted a fully ‘normal’ state in 
post-Cold War international society: democracy, human rights, non-aggression and 
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capitalism. It identifies how these standards of behaviour became dominant, the 
mechanisms and institutions through which they were enforced, and varying regional 
patterns, notably how the normative and institutional pressures to conform to the norms 
of democracy and human rights were highest in the Euro-Atlantic context, which is 
relevant for the study given the specific focus on Russian-Western relations. Chapters 4 
through 7 then investigate stigmatisation processes in Russian-Western relations in 
relation to each norm, analysing both the level and kind of stigma imposition, which 
actors were involved in the process, and what stigma management strategies were 
pursued by the Russian leadership. 
 Finally, the Conclusion summarises the empirical analysis and the study’s 
contributions, identifies some hierarchies between the different norms that emerge from 
the analysis and discusses the continued relevance of temporal/teleological frames of 
reference such as ‘modernity’ and ‘backwardness’ to stigmatisation internationally. It 
closes by considering whether stigmatisation is increasingly failing in its purpose of 
‘holding the world together’ (Zarakol 2014), as the taboos surrounding illiberal practices 
increasingly wane.  
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Chapter 1 
The power politics of norms in international society 
 
This study is about processes of stigmatisation between actors in international society, 
and the role played by these processes in shaping the norms of that society. It is about the 
social construction of ‘normality’ and ‘abnormality’, and the central role of ‘deviance’ and 
‘transgression’ in clarifying norms and strengthening or weakening the normative fabric 
of international society. It explores these processes through an investigation of the co-
constitutive relationship between international society’s dominant Western actors and 
Russia, expressed through discursive practices.  
The preceding sentences contain several conceptual, theoretical and 
methodological assumptions. The most basic is the assumption of the existence of an 
international society (as opposed to a system or community). The second is that norms, 
understood as expectations of social behaviour, are important and relevant to how 
international society functions, but that norms are not necessarily always ‘good’. The 
third is that deviance and transgression are as important as norm-abiding in the social 
construction of norms. Fourth, in focusing on social processes the study adopts a 
phenomenological, relational rather than transfactual, substantialist ontology, giving 
pride of place to the co-constitution of social identities. And finally, it assumes that 
stigmatisation as a social process can be analysed through discourse. 
 This chapter and the next elucidate each assumption in turn. This chapter 
introduces and critically interrogates English School conceptions of international society 
and constructivist scholarship on norms. It critiques both approaches for their 
substantialist biases, i.e. the tendency to conceptualise international society and/or 
individual norms as substantialist entities or ‘things’, and for their neglect of power 
relations. The last section of the chapter surveys some of the critical theories that have 
been used in IR to address such shortcomings, focusing on works inspired by Antonio 
Gramsci, Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault. The purpose of this section is to show 
some of the affinities between these approaches and the study’s analytical framework, 
notably the focus on power relations and the ongoing co-constitution of ‘normal’ and 
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‘deviant’. 
 
I – International society: Norms as consensual building blocks or an exclusionary 
‘standard of civilisation’? 
The argument that the modern collective of states constitutes a ‘society’, as opposed to 
merely a ‘system’, was popularised within IR by the so-called English School. In Hedley 
Bull’s (1977, 13) classic definition, an international society ‘exists when a group of states, 
conscious of their common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that 
they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with 
one another and share the work of common institutions’. In their study of the historical 
‘expansion’ of international society, Bull and Adam Watson (1984, 3, emphasis added) 
similarly described it as a group of states that had established ‘...by dialogue and consent 
common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognise their 
common interest in maintaining these arrangements’. In addition to this focus on 
consensually agreed rules and norms, English School scholars from Martin Wight (1977) 
to Andrew Linklater (2016) have emphasised the requirement of a common culture for 
international societies or even systems to exist: ‘a state system presupposes a common 
culture’ (M. Wight 1977, 46). 
The enduring legacy of early English School work and the concept of international 
society is to highlight the inherently social nature of international relations. Against the 
asocial, hyper-rational behaviouralists and the structural realists of the time, Bull and 
colleagues argued that international relations were conducted not by billiard ball-like 
states in a system but by thinking, reflective social beings in a society (see e.g. S. Hoffman 
1986).7 The flipside of this legacy is that this society was seen as defined by a common 
culture or properties, as primarily consensual and inclusive, and as spreading through 
dialogue and consent.8 This encouraged a view of international societies as bounded 
 
7 This is not to suggest that ‘social’ and ‘society’ are value-neutral, mere methodological terms. See Owens 
(2015) and Bartelson (2015) for critical overviews. Separately, while Waltz (1979) did include a theory of 
‘socialization’ in his structural-realist theory of international politics, what he describes is a process of 
competition and homogenisation more akin to natural selection than socialisation, whereby states that do 
not follow the structural imperatives of the system will be ‘selected out’ (Johnston 2007, 3). 
8 An alternative approach with some terminological overlap is the ‘World Society’ (or ‘World Polity’) 
research programme of sociologist John Meyer and colleagues, developed from the 1970s onwards (for a 
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entities, and neglected the power relations and hierarchical exclusion inherent in most 
societies as well as the frequent violence engaged in by the putative members of society 
both against other members and outsiders. The following sub-sections deal with each of 
these issues in turn. 
 
Common culture, identity and values – international society as a substantialist ‘entity’ 
The focus of scholars like Wight on common culture and Bull and Watson on common 
values as a prerequisite and/or a necessary attribute of international society encourages 
an approach that envisions societies as bounded units with certain attributes and clear 
limits separating them from other societies. International society in this view becomes an 
‘entity’. Yaqing Qin describes the approach as such:  
The first approach to international society is that of regarding it as an 
independent ego-entity, by which I mean an ontologically self-organizing 
and self-evolving ego born in a particularly socio-cultural locale that 
develops its own organs and institutions and expands as it grows. (Qin 
2010, 132) 
This approach, Qin (2010, 132) argues, is rooted in Western tendencies towards 
‘taxonomical thinking’, in which objects (including such abstract objects as a society) are 
seen as discrete, defined by certain essential properties that are independent of context, 
identifiable and can be systematised into laws as part of a ‘tenacious search for certainty’. 
Such thinking is ubiquitous in Western social sciences. In IR, it finds expression in the 
tendency to define states as, for example, either democratic or authoritarian, status quo 
or revisionist, etc. (for a recent critical overview, see Cooley, Nexon, and Ward 2019). 
 In analytical terms, such an approach to international society can be described as 
substantialist – it treats society as a bounded unit defined by its supposedly internally 
 
collection of key writings, see Krücken and Drori 2009). Meyer et al’s argument that states have taken on 
increasingly similar form owing to their embeddedness in a ‘world culture’ with its origins in Western 
society and promoted through the global social ‘ether’ (Drori and Krücken 2009, 17–19; see also e.g. Meyer 
et al. 1997) has clear overlaps with the English School ‘expansion story’ and constructivist arguments about 
norm ‘diffusion’ presented in this chapter. For reasons of space, I do not go into the nuances of the approach, 
but it is notable that one line of criticism concerns its downplaying of coercion, conflict and resistance 
against top-down ‘diffusion’, similar to critiques made in this chapter of the English School and 
constructivist norms literature (Finnemore 1996; see also Meyer 2009, 55–56). 
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agreed substantive culture or values, which are seen as properties of the unit.9 Within 
such a substantialist approach there are varying degrees of nuance. The ‘culturalist’ 
approach represented by Wight, who argued that the common culture of a states-system 
would be pre-existing for it to form but was ‘decidedly unclear about what this meant’ 
(Reus-Smit 2017, 865), is in practice quite close to the essentialist argument about 
different civilizations put forward by Samuel Huntington (1993a; 1996). In this latter 
view, cultures are not only bounded and unitary, but their properties are seen as essential 
to that culture and relatively timeless, frequently reduced to religious identities such as 
‘Judeo-Christian’, ‘Muslim’, etc. (though not all civilizational analysis is necessarily 
essentialist; see Bettiza 2014). Bull’s (and Watson’s) somewhat more open focus on 
common values and institutions arrived at through negotiation allows for a historical 
analysis of how these values were arrived at in the first place, but still conceives of 
international society as bounded once the values and institutions are established. 
Moreover, Bull (1977, 15) also argued that all historical international societies were 
‘founded upon a common culture or civilisation, or at least on some of the elements of 
such a civilisation: a common language, … epistemology and understanding of the 
universe, … religion, … ethical code, … aesthetic or artistic tradition’. This argument risks 
a degree of tautology – if one’s definition of society in the first place is founded upon the 
idea of common values, then it is unsurprising that most ‘actually existing’ international 
societies one finds will have a common culture. 
A recent example that demonstrates the continued existence of this form of 
analysis is Andrew Linklater’s recent work (Linklater 2016; see also 2011). Linklater sets 
out to explore the changing attitudes to violence in what he describes as ‘Western states-
systems’ over time, from the Greeks and Romans of antiquity and their tolerance of 
massacres and other mass violence, to today’s supposedly more ‘civilised’ world of 
restraint and legal codes prohibiting genocide, war crimes, etc. (Linklater 2016, 1–2). To 
do this, he employs a theoretical framework combining the work of Wight, specifically his 
call for a comparative sociology of states-systems, and process sociologist Norbert Elias, 
specifically his work on the ‘civilising process’ (Linklater 2016, 1–17; also 2011, chapter 
6). Like much English School work, Linklater has been criticised for being Eurocentric, 
 
9 As noted in the Introduction, this study adopts instead a relational approach, on which more in Chapter 
2. 
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downplaying or omitting the constitutive role of interactions between the ‘West’ and non-
Western actors in the development of ‘Western civilisation’, and overly elite-focused, 
underestimating the importance of broader social forces and actors in shaping elite 
actions.10 More important for the purpose of this section’s argument is that Linklater 
perpetuates Wight’s substantialist view of states-systems/international societies. While 
trying to mould Wight’s insights with the relational, process-oriented work of Elias, 
resulting in an ‘unstable theoretical scaffolding’, Linklater also ‘accepts Wight’s notion 
that states-systems can be understood as a “bounded cultural region”’ (Lawson 2017, 
672, 677). In Lawson’s (2017, 677–78; see also Reus-Smit 2017; 2018) words, this not 
only misrepresents the level of unity and coherence of any given ‘culture’, but also 
underestimates how durable international orders in fact regulate cultural diversity: 
‘cultural heterogeneity is not the mark of an unsuccessful international order, but a 
requirement of international order’. In Linklater’s work, society (specifically Western 
international society) instead remains largely bounded and unaffected by outside 
influences. 
As Edward Keene (2014, 657) points out, this view of society as a bounded unit, 
opposed to a more anarchical ‘system’, is the very basis for the English School’s 
‘expansion’ thesis, in which a clearly defined, bounded society expanded outwards from 
Europe until it met other clearly defined and bounded societies, either destroying them 
or existing alongside them. For a school of thought that has prided itself on its close 
attention to history, it has been pointed out that this removes attention from the messy 
and multiple transnational and -societal interactions in ‘actually existing’ history (Keene 
2014, 658; see Go and Lawson 2017 for a critique of methodological nationalism). Jens 
Bartelson (2015, 688–89) argues that part of the problem lies in the English School’s very 
adoption of a society/system distinction from nineteenth-century historians such as 
Arnold Heeren, whose conception of ‘society’ was as a ‘pre-political realm composed of 
moral beings sharing the same general ideas’ and thus relatively bounded and free of 
 
10 See the forum on Linklater’s book in Review of International Studies, in particular Hobson (2017), Çapan 
(2017), Chong (2017), Go (2017), Lawson (2017) and Ling (2017). For less critical readings, see Mennell 
(2017) and Dunne and Devetak (2017). Linklater’s (2017) response rests heavily on the argument that the 
power imbalances between ‘the West’ and ‘the Rest’ from the start of European colonial expansion until 
roughly the end of World War II were so large as to make the latter virtually powerless, an argument that 
both homogenises a variety of colonial relationships over a long time period and tends to totalise them, 
somewhat missing the point about interactions, emulations, etc., never occurring only in one direction. 
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political conflict. Attempts at adding more nuance to the story by introducing the idea of 
a ‘layered’ international society, in which a culturally thin global international society co-
exists with several culturally thicker regional international societies (Buzan 2010, 22–
23), suffer from the same tendency towards ‘either-or’ thinking (Qin 2010, 136). It also 
does little to acknowledge the centrality of political conflict and struggle to the 
constitution of society. 
 The tendency towards seeing culture as a defining feature of international society 
is thus unsatisfactory for two reasons. It gives primacy to an empirically unsustainable 
idea of cultures as ‘coherent, neatly bounded systems of meaning and practice’ (Reus-
Smit 2017, 857), and it encourages a substantialist view of social relations in which 
entities and their properties are seen as ontologically primary and the processes and 
relations that constitute them in the first place as secondary. 
 
Benign expansion vs power-political stratification 
Along with and complementary to the cultural critique, the primary line of criticism 
against the traditional international society literature has focused on its relatively benign 
view of what a society is and myopia about discriminatory and violent European 
practices, particularly how the norms that allegedly governed relations between states in 
European international society were ignored in Europeans’ interactions with the rest of 
the world (see e.g. Keal 2003; Keene 2002; 2007). Moreover, several studies focusing on 
empirical cases have problematised the traditional conceptualisations of ‘entry’ into 
international society by non-Western European polities such as China (Gong 1984; Zhang 
1991; 1999; Suzuki 2009), Greece (Stivachtis 1998), Japan (Suzuki 2005; 2009), Russia 
(I. B. Neumann 2011), Siam/Thailand (Zarakol 2014) and Turkey (Zarakol 2010).11 These 
studies have broadly reconceptualised the ‘entries’ as ‘encounters’ and problematised the 
unidirectional story of socialisation and entry told by the traditional expansion story. 
Some have drawn on alternative theoretical frameworks: Ayşe Zarakol (2010; 2014) 
 
11 Not all these authors consider their work part of the English School as such. While some, such as Edward 
Keene, might be seen as proponents of a more ‘critical’ English School, others, notably Ayşe Zarakol, 
approach the issue of international society’s historical development from a broader historical-sociological 
tradition and do not consider themselves ‘English School scholars’. 
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emphasises the centrality of stigmatisation, seen primarily as the internalisation by 
‘defeated’ or otherwise semi-peripheral states of a normative hierarchy that relegates 
them to an inferior position, and Iver Neumann (2011) draws on memory studies to 
emphasise the role played by previous experiences for newcomers in their interaction 
with international society, specifically Russia’s memory of existing in a suzerain system. 
Several of these studies form part of a critical strand of literature that points to the 
exclusionary and ordering function played by normative standards such as the 19th 
century ‘Standard of Civilisation’ and its historical and contemporary equivalents.12 
These works’ fundamental critique of the traditional English School literature (and 
several other strands of IR) concerns its assumption of anarchy, rather than hierarchy, as 
the basic concept of international relations (see Bially Mattern and Zarakol 2016 for a full 
review of the ‘hierarchy literature’).13 The basic argument is that ‘IR as a discipline is 
primed to understand and explain the relations between juridically-equal sovereign 
states in an anarchic world and therefore finds international hierarchy a conceptual blind 
spot’ (Hobson 2014, 558).14 More attention must thus be paid to the hierarchy-creating 
processes of ordering and differentiation that normative standards play a central part in. 
To do this, one must do away with the simple dichotomy of a society founded on shared 
values versus a free-for-all system in favour of a more global, integrated view of the 
multiple ongoing processes of stratification in world politics (Keene 2014; Bially Mattern 
and Zarakol 2016; Zarakol 2017; see also James 1993 for an early critique of the 
system/society distinction). As Keene (2014, 658) argues, ‘…the conceptualisation of the 
move from system to society in terms of the extent of agreement upon a set of shared 
values makes it harder to grasp the ways in which hierarchies reproduce themselves 
through social interaction…’, and underestimates the degree to which all societies are 
ultimately hierarchical. 
 
12 The term ‘standard of civilisation’ is used by numerous studies, again not all of which consciously write 
in the English School tradition. For some of the most defining, explicit discussions of the term see Gong 
(1984), Donnelly (1998), Fidler (2001), Bowden and Seabrooke (2006) and the 2014 special issue of 
Millennium, ‘Rethinking the Standard(s) of Civilisation(s) in International Relations’, especially Bowden 
(2014), Buzan (2014), Hobson (2014), Keene (2014), Towns (2014) and Zhang (2014). 
13 Though some traditional English School scholars did pay attention to hierarchy – notably Watson (1990) 
in his ‘pendulum’ model that conceived of international society oscillating between more or less 
hierarchical/anarchical states. 
14 Hobson goes on to critique this ‘axiom’ by arguing that IR theory has always embodied an ‘already built-
in hierarchical conception of world politics’. 
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The more critical literature on international society’s historical development thus 
do pay attention to the ‘domination and exclusion’ inherent in normative discourses such 
as ‘democracy as civilisation’ (Zhang 2014, 688). However, with some notable exceptions, 
such as Keene’s (2014) conceptualisation of stratification along three separate 
dimensions of power or Zarakol’s (2010) use of stigma theory to explain the status-
seeking of ‘defeated’ powers, these studies make little explicit use of social theory to 
strengthen and nuance their arguments. Yongjin Zhang (2014, 694) is a case in point – in 
critiquing the traditional literature’s neglect of power relations and the agency exercised 
by non-Western states, he argues that it has been ‘blind to the complex processes of 
communicative actions … through which common norms, values, interests and 
institutions have been negotiated, diffused, interpreted and accepted in different social 
embeddings’. While seemingly drawing on a Habermasian communicative action 
framework, there is neither an explicit reference to this, nor a consideration of the 
relative strengths or weaknesses of such a framework when analysing norms, for 
example the way in which it would tend to highlight reasoned negotiation and acceptance 
of norms over forceful imposition and domination. 
 
Russia: within or without? 
Relating this discussion to Russian-Western relations illustrates the limits of the 
society/system divide. Per the analytical tools given us by traditional English School 
theory, the recent deterioration would seem to put relations in the ‘system’ category, with 
Russia and the West no longer part of the same society. That is, of course, assuming they 
were part of the same society in the first place, which a cultural view may throw into 
doubt. However, any civilizational analysis struggles to place Russia and its many 
peripheries, where religions and ethnicities intersect and overlap (Morozov 2015, 52–
54). The country is perpetually seen as both ‘part of’ and ‘apart from’ Europe (Baranovsky 
2000), a liminal space where clear-cut civilizational boundaries make little sense. 
Assuming that culture does at least not preclude Russia from being considered part of a 
European international society, it could be argued that Russia and most Western states 
or governments no longer share the common values emphasised by Bull or even see 
themselves as bound by a more limited set of common rules, given the increasing disputes 
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over everything from democratic credentials and human rights records domestically to 
the annexation of Crimea and bombing of Syria internationally. Russia in this sense would 
have fallen out of favour in (high) society, paying the price of its transgressions in the 
form of relegation to the lower, ‘systemic’ sphere of relations. 
 This would not be a very satisfactory analysis. This study aims to contribute a 
more nuanced reading of Russian-Western relations by drawing on insights from social 
theory that highlight not only the dominating and exclusionary aspects of norms, but that 
these exclusionary processes occur within society and help constitute it. International 
society in this view is not an ‘entity’ but ‘an open process of complex social relations in 
motion’ (Qin 2010, 138). Rather than contrasting a consensual, ‘social’ international 
sphere with a conflict-driven, ‘systemic’ sphere, we should take seriously the fact that 
power relations and exclusion are integral to and inherent in social relations and build 
conceptual tools that capture these ongoing processes rather than obscure them (c.f. 
Keene 2014). For there to be social order, there must be social ordering, and norms are 
excellent ordering devices, as shown by the persistent criticism of those states and 
societies that fall short of expected standards of democracy, human rights, etc. Actors 
such as Russia should not be seen as being outside society but as integral parts of it; the 
deviants whose transgressive behaviour serves to clarify the norms but who also contest 
their validity. Analytical lenses are needed that highlight these social aspects of norms 
and their operation. 
 
II – ‘Thin’ Constructivism: Norms as substantialist variables and ‘good things’ 
The other main area of IR scholarship concerned with norms is constructivism, 
introduced to IR by scholars such as Friedrich Kratochwil (e.g. 1984; 1989), Nicholas 
Onuf (1989), John Ruggie (1982; 1998; Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986) and Alexander 
Wendt (1992; 1999) in the 1980s and 1990s. These works did much to question realist 
and rationalist approaches, highlighting how supposedly immutable structures such as 
‘anarchy’ or ‘national interests’ were socially constructed concepts. However, the 
interaction with the positivist mainstream soon led to an arguable watering-out of 
constructivism’s radical promise in favour of a ‘soft positivism’ where socially 
constructed concepts like norms and ideas became merely new ‘intervening variables’ or 
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‘billiard balls’, ready for inclusion in hypothesis-testing models (Wiener 2010, 205–6; 
Epstein 2012). This assertion that ‘ideas matter’, but only in the same way other variables 
do, became the key contribution of the first ‘generation’ of constructivist writing on 
norms, exemplified by Wendt’s (1999, 1) definition of his theory as a form of structural 
idealism in opposition to Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) structural realism (Widmaier and Park 
2012).15 A second generation of ‘thin’ constructivist scholarship on norms became 
concerned with the ways in which norms and ideas spread, how actors in international 
relations were ‘socialised’ into adopting certain beliefs or ways of behaviour (Widmaier 
and Park 2012, 127–28). Among the most influential works in this wave of scholarship 
were Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s (1998) article on norm dynamics and 
change, which coined the term ‘norm life cycle’, Margaret Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) work 
on ‘norm entrepreneurs’, Sikkink, Thomas Risse and colleagues’ (Risse and Sikkink 1999; 
Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; 2013) work on the spread of human rights norms, and 
Jeffrey Checkel’s (e.g. 1999) work on norms’ role in European integration. These works 
sought to develop testable hypotheses and break down the alleged dichotomy between 
interest- and ideas-based explanations of state behaviour, including by theorising actors’ 
strategic promotion of their own ideas and adoption of other norms through socialisation 
(Checkel 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). 
 This study joins critiques of this literature on two primary points. First, the 
substantialist view of norms as ‘things’ or ‘variables’ that can be measured and explain 
actor behaviour, and second, the normative tendency to view norms as benign, as ‘good 
things’ done by good people to those who do not know better (or, sometimes, resist). 
These two points link back to the critiques of the English School and the international 
society literature above, to provide a basis for this study’s relational and normatively 
more agnostic contribution. 
 
Norms as entities – the substantialist premise of ‘thin’ constructivist norms research 
Just as English School theorists have come under critique for treating international 
 
15 Wendt’s adoption of a ‘critical realist’ ontology arguably means his work does not belong to the broader 
social constructivist tradition in the social sciences at all. See Jackson (2011, 72–74) and Wendt’s latest 
work on quantum theory (2015). For his part, Wendt no longer describes himself as a constructivist. 
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society (or societies) as entities with essential properties, IR norms scholars have been 
criticised for treating norms as ‘things’ (Krook and True 2012) or even agents – ‘acting 
abstractions’ with not only substantial properties but agential qualities (Bucher 2014). 
Such approaches are problematic because they provide over-simplified and overly 
abstract analyses of what norms are and how they are enacted, contested and adapted 
through social relations. 
 The first issue is a problem of definition. Perhaps the most influential definition of 
a norm is ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’ 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891). Variations include ‘a legitimate behavioral claim’ 
(Florini 1996, 364–65) and ‘intersubjective [shared] understandings that constitute 
actors’ interests and identities, and create expectations as well as prescribe what 
appropriate behaviour ought to be’ (Björkdahl 2002, 21). The problem with such 
definitions, Mona Lena Krook and Jacqui True (2012, 104) argue, is that ‘although norms 
may take different forms, their boundaries are largely understood as fixed: norms are 
taught, advocated and internalized’. Their substantial existence as bounded entities, a 
clearly defined and relatively stable shared understanding or standard of behaviour, is 
not usually questioned. The upshot of such a view is that when tensions arise in the 
process of teaching, advocacy and internalisation, these are not seen as the result of 
‘internal contradictions or dissonance, but [of] competition with other, often opposing 
norms’ (Krook and True 2012, 104) – different stable, bounded norms duelling it out or 
colliding with each other like billiard balls. In fact, as Bernd Bucher (2014) has shown, 
the practice of not only treating norms as bounded entities but giving them agency is 
widespread in the literature. Through both the metaphors used to describe processes of 
norms spreading (including norm ‘diffusion’, norm ‘cascades’ and norm ‘life cycles’) and 
the frequent semantic positioning of norms in the subject position of sentences (norms 
‘emerge’, ‘diffuse’ and ‘cascade’) norms are turned into ‘acting abstractions’ with a life of 
their own, separate from the agents who articulate, propagate, contest, adapt, adopt or 
reject them (Bucher 2014, 742). Aside from the ontological issue with these practices – 
norms are neither things nor agents, and equating them commits an ‘ontological fallacy’ 
(Bucher 2014, 745) – they also encourage an overly simplified view of both how complex 
norms are and how much variety there are between different norms in terms of how 
stable, prescriptive or bounded they are. 
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 One way of addressing this issue is to keep a view of norms as relatively bounded 
but make the definition more complex to allow for variety. For example, Carla Winston 
(2018, 640–41)  argues that every norm consists of three inter-related components: a 
real-world problem, a value that is both constitutive of the problem and suggests an 
appropriate form of solution or behaviour to deal with it, and the resultant practice or 
behaviour, summed up in the model ‘If [problem], [value] suggests [behaviour]’. This 
allows for direct comparison between norms with relatively neat, concise 
problem/value/behaviour combinations and those broader fields with much looser ones. 
Winston (2018, 650–53) contrasts the relatively concise non-nuclear proliferation norm 
(problem: nuclear weapons exist; value: nuclear war is undesirable; behaviour: do not 
develop or transfer weapons, report and verify existing ones) with the broad normative 
field of transitional justice, in which a variety of problems, values and potential 
behaviours co-exist. In order to capture variety and complexity, Winston (2018, 647) 
proposes the concept of a ‘norm cluster’, ‘a bounded collection of interrelated specific 
problems, values, and behaviors that are understood to be similar enough that their 
adopters form a family group’, and which do not have to be copied exactly by actors in 
order for adoption to be recognised. This is, in part, a useful way of understanding the 
more complex norms that will be covered in subsequent chapters. While norms like non-
aggression and human rights are both relatively clear and concise and/or backed up by 
an established or developing legal regime, democracy and capitalism are much looser 
‘norm clusters’. For example, the core value of democracy is relatively clear (people 
should have a say in the way they are governed), but there are many ways to implement 
this in practice, and as will be discussed in Chapter 3, states with a variety of actually 
existing systems can be recognised as broadly democratic. 
 Another useful way to distinguish different forms of norms is the distinction 
between constitutive and regulative norms. This distinction, introduced to IR primarily 
by Kratochwil (1989) and Ruggie (1998, 871–74) draws on the well-established 
distinction in philosophy, for example in John Searle’s work, between constitutive and 
regulative rules. Constitutive rules or norms are those that constitute a game or society 
in the sense that without them, the game or society would be fundamentally different. For 
example, a constitutive rule of football is that players are not allowed to touch the ball 
with their hands, while a constitutive norm of contemporary international society is the 
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formal sovereign equality and mutually exclusive territoriality of its member states, 
which simultaneously constitutes the members of society and sets a baseline for their 
conduct towards each other. Regulative rules or norms are those that regulate behaviour 
given the constituted ‘rules of the game’. For example, the ban on the use of force against 
other states that embodies the norm on non-aggression is a regulative norm, proscribing 
a certain behaviour to regulate the constitutive norm of sovereign equality, akin to the 
behavioural aspect of Winston’s norm cluster above. Similarly, drawing on the discussion 
of international society and stratifications within it, norms like democracy and capitalism 
are constitutive of groups within international society. They are identity markers that 
implicitly constitute ‘civilised’ or ‘developed’ groups of states. 
 Neither of these two nuancing moves, however, addresses the ontological 
question of what norms are. The ‘norm cluster’ approach allows for more complexity, but 
still maintains boundedness. The constitutive/regulative distinction differentiates types 
of norms but does not by itself challenge the view of norms as stable entities. A more 
critical approach to norms, pioneered by Antje Wiener (e.g. 2004; 2007; 2008; 2009; 
2010; 2014), brings attention to the question of enactment and contestation by defining 
norms as contested ‘by default’ (2007, 6; 2009, 179) and/or ‘all the way down’ (2010). In 
this view, norms do not have a fixed, stable meaning or indeed existence independently 
of practice – they are ‘meaning-in-use’ (Wiener 2009), always enacted, always contested. 
Moreover, they have a ‘dual quality’ that means they both structure interaction and are 
structured through interaction, changing in the process (Wiener 2014, 19). This moves 
away from the view of norms as stable, structuring entities that may move in time and 
space but remain relatively stable and bounded towards a more dynamic view also of 
norm content and substance. However, Wiener has been criticised for in practice falling 
back on a more static view of meaning given her argument that norms require ‘cultural 
validation’ and that contestation principally occurs when norms are moved beyond their 
original cultural context, thus encountering actors with different cultural and normative 
‘baggage’ (Niemann and Schillinger 2017, 40). In this way, Holger Niemann and Henrik 
Schillinger (2017, 41) argue, culture, understood as ‘fixed cultural scripts’ with a ‘singular 
and stable meaning’, comes to define norm meaning for individual actors, making 
contestation ‘a divergence between stable meanings rather than a process 
(re)constituting meaning’. Moreover, as will be discussed further below, while the focus 
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on contestation implies a focus on power relations, the way it is conceptualised in 
Wiener’s work contains an assumption that there can be ‘too much’ contestation (Wolff 
and Zimmermann 2016). Contestation thus becomes an anomaly rather than a defining 
feature of norms.  
A more critical view of norms in line with the relational ontological approach of 
this study is contained in a set of recent works that draw on the poststructuralist tradition 
to conceptualise norms as discursive processes (e.g. Krook and True 2012; Engelkamp, 
Glaab, and Renner 2014; Engelkamp and Glaab 2015; Almagro 2018). This reformulation, 
Krook and True (2012, 109) argue, ‘theorizes that norms are subject to ongoing attempts 
to reconstitute their meanings, even as they exert effects on patterns of social behaviour’. 
Moreover, it draws our attention to the link between norms and identity, how agents and 
the norms they advocate are co-constituted (Almagro 2018, 674). Such constitution, co-
constitution and reconstitution is never complete. As will be elaborated further in the 
next chapter, seeing the social world as made up of ongoing processes highlights how the 
work of ‘stabilization – the ongoing production and reproduction of social arrangements 
[such as norms] – never ceases, never finishes, and in a certain sense never fully succeeds’ 
(Jackson 2006b, 39).  
Norms such as democracy, human rights, non-aggression and capitalism can thus 
be understood both as essentially contested, in the manner of essentially contested 
concepts (Gallie 1955; Niemann and Schillinger 2017, 45), and as discourses – systems of 
meaning-making that constitute certain actors and possibilities. This way of thinking 
about norms highlights another deficit in the mainstream norms literature: its view of 
norms as broadly benign and its resultant neglect of power relations. This is discussed in 
the next sub-section. 
 
Norms as good things – the progressive normative bias 
Norms are not just seen as ‘things’ in much of the mainstream literature, they are seen as 
good things. As Charlotte Epstein puts it (semi-sarcastically): ‘Norms, it would seem, are 
good things. They oil the workings of international cooperation and sustain peace in the 
anarchic international political system’ (2012, 135). Much like the traditional English 
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School view of international society as a benign, consensual entity, there is an ‘implicit 
[sometimes explicit] normative bias’ in much of the literature (Widmaier and Park 2012, 
127–28). This manifests itself in several ways, three of which are worth highlighting: the 
tendency to focus on ‘good’ norms, the negative and/or limited attention to contestation 
already mentioned, and the dominant place of a benign, teleological conception of 
‘socialisation’ in the story of how actors supposedly become norm-abiding. 
 First and most straightforwardly, on a purely empirical level (albeit with an 
implicit normative aspect) the literature tends to focus on norms that are generally seen 
as positive and progressive – for example various forms of human rights, the rule of law 
and anti-corruption, the responsibility to protect (R2P), etc. There is a remarkable lack of 
attention to what could be seen as ‘bad’ norms (Epstein 2012, 137–38; see also Checkel 
1998, 339; Zarakol 2014). Moreover, the language used to describe norms tends to imply 
the positive role that norms and their promoters play: ‘norm entrepreneurs’ and ‘norm 
cascading’, etc., versus ‘norm antipreneurs’ and ‘norm regress’ (see e.g. Bloomfield 2016; 
Bloomfield and Scott 2017; McKeown 2009). The result of these tendencies is, first, to 
encourage the empirical conclusion that most norms are indeed inherently good. Second, 
on a more analytical level, the implicit view of norms as good (or indeed bad) goes 
together with the analytical view above of norms as relatively stable entities with defined 
content both substantively and normatively. The norm’s substance is clear and can be 
evaluated normatively based on this clear substance. However, even the most 
superficially good norm can have adverse effects in practice. As Joe Hoover (2016) has 
argued in his work on human rights, they are ‘only as good as the ends they help us 
realise’. Any norm or normative framework should be judged not on its philosophical 
abstraction but on its implementation in practice and the consequences of this 
implementation. Whether they are conceived of as entities or processes, substantial or 
relational, norms in themselves are normatively neutral, neither inherently good nor bad. 
In seeking to define the limits of appropriate (and thereby also inappropriate) behaviour, 
every act of norm definition, promotion or otherwise involves an expression of a power 
relation or a silencing of alternative perspectives (Epstein 2012). While this power 
relation is often ignored because of the view of norms as good, arguing that this makes 
norms inherently bad would be similarly misplaced – power relations are ubiquitous in 
the social world, and are not ‘bad’ in themselves. 
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 A second manifestation of the tendency to view norms as good is the limited 
attention paid to contestation of and resistance against norms, and the tendency even in 
works that do give them attention to assess contestation as good only in limited amounts. 
For example, in addition to their critique of Wiener’s tendency towards substantialist 
thinking in assigning culture as a fixed ‘script’ of meaning, Niemann and Schillinger (2017, 
47) argue that her work ultimately relies on a ‘liberal understanding of political conflicts 
as both disruptive and solvable through consensus and dialogue’. In this view, 
contestation is ultimately marginalised conceptually by being treated as ‘an obstacle to 
developing global understandings’, which are seen as normatively desirable (Niemann 
and Schillinger 2017, 47). A similar assertion is made by Jonas Wolff and Lisbeth 
Zimmermann (2016), who include Wiener’s work alongside that of three other scholars 
who take norm contestation seriously in their respective fields – Amitav Acharya (norm 
localisation), Oliver Richmond (peacebuilding) and Milja Kurki (democracy promotion). 
Their argument is that in each of these scholars’ work, the critical commitment to putting 
contestation centre stage and seeing it favourably is still accompanied by fairly 
conventional normative connotations that treat contestation as ‘a means to enable 
dialogue’ and nothing more (Wolff and Zimmermann 2016, 513). Contestation through 
inclusive dialogue is acceptable and desirable; more ‘fundamental and radical’ conflicts 
over norms are ‘either not considered or seen as normatively undesirable’ (Wolff and 
Zimmermann 2016, 515). In this way, just like a distinction is drawn between good and 
bad norms, a line is drawn between good and bad contestation. 
 Finally, the dominant conceptualisation for how actors are brought into the norm-
abiding fold has been the model of socialisation, understood as a progressive force. This 
model brings together the two previous points, in that the norms that actors are 
socialised into are seen as good and the process therefore as benign and progressive, 
carried out through peaceful means such as persuasion and argumentation, and because 
contestation as a result becomes seen as undesirable. In Epstein’s (2012, 135) words, the 
literature’s conception of socialisation ‘tends to be apprehended as a bettering of the 
socializee, because of an implicit teleological assumption of change as progress … tends 
to frame out the perspective of the socializee … [and] infantilizes the socializee’. 
Internalisation of a norm is seen as ‘synonymous with socialisation, socialisation with 
compliance, and compliance with progress’ (Zarakol 2014, 316). Epstein (2012, 141–42) 
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argues that the infantilising tendency is based on an uncritical, misplaced adoption of the 
socialisation term from the social constructivist tradition in sociology, specifically from 
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s influential The Social Construction of Reality 
(1967), in which socialisation referred to the process of children being socialised into 
society, and which explicitly ruled out such processes occurring in similar ways among 
‘pre-socialised’ adults (see also Epstein 2011, 334–38). A similar point, though more 
oriented towards the aspect of social control inherent in the term, is highlighted by 
Patricia Owens (2015, 665–68). She notes that the origin of the socialisation term in the 
sociology of the early 20th century was an orientation towards making the population 
more ‘social’, i.e. aware of their roles in society so that they could contribute to the 
officially declared social good and drop any thoughts of revolution or rebellion that they 
may harbour. This element of social control, of how norms can strengthen society by 
keeping its less advantaged elements in check (another example of the power relations 
inherent in norms), is marginalised in the mainstream accounts of socialisation because 
of the inherent bias towards seeing norms as good and progressive things. The next 
section and chapter will discuss approaches that highlight these elements instead of 
marginalising them. 
 
The failed socialisation of post-communist Europe? 
The implicit biases of the ‘socialisation’ hypothesis can again be demonstrated through a 
pertinent case for Russian-Western relations: the expected socialisation of post-
communist Europe, including Russia, into European ‘norms and values’ after the end of 
the Cold War. The EU’s eastward expansion in 2004 and 2007, the processes leading up 
to it and the ongoing socialisation of the post-communist states into other international 
organisations and forums such as NATO and the Council of Europe went together with 
the popularity of the socialisation thesis. Here was a real-life ‘laboratory’ in which the 
spread of norms such as democracy and good governance could be empirically tested and, 
hopefully, proven to be successful. The EU became seen as the quintessential ‘norm 
promoter’ and its Acquis Communautaire, encapsulating all EU law on matters from 
agriculture to transport, seen as a blueprint for how to become a liberal democratic state, 
rather than what it was – a technocratic, historically contingent set of regulatory 
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standards that had developed piecemeal to suit very different circumstances to those 
now facing the post-communist states and whose wholesale adoption in fact limited 
democratic choice in the target states (see e.g. Grabbe 2006; 2014; Grzymala-Busse and 
Innes 2003; Mungiu-Pippidi 2007; 2014; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). While 
EU membership was never on the cards for Russia and conditionality thus weaker, it too 
was expected to become socialised, to ‘eat [its] spinach’ and be the better for it (Wood 
2017).16 
A couple of decades on from 1989-91, the socialisation process had not worked 
out as expected. ‘Western’ norms had been only partially adopted across the post-
communist states, with democratic ‘backsliding’ a worry not only in Russia and several 
post-Soviet states (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Central Asia) but in some of the new 
Central and East European EU member states too (Hungary, Poland). Given the 
substantialist approach of thin constructivism explored above, employing such a lens to 
the puzzle of how socialisation seemingly did not occur would lead one to explain this 
supposed ‘failure’ through a focus on how other norms somehow outcompeted the norms 
flowing from West to East, rather than through any internal contradictions or dissonance 
in those norms in the first place (c.f. Krook and True 2012, 104). Research questions 
raised by such an approach would tend to be focused on the receiving end of the 
socialisation process. What salient aspects of national identity and specific circumstances 
might have been missed by the norm promoters? Were some states just not ‘ready’ for 
democracy due to deep-seated authoritarian traditions or cultural attitudes, in line with 
Wiener’s focus on ‘cultural validation’? Did domestic ‘spoilers’ such as Vladimir Putin 
stand in the way of history? Who ‘lost’ Russia and the other backsliding states (c.f. Conradi 
2017)? 
The underlying assumptions behind such questions remain both that norms are 
things, essentially transportable through time and space as ideas or variables, and good, 
a force for progressive change in world politics. This leads to an underestimation of the 
true ‘thickness’ and situatedness of norms, how all social actions and interactions are in 
some sense normative in that they draw on and conform to varying degrees to some 
 
16 The spinach metaphor was invoked in the context of NATO enlargement in the mid-1990s by Victoria 
Nuland, then chief of staff to Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and later Assistant Secretary of State 
for European and Eurasian Affairs, (in)famous for her comment ‘fuck the EU’ while discussing options for 
Ukrainian government formation with the US ambassador to Ukraine in January 2014. 
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temporally and spatially contingent expected standard of behaviour. In turn this leads 
analysis away from the power-political aspect of norms, the way in which controlling the 
normative narrative or being on the side of the given normative order is a fundamental 
‘face of power’ (c.f. Lukes 2005), irrespective of whether the normative order is assessed 
as ‘good’ or ‘bad’.  
 In sum, English School writings on international society and the thin constructivist 
norms literature suffer from the twin drawbacks of seeing society and the norms that 
constitute it as, first, bounded, stable entities, and second, overly ‘good’ and/or 
consensual. Society and norms are good things – good in the sense of benign and things 
in the sense of bounded entities. These approaches do not give us much of a grasp on the 
power politics of either norms or society (I. B. Neumann and Sending 2007, 88–89). 
Against these essentialist and liberal tendencies, this study joins calls to focus less on 
norm ‘diffusion’ and more on norm ‘politics’ – the ‘propagation, contestation, adaption, 
adoption, or rejection of norms’ carried out by socially situated agents and heavily 
characterised by power relations (Bucher 2014, 745). In the next section, it is argued that 
a better approach to understanding international social relations needs a 
conceptualisation of society that considers both how norms exercise a dominating and 
disciplining effect and how deviance from a society’s norms is a central, co-constitutive 
part of society, not an aberration indicating its absence.  
 
III – Dominance, deviance and power: society as a struggle for norms 
To find analytical lenses that alert us to the power politics of norms and international 
society, much critical IR scholarship has turned to social and anthropological theories. 
Before the next chapter’s elaboration of the theory and theorist (stigma theory and Erving 
Goffman) that will serve as the main analytical frame for this study, this section considers 
some other prevalent approaches and the purchase they give us on the power-political 
processes that underpin international society and international normative orders. 
Particular attention is given to three approaches that in similar ways bring attention to 
the structural power of norms and their role in sustaining the dominance and/or 
hegemony of the most powerful actors in any given society: those drawing on the writings 
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of Antonio Gramsci, Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault.17 The analysis here cannot do 
full justice to the nuances and complexities of these scholars’ thought, the tensions 
between them, or the many ways in which they have influenced IR scholarship. The focus 
is instead more narrowly on how they help us address the shortcomings noted above in 
ways that chime with the approach taken in this study. 
 
Norms as constitutive of dominance or hegemony 
A common feature of Gramscian, Bourdieusian and Foucauldian thought is the focus on 
the ways in which the views and practices of a society’s most powerful actors come to be 
seen as the ‘natural’ or ‘normal’ way of doing things, thereby framing and structuring 
what is seen as acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. This is the common thread 
linking Gramsci’s (1971) concept of ‘hegemony’, whereby the ruling group of a society 
legitimises its rule through the promotion of a particular ‘common sense’ that ensures 
the consent of the ruled (for a distinction between this and other conceptions of 
hegemony, see W. I. Robinson 2006), to Bourdieu’s (1998, 9) notion of ‘symbolic 
violence’, whereby the ‘dominated’ come to see the world, including their own lifestyles, 
‘from the destructive and reductive view of the dominant aesthetic’. As with Gramsci’s 
focus on hegemony producing ‘consensual domination’ (W. I. Robinson 2006, 166) 
through the spread of common sense, so Bourdieu (1998, 103, emphasis added) sees 
symbolic violence as ‘the violence which extorts submission, which is not perceived as 
such, based on “collective expectations” or socially inculcated beliefs’. Similarly, Foucault 
(2007) focuses on how the shifting logics of government or ‘governmentality’ over time 
indirectly shape and re-shape appropriate standards of behaviour for both states and 
individuals through the ‘conduct of conduct’ – ‘a form of activity aiming to shape, guide 
or affect the conduct of some person or persons’ (Gordon 1991, 2). Whether through 
hegemony, symbolic violence or governmentality, then, these concepts focus on the ways 
in which appropriate standards of behaviour of a given society are shaped through 
 
17 These are of course not the only critical approaches that draw attention to the structuring power of 
norms. For reasons of space, I do not go into feminist theory and its focus on ‘normative violence’ (Butler 
2009; in IR, see e.g. Enloe 2014; Cohn 1987; Hansen 2000; Sjoberg 2013; Weber 2016) or post-colonial 
theory and its focus on the Eurocentrism of norms (Spivak 1988; Chakrabarty 2000; in IR, see e.g. Geeta 
and Nair 2002; Seth 2012; Muppidi 2012; Epstein et al. 2014). 
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historically situated processes, often through the promotion of a historically contingent 
set of standards based on the interests or worldviews of the powerful as ‘normal’ or 
‘natural’. These processes are thus infused with power, what Lukes (2005, 143–44) calls 
the ‘third dimension’ of power, ‘the capacity to secure compliance to domination through 
the shaping of beliefs and desires’.18 Norms are always norms for someone.19 
In IR, Gramscian, Bourdieusian and Foucauldian works have been influential in 
providing analyses more attuned to the power relations of norms and broader symbolic 
orders. Neo-Gramscians working primarily within the sub-field of International Political 
Economy have analysed the ways in which hegemony operates on an international scale, 
highlighting the shifting dynamics of material, ideational and institutional forces in the 
shaping of international order (e.g. Cox 1981; 1983; 1987; Bieler and Morton 2006; 
Morton 2003; 2007; Parmar 2012a; 2012b). Several of these analyses focus on the central 
role of states or groups of states in particular hegemonic projects – e.g. the post-WWII 
Pax Americana (W. I. Robinson 2006, 167). However, they also provide a particularly 
useful lens for showing how transnational processes influence hegemonic projects and 
how powerful civil society actors can aid the promotion of such projects. For example, 
Parmar (2012a; 2012b) shows how American philanthropic foundations, notably the ‘Big 
3’ of Ford, Brookings and Carnegie, formed a central part in the construction of American 
hegemony in the 20th century, even in periods where the US state itself adopted a more 
isolationist position. The foundations, Parmar (2012a, 2, 13–22) argues, built ‘the 
domestic and international infrastructure for liberal internationalism’ through their 
construction of global knowledge networks promoting the spread of market democracies 
and other policies congenial to US interests, including modernisation theory in the 1950-
1970s. They co-operated closely with the American state, enhancing both their and the 
state’s power in the process and belying their supposed ‘independence’ (Parmar 2012a, 
3–4). The foundations can thus be conceived as something akin to ‘norm entrepreneurs’, 
but rather than the apolitical register this term evokes, their entrepreneurial project was 
deeply enmeshed in existing power relations, promoting the ‘common sense’ of the 
hegemon and sustaining a hegemonic order. 
 
18 As Lukes (2005, 87–107) notes and then discusses at length, Foucault’s approach to power has 
sometimes been associated with a ‘fourth dimension’ of power. However, as he shows while partly 
dismissing that idea, Foucault’s work is also centrally concerned with the ‘third’ dimension. 
19 From Robert Cox’s (1981, 128) famous dictum, ‘Theory is always for someone and for some purpose’. 
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 Bourdieu’s impact in IR has mainly been felt through the ‘practice turn’, a body of 
literature that aims to study the ways in which international relations are expressed 
through international ‘practices’.20 In Adler-Nissen’s (2013, 1) words, ‘Bourdieu allows 
us to explore how people create international relations in their daily activities’. For the 
purposes of this study, the key points to take away from Bourdieu’s thought are the focus 
on how normative orders are expressions of symbolic violence or even symbolic 
domination (a state in which certain ways of ‘talking and acting have been actively 
evacuated’ (Epstein 2013, 168)) and thus infused with power relations, and how single 
‘norms’ are always part of a broader inter-connected structure. Epstein (2013, 165) 
explores the latter point through Bourdieu’s concept of nomos, ‘the underlying normative 
order structuring a field of interactions’. This focus, she argues, helps us to see how norms 
do not ‘operate in a vacuum … a single norm always belongs to an organized ensemble’ 
(Epstein 2013, 171). Norms are thus not bounded, free-floating ‘things’ but part of a 
thicker, stickier normative structure bound up with existing power relations.  
This focus on structure and domination has led many to criticise Bourdieu for 
being too deterministic and/or reproductionist, his work more suited to explaining 
durability than change (for defences against such criticism, see e.g. Bourdieu 1998, vii–
viii; Wacquant 2007; Steinmetz 2011).21 An example of this can be seen in Neumann and 
Pouliot’s (2011) use of Bourdieu’s concept of hysteresis – a lack of fit between an actor’s 
dispositions or habitus and the dominant practices of the field in which the actor seeks to 
operate – to explain the persistent awkward relations between Russia and Europe over 
the past millennium. The argument is that Russian dispositions about the conduct of 
diplomacy have had a persistently bad ‘fit’ with the dominant practices in the European 
field over time, with for example secrecy and centralised decision-making favoured over 
more open and flexible European ambassadorial practices. While the analysis is very 
good at showing how a conflictual relationship is reproduced through the interaction of 
habitus and field, it is hard to see how such relations would change except through some 
 
20 This ‘turn’ is too wide-ranging to do full justice to here. For the article often cited as its starting point, see 
Neumann (2002), as well as the Millennium special issue of which it forms part. For useful collections or 
overviews by central figures, see e.g. Adler and Pouliot (2011) and Bueger and Gadinger (2014), and for 
critical takes see e.g. Kustermans (2016) and Martin-Mazé (2017). 
21 This charge of determinism was one of the main reasons why a ‘pragmatist’ research programme was 
started by some of Bourdieu’s students and colleagues, notably Luc Boltanski (e.g. Boltanski and Thévenot 
1999; 2006; Boltanski and Chiapello 2005; Boltanski 2011). 
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exogenous shock that fundamentally transforms the relationship. In the same vein, some 
practice-oriented approaches have been criticised for underestimating the importance of 
struggle to Bourdieu’s theoretical apparatus, instead overplaying the role of habitual 
practices (Martin-Mazé 2017). In fact, in Bourdieu’s collaborator Loïc Wacquant’s words 
(2007, 264–65), ‘struggle, not “reproduction”, is the master metaphor at the core of 
[Bourdieu’s] thought’. Norms and normative orders are thus shaped through ongoing 
power struggles. 
Foucault-inspired work in IR has similarly drawn attention to the power relations 
inherent in norms and other concepts often taken for granted in the field (for a critical 
overview, see Selby 2007). Poststructuralist work drawing on Foucauldian discourse 
analysis has shown how e.g. national identities and ideas of national security are 
discursively constituted rather than given by material or natural factors (e.g. Campbell 
1992; Doty 1993; Hansen 2006; I. B. Neumann 2016).22 Separately, scholars have drawn 
on Foucault’s work on liberal governance practices and the evolution of disciplining 
practices in modern societies to show how liberal international norms and regimes are 
not merely benign and voluntary practices engaged in through cooperation, but power-
infused and contested disciplining devices that define certain actions and practices as 
normal and legitimate, and others as ‘abnormal’ and illegitimate (Keeley 1990; Foucault 
1991). Studies applying the concept of governmentality to the international level have 
further served to ‘denaturalise’ and critically interrogate the benign nature of liberal 
orders and practices of governance, whether in relation to regional governance projects 
such as the EU (e.g. Walters and Haahr 2004) or the broader international arena (e.g. 
Larner and Walters 2004a; 2004b; I. B. Neumann and Sending 2007; 2010; Joseph 2010; 
2012; for sympathetic critiques, see e.g. Hamilton 2014; 2018).  
This research is not always explicitly concerned with norms per se, at least not as 
traditionally understood in IR. Like the approaches discussed above, it instead focuses 
attention on how the ‘norms’ of a society form part of broader processes of contestation 
and control reflective of the current state of that society. As Joseph (2010, 223–24) notes, 
in ‘advanced’ or late-modern societies, ‘more subtle methods of power’ are ‘exercised 
through a network of institutions, practices, procedures and techniques which act to 
 
22 These studies’ influence on this study’s methodology will be further elaborated in Chapter 2. 
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regulate social conduct’. Neumann and Sending (2007, 679) argue that the spread of this 
particularly ‘governmental’ form of governance (as opposed to e.g. disciplinary forms) 
also internationally in recent decades means that the international realm can be usefully 
conceptualised as one of increasing ‘governmentality’: ‘a discourse where liberal norms 
of governing take on increasing importance’. These liberal norms serve to shape ‘the 
identity and behavioural patterns of states’ as well as individuals, setting up ‘standards 
of behaviour for individuals and models of institutions to be implemented and followed 
by all good members of the international community’ (I. B. Neumann and Sending 2007, 
699).23 For those that do not, exclusion and/or status loss may be the result. As Neumann 
argues elsewhere (2008, esp. 133-134), another way of conceptualising Russia’s lack of 
recognition as a great power by West European states is that its mode of governance has 
remained focused on direct state power and policing while Western states have moved 
towards governing ‘less’, i.e. less directly. However, rather than a sign of civilizational 
progress and the spread of reasoned, consensual governance as expressed through 
norms, in a Foucauldian lens such practices are still infused with power relations. They 
merely represent a shift in the ways power operates. 
 These approaches thus have in common that they lay bare the power relations and 
structuring violence behind the operation of any society or social order, and how a 
society’s norms serve to legitimise existing power relations by presenting the viewpoint 
of its most powerful actors as the ‘normal’ way of doing things. Society, in this view, is 
characterised more by a struggle over norms and normality, including the stigmatisation 
of ‘abnormal’ behaviour, than by the consensual undertaking based on shared norms 
envisaged by the English School and the rational persuasion of mainstream norms 
literature. As Berger and Luckmann (1967, 121) argue, all societies are ‘constructions in 
the face of chaos’: ‘…the institutional order … is continually threatened by the presence 
of realities that are meaningless in its terms. The legitimation of the institutional order 
[faces] the ongoing necessity of keeping chaos at bay’. The work of legitimising the order, 
for example through stigmatisation, is an exercise of power, one that is ongoing and never 
entirely complete. Similarly, contestation of the norms underpinning social order is both 
 
23 There is a parallel here, notwithstanding important differences, to the ‘World Society’ approach 
mentioned in footnote 8 above and its focus on the construction of actors through the circulation of ‘scripts’ 
that makes organisations, such as nation states, develop similar characteristics and institutions (see Drori 
and Krücken 2009, 23–24 for a discussion). 
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widespread and productive, though it does not necessarily produce ‘progress’ in the 
teleological sense implicit in the socialisation approach. 
 
The constitutive role of deviance 
The conceptualisation of society adopted in this study sees ‘deviance’ and abnormality as 
an integral part of any social order, international society included. As will be explored 
further below, the understanding of deviance adopted here is critical, constructionist and 
relational, inextricably bound up with the production of norms and normality highlighted 
above. For every standard of appropriate behaviour that becomes established, there must 
by necessity be a standard of inappropriate behaviour that goes along with it. These 
inappropriate behaviours are just as central to the constitution of society.  
The constitutive role of deviance in society has long been the focus of sociological 
investigations, although the term itself has had a chequered history and has fallen 
somewhat out of favour.24 For example, already in 1895 Émile Durkheim, one of modern 
sociology’s ‘founding fathers’, wrote of criminality and the criminal as ‘normal’ 
sociological phenomena: 
[Crime] is a factor in public health, an integrative element in any healthy 
society. … crime is normal because it is completely impossible for any 
society entirely free of it to exist. … Thus crime is necessary. (1982, 98–99, 
101) 
This argument gets at the fundamentally co-constitutive relationship between normal 
and abnormal, good and evil. It relates to this study’s second epigraph, in which Satan 
dismisses as futile and impossible the idea of absolute good, ‘bare light’, and thereby 
shows the necessity of evil for good to exist: ‘Nothing is good indefinitely and without 
limits’ (Durkheim 1982, 101). Just because a group of members of society do not fully 
 
24 The sociological study of ‘deviance’ took off in the 1950s and peaked in the mid-1970s, at which point its 
most successful approach – labelling theory – came under increasing criticism from conflict theorists, 
feminists and activists, primarily over the normative problems inherent in studying certain activities as 
‘deviant’, even if only owing to society’s labelling of them as such (Best 2004a; 2006). Since then its use 
declined, prompting debates about the concept’s ‘death’ (J. Miller, Wright, and Dannels 2001; Goode 2003; 
2004; Best 2004b). However, it persists as a focus of study, and has been the subject of at least two 
handbooks in the past decade (on ‘deviant behavior’ and ‘deviance’, respectively), suggesting reports of its 
death are premature (Bryant 2011; Brown and Sefiha 2017). 
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share or act contrary to the norms of the society, does not necessarily mean that the group 
or individuals within it stand outside society, that society itself ceases to exist (as in the 
English School distinction between system and society) or that the social norms thus 
flouted are necessarily any weaker. In fact, as Durkheim hinted, deviance may indeed 
improve the overall ‘health’ or cohesiveness of the society in question and enhance social 
order, by clarifying its norms through the example of deviant behaviour – even more so 
if the deviant is disciplined or stigmatised. It should be noted that, despite his views on 
crime being unconventional for his time, Durkheim’s approach to society was 
conservative and functionalist. Unlike successors such as Foucault (e.g. 1991), who 
identified the disciplining violence of norms, he celebrated the norm and saw crime as 
necessary only in so far as it served to strengthen societal equilibrium as a whole. Much 
like the norms scholars cited above, he acknowledged the role of contestation and 
deviance but thought there should be a limit to them. 
 The approach to deviance in this study is not functionalist, nor does it rely on a 
substantialist or essentialist view of deviance and normality as solid, bounded entities 
defined by some essential attributes. It draws instead on the social constructionist, 
labelling theory of deviance, developed by e.g. Edwin Lemert (1951), John Kitsuse (1962) 
and Howard Becker (1973). As Becker’s work is exemplary for this approach and is very 
close to the analytical framework of stigmatisation elaborated in the next chapter, he will 
serve as the primary interlocutor here (see Best 2004a; 2006 for more on the different 
approaches to deviance and how they have gone in and out of fashion). In his influential 
work Outsiders (1973, 4–6), Becker noted that deviance could be defined in several ways, 
for example statistically, as the deviation from the statistical norm, or 
pathologically/medically, as a ‘disease’ that prevents the healthy functioning of an 
organism. He  argued that the main sociological way of thinking about deviance came 
close to the medical notion, where the organism in question was society and analysis 
focused on identifying ‘functional’ and ‘dysfunctional’ processes in society that either 
promoted or hindered its smooth operation and survival (Becker 1973, 7). This reflected 
Durkheim’s view of society as well as the broader structural-functionalist tradition 
associated with Talcott Parsons. 
There is a parallel here to the relative neglect of deviance by mainstream IR 
scholarship (for a notable early exception, see A. J. Miller 1983). The editors of a recent 
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volume on deviance in international relations (Wagner, Werner, and Onderco 2014, 1–2) 
argue that this neglect was due precisely to the legacy of IR’s focus on structural 
theorising, particularly the influence of Waltz’s (1979) assertion that the international 
system tends to produce ‘like units’ and the tendency to see structural factors as strongly 
homogenising.25 This parallel is no coincidence. As Stacie Goddard and Daniel Nexon 
(2005, esp. 22-29) have shown, Waltz was heavily influenced by structural-functionalist 
theorists, including Parsons and Durkheim, and his theory of the international system 
shares several features with structural-functionalist approaches to social order and their 
focus on social equilibrium. The problem with such a functionalist approach, in Becker’s 
(1973, 7) view, was that it marginalised questions of power and politics: the function of 
a social group ‘is decided in political conflict, not given in [its] nature’, and consequently 
what counts as deviant is a political question. This foreshadows the IR constructivist and 
English School literatures’ neglect of the power politics of society and norms. 
The labelling view of deviance adopted here is instead fundamentally relational 
and contingent, infused with power relations. Becker (1973, 7–8) identified another, 
more ‘relativistic’ sociological approach to deviance that saw it as the ‘failure to obey 
group rules’, but argued that this still failed ‘to give sufficient weight to the ambiguities 
that arise in deciding which rules’ apply in any given situation, i.e. the politics involved. 
Moreover, such an approach risks missing the fundamental constitutive element of rule-
making, easily taking the ‘group rules’ in question for granted and the group as bounded. 
Becker instead advocated an understanding even more strongly rooted in relational 
thinking and that emphasised the power-relation aspect of labelling something or 
someone deviant:  
…social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction 
constitutes deviance, and by applying those rules to particular people and 
labelling them as outsiders. From this point of view, deviance is not a 
quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the 
application by others of rules and sanctions to an “offender.” The deviant is 
one to whom that label has successfully been applied; deviant behavior is 
behavior that people so label. (1973, 9, emphasis in original) 
 
25 They also identify the role of IR’s dominant ‘positivist metatheory’, which treats ‘deviant’ cases as outliers 
or ‘noise’ in the study of regular patterns (Wagner, Werner, and Onderco 2014, 3). Of course, another 
reason for IR’s neglect of deviance may simply be the above-noted decline in the study of deviance in 
sociology, which meant there were fewer studies to ‘borrow’ ideas from. 
46 
 
Deviance thus arises not from some inherently deviant quality but from social interaction, 
the reaction of others to some act. Rules and norms, and therefore deviance, are 
fundamentally contested and ‘part of the political process of society’, with society’s more 
economically and politically powerful actors imposing their conceptions of normality and 
deviance on the less powerful and differentiating, often arbitrarily, on grounds of class, 
race, gender, age and circumstance (Becker 1973, 14–18).  
The promise of this approach to deviance is its focus on the interactive dynamic 
and power relations between the ‘labellers’ and the ‘labelled’. Drawing on a similar 
approach, a small number of critical studies have highlighted the similar, selective 
construction of ‘rogue’ or ‘renegade’ states in international relations, and the social 
purpose of re-enforcing the dominance of those who manage to successfully define such 
‘rogue-ness’ (e.g. Chomsky 2000; Nincic 2005; Homolar 2011). Deviance is relational and 
managing to establish one’s own view of deviance as dominant in a society is both a 
source and an exercise of power. 
 
Conclusion 
While international society is built on norms, it is socially constituted and maintained as 
much through productive norm contestation, the labelling of deviance and the power 
politics inherent in norms as through a deliberative process of dialogue, consent and 
‘norm cascading’. Society is not a bounded entity defined by ‘shared’ norms, and norms 
are neither bounded ‘things’ nor (necessarily) ‘good’ things. Norms and societies are 
constituted, developed and clarified through interactive, relational processes, including 
processes of shaming and ostracising. Rather than rejecting the terms altogether, we need 
analytical and conceptual tools that allow us to capture these processes. The final section 
of this chapter highlighted some such approaches, inspired by the work of Gramsci, 
Bourdieu and Foucault, and the purchase they give us on the power politics of norms – 
notably the ways in which norms can serve to aid processes of domination by making 
hierarchical relations seem normal and thereby secure compliance or consent in the 
dominated. However, as noted in particular about Bourdieusian analysis, while these 
approaches give us a good handle on structural power relations, they are less well suited 
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to illuminating the interactive dimension of these processes. To develop a framework that 
is more attuned to this interactive dimension, the next chapter turns to the theoretical 
approach that will serve as the main analytical toolkit in the rest of this study: stigma 
theory. 
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Chapter 2 
Stigmatisation, relationalism and discourse 
 
This chapter elaborates the study’s conceptual toolkit, following from the previous 
chapter’s discussion of some of the deficiencies in IR literature on norms and 
international society and of some alternative approaches more attuned to the power 
politics of norms. It builds on these approaches and proposes a lens of stigmatisation as 
a fruitful way of conceptualising the ongoing formation and contestation of international 
society and the struggle over norms and normality in international relations. After a brief 
introduction outlining the study’s use of stigma and stigmatisation, section II addresses 
the question of substantialism by showing how stigmatisation can be studied both from 
substantialist and relational perspectives. It lays out the study’s relational ontological 
wager and conceptualisation of stigmatisation as a relational process. Section II discusses 
in more depth how stigma theory provides us with a lens that addresses the inherent 
power politics or ‘darker’ side of norms. Finally, section III turns to questions of 
epistemology, presenting the study’s methodological approach, methods for studying 
stigmatisation as a process, as well as case selection. 
The central theoretical figure in this chapter is Erving Goffman, author of the most 
influential sociological work on stigma: Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled 
Identity (1963). A Canadian-American sociologist, Goffman’s work stands firmly within 
the American pragmatist tradition and primarily concerns itself with social 
interactionism and the social construction of identities and selves (see e.g. Goffman 1959; 
1967).26 As Rebecca Adler-Nissen (2014b, 145; 2016) explains, Goffman’s work on 
dramaturgy and social interactionism, as well as the broader symbolic interactionist 
tradition of which he formed part, was a source of inspiration for the initial wave of 
constructivist scholarship in IR, particularly Wendt. However, she argues, Wendt’s 
import of symbolic interactionist principles was ‘half-hearted’, and, as seen briefly in 
 
26 Goffman was a contemporary and colleague of Howard Becker in the second Chicago School of Sociology, 
and Becker’s Outsiders was originally published in the same year as Stigma. The two works have many 
overlapping insights, notably the relational understanding of stigma and deviance and the focus on the 
agency of the stigmatised/outsiders. The main focus here is on stigma owing to the theory’s broader 
application and influence in IR. 
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Chapter 1, his work ended up privileging structural analyses and anthropomorphising 
the state as a unitary actor (Adler-Nissen 2016, 31). Moreover, echoing the above critique 
of IR scholarship’s tendency to focus on the good side of norms, Goffman’s work on stigma 
remained underused until it was recently picked up and applied to a variety of cases, from 
European integration to international financial policy options and nuclear weapons (e.g. 
Adler-Nissen 2014a; 2014b; Chwieroth 2015; Mégret 2014; Sauer and Reveraert 2018; 
Shamai 2015; Svendsen 2016; Zarakol 2010; 2014).27 The stigma concept has been 
hugely influential in other disciplines, particularly social psychology, and has been used 
to explain and elucidate a huge variety of human experiences (see Phelan, Link, and 
Dovidio 2008 for an overview of the literature). But, in Adler-Nissen’s (2014b, 144) and 
Zarakol’s (2014, 317) words, ‘the proposition that stigmatization is central to 
understanding how norms work’ has not been ‘seriously explored’ by IR scholars, despite 
the fact that it ‘characterises normative diffusion to a much greater degree than 
persuasion ever did’. 
Arriving in English from Greek via Latin, stigma originally meant ‘a mark made by 
a pointed instrument’, referring to tattoos or identifying marks on animals, and in the 
Christian tradition referred to marks similar to those left on Jesus Christ’s body after his 
crucifixion (stigmata), appearing miraculously on saints and other humans as a symbol 
of divine grace (Page 1984, 2; Adler-Nissen 2014b, 145). Goffman (1963, 3) defined it as 
‘an attribute that is deeply discrediting’, reducing the bearer ‘from a whole and usual 
person to a tainted, discounted one’. Importantly, however, stigmas are socially 
constructed and therefore relational and contingent: ‘...a special kind of relationship 
between attribute and stereotype’ (Goffman 1963, 14). What counts as a stigma in one 
place and time may not in another, for instance as the relationship between attribute and 
stereotype is altered over time. Prominent examples of attributes or behaviours that have 
become less stigmatised or discredited in recent decades in the UK, albeit not uniformly, 
include homosexuality, mental health problems or being non-white. Similarly, although 
again not uniformly, new stigmas have slowly arisen around homophobia, racism and 
other types of discrimination. In international relations, perhaps the most obvious change 
 
27 Mégret draws on Durkheim rather than Goffman for his work on stigmatisation practices in international 
law but is part of the broader discussion on stigmatisation’s role in international relations. 
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over the past couple of centuries has been the increasing stigma attached to territorial 
conquest, as well as the increasing stigmatisation of human rights violations. 
Goffman identified three types of stigma, the last two of which appear particularly 
amenable to the international scale: 1) abominations of the body, i.e. visible deformities 
or disabilities; 2) blemishes of character perceived as weak will, domineering or 
unnatural passions, treacherous and rigid beliefs, and dishonesty, for example ‘radical 
political behaviour’; and 3) tribal stigmas of race, nation and religion (1963, 13–14). As 
will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter, I argue that analytically, the most 
relevant of these three categories for understanding stigmatisation in contemporary 
international society is 2), given its focus on behaviour rather than attributes. Keene 
(2013) argues that European international society has increasingly come to be defined 
by ‘individualist’ rather than ‘collectivist’ attributes, i.e. behaviours that any individual 
state can in theory follow. The same can be argued, albeit more ‘thinly’, at a global level. 
This is not to say that ‘tribal’ stigmas have become irrelevant – politically, they remain 
the most powerful source of justification for the use of violence against other human 
beings. Moreover, stigmas are interlinked, and collectivist attributes like gender, class or 
race clearly influence stigmatisation over supposedly neutral behaviours. As Zarakol 
(2010, 94) argues, election irregularities in the periphery are more likely to be criticised 
than in the core. Actors can also come to embody and symbolise stigmas, and in practice, 
once an actor has embodied a stigma at one point in history it is unlikely ever to fully 
eradicate it, becoming instead someone who has ‘corrected a particular blemish’ 
(Goffman 1963, 19–20): a former alcoholic, an ex-dictatorship, a post-Soviet country. 
 The contingent nature of stigmas brings the attention to the process of 
stigmatisation, understood in this study as the social construction of stigmas. A 
conceptualisation is offered by sociologists Bruce Link and Jo Phelan (2001), who argue 
that a stigma comes into existence when four interrelated components or mechanisms 
co-occur: labelling, stereotyping, separation and status loss/discrimination. The 
components are summarised in Table 2.1 below, but a brief elaboration is in order to 
show how these may operate on an international scale. The first component, labelling, 
refers to how certain differences become labelled as socially relevant, for example one’s 
‘skin color, IQ, sexual preferences, or gender’ (Link and Phelan 2001, 367), or in 
international politics, the nature of a state’s government (democratic/authoritarian), 
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economic organisation (capitalist/socialist), etc. Such labels simplify and order complex 
reality, and as with all labels, which differences are deemed salient varies over time and 
from place to place (Link and Phelan 2001, 367–68). Stereotyping refers to how labelled 
differences become linked to particular characteristics, for example how mental patients 
or black people become perceived as ‘dangerous’ (Link and Phelan 2001, 368–70), or 
democracies as ‘peaceful’ and authoritarian states as ‘aggressive’, as per variants of the 
Democratic Peace Theory. The third component, separation, concerns how labels and 
stereotypes combine to rationalise distinctions between ‘us’, the normals (or ‘audience 
of normals’ in Adler-Nissen’s (2014b, 152) term, denoting the states or individuals that 
try to impose a stigma), and ‘them’, the stigmatised, often justifying physical segregation 
(Link and Phelan 2001, 370). In international relations, such processes can be seen in 
how inclusion or exclusion in inter-governmental organisations are justified on grounds 
of e.g. required levels of democracy, human rights protections, etc. Finally, status loss and 
discrimination refers to how the stigmatised are directly or indirectly devalued, rejected 
and excluded on the basis of their labelled and stereotyped separation, on an individual 
scale affecting a person’s ‘life chances’ (Link and Phelan 2001, 370–75; see also Goffman 
1963, 15), on an international scale reducing for example a state’s access to credit, trade, 
aid or generally excluding it from international decision-making processes.  
Table 2.1 – Components of stigmatisation 
Labelling Stereotyping Separation Status loss 
Identifying and 
labelling certain 
human differences 
as socially relevant. 
Linking those 
labelled as different 
to undesirable 
characteristics. 
Creating categories 
of ‘us’ (the normals) 
and ‘them’ (the 
labelled). 
Labelled persons 
experience status 
loss and 
discrimination. 
 
These four components are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. As will be 
discussed in more detail below, they should not be taken as embodying a linear, 
progressive model where each step is clearly identifiable and occurring after one another. 
Rather, the conceptualisation offers a heuristic, an analytical frame through which to 
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locate, assess and compare instances of stigmatisation. What form does the link between 
labelling, stereotyping and separation take over time or from place to place? What sort of 
status loss or discrimination is imposed on those stigmatised in any given situation? How 
settled or involved is the ‘audience of normals’ in any given instance? What does all of 
this in turn tell us about the strength or nature of the stigmatising process and the 
normative fabric of society? The next section elaborates the relational premises of this 
conceptualisation. 
 
I – Stigmatisation as a relational process 
Stigmatisation and stigma can be conceptualised in many ways for social research – as a 
primarily sociological or psychological phenomena, as a relational or substantialist 
concept, as an interactive process or an attribute or variable. This section elaborates this 
study’s relational ontological wager and how it consequently treats stigmatisation as a 
relational process constitutive of societies and norms. It first outlines relationalism as an 
approach to social analysis, building on the brief mentions in the Introduction and 
Chapter 1, and then extends this discussion to the concept of stigmatisation specifically, 
distinguishing the relational approach from a more substantialist conceptualisation. 
 
Relationalism – analysing a world in flux 
Relationalism posits that social relations are logically prior to the social phenomena that 
become constructed through them, be they durable social forms such as nation states, 
these social forms’ presumed attributes such as national identities, or social categories 
such as class, crime or capitalism. In Mustafa Emirbayer’s (1997, 287) words, social 
research should therefore take ‘relations’ as its primary unit of analysis: ‘Relational 
theorists reject the notion that one can posit discrete, pre-given units such as the 
individual or society as the ultimate starting points of sociological analysis’. Emirbayer 
dubbed such an approach substantialist. In this approach, such pre-given units as 
individuals or states either ‘self-act’ or ‘inter-act’ (with other units) based on their pre-
given attributes, identities or interests, and remain substantially unchanged through this 
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self-action or inter-action, although their attributes may be enhanced or diminished (see 
also Abbott 2001a, 37–63). In Emirbayer’s New School colleague Charles Tilly’s (1995, 
1594) words: ‘Analysts of large-scale political processes frequently invoke invariant 
models that feature self-contained and self-motivating social units. Few actual political 
processes conform to such models’. 
 As noted in Chapter 1, much of the literature on international society and 
international norms, and indeed the IR literature more broadly, is characterised by 
substantialism. It treats society or norms as relatively stable things or entities with 
intrinsic qualities or attributes. Collective actors such as societies or states are seen as 
acting on the basis of these intrinsic qualities – the variables (or norms), rather than the 
actors themselves, end up ‘doing the acting’ (Bucher 2014, 751–52; c.f. Emirbayer 1997). 
Norms become essential attributes that are either permanently linked to certain actors 
as part of their intrinsic identities or can be adopted by various actors but do not 
substantially change in the process. In analyses of international society (or societies) that 
emphasise the requirement of a common culture, it encourages the either/or-style 
thinking whereby substances or essences cannot mix and societies thereby are separated 
from each other either vertically (e.g. ‘European’ international society vs ‘Asian’ 
international society) or horizontally (‘global’ international society from ‘regional’ 
international societies) (Qin 2010). Substantialist ascription of pre-existing, permanent 
interests to states and indeed permanent logics to the international system also 
characterises other IR theories like realism (Go and Lawson 2017, 22). When applied to 
the analysis of a core IR phenomenon such as diplomacy, substantialist approaches 
become theories either of ‘states bumping into each other’ (self-action) or of ‘reciprocal 
signaling’ (inter-action) (Adler-Nissen 2015, 291–95). Common to all these approaches, 
then, is the view that one can posit certain substantial entities, be they individuals, states 
or societies, who either have certain essential, unchanging attributes or, slightly more 
flexibly, can adopt such attributes, which in turn explain the actors’ actions. 
What is the alternative? In a similar vein to processual sociologists such as Andrew 
Abbott (2001a; 2007; see also McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001), Emirbayer instead 
posited a relational, ‘trans-actional’ approach in which:  
54 
 
the very terms or units involved in a transaction derive their meaning, 
significance, and identity from (changing) functional roles they play within 
that transaction. The latter, seen as a dynamic, unfolding process, becomes 
the primary unit of analysis rather than the constituent elements 
themselves. (1997, 287) 
In this mode of thinking, the focus is not on entities and their attributes, but on what goes 
on between entities to continually shape and reshape them. As Jackson and Nexon (1999) 
put it in a bid to correct IR’s state-centric substantialism: ‘relations’ come before ‘states’.28 
This does not mean that states or national societies should never be taken as the primary 
object of study. As Emirbayer (1997, 294–95) himself notes, the approach of beginning 
enquiry with nation states is not ‘entirely implausible’, but one should remember that, 
however stable they may seem, such social formations are ultimately made up of (quoting 
Michael Mann) ‘multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power’.29 
States may often appear as ‘static entities with predetermined identities and interests’, 
but they are ‘entities-in-motion’, continually being shaped and reshaped through 
interactions in space and time, and social-scientific analyses should be mindful of this and 
avoid reification (Go and Lawson 2017, 23). Processes, interactions and the evolution of 
various social formations through their relations to other social formations are thus the 
objects of relationalism-inspired research. 
 In a relational ontology, international society (indeed, any society) should thus be 
seen as a process – ‘a process of complex, entangled, and ongoing relations’ (Qin 2010, 
141). It has neither clear boundaries nor a substantial essence. Neither have the norms 
that constitute it, which are in themselves processual and discursive in nature, not fixed 
(c.f. Krook and True 2012). The fundamental ontological assumption of this view is that 
the world is continually in flux, and that the entities and social formations that appear 
stable and given are, ultimately, fragile and temporary, albeit to varying degrees. Unlike 
in substantialist approaches where the assumption of stable essences and interests mean 
that change is the thing to be explained, relational analysis ‘begins with the analytical 
presumption of continual flux and seeks to explain how social life is relatively stabilized’ 
through processes of ordering and disordering (Jackson 2006b, 15). This process of 
 
28 See Holm and Sending (2018) for an account putting ‘states before relations’, foregrounding the 
importance of the state as a legal entity. 
29 See also Emirbayer and Mische (1998, 974) for a discussion of the difficulty of accommodating corporate 
actors such as states in a relational framework of agency. 
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stabilisation, the ‘ongoing production and reproduction of social arrangements’, Patrick 
Jackson (2006b, 39) notes drawing on Abbott (2001a), ‘never ceases, never finishes, and 
in a certain sense never fully succeeds’. Processes and mechanisms such as stigmatisation 
contribute to the production and reproduction of relational identities, norms and actors, 
which are all inextricably bound up in one another. Pre-figured actors with set identities 
do not arrive on the scene and pick which norms to adopt or promote but in part derive 
their very identities through the interactional processes that shape and reshape norms 
and societies. 
 Relationalism has many sources. Qin (2010; 2016; 2018) locates it in Confucian 
thought and the ‘Chinese way of thinking’. This borders on essentialism in its own right, 
particularly when contrasted with a ‘Western way of thinking’ that he argues tends to 
focus on independent entities assumed to be discrete. As seen above, this underestimates 
the extent to which relational principles are scattered throughout much ‘Western’ social 
theory.30 Moreover, imposing a strict, binary division between substantialist and 
relational thinking would itself be a fallacy of substantialism. Relationalism itself is more 
of a ‘family of social theories’ than a coherent school of thought, with divisions 
(‘fractalization’ in Abbott’s (2001b) words) between different approaches that 
nevertheless share a common ‘relational sensibility’ (Jackson and Nexon 2019). Hence it 
is more apt to consider the two as opposite ends of a spectrum where more or less 
relational/substantialist principles appear in different bodies of thought. 
 Goffman’s work and symbolic interactionism more broadly were prominent 
examples of relational thinking in Western academia in the mid-20th century. Emirbayer 
(1997, 295–96) notes Goffman’s call for a ‘sociology of occasions’ and calls the impact of 
his work on face-to-face encounters an ‘explosion’ of the self-actionist and inter-actionist 
approaches of his day. Joel Best, in an introduction to a 2005 edition of 1967’s Interaction 
Ritual (Goffman 2005, vii–x), describes how Goffman’s early work (1959’s The 
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 1961’s Asylums and 1963’s Stigma) had caused 
enthusiasm owing to ‘growing disenchantment’ with both the structural theories of 
Talcott Parsons and the rise of quantitative analysis, and how his work differed from 
 
30 For further discussion of relationalism’s position in Chinese and/or Western thought, see the recent 
special issue in Cambridge Review of International Affairs, notably Qin and Nordin (2019), Ling and Nordin 
(2019), Nordin and Smith (2019), Zalewski (2019), and Jackson and Nexon (2019). 
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existing takes on the ‘self’ in that he saw the self as ‘embedded in social situations’, i.e. 
relationally constituted. Goffman himself, in the introduction to Interaction Ritual (2005, 
2–3), put it this way: ‘I assume that the proper study of interaction is not the individual 
and his psychology, but rather the syntactical relations among the acts of different 
persons mutually present to one another. … Not, then, men and their moments. Rather 
moments and their men [sic]’. Goffman’s goal, Best argues, was to ‘spot elementary 
processes that underpinned all social life’ (Goffman 2005, viii). The production and 
contestation of spoiled and unspoiled identities through stigmatisation was one such 
process. 
 Before moving on to consider how stigmatisation can be conceptualised in 
different ways, a note on analytical terminology is in order. As seen above, Emirbayer 
distinguishes between a (relational) ‘trans-actional’ approach and a (substantialist) 
‘inter-actional’ approach. This hyphenated distinction is drawn from the work of John 
Dewey and Arthur Bentley (1949). As Emirbayer (1997, 285) notes, it is a philosophical 
distinction that does not match how the terms ‘interaction’ and ‘transaction’ are used in 
everyday life. Moreover, as seen from e.g. Goffman’s use of the term interaction and the 
broader family of symbolic interactionism, it does not match the vocabulary of other 
broadly relational approaches. The distinction is thus both intuitively and analytically 
difficult to sustain. François Dépelteau (2015, esp. 55-56) argues that ‘transactions are 
not simply interactions’ and that the notion of transaction brings attention to the 
interdependence of actions, but does not convincingly explain why interactions cannot 
be interdependent as well, and anyway concedes that the term interaction ‘can be used 
in relational research’. Both in what follows and in the brief discussions in previous 
chapters, I therefore follow e.g. Go and Lawson (2017) in using interaction as my primary 
term but also on occasion transaction as an interchangeable replacement. For the 
purposes of the analysis, the important thing is not any distinction between transaction 
and interaction, but the relational ontological assumption that stigmatisation is an 
interactive process occurring between a multitude of actors, understood as entities-in-
motion that in part derive their identities and interests from the process. 
 
Stigmatisation: process or attribute? 
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The difference between a relational and substantialist approach to analysing 
stigmatisation can be summarised as a difference between focusing on stigmatisation as 
a process or stigma as an attribute. In the former, the focus is on stigmatisation as an 
ongoing process occurring between actors; in the latter, on stigma as an attribute of one 
or more actors. The two different approaches can also be conceptualised as primarily 
sociological or primarily psychological. Again, in the former, the focus is on the 
sociological effects of the stigmatisation process on the broader social relations in which 
its participating actors are embedded, while in the latter the focus would be more on the 
psychological effects on stigmatised actors (and to a lesser extent those interacting with 
them). This subsection explores these distinctions and their implications for the IR 
literature on stigma. 
 Despite Goffman’s relational account of stigma, much of the subsequent literature 
has tended to adopt a more substantialist approach. To some extent, the tension is 
already there in Stigma – the shorthand definition of a stigma as an ‘attribute that is 
deeply discrediting’ has often been more influential than the subsequent, more relational 
elaboration that ‘a language of relationships, not attributes, is really needed’ and that a 
stigma ‘is really a special kind of relationship between attribute and stereotype’ (Goffman 
1963, 13, 14). As Link and Phelan note, ‘subsequent practice has often transformed 
stigmas into attributes of persons’, seeing the stigma as ‘something in the person rather 
than a designation or tag that others affix’ (2001, 366). When dealing with well-
established stigmas this is perhaps understandable to some degree – Goffman noted that 
he was not going to keep stressing the relationship point because ‘there are important 
attributes that almost everywhere in our society are discrediting’ (1963, 14). However, 
noting that particular stigmas are so well entrenched as to be taken for granted in a 
particular social context is one thing (see the above discussion of how social forms often 
appear stable and fixed), adopting a substantialist approach where the stigma is taken as 
an intrinsic attribute of an individual or even state quite another. 
 The IR literature on stigma to date has approached the concept in a variety of 
ways. Several scholars have focused on the process of stigmatisation, often drawing on 
Link and Phelan’s four-component conceptualisation (e.g. Adler-Nissen 2014b; 
Chwieroth 2015; Shamai 2015). Each of these analyses focus on the stigmatisation of 
particular actors and/or behaviours – Adler-Nissen on West Germany, Cuba and Austria, 
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Chwieroth on capital controls (and their enactment by, amongst others, Brazil and South 
Korea post-2008), Shamai on ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ as a category of weapons 
whose development and use states should shun (see also Tannenwald 2005; Sauer and 
Reveraert 2018) – as well as the impact of the stigmatisation process and stigma 
management on the normative fabric of the broader social context. Through the focus on 
either the construction, maintenance and/or transformation of stigma(s), then, these 
analyses lie towards the relational and processual end of the spectrum. Somewhere in the 
middle can be placed Zarakol’s work (2010; see also 2014), which focuses on the impact 
of stigmatisation on three states that were in a similar structural place in world order and 
had just suffered military defeats: post-WWI Turkey, post-WWII Japan and post-Cold War 
Russia. Because it illustrates the tensions between a relational and substantialist 
approach to stigma, Zarakol’s argument is worth exploring further.  
 The central thesis of After Defeat is that Turkey’s, Japan’s and Russia’s 
stigmatisation as outsiders and laggards by the ‘civilised’ and ‘developed’ European 
society of states, coupled with these states’ defeats in wars (hot or cold) and the societies’ 
internalisation of Western normative frameworks, led to their leaders feeling 
ontologically insecure and developing a ‘sustained preoccupation with international 
stature’ (2010, 30). This draws directly on the more psychological sides of Goffman’s 
work, notably his argument that a stigma creates ‘permanent insecurity’ in the 
stigmatised due to their ‘awareness of inferiority’ (1963, 24). Zarakol’s analysis treats 
this psychological stigma largely as a structurally-induced factor, both a result of a state’s 
position within the structure of international society and in turn explanatory of that 
state’s strategies. For example, she argues that the development of similar discourses in 
Russia, Turkey and Japan at different points of the 19th century were ‘a direct 
consequence of the special social space these countries share within the international 
system and the relational ontological insecurity they suffer as a result’ (2010, 223). 
Following their respective defeats, elites in the three states deliberately picked similar 
strategies for managing stigma ‘because of status concerns, given the international 
normative standards of the time’ (2010, 24). There are two things pushing this analysis 
towards the substantialist end of the stigma spectrum: the analytical focus on explaining 
a particular group of states’ similar behaviour, and the psychological focus on 
internalisation. 
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 First, Zarakol’s analytical focus is primarily on the explanatory potential of stigma 
for the similar processes occurring in the three otherwise separate and different states 
and societies. By itself this is not substantialist, despite the clear distinction she makes 
between the ‘systemic angle’ and ‘endogenous processes’ in each society, which suggests 
both clear vertical and horizontal separations and a somewhat bounded view of societies 
(2010, 18). The stigmas Zarakol describes do develop out of processes that are best 
described as relational – the partial integration into a symbolic and institutional order in 
an inferior position and a military defeat. However, their subsequent analytical and 
explanatory power come close to the role played by substantialist attributes: Turkey, 
Japan and Russia have stigmas and act accordingly. This resembles what Emirbayer 
(1997, 286) called the ‘variable-centred approach’, in which the variables themselves 
(e.g. stigma, backwardness) do the ‘acting’. In Abbott’s (2001a, 39) words, ‘attributes 
interact, in causal or actual time, to create outcomes, themselves measurable as attributes 
of the fixed entities’. Moreover, the focus on permanent search for status caused by 
structurally-induced ontological insecurity bears very close resemblance to Social 
Identity Theory (SIT), another social-psychological approach premised on individuals’ 
perpetual desire for social esteem that has been imported to IR and used to explain both 
Russian, Chinese and other foreign policies through the prism of status-seeking (e.g. 
Larson and Shevchenko 2010; 2014). In both accounts, activity is explained through 
actors’ interaction with existing social structures, and motivation is to a large extent 
imputed based on the actor’s objective position within those structures or perceived 
deficiency in an area such as social status. This ends up underplaying the continued 
relational interactions that constitute such structures (i.e. the continued stigmatisation 
by powerful actors) and the fact that actors’ search for status often has less to do with 
perceived normative deficiencies as much as their search for recognition and respect in 
interaction with others, regardless of whether this is rooted in normative concerns (see 
Wolf 2019 for a critique of SIT’s neglect of this latter point). Thus, while Zarakol’s thick 
historical approach is far more sensitive to context than SIT-inspired approaches, there 
are elements of a similarly variable-centric approach at work. 
Second and related to the above is the emphasis put on internalisation, which 
leads towards a more psychological conception of stigma. Zarakol (2014, 314) defines 
stigmatisation as ‘the internalisation of a particular normative standard that defines one’s 
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own attributes as undesirable’. This definition locates the stigma imposition process 
almost exclusively in the stigmatised person themselves, even if the internalisation 
occurs through exposure to a normative standard (in the article’s case through King Rama 
IV of Siam’s Western education). The need for some form of inter-subjective normative 
framework to exist or be in the process of being constructed for stigmatisation to be 
possible is clear. As Zarakol illustrates in After Defeat with an imagined example of her 
grandmother encountering women of the Himba people of northern Namibia, who go 
about their daily business topless, without some common understandings of 
appropriateness her conservative grandmother would be unable to shame the Himba 
women for such behaviour: 
…even if she got over the language barrier somehow, my grandmother’s 
comments would fall on deaf ears; she could no more shame the Himba 
women into covering up than they could convince her to shed her blouse. 
My grandmother’s views are irrelevant to the Himba women, as much as 
their views are irrelevant to her – they are not members of the same society 
and neither party has to make any effort to see the world as the other sees 
it. (2010, 60) 
Zarakol argues that before the onset of modernity in the ‘long nineteenth century’ of 
1789-1917 and a convergence on normative standards largely based on Western 
practices, the relationship between Western and non-Western states and societies (and, 
presumably, between several non-Western ones) was similar to this dynamic. Since that 
period, the ‘modernist ontology’ she identifies with a certain view of how to organise 
states had become increasingly dominant, providing the necessary normative framework 
for stigma to operate.31 Domination or hegemony is thus the necessary conceptual 
partner to stigmatisation – without dominant or hegemonic norms in any given social 
setting there would not be the common context needed for stigmatisation to occur. 
However, putting the bar as high as internalisation, which implies an acceptance 
rather than a mere awareness of such norms, puts the burden of evidence too high, for 
two reasons. First, it raises the philosophical questions of how one can know the extent 
to which actors have internalised anything, and how such internalisation would be 
relatively uniform on the scale of society or elites. There is a risk here of reverting to IR’s 
 
31 For a similar argument about the transformative effect of the ‘long 19th century’, see Buzan and Lawson 
(2015). 
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practice of anthropomorphising states, as Viatcheslav Morozov (2015, 58–59) has 
pointed out with reference to Zarakol’s work. Anticipating such criticism, Zarakol (2010, 
99–102) invoked Bourdieu’s concept of individuals’ habitus – a ‘system of durable, 
transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every 
moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions’ for individuals; ‘a product 
of history [that] produces individual and collective practices’ (Bourdieu 1977, 82–83; 
1990, 53–54) – arguing that ‘national habituses’ shape the identity of individual leaders 
in similar ways over time.32 This provides a discursive rather than psychological way of 
conceptualising individuals’ and indeed whole groups’ internalisation of a normative 
framework, even if the presence of stigma as a quasi-intervening variable turning 
structural pressures into discourse/habitus remains unobservable. Still, second, 
internalisation by the target of stigmatisation is not necessary for a stigmatising dynamic 
to develop in a social context. An actor can be shunned by others without accepting or 
even fully understanding the reasons for being shunned: ‘One can be stigmatised by 
society, even though one is not personally shamed’ (Mégret 2014, 287). The dominance 
of a normative framework in a society or social context means that all or most actors will 
be aware of the standards set by the framework and the potential consequences of 
breaching it or having a stigma affixed to oneself. Russian leaders do not need to have 
internalised and accepted the virtues of democracy or territorial integrity to be aware of 
the consequences of being successfully labelled undemocratic or aggressive in 
contemporary international society. 
This study is concerned with stigmatisation as a relational process rather than 
with stigma as a (more or less) substantialist attribute. Following Adler-Nissen (2014b, 
156), it adopts an approach not of ‘trying to get inside people’s heads’ but of analysing 
the ‘intersubjective processes of negotiating stigma’ and these processes’ impact on the 
context in which they take place. It focuses on how norms, identities and societies are all 
constituted, contested and negotiated through ongoing interactional processes of 
stigmatisation in which, following Emirbayer (1997, 298), actors play a variety of roles 
from which they and the collectives they form ‘derive their meaning, significance, and 
identity’. Norms or societies are not substantialist entities but relational processes, 
 
32 A Gramscian-inspired focus on education and the promotion of a hegemonic ‘common sense’ would also 
be a way of answering this critique. 
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constituted by processes like stigmatisation. Central to these processes are power 
relations, to which the next section turns. 
 
II – Stigmatisation and power: The co-constitution of deviance and normality 
Stigmatisation is both an exercise and source of power – ‘it takes power to stigmatize’ 
(Link and Phelan 2001, 375). By directly or indirectly participating in stigmatisation 
processes through labelling, stereotyping, separation and discrimination, actors 
contribute to the creation and maintenance of hierarchies and the ordering of social 
groups according to symbolic categories linked to conceptions of (superior) normality 
and (inferior) deviance, hierarchies that in turn perpetuate the power of those on top. 
This is what links the theory to concepts like symbolic violence and hegemony mentioned 
in the previous chapter. When a viewpoint comes to be defined as ‘normal’ and its 
opposite stigmatised as abnormal or deviant, it provides symbolic power to those who 
already conform to it. This section explores these power relations, first elaborating 
further on the power purposes of stigmatisation, then discussing the question of 
intentionality and distinguishing between ‘direct’ and ‘diffuse’ stigmatisation, and finally 
considering the agency of and options available to those on the receiving end of the 
stigmatisation process. 
 
The power purposes of stigmatisation 
Symbolic interactionist approaches have often been criticised for insufficient attention to 
power, particularly structural power. This is unfair: both Goffman and other symbolic 
interactionists were deeply concerned with the production of hierarchies and ordering 
going on in the social world, even if this was often implicit in their work rather than 
explicit (Adler-Nissen 2016, 34–35). The criticism in part rests on the symbolic 
interactionist focus on the ‘micro’ level of analysis. However, Goffman acknowledged that 
social structures such as race and class were the ‘central issue’ facing stigmatised groups 
and that the face-to-face encounters he studied were only part of their experience (1963, 
127; see also Kusow 2004). Moving away from the question of scale towards the general 
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social purpose of stigma processes, Goffman (1963, 164) argued that this was to enlist 
‘support for society among those who are not supported by it’, a clear acknowledgement 
of the power relations involved. More recently, Phelan, Link and John Dovidio have 
argued that stigma has three general purposes, all of which relate to power: domination 
or keeping people or groups ‘down’; norm enforcement or keeping people ‘in’; and/or 
disease avoidance or keeping people ‘away’ (Phelan, Link, and Dovidio 2008; see also Link 
and Phelan 2014).33 It is worth considering each of these in turn to demonstrate the 
analytic utility of the concept and the grip it can give on analysing power relations. 
 The first purpose, domination, is where stigma theory’s links to more structural 
theories of power is most clear. As noted above, there is a strong affinity between stigma 
theories’ focus on the social construction of normality and Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic 
violence, how the viewpoint and practices of the dominant group in any society come to 
be seen and instituted as the norm, thereby doing violence to other experiences 
(Bourdieu 1998, 121; Link and Phelan 2014). What stigma theory and other symbolic 
interactionist approaches give a better grasp on than some of the more deterministic 
theories of domination is the fact that any dominant social order is ultimately a fragile 
collective achievement shaped and reshaped through multiple, repeated interactions 
(Link and Phelan 2014, 25; Adler-Nissen 2016, 38). Dominance in this view is an 
interactional process, ‘always co-constituted by the weak in some way or another’ rather 
than a strict top-down process (Adler-Nissen 2016, 38). In international relations, 
stigmatisation (when successful) thus serves to form and reform hierarchies according 
to normative frameworks that keep certain actors ‘down’ and allow them to be exploited, 
usually accompanied by differences in material power – it can be seen in such ordering 
mechanisms as the Standard of Civilisation, the distinction between developed and 
underdeveloped, and multiple other hierarchies (Zarakol 2010, chap. 2; 2017). 
Frequently overlapping with other differences such as class or race, such stigmatising 
frameworks match Goffman’s (1963, 15) argument of how ‘the normals’ construct an 
 
33 It should be noted that both Goffman and Phelan et al use the term ‘function’ rather than ‘purpose’. 
Because of the structural-functionalist connotations of this term, i.e. the implicit idea that the ‘function’ 
serves to reinforce social cohesion and equilibrium, and the questionable compatibility of such a 
functionalist approach with a relational ontology, I replace it with the more general ‘purpose’. Interestingly, 
despite his usual association with symbolic interactionism, Goffman has on occasion been labelled a ‘micro-
functionalist’, and he spoke of a shared affinity with structural functionalism in some respects (see e.g. 
Gouldner 1970; Chriss 2003; Jacobsen and Kristiansen 2010, 74–78). 
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‘ideology to explain [the person with a stigma’s] inferiority and account for the danger he 
represents, sometimes rationalising an animosity based on other differences, such as 
those of social class’. 
 The second purpose, norm enforcement or keeping people ‘in’, is where the 
critique of the IR norms literature comes out clearest. This purpose can manifest itself in 
different ways. The process can serve to make a deviant actor conform and either return 
to or join the ‘in-group’, or to ‘clarify for other group members the boundaries of 
acceptable behaviour and identity and the consequences for non-conformity’ (Phelan, 
Link, and Dovidio 2008, 362). Usually, both will be the case simultaneously. For example, 
when EU member states sanctioned Austria in 2001 after the formation of a coalition 
government including the far-right Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ), 
the purpose appeared both to make Austria conform by ditching the FPÖ from the 
coalition and to demonstrate to other states the unacceptability of including far-right 
parties in government – with ambivalent results on both counts (Adler-Nissen 2014b). 
The heavy criticism directed at countries like Brazil and South Korea by global financial 
institutions for their implementation of capital controls following the 2008 global 
financial crisis was also dual-purpose (Chwieroth 2015). Similarly, as will be explored in 
further detail in subsequent chapters, the stigmatisation of Russia following its 
annexation of Crimea did not just serve the purpose of pressuring Russia to repent and 
return Crimea to Ukraine, but to reinforce the norm of non-aggression and territorial 
integrity. While these are examples of fairly direct stigmatisation, i.e. targeted at actors 
for specific transgressions, stigmatisation as a lens directs our attention to how norm 
promotion in general is infused with stigmatisation and power relations given the 
influence of dominant actors in ‘defining the unacceptable’ (Phelan, Link, and Dovidio 
2008, 362). 
 The third purpose, disease avoidance or keeping people away, may at first glance 
appear less relevant for international relations, rooted more in stigma’s widespread use 
in medical literature. However, one does not need to look far to locate instances of state 
leaders, politicians, diplomats or international institutions employing medical 
metaphors, or in general advocating the need to keep certain people or groups separated. 
From the language used to describe migrants crossing the Mediterranean during the 
2015 ‘migration crisis’ in Europe, including UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s 
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description of a ‘swarm’ of migrants (BBC News 2015), to the IMF’s traditional labelling 
of emerging markets as the main potential sources of global financial instability, which 
should be contained and kept away from the developed market economies (Chwieroth 
2015, 52–54), to President Obama’s 2014 juxtaposition of Russian aggression, Islamic 
State terrorism and Ebola mentioned above, the stigmatisation of people, states, terrorist 
groups or other actors using language that evokes disease is rife, often with tragic and 
violent consequences. 
 These purposes are potentially overlapping and mutually reinforcing. By keeping 
people down, one may simultaneously keep them out (or vice versa) and others in, by 
demonstrating the costs of non-conformity. Overall, they demonstrate the centrality of 
power relations to processes of norm politics. However, while it is possible to speak of 
the general purposes of the stigmatisation process, this does not mean that the 
components that make up the process are always purposefully enacted. The next 
subsection turns to this issue to discuss how different forms of power may yield different 
forms of stigmatisation. 
 
Direct vs diffuse stigmatisation 
To argue that stigmatisation has a purpose (or indeed three) is not to imply that the 
actions involved in the process are always or necessarily intentional, a deliberate strategy 
to fulfil a specific aim. As Zarakol (2010, 66–67) argues: ‘For a stigmatizing … dynamic to 
emerge in a social system, there does not have to be a deliberate master plan of 
oppression formulated with an eye on the monopolization of resources (although 
sometimes there are those as well)’. Any relational approach should be agnostic about 
intentions, both because they are ultimately unknowable, and because they frequently do 
not matter. Actions and utterances always have unintended consequences, which are 
often more impactful than whatever was intended. Thus, ‘while the exercise of stigma 
power can be brutishly obvious’, for example through direct social or material sanctions 
such as boycotts or suspensions from international organisations, ‘it is more generally 
hidden in processes that are just as potent, but less obviously linked to the interests of 
the stigmatizers’ (Link and Phelan 2014, 30), such as the ongoing definitions of normality 
that tend to reinforce the power of dominant groups in society. Sometimes, actors will 
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deliberately and purposefully seek to label and shame others, as with the human rights 
NGOs on which the ideal-type of a ‘norm entrepreneur’ is based (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998). However, often the processes will be subtler and not reflected upon by the actors 
involved as ‘stigmatisation’ as such, for example in the practices of international judges 
or election monitors. As Mégret (2014, 294, 287) notes, stigmatisation is probably not a 
practice that most international criminal lawyers ‘spontaneously think of themselves as 
being engaged in’, even if the assignment of stigma to certain behaviours is, he argues, the 
’actual goal of international criminal tribunals’.  
 A useful way of considering the distinction between such different forms of 
stigmatisation is through Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall’s (2005) taxonomy of 
different forms of power in international politics. Barnett and Duvall distinguish between 
four types of power: 
Compulsory power exists in the direct control of one actor over the 
conditions of existence and/or the actions of another. Institutional power 
exists in actors’ indirect control over the conditions of action of socially 
distant others. Structural power operates as the constitutive relations of a 
direct and specific—hence, mutually constituting—kind. Productive power 
works through diffuse constitutive relations to produce the situated social 
capacities of actors. (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 48, emphases added) 
A key distinction in the taxonomy is between power that works through direct social 
relations (compulsory and structural) and diffuse social relations (institutional and 
productive). Direct forms assume a shorter distance, both spatially and temporally, 
between those on the exercising and receiving end of power, while diffuse forms 
acknowledge that power can operate through more ‘detached and mediated’ connections, 
at a ‘physical, temporal, or social distance’ (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 47–48). A similarly 
useful analytical distinction can be drawn between direct and diffuse stigmatisation. 
 Direct stigmatisation denotes those instances when the stigmatisation process is 
clearly and explicitly directed at a single actor or group of actors. This will often be done 
with the openly stated aim of keeping the target of stigmatisation ‘down’, ‘in’ or ‘out’ as 
per the three purposes noted above. Examples include the three cases cited by Adler-
Nissen (2014b): post-WWII Germany, Cuba under Fidel Castro and Austria while FPÖ 
were in government were directly stigmatised by the victorious Allies, the US and the EU, 
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respectively. While the labels and stereotypes employed in each case were not 
necessarily unique to the targets of stigmatisation – aggression, communism, racism, etc. 
– the stigmatisers sought to establish the targets as particularly worthy of discrimination 
and status loss, with direct sanctions and other measures explicitly meant to isolate, 
induce a change in behaviour and/or establish a stigmatising coalition or ‘audience of 
normals’ supporting the ostracization. Similarly, as will be seen in subsequent chapters, 
at various points in Russian-Western relations over the past decades Russia was the 
object of direct stigmatisation by Western actors, never more so than after its annexation 
of Crimea prompted direct sanctions by the US, EU and others and attempts to construct 
a global ‘audience of normals’ condemning Russia’s behaviour. In such cases, exercises of 
stigma power are indeed ‘brutishly obvious’, and even if actors may not use the term 
stigmatisation consciously, they often openly talk about isolation, punishment and 
shaming. 
 However, as noted, stigmatisation processes are more often not direct but diffuse, 
constituted by ongoing processes of labelling, stereotyping, separation and 
discrimination that do not necessarily target specific actors but produce hierarchies of 
normality that in turn create the possibility for discrediting. The creation and 
maintenance of such normative hierarchies as developed/underdeveloped, 
modern/backward, democratic/authoritarian do not as a rule develop from a purposeful 
master plan to discredit and exploit, as Zarakol notes, but instead from multiple ongoing 
and often unreflective processes of knowledge production that coalesce to create them. 
Examples of such diffuse processes in current international relations are the multiple 
reports produced annually by international and non-governmental organisations 
covering fields such as human rights, press freedom, economic performance and levels of 
democracy, rulings from international courts, monitoring reports from election monitors, 
etc. Of course, some of these are directly targeted at specific actors, for example labelling 
governments such as Russia’s as human rights offenders or authoritarian. Whether such 
labels on their own can constitute stigmatisation is an open question. Adler-Nissen 
(2014b, 147) dismisses for example a bad ranking on Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index as not fully stigmatising because it does not on its own 
involve a status loss. The implication is that in an international society where states are 
both the main ‘members’ and (usually) the most powerful actors, only states have the 
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power to fully stigmatise.34 This underestimates the power of NGOs to confer legitimacy 
in today’s world and enforces too strict a separation between stigmatisation being 
present or not. True, such labels ‘may never develop into a genuine system of social 
differentiation’ or ‘prove futile’ (Adler-Nissen 2014b, 147), but even if NGOs, 
international organisations and others may lack direct-power enforcement mechanisms 
of their own, the knowledge they produce contributes to stigmatisation processes and 
can be mobilised by those who have such power. Moreover, as will be seen particularly 
in the chapter on human rights, NGOs and other actors can be singled out for (counter-) 
stigmatisation campaigns by states. 
 Stigmatisation can thus be both direct and diffuse. Returning to Link and Phelan’s 
four-component conceptualisation, processes of labelling, stereotyping, separation and 
status loss may occur sequentially, intentionally and openly, but they need not in order to 
have the effect of stigmatisation.35 A parallel can be drawn to the prominent IR concept 
of securitisation, consisting of the four components of, 1) a securitising agent making a 
securitising statement, 2) that statement identifying an existential threat, 3) that 
existential threat referring to a particular object that needs to be protected, and 4) an 
audience accepting the issue as a security threat (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998). 
Since its inception, securitisation has often come to be treated as a ‘narrow, linear and 
intentional event’, but its original poststructuralist foundations conceive of it as a much 
more messy and indeterminate process (Wilhelmsen 2017, 166; see also Austin and 
Beaulieu-Brossard 2018). Labels and stereotypes do not suddenly appear out of nowhere 
simply because powerful actors will them into being; they are usually deeply rooted in 
long-standing discourses. Status loss and discrimination can be direct and intentional but 
is equally often the result of a myriad unreflective actions. This brings the attention 
towards the relational and processual nature of stigmatisation as elaborated in the 
 
34 This power is not just material. As Bourdieu (1994, 4) argues, as the ‘culmination of a process of 
concentration of different species of capital’, modern states possess ‘meta-capital’ and power over the ‘rates 
of conversion’ between different forms of capital – material, economic, symbolic, etc. 
35 A seemingly more intention-driven conceptualisation can be found in the communication literature, for 
example in Smith’s (2007) outline of ‘stigma communication’, i.e. stigmatising messages or utterances: 
‘Stigma messages … provide cues (a) to distinguish people, (b) to categorize distinguished people as a 
separate social entity, (c) to imply a responsibility for receiving placement within this distinguished group 
and their associated peril, and (d) to link this distinguished group to physical and social peril’. However, 
even such messages need not explicitly label a target, thus contributing to a diffuse process in which actors 
are left discreditable rather than discredited (Meisenbach 2010, 276). 
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previous section. 
 
Stigma management strategies and their effects 
Before turning to the methodological challenges of studying such a relational process, a 
final aspect of the power relations of stigmatisation must be considered: the agency of 
the stigmatised. While stigmatisation processes are infused with both direct and diffuse 
power relations, they are usually not totalising in the sense of rendering those 
stigmatised without choices of how to respond to their stigmatisation.36 Goffman argued 
that stigmatised actors had three coping options. First, they could attempt to ‘pass’ the 
stigma, by pretending to never have had it in the first place (1963, 92–113). Second, they 
could recognise their stigma and identify with other stigmatised actors, asserting the 
group’s uniqueness and superiority – so-called ‘out-group alignment’. Third, they could 
recognise their stigma but identify with the normals and seek to overcome the stigma by 
conforming to ordinary standards as fully as possible – so-called ‘in-group alignment’ 
(1963, 137–49). Adler-Nissen (2014b, 153–56) adopts a similar typology by different 
names: passing becomes, roughly, ‘stigma rejection’, exemplified by Austrian politicians’ 
rejection of the country’s stigmatisation by the EU in 2000-01; ‘out-group alignment’ 
becomes ‘counter-stigmatisation’, exemplified by Cuban leaders’ assertion of their 
stigmatisation by the US as an ‘emblem of pride’; and ‘in-group alignment’ becomes 
‘stigma recognition’, exemplified by West German leaders’ recognition of their stigma and 
attempt to fully ‘normalise’ after World War II. Zarakol (2014) provides another example 
of ‘passing’, showing how Siam’s King Mongkut (Rama IV) claimed he had held ‘Western’ 
views about the earth being round long before he almost certainly acquired these during 
his Western education. 
 The three strategies above provide a solid analytical basis but are worth 
unpacking further to show different options within each broad category and consider 
further potential strategies. Rebecca Meisenbach (2010, 278), building on the stigma 
literature in communication studies, develops a more comprehensive two-by-two of 
stigma management strategies built around the two questions of whether the stigmatised 
 
36 As Foucault would say, there is no power without resistance. See e.g. Pickett (1996). 
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actor a) accepts or challenges the public understanding of the relevant stigma, and b) 
accepts or challenges that the stigma applies to themselves. The overall strategies derived 
from this and the various options within them are reproduced in Figure 2.1 below. 
Figure 2.1 – Stigma management communication strategies (Meisenbach 2010) 
 
The overlap with the three-part conceptualisation above is relatively clear: accepting 
roughly equals recognition, avoiding – rejection, and denying/ignoring/displaying – 
counter-stigmatisation. The fourth, bottom-left quadrant can be summarised as stigma 
evasion (c.f. Sauer and Reveraert 2018) – a less direct strategy than the more aggressive 
counter-stigmatising tactics of ‘discrediting the discreditors’ or ‘attacking the accuser’ 
(Meisenbach 2010, 284). Evasion acknowledges the stigmatising attribute or behaviour 
but seeks to explain it away by claiming provocation, trivialising or relativizing it, etc. 
 The four strategies identified so far (recognition/acceptance, rejection/avoidance, 
evasion and counter-stigmatisation) tend to assume that a stigma has already been 
imposed on the actor or actors managing it. That is, the actor is already discredited. 
However, it is important to note that all of the above strategies may also be employed pre-
emptively by actors that are discreditable but not yet discredited. Such actors may already 
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have either done something discreditable or have a discreditable attribute by the 
dominant normative standards of society, but have not been the object of direct 
stigmatisation either because the attribute or behaviour is not publicly known or because 
actors with the power to directly stigmatise have not acted upon the knowledge. Goffman 
(1963, 57–58) highlighted how for such actors, information management was all-
important – they must stop knowledge of their stigma from emerging in order to avoid 
being stigmatised. Another option open to actors would be to seek to pre-emptively shift 
the public perception of the stigma, as in the bottom half of Meisenbach’s quadrant above, 
in order that if the attribute or behaviour ever came to light the negative social effects, i.e. 
status loss or discrimination, would be less severe. Stigma management strategies can 
thus relate both to established and emergent, partial or potential stigmas. Table 2.2 
summarises the four strategies that will serve as shorthand throughout this study, 
combining the insights and terms of Goffman, Adler-Nissen and Meisenbach. 
Table 2.2 – Stigma management strategies 
 Actor accepts stigma’s 
application to self 
Actor rejects stigma’s 
application to self 
Actor accepts public 
understanding of stigma 
Stigma 
acceptance/recognition 
Stigma 
rejection/avoidance 
Actor rejects public 
understanding of stigma 
Stigma evasion Counter-stigmatisation 
 
Depending on which stigma management strategy actors choose and how 
successful their strategy ends up being, the impact on the stigma and therefore the 
normative cohesion of (international) society may differ greatly. For Adler-Nissen 
(2014b, 153–54), if an actor (in her case a state) accepts a stigma and tries to ‘normalise’, 
the normative fabric of international society will be strengthened; if they reject their 
stigma, arguing that it is not applicable, doubts and uncertainty may be sowed about the 
norm(s) in question, weakening the normative order; finally, if they identify with their 
stigma but counter-stigmatise the ‘normals’ by promoting the stigma as an alternative set 
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of values, the presence of competing normative visions may serve to split international 
society into competing blocs, with normative cohesion within but not between the 
groups. Stigma evasion may have similar effects depending on the extent to which actors 
seek to challenge public perceptions and how successful they are. In short, actors may be 
kept ‘down’, ‘in’ or ‘out’, but they may also contest their position and seek to undermine 
or overturn the normative framework that excludes them or defines them as inferior. 
Chwieroth (2015, 46–50) shows how stigma rejection and counter-stigmatisation can 
lead to transformations of the normative order, creating a ‘new normal’. His example is 
the transformed stigma around capital controls following Brazil’s (counter-
stigmatisation), South Korea’s (stigma rejection) and other states’ successful 
implementation of controls and resistance against attempted stigmatisation by the IMF 
and others in the years following the 2008 global financial crisis. Similarly, as will be seen 
in subsequent chapters, Russia’s counter-stigmatisation strategy in the case of human 
rights – its turn to so-called ‘sovereign morality’ (Sharafutdinova 2014) – has contributed 
to the international undermining of LGBT rights. 
Stigmatisation and stigma management are thus contentious processes, infused 
with power relations, and fruitful concepts for investigating Bucher’s ‘norm [power] 
politics’ given their focus on defining the boundaries of the ‘normal’. They can operate 
directly or diffusely or somewhere in between, and either reinforce, undermine or 
transform established frameworks and power relations. Moreover, a stigmatisation lens 
recognises that society is a struggle over norms and normality, and that the stigmatised 
or deviant do not stand outside of society but co-constitute it. In Goffman’s (1963, 149, 
150) words, the special situation of stigmatised people ‘is that society tells [them they 
are] a member of the wider group, … a normal human being, but that [they are] also 
“different” in some degree, and that it would be foolish to deny this difference’, and 
‘unwise to pass or to let down “[their]” group’. Indeed, in line with the processual, never-
settled process of stabilisation of which stigmatisation forms part, the process creates its 
own two-way fragility between the stigmatised and normals:  
The stigmatised and the normal are part of each other; if one can prove 
vulnerable, it must be expected that the other can, too. For in imputing 
identities to individuals, discreditable or not, the wider social setting and 
its inhabitants have in a way compromised themselves; they have set 
themselves up to be proven the fool. (Goffman 1963, 161)  
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As Adler-Nissen argues (2014b, 152), ‘stigma imposition may fail (and we need to study 
the effects of failure)’. Examples of this in international relations include sanctions that 
have not had their desired effect or where the sanctioned, stigmatised party has managed 
to lift or subvert its stigma, such as Austria in 2000-01 or Libya after the sanctions 
imposed for its alleged part in the Lockerbie bombing (Adler-Nissen 2014b; Hurd 2005; 
Onderco 2014). Such failures will not necessarily be the result of insufficient power 
imbalances between stigmatisers and stigmatised, but the relational interplay of 
stigmatisation and stigma management processes and the shifting patterns of ‘audiences 
of normals’ supporting or rejecting emergent stigmas. 
 
III – Methodology and methods: stigmatisation as discursive practices 
The previous sections have presented the study’s conceptualisation of stigmatisation and 
shown how such a lens provides a relational, power-attentive approach to the study of 
norms and international society. This section presents the study’s methodology and 
methods, justifies the case selection and addresses such questions as source selection and 
scale. I follow Jackson’s distinction between methodology as the underlying assumption 
about ‘what kind of data is preferable and what the status of that data is’ and methods as 
techniques for gaining ‘access to the relevant data’ (2006a, 495). Building on the 
relational ontology and processual view of social relations presented so far, it is argued 
that stigmatisation is best analysed through a discursive approach that privileges public 
utterances and actions as the preferable data and discourse analysis as the preferable 
way to access and analyse these, constructing an analytical narrative of stigmatisation 
and stigma management processes. Stigmatisation as a process is seen as a bundle of 
discursive practices. The first subsection below considers the discursive nature of 
stigmatisation, the second the methods for selecting and analysing material, the third 
discusses the case selection, and the fourth addresses questions of how to scale up a 
theory developed for an individual level for application to international relations, 
preparing the ground for the next chapter’s discussion of the normative context enabling 
stigmatisation on an international scale. 
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Stigmatisation as discursive practice(s) 
As mentioned above, stigma and stigmatisation can be conceptualised in many ways for 
social analysis – sociological or psychological, relational or substantialist, an observable 
social process or an unobservable variable. For example, in a positivist rendering based 
on an ontological commitment to mind-world dualism, the idea of a ‘real world’ that is 
‘independent of our experience of it’, and view that social science should aspire to 
improve our knowledge about this mind-independent world by establishing law-like 
patterns of causality about it, stigma could be conceptualised as a somehow measurable 
‘ideational variable’ and included in models as either an ‘independent’ (explanatory) or 
‘dependent’ (to be explained) variable (Moses and Knutsen 2007, 8; Jackson 2011). Its 
explanatory power for various outcomes could then be assessed through a comparison 
with other independent variables, be they ideational (identity, norms, etc.) or material 
(military capacity, relative power distribution, etc.). Alternatively, the impact of such 
factors on stigma could be measured: is a deficiency in material or ideational power more 
likely to induce stigma and to what degree? This sort of conceptualisation would rely on 
a substantialist ontology as discussed above – stigma would be an attribute of a 
substantive ‘unit’, e.g. a state, and the focus of analysis would be that state’s ‘self-action’ 
based on such attributes. 
For the relational, processual ontological wager underlying this study, such a 
conceptualisation of stigma would be highly problematic. Relationalism does not mesh 
well with mind-world dualism. If the social world is in constant flux (in principle, despite 
the durability of many social forms) and there is no substantial ‘essence’ to be analysed, 
it follows both that there cannot be law-like relationships in social relations and that 
social scientists cannot ever hope to achieve perfect knowledge, as they are themselves 
inextricably a part of the world they analyse. If stigmatisation is conceived as a relational 
social process, it must assume that the social world is in principle contingent, and that 
the social scientist’s role is to interpret the world rather than explain or predict it. 
Moreover, the components and mechanisms identified as part of the stigmatisation 
process in the conceptualisation above – labelling, stereotyping, even separation and 
discrimination – are inextricably discursive, rooted in ‘representational practices 
through which meanings are generated’ (Dunn and Neumann 2016, 2). This 
conceptualisation fits much better with a poststructuralist methodology. 
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Poststructuralism’s basic ontological assumption is that the social world is not 
independent of our perception, but socially constructed through discursive 
representations. In Foucault’s words: ‘We must not imagine that the world turns toward 
us a legible face which we would only have to decipher’ (quoted in Moses and Knutsen 
2007, 147). The social world is constructed and given meaning through language:  
…it is only through the construction in language that ‘things’ – objects, 
subjects, states, living beings, and material structures – are given meaning 
and endowed with a particular identity. Language is not a transparent tool 
functioning as a medium for the registration of data as (implicitly) assumed 
by positivist, empiricist science, but a field of social and political practice… 
(Hansen 2006, 18) 
Language produces and constitutes the world, it does not explain or reveal it by 
establishing neutral descriptions of some essentially graspable ‘truth’. The world 
becomes knowable through our representations of it, which over time form discourses: 
Representations are socially (re)produced facts. They are things as they 
appear to us (not to be confused with the things themselves). Thus, a 
representation is an understanding or a description of the world: it is 
repeatedly presented – it is literally re-presented – to us as fact. This 
repeated presentation instils in us a sense of permanence. When a series of 
such representations appear together in a lasting way, they produce a 
discourse. A discourse, then, is a lasting system of representations. It is also 
a system of meaning, in light of which meaningful claims can be presented 
(and re-presented). (Moses and Knutsen 2007, 213) 
Thus, discourses are more than ‘just’ language, understood as ‘speech acts or textual 
products’ – they are ‘systems of meaning-production that fix meaning, however 
temporarily, … enable actors to make sense of the world and to act within it’ (Dunn and 
Neumann 2016, 19). Discourses provide the pre-conditions for meaningful action. 
 A key tenet of poststructuralist discourse analysis, as opposed to more positivist-
oriented variants such as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), is that there is no separate, 
non-discursive realm in which the impact of discourses can be ‘measured’. For 
poststructuralists, ‘[since] language enters between humans and the world, there is 
nothing existing independent of text’ (Dunn and Neumann 2016, 39). This is the basis for 
one of the most frequent criticisms of discourse analysis: that it ignores material factors, 
operating only on a supposedly non-material level of unmeasurable ‘ideas’ or ‘text’. 
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However, emphasising that the social world should be understood primarily through text 
does not deny the existence of a material, non-social world as such or diminish the 
importance of materiality. As Lene Hansen clarifies:  
…neither ideas nor materiality have a meaningful presence separate from 
each other. A tank, for example, is not simply a material assemblage of 
metal and rubber but [a socially produced] object of warfare – or 
peacekeeping… the point is not to disregard material facts but to study how 
these are produced and prioritized. (2006, 22) 
Poststructuralists insist that there can be no such thing as unfiltered materiality in human 
perception; the non-social world is bracketed, not ignored. 
 Examining the discourse/materiality question through the example of stigma 
should make the point that materiality never speaks for itself clear. As Goffman argued, a 
stigma is a ‘special kind of relationship between attribute and stereotype’ (1963, 14). The 
‘attribute’ can be conceived as material and relatively permanent – be it a physical 
characteristic such as a person’s skin colour or a behavioural characteristic such as 
membership of a political organisation. However, the ‘stereotype’, which is what gives the 
stigma meaning, is inextricably linked to discursive representations of the attribute. What 
is a stigmatising attribute or behaviour within one discursive context can thus be the 
opposite within another context in another place or time, be it another continent in 
another historical period or in the same city on the same day. For example, being 
politically active as a woman was a stigma in 19th century Europe, but is generally not so 
anymore, despite continued contestation (Towns 2009; 2014). Goffman (1963, 13) notes 
how going to a library may be normal behaviour for a ‘middle class boy’ but cites a 
‘professional criminal’ as recounting how they would look over their shoulder when 
entering a library to check that no-one who knew them was around. The two people 
would be engaged in the same material activity, but only for one of them would it be 
discreditable.  
Considering the intuitively more ‘material’ components of the above 
conceptualisation of stigmatisation, e.g. the physical enactment of separation or 
discrimination, also reveals the co-constitutive element of discourse and materiality. 
Without context, for example the discursive elements of labelling and stereotyping that 
(explicitly or implicitly) justify or explain the reason for the separation on the basis of 
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some attribute or behaviour, the physical enactment lacks meaning and could be an 
expression of anything. Material sanctions such as asset freezes or visa bans could happen 
for a variety of reasons – they would only be ‘stigmatisation’ if accompanied by the 
components identified above. This does not mean that physical practices resembling 
discrimination cannot happen ‘on their own’ – a visa ban or asset freeze could occur 
without any form of justification. The point is that the social effects of the ‘material’ 
practices are never self-evident, never speak for themselves, just like the discourse itself 
is also meaningless without a reference to some materiality. It is in the relationship 
between the two that meaning is produced and in which the potential for stigmatisation 
occurs. 
 One way of thinking about this inextricable intertwining of ‘ideational’ discourse 
and ‘material’ practices is through Foucault’s idea of ‘discursive practices’, which 
‘systematically shape the objects of which they speak’ (quoted in Dunn and Neumann 
2016, 2). As Dunn and Neumann (2016, 62) argue, this was Foucault’s way of grappling 
with the discourse analyst’s perpetual ‘dilemma of how to reconcile meaning and 
materiality, discourse and practice’, and of expressing his argument that practice forms 
part of discourse: 
The analysis of discourse understood as the study of the preconditions for 
action has to be complemented by analysis of practice understood as the 
study of action itself. … Practices are discursive, both in the sense that some 
practices involve speech acts and in the sense that practice cannot be 
thought “outside of” discourse. … The possibility of accounting for a range 
of contemporary social and political phenomena thus requires treating 
discourses and practices together, as preconditions for action and 
patterned action respectively. (2016, 62, 66) 
An analysis of stigmatisation as a discursive process enabling and constraining action 
must also involve an analysis of the practices that either reinforce or undermine the 
discourse. Stigmatisation can be conceived as a bundle of discursive practices organised 
around the component parts of labelling, stereotyping, separation and status loss.  
Thus, as conceptualised in this study, stigmas are socially produced through 
discursive practices of stigmatisation, rather than being self-evidently derived from 
objective, mind-independent material conditions. For example, when multiple Russian 
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leaders through history seem to have recognised a stigma (or self-stigmatised) by 
speaking of Russia’s ‘backwardness’ and the need to ‘catch up’ either by adopting 
Western military and diplomatic practices (Peter the Great), accelerating industrial 
development (Stalin) or becoming liberal democratic (Boris Yeltsin), this is not an 
inevitable result of Russia’s material conditions (though it does indicate Russia’s 
persistent liminality). In fact, the invocation of ‘backwardness’ is already discursive, 
infusing what would by itself be just a difference in material circumstances with meaning 
by framing it in relational terms of relative teleological development. Similarly, when 
Western leaders have sought to stigmatise Putin’s Russia for being undemocratic, 
aggressive, illiberal, etc., this is not an automatic result of objective material conditions 
but the product of the relationship between these conditions and inter-subjective 
discourses about how states should behave as well as Western discourses about Russia. 
Finally, actions large or small do not speak for themselves: Western leaders’ non-
attendance at the Winter Olympics in Sochi only becomes meaningful when seen in the 
context of criticisms of Russia’s LGBT rights record that themselves were rooted in a 
particular discourse. Russia’s annexation of Crimea was only a ‘transgression’ because it 
occurred in a time when military conquest had long since been considered illegitimate in 
the dominant discourse on state behaviour. 
 Stigmatisation, like discourse, is thus both structuring, in the sense of constraining 
and enabling certain ways of acting, relational, in the sense of having no fixed or 
permanent essence, and open-ended, in the sense of being incomplete, contingent, and not 
deterministic (Dunn and Neumann 2016, 2–4). As noted above, as part of the ‘ongoing 
production and reproduction of social arrangements’ it ‘never ceases, never finishes, and 
in a certain sense never fully succeeds’ (Jackson 2006b, 39). Nevertheless, it has 
structuring effects upon the actors involved in it, shaping both the identities of the 
stigmatisers and stigmatised, and the social context in which they act. In keeping with 
poststructuralism’s focus on the constitution of social reality, the argument advanced 
here is thus constitutive, focusing on how processes of stigmatisation and stigma 
management constrain and enable relations by producing and reproducing certain 
discourses. In the neopositivist conception of causality this would not be a causal story 
where ‘A’ – stigmatisation – necessarily or sufficiently led to ‘B’ – an outcome (Jackson 
2011, 105). As shown by Milja Kurki (2006), in response to the dominance of this 
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reductive view of causality several ‘reflexivist’ scholars have argued for abandoning 
claims to causality altogether. However, following Kurki’s (2006, 189) argument that ‘we 
need to deepen and broaden our understandings of the concept of cause’, the argument 
advanced here is that constitutive work is causal work. This study does not aim to 
establish a timeless, universal ‘covering law’ of stigmatisation and its role in social 
relations, rather a context-specific and thickly descriptive analytical narrative 
contributing to the interpretation of how a particular state of affairs came into being. 
 Stigmatisation as conceptualised in this study is a public process – as discussed 
above, the focus is on how actors intersubjectively impose, manage, negotiate and contest 
stigmas. This leads to a privileging of public sources, i.e. statements, speeches and other 
utterances made or practices engaged in publicly, rather than ones made in private and 
subsequently revealed through leaks, memoirs or other sources. As Jackson notes about 
legitimation processes (which have clear overlaps with stigmatisation processes), ‘the 
important action … takes place not inside of individual heads, but in the intersubjective 
space between individuals. Hence the reversal of the usual historian’s hierarchy of 
evidence … is justified by the ontological and epistemological status of the investigation’ 
(2006b, 32). Stigmatisation, whether direct or diffuse, intentional or unintentional, 
involves an element of performance, of intersubjective audience building, the 
(attempted) construction of an ‘audience of normals’ to close ranks against the 
stigmatised or win support for a particular stigma management strategy. Who this 
audience is varies from statement to statement, context to context. Consider the 
difference between President Barack Obama making a standard, brief reference to 
America ‘leading the fight against Russian aggression’ in an after-dinner speech at a 
Democratic Party fundraising event during the 2014 mid-term elections, versus 
juxtaposing Russian aggression with the risk from Ebola and Islamic State in his speech 
at the UN General Assembly the same year. While the former statement is evidence of an 
increasingly settled discourse, its primary audience is Obama’s own party donors and its 
purpose to justify his foreign policy, rather than building a stigmatising ‘audience of 
normals’ among world leaders. Between these two relatively clear examples there are 
many different shades of statements, meaning no hard and fast rule can be made about 
when something is relevant or not. All texts or utterings have multiple audiences and 
need to be evaluated on their own terms. The role of the media is important here. In the 
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24-hour, internet and social media-driven news cycle, even obscure statements by 
officials can be picked up and magnified, having effects far beyond their originally 
intended purpose. 
Given the relational, discursive ontology of this study and the focus on 
stigmatisation as a process, the selection of which actors’ statements and actions to focus 
on is guided by what Charlotte Epstein (2011, 342) calls the ‘initial question’ of any 
discursive approach: ‘who speaks?’. The focus on Russian-Western relations means the 
primary actors are official representatives of Russia and various Western states and 
institutions and the focus on ‘official’ discourse, understood as ‘those texts and utterings 
by agents that society generally imbues with political power and significance’, including 
‘speeches by political leaders and official state documents’, and as distinct from ‘expert’ 
discourse or ‘popular’ discourse such as academic writings, mass media reports, films or 
TV series (Dunn and Neumann 2016, 12–14). However, rather than focusing only on a 
series of pre-given actors such as the heads of state and government, foreign ministers, 
etc., the analysis is guided by which actors were found to be empirically more prominent 
in the stigmatisation process in relation to each norm. Hence, for democracy, election 
monitors play a key role as actors imbued with the authority to judge whether an election 
meets democratic standards; for human rights, NGOs provide much of the knowledge on 
which stigmatisation is based and themselves engage in labelling, while international 
courts provide authoritative rulings on human rights abuses; for capitalism, credit rating 
agencies and investors both in their own way participate in processes that may either 
constitute or show evidence of stigmatisation at work, from changes in ratings to 
investment decisions. The variation in actors’ involvement in the different issue areas in 
itself is a point of analysis with implications for their ‘thickness’ in contemporary 
international society. The material that serves as the basis for the analysis thus varies 
from statements by heads of states and governments, via NGO reports to international 
court rulings, voting records in international organisations and levels of foreign direct 
investment in Russia. 
 
Analysing stigmatisation in practice 
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Having established poststructuralist discourse analysis as the most suitable methodology 
for this study and discussed the relationship between the conceptualisation of 
stigmatisation and the prioritisation of public sources, I now turn to the question of 
method – how to practically go about generating data for the analysis of the stigmatisation 
process. 
 The overall method of this study is to use the categories identified in tables 2.1 
and 2.2 to construct an ‘analytical narrative’ of stigmatisation and stigma management in 
Russian-Western relations (Jackson 2011, 154). The categories of labelling, stereotyping, 
separation and status loss on the one hand and stigma recognition, rejection, evasion and 
counter-stigmatisation on the other, as well as the distinction between direct and diffuse 
stigmatisation, will be employed to order and analyse the processes of stigmatisation and 
stigma management. After establishing four core norms of international society in 
Chapter 3, the following empirical chapters deal with each norm in turn, identifying the 
main actors in each area through the guiding question of ‘who speaks?’, and investigating 
the nature and intensity of stigmatisation processes through the lenses of the conceptual 
models. In doing so, I draw on a series of largely implicit questions, such as: Is there 
labelling going on and if so by whom and of what kind? Does the labelling draw on 
stereotypes? Are clear distinctions being drawn between ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘normals’ and 
‘deviants’, and are they linked to existing labels? Are status losses or discriminatory 
practices implemented and are they justified by reference to labels, stereotypes, etc.? Are 
the processes direct or diffuse, and what ‘audiences of normals’ can be discerned? What 
are the reactions of those on the receiving end – acceptance, rejection, evasion, counter-
stigmatisation, a mix or something else entirely? How do the reactions in turn impact the 
stigmatisation processes, do they defuse them or ratchet them up? 
 The categories above should be understood as Weberian ideal types, meaning that 
they are unlikely to neatly and exhaustively map onto real-world events. Stigma 
imposition is unlikely ever to be a neat, linear process of labelling, stereotyping, 
separation and status loss, implemented by a unified and harmonious ‘audience of 
normals’. Moreover, there may be elements of various approaches to stigma management 
present in actions at any given time. And finally, the two stages are not mutually exclusive 
temporally but interactive – different responses by the would-be stigmatised to 
attempted stigmatisation will inevitably affect the success or failure of stigma imposition 
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and may influence the stigmatisers’ future course of action. Finally, it is as important to 
recognise when stigmatisation is not present as when it is – the danger of approaching 
source materials with a particular theoretical lens is of course to subsume everything 
under that lens, stretching the concept beyond any meaningful limits. However, it is 
exactly these potential frictions that the proposed analytical narrative will feed on. As 
Jackson (2011, 154) asserts, it is when ‘the messy complexity of actual concrete 
experience’ does not fit the categories offered by the ideal-type ‘that an analytical 
narrative really takes off’, allowing the analyst to explore the nuances and grey zones. 
Embracing this messiness, the ideal-types will nevertheless be used to ‘organize the 
empirical material … into a coherent story’ and provide details of the different factors’ 
‘sequential interaction and concatenation over the time frame of the analysis’ (Jackson 
2011, 154). 
Aside from the overall approach of constructing an analytical narrative using the 
categories in question, no one single ‘method’, understood as a technique to extract data, 
has pride of place in the analysis. Nevertheless, in order to ‘identify and inventory the 
representational practices that constitute the discourses at work’, I draw both explicitly 
and implicitly on various discourse analysis techniques, notably predicate analysis, 
subject positioning and metaphorical analysis (Dunn and Neumann 2016, 128). Each of 
these are considered briefly below. 
Predication or predicate analysis ‘examines the verbs, adverbs, and adjectives that 
are attached to nouns within specific texts’, seeking ‘to expose how certain meanings or 
capabilities are established, thus enabling actors to understand and act in certain ways’ 
and ‘exposing how texts link certain qualities to particular subjects through the use of 
predicates’ (Dunn and Neumann 2016, 111). In their presentation of the method, Dunn 
and Neumann use as a key example Jennifer Milliken and David Sylvan’s (1996) findings 
of the links between ‘male’ representations of North Vietnam and ‘female’ 
representations of South Vietnam in American discourse during the Vietnam War and the 
types of weapons deployed in both places: ‘hard’ explosives in the North and ‘soft’ 
chemical weapons in the South. Similarly, Roxanne Lynn Doty (1993) drew on predicate 
analysis to show how the Philippines and Filipinos were constructed as ‘children’ in US 
congressional debates in the 1950s, contributing to justifications of an interventionist 
policy. Further examples include Dunn’s findings about the linkage in US discourse of 
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Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba of Congo to adjectives such as ‘irrational, erratic, 
trouble-making, paranoid, unpredictable, reckless, immature, and irresponsible’, and 
Neumann’s analysis of the connection of certain qualities to Russia in Western discourse 
and vice-versa (Dunn and Neumann 2016, 111–12; Dunn 2003; I. B. Neumann 1999, chap. 
3; 2016). In a similar vein, predicate analysis contributes to identifying stigmatisation in 
Russian-Western relations by locating stigmatising representations: what predicates are 
used by the relevant actors to describe actions, actors, attributes and behaviours? Are 
they negatively, positively or neutrally loaded? What sort of subject(s) do they constitute? 
This technique is particularly useful for getting at the labelling component of 
stigmatisation – what predicates or other labels are attached through the discourse? 
 The second technique is to make explicit the subject positioning in these 
representations. As Dunn and Neumann explain: 
one can uncover the process of subject positioning by interpreting the ways 
in which text(s) work to create a knowable reality by linking subjects and 
objects to one another... What defines a particular subject is the relative 
relationships that are constructed between it and other subjects. 
Oftentimes these relationships are established through the construction of 
subject positioning based upon opposition or similarity. (2016, 112) 
Doty (1993, 313–16) draws on subject positioning to show how US debates on the 
Philippines constructed the US as a ‘rational, moral and powerful’ subject, the USSR as 
‘equally rational and powerful but morally lacking’, and the Filipinos as ‘guided by 
emotion and passion, yet full of potential with the proper guidance’, thus again 
contributing to making possible and even desirable the idea of American intervention in 
its former colonial subject. This technique is thus particularly useful for uncovering the 
separation part of the stigmatisation process. How do the actors construct identities 
through the positioning of themselves and others in relation to each other and to (non-) 
desirable characteristics? Combining this with predicate analysis, how are predicates 
used to construct and position subjects, including by separating those associated with 
desirable behaviour and characteristics from those without? 
 The third technique is metaphorical analysis. ‘Metaphors are a textual mechanism 
used for the transference of meaning, connecting the unfamiliar with the familiar’ and 
employed in order to ‘persuade’ (Dunn and Neumann 2016, 114). An analysis of 
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metaphors as related to stigmatisation would thus critically analyse the type of meaning 
evoked by the metaphors used – do they contribute to labelling, stereotyping, separation 
or discrimination and thereby the process of stigmatisation? Do they link certain subjects 
to stigmatising characteristics?  
 Beyond these textual analysis mechanisms used to uncover the discursive 
‘preconditions for action’, the analysis will also focus on the practices (the ‘patterned 
action’) that result. This includes practices such as voting records, attendance patterns at 
diplomatic and cultural events, frequency of summits, practices of inclusion and exclusion 
in various diplomatic forums, etc. Through a combination of the close textual analysis and 
the close practice analysis, an analytical narrative will be created tracing and ordering 
the processes of stigmatisation and stigma management in Russian-Western relations. 
 
Choosing a case: Political relevance and cultural competence 
The case of Russian-Western relations since the end of the Cold War has been chosen for 
two reasons: its political relevance to contemporary international relations and the 
author’s cultural competence and situatedness. On the first point, relations between 
Russia and the West, however defined, are of crucial importance to the international 
relations both of the Euro-Atlantic geographical region and to some extent the wider 
world, albeit less than at the height of the Cold War when Soviet-American superpower 
relations structured the global order. As discussed in the Introduction, the development 
from the cautiously optimistic relations of the early 1990s to the ‘new cold war’ of the 
2010s is not merely the object of abstract academic discussion but also of fractious 
political debates, not to mention real-world military conflict in places like Ukraine. The 
empirical case is thus worth exploring for its own sake, in order to provide new 
perspectives on a politically important subject for contemporary international relations. 
 The second reason for choosing Russian-Western relations as the subject of study 
concerns my own cultural competence and motivation. The original motivation for the 
study arose out of empirical interest. Having completed an MPhil in Russian and East 
European Studies during a time (2009-11) when Russian-Western relations were cold 
but still relatively cordial, I went on to experience the subsequent deterioration in 
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relations at close hand (professionally speaking) as an intern at the OSCE in 2011-12 and 
as a political risk analyst with a focus on both Russia, Ukraine and the wider European 
context in 2012-15. All the while, I was struck both by the deeply divergent 
interpretations of reality between the two sides and the frequently one-sided (on both 
sides) explanations for the worsening state of affairs. This experience was a direct 
motivation for pursuing a PhD on this particular subject: I want to improve on these 
explanations by offering a theoretically informed, relational account that focuses on the 
co-constitution of the relationship. 
From the poststructuralist epistemological position underlying this study, this 
motivation and the competence gained from previous academic and professional 
experience are assets in the research process (rather than contributing to a value-laden 
and therefore biased case selection, as in a positivist framework). While researchers 
should aspire to pick cases with some theoretical justification and be even-handed and 
judicious in their evaluation of evidence, from this perspective all knowledge is to some 
extent situated and contingent. Biases can never be eliminated completely. As such, 
scholars should acknowledge that they are ‘situated’, be ‘mindful or aware of the 
relationship between oneself and one’s context’, and think critically about why one 
chooses ‘this phenomenon [or theory or field] instead of that’ – what could be called 
autobiographical situatedness (C. B. Neumann and Neumann 2015, 799–805; see also 
Inayatullah 2011). Moreover, as Dunn and Neumann (2016, 49, 85) argue, conducting 
discourse analysis requires a ‘basic level of cultural competence’. To be able to make 
sense of a research area, one must know something about the phenomena involved. 
Analysing Western discourses about Russia (I. B. Neumann 1999, chap. 3), the Congo 
(Dunn 2003) or the Balkans (Hansen 2006) requires a certain level of competence in 
‘Western discourses’ as well as historical contexts and events on the ground that become 
represented in these discourses. Extant knowledge is not just co-incidentally helpful, but 
vital: a ‘primary prerequisite’ to the discourse analyst, and one that should be stated 
openly. Knowing the limits and potential blind spots of one’s cultural competence is as 
important as having some (Dunn and Neumann 2016, 83–86). 
My own background of studying and/or working on Russian and European affairs 
for several years has given me a useful degree of such cultural competence. This includes 
an intermediate knowledge of Russian and experience of living in Russia along with 
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sound knowledge of both the recent history of Russian-Western relations and the 
narratives that both sides tell about each other. As such, I am well placed to conduct 
research on the specific case, and, importantly, far better placed to conduct research on 
this case than on other politically relevant candidates for a study of stigmatisation in 
international relations, such as relations between the West and Turkey, Iran or China. 
The case has thus not been chosen to test or (dis)prove the theory, as in a positivist 
framework. The aim here is exploratory, seeing what can be gained from reading a 
particular empirical story through a particular theoretical lens and following Hans 
Eysenck’s exhortation to ‘sometimes … keep our eyes open and look carefully at 
individual cases – not in the hope of proving anything, but rather in the hope of learning 
something!’ (quoted in Flyvbjerg 2006, 224). That said, it is hoped that some of the things 
that may be learned from the application of stigma theory to Russian-Western relations 
in the following pages can provide useful insights that can in turn inform other studies of 
stigmatisation processes in international relations. 
 
Scale, actors and language 
Before turning to the empirical scene-setting of the next chapter, three methodological 
questions related to the use of stigma theory to analyse international relations must be 
briefly addressed. They relate to scale, actors and language. 
 The first issue is whether a theory developed for the individual, ‘micro’ level of 
analysis can be ‘scaled up’ to the international. Such a move both feels intuitively 
questionable and violates IR’s traditional orthodoxy on levels of analysis, whereby only 
systemic theories can supposedly apply at the systemic level (Waltz 1979). However, this 
intuition relies largely on the substantialist claim that such levels are both essentially 
separate and analytically separable and that stigmatisation is something self-acting 
individuals do, rather than a transactional social process that produces and shapes 
identities, both individually and collectively and at various ‘levels’ simultaneously. As 
Epstein (2011, 342) notes, discursive approaches to the study of international relations 
do not ‘decide a priori at what level the analysis must be cast, rather, this is determined 
after the empirical observation of a particular issue-area’. Morozov (2015, 58) is right to 
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call Zarakol’s (2010, 4) assertion that ‘stigma has the same effect on states that it has on 
individuals’ ‘rather bold’ and even ‘radical’, but this is because the statement reproduces 
the tendency in IR to treat collective actors like states as if they were human beings. This 
does not necessarily mean that stigmatisation cannot function on an international scale, 
as long as we shift our attention away from pre-given actors and focus instead on the 
relational processes that constitute them. 
This leads to the second, closely related question of how to conceive of collective 
actors such as ‘Russia’ and ‘the West’ being engaged in a process of stigmatisation. The 
answer is that the study’s focus is not on interaction between pre-given social units but 
on the process of stigmatisation and its effect on the evolution of discursive structures 
(in the form of norms) and relations between (in principle) changing social formations. 
Any actor that takes part in the process of stigmatisation can therefore be legitimately 
included in the analysis. The actors are those who embody and enact the processes and 
identities they shape – representatives of large-scale political communities such as 
Russia, the US and the EU but also a multitude of other individuals representing NGOs, 
international organisations, private companies, etc. The processes define the actors, not 
vice versa. Moreover, as noted by Epstein (2011, 342), in a discursive approach the focus 
is not on the individuals speaking but on the subject position or discourse they take up 
on behalf of the group they represent. Thus, when ‘Russia’ and ‘the West’ are mentioned 
in the following analysis, they are not understood as substantive entities with intrinsic 
qualities – the focus is rather on how people acting on behalf of the two ‘entities-in-
motion’ shape, reshape, contest and negotiate their identities and social norms through 
processes of stigmatisation and stigma management. 
 All of that said, even if one accepts a relational ontology, this does not necessarily 
mean that all relational theories can simply be ‘scaled up’ (or down) without 
consideration for how the scale might affect fundamentals of the processes involved. A 
case in point is the question of language. Einar Wigen (2015; 2018) argues that 
international relations are also interlingual relations, an obvious yet underestimated 
point in IR theory that is also of vital importance to processes such as stigmatisation. On 
the most prosaic level, if two or more people do not speak the same language, any form 
of stigmatisation, socialisation or any other social process between them becomes 
complicated – as Zarakol notes about her grandmother and the Himba women, the first 
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step to overcome is the language barrier. But more broadly, even if people representing 
different polities such as Russia, the US or the various members of the EU are able to 
communicate with each other, whether in English, Russian, French or German, directly or 
through an interpreter, their communication will be affected by issues of translation, both 
of words and, more broadly, whole concepts (Wigen 2018, 31–69). As already noted, 
norms such as democracy, human rights, capitalism, etc., are essentially contested 
concepts that do not have a stable meaning even to people speaking the same language, 
let alone across linguistic divides. While some of these concepts and their particular 
meanings have become dominant internationally, stigmatisation and stigma 
management processes in international relations often revolve around contestation of 
what should count as the proper meaning of a concept or its application to a set of 
circumstances – for example, is ‘sovereign democracy’ still democracy? The majority of 
sources used in this study are in English, though many will have been initially issued in 
Russian. Aside from pragmatic reasons of linguistic ability, there is also a theoretical 
reason for this, namely that it is a study of international interaction in which the primary 
focus is on interaction with other international audiences rather than domestic ones. That 
said, any analysis of stigmatisation internationally must thus be attentive to the linguistic 
context and what the use of language says about a statement’s intended audience(s), 
rather than assuming a flat mono-linguality. 
 
Conclusion 
The points about scale and the need for a common language leads to the concluding point 
and the bridge to the next chapter. As noted above, for stigmatisation to occur there must 
be a certain degree of common normative context for the would-be stigmatisers and 
stigmatised, whether those norms are fully internalised and accepted by all or not. In 
most ‘national’ or domestic settings we assume such a context exists, given the high 
degree of shared cultural background, linguistic commonality and similar education 
between individuals of the same nationality. However, as Goffman’s (1963, 13) example 
of the different feelings a middle class boy and a professional criminal of the same 
nationality may feel in going to a library shows, that assumption may be qualified by 
issues of class, gender, race, etc. Either way, such an assumption becomes intuitively more 
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questionable on the international scale and needs to be established empirically to show 
the possibility of stigmatisation taking place. As Zarakol argues, prior to the rise to 
dominance of a particular view of how to organise a state through the long 19th century, 
speaking of stigmatisation on a truly international or global scale may not have been 
possible. However, since then, there has been a set of evolving norms for how best to 
organise states that together are constitutive of what it means to be a ‘normal’ state in 
international relations. Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the communist 
alternative, the dominant norms have been those constitutive of what may broadly be 
called the liberal international order, including democracy, human rights, non-aggression 
and capitalism. In order to set the empirical scene for the subsequent ‘deep dives’ into 
stigmatisation processes in Russian-Western relations in relation to each norm, the next 
chapter elaborates each of these norms, identifying their constitutive elements as well as 
the relevant actors in each field and the mechanisms by which stigmatisation may occur.  
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Chapter 3 
The ‘normal’ state in post-Cold War international society 
 
The previous chapter introduced the concepts of stigma, stigmatisation and stigma 
management as promising concepts for the study of ‘norm politics’, given the insight they 
give into ongoing processes of constituting normality and deviance, and the closely 
related (re)production of spoiled and unspoiled identities. This chapter moves the 
discussion from the theoretical to the empirical, analysing the norms or characteristics 
that constituted the expectations for how a ‘normal’ state should be organised 
domestically and behave internationally in post-Cold War international society. This had 
four components: democratic governance at home and support for the same abroad; a 
commitment to human rights, enacted through legislation and participation in 
international treaty regimes; non-aggression in relations with other states; and a 
commitment to free-market capitalism, understood largely as a separation of the political 
and economic spheres of governance. Each of these norms or norm clusters will be 
analysed in more detail in the sections that follow, including the practices, mechanisms 
and actors most central to the ongoing process of enforcement and stigmatisation in 
relation to each. 
 To say that a ‘normal’ state in contemporary international society should be 
democratic, human rights-abiding, non-aggressive and capitalist is not meant to suggest 
that most states necessarily always followed these norms (normal as ‘average’), or that 
their primacy or nature were universally accepted or uncontested. Rather, ‘normal’ is 
meant in the Bourdieusian sense of the ‘natural point of view’, the point of view of the 
dominant actors in society that imposes itself as natural and most legitimate, and any 
deviation from which is potentially discreditable. In any given society, most actors will be 
discreditable in some way. Goffman (1963, 153) argued that there was only one ‘complete 
unblushing male in America: a young, married, white, urban, northern, heterosexual 
Protestant father of college education, fully employed, of good complexion, weight and 
height and a recent record in sports’. Similarly, a ‘complete unblushing’ state in post-Cold 
War international society would be something like a (liberal) democratic, human rights-
abiding and -promoting, free-market capitalist, peaceful state with no significant level of 
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corruption, no recent history of authoritarian/totalitarian/communist government, 
imperialism, violence against neighbouring states or minorities and a good record in 
providing certain basic levels of public services such as health, employment and 
education for its citizens (and perhaps, like the ‘unblushing male’, a recent record in 
sports). Such a state would perform what Christian Reus-Smit (1999, 123) identifies as 
the ‘moral purpose of the modern state’: ‘the augmentation of individuals’ purposes and 
potentialities’. As these characteristics in their entirety apply to virtually no state, and as 
there has never been complete agreement internationally on either the general 
characteristics or their regulative features, all states are to some degree discreditable. 
The extent of discrediting or stigmatisation depends on whether a state’s particular 
discreditable attribute or behaviour is picked up by stigmatising actors, whether other 
states, NGOs or otherwise, and made the basis for public discrimination and status loss. 
The ‘post-Cold War’ order of democracy, human rights, non-aggression and 
capitalism did not emerge overnight in 1989 or 1991. Ian Clark (2001, 1–12) argues that 
the order was primarily a reaffirmation and extension of the ‘regulative peace’ operating 
in the West since the end of World War II. John Ruggie (1982) has similarly shown how 
liberalism became ‘embedded’ in the economic system after World War II and beyond. 
The 1970s and 1980s were central to two particular inflections of the order: the centrality 
of democracy and democracy promotion, inspired by the ‘third wave’ of democratisation, 
and the neoliberal inflection of capitalism in response to the crisis of Keynesianism and 
the Bretton Woods system (Guilhot 2005; Harvey 2005). Going further back in time, 
Barry Buzan and George Lawson (2013; 2015) identify the seeds of the current order in 
the multiple ‘revolutions of modernity’ of the long nineteenth century, including the rise 
of ‘ideologies of progress’ such as liberalism. Any detailed engagement with the historical 
process of ‘how the West came to rule’ (Anievas and Nisancioglu 2015) is beyond the 
scope of this study. The focus in what follows is rather on how a particular part of this 
‘rule’, understood as the dominant expectation of what a ‘normal’ state should look like 
and how it should behave, expressed itself in the decades following the collapse of its 
main 20th century alternative, the Soviet Union and international communism.37  
 
37 This was of course itself a largely ‘Western’ alternative, the culmination of one of the many ideologies of 
progress (in this case socialism) that developed in Europe during the 19th century and since spread around 
the world with various adaptations. 
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In the following sections, each of the norms or behaviours that together 
constituted expectations of a ‘normal’ state post-1991 are treated in turn, starting with 
democracy and ending with capitalism. In the conclusion, two further aspects of the 
norms are considered: their voluntarism or individualism, and their (sometimes 
contradictory) interlinkages and overlaps.  
 
I – Democracy 
One of the most defining features of international relations in the post-Cold War period 
was the dominance of democracy, which became ‘almost universally accepted as the only 
legitimate form of government’ (Morozov 2013b, 1). From its spread through the last 
parts of the ‘third wave’ of democratisation (Huntington 1993b) and subsequent waves 
like the colour revolutions and the Arab Spring (dubbed the 12th and the 13th wave by 
Gunitsky (2018)), via the concept’s inscription in the founding documents and codes of a 
variety of international organisations (Bowden and Charlesworth 2009), to the 
‘democracy promotion’ agenda of the United States and its allies, including non-
governmental organisations, democracy was becoming an inextricable part of the new 
‘normal’ of international relations. And yet it was also a deeply contested concept, albeit 
often more in theory than in practice (Kurki 2010). This section identifies first the 
substantive aspects of the dominant, ‘normal’, view of democracy, before identifying 
some of the main actors involved in its promotion and mechanisms whereby this ‘normal’ 
was enforced. 
 In keeping with the argument in Chapter 1 about how ‘successful’ norms are often 
vague, democracy is a fundamentally vague and essentially contested concept (Morozov 
2013b, 5–6). Its academic definitions range from the thin, procedural focus on elections 
within states promoted by the likes of Joseph Schumpeter and Samuel Huntington, to 
more expansive models like Marxist ‘delegative’ democracy, social democracy, 
participatory democracy, radical democracy, deliberative democracy and cosmopolitan 
democracy (see Kurki 2010, 372–73 for an overview). These different forms all depart to 
varying degrees from the liberal democratic model that focuses on regular elections and 
liberal individual rights such as freedom of expression, encompassing also issues such as 
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economic inequality or democracy in other arenas of social life beyond the confines of the 
nation state, in order to enable more meaningful democratic experiences than the four-
or-five-yearly opportunity to elect new elites. If we think of democracy as a ‘norm cluster’ 
(Winston 2018), it is clear that while the basic value may be relatively clear (people 
should have a say in how they are governed), the various practices that lead to this value 
being fulfilled are numerous. The concept itself is understood in different ways around 
the globe and so has no fixed ‘essence’ (see e.g. Schaffer 1998; Morozov 2013a). 
Democracy comes with ‘adjectives’ (Collier and Levitsky 1997), and it is an open question 
how far one can stretch the concept – a particularly relevant point when discussing Russia 
given its leadership’s promotion of its own ‘sovereign democracy’ doctrine in the 2000s 
(Morozov 2008). 
 Despite this multiplicity, the dominant version of democracy internationally since 
the end of the Cold War has been a relatively narrow liberal democratic one, modelled 
closely on the experiences of the modern West. This reflected both the general Western 
dominance of international affairs (at least in the 1990s), the liberal triumphalism of the 
‘end of history’38 and liberal democracy’s supposed victory, and the specific loss of 
confidence in more left-wing forms of democracy that accompanied the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the communist bloc (Kurki 2010, 365–66). Despite an increasing focus 
in the 2000s on the need to also promote and encourage ‘liberal democratic cultural 
values’ in order to prevent democratic ‘backsliding’, the consensus remained that 
‘democracy promotion’ entailed the promotion of ‘liberal democratic procedures – 
encompassing electoral processes and institutionalisation of rule of law, freedoms of 
expression, press and association’ (Kurki 2010, 363). William Robinson (1996; 2013) has 
argued that rather than ‘democracy promotion’, the practices of the US and American 
NGOs since the 1980s should be seen as ‘polyarchy promotion’, after Robert Dahl’s (e.g. 
1989) term for describing what he saw as the less-than-fully-democratic form of 
government in modern Western states. For Robinson, the aim of this polyarchy 
promotion was as much the spread of neoliberal capitalism as ‘democracy’, highlighting 
one of the many links between the different dominant norms: ‘democracy promotion’ was 
about making ‘the world safe for transnational capital’ by cultivating transnationally 
 
38 It should be noted that Francis Fukuyama’s work that coined the ‘end of history’ term does not actually 
share in this triumphalism, though the earlier article (1989) is more in the triumphalist vein than the 
subsequent book (1992). See e.g. Fukuyama (2013) for his take on the subject two decades on. 
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oriented elites willing to open up their countries to foreign capital (W. I. Robinson 2013, 
229–30). Regardless of intentions, these processes served to promote a dominant narrow 
view of democracy as primarily about elections. 
The elevation of liberal democracy to the status of a dominant norm owed a lot to 
the democracy promotion activities of Western (particularly American) NGOs and 
governments. Organisations such as the National Democratic Institute, International 
Republican Institute, Freedom House and the Open Society Institute played central roles 
in the wave of ‘colour revolutions’ by promoting practices such as independent electoral 
monitoring, training, equipping and encouraging opposition parties and civic groups, 
even if their actual impact was often overblown relative to structural and local factors 
(Carothers 2006, 60–61). Freedom House’s annual report on Freedom in the World served 
a similar role to credit rating agencies by ranking countries according to their degree of 
liberal ‘freedom’ in the form of civil liberties and political rights, providing both a source 
of diffuse stigmatisation and information that could be mobilised by governments to 
justify more direct forms of discrimination and exclusion.39 Backing this up was a 
succession of US governments and presidents, from Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama, 
devoted to the spread of democracy, albeit with varying emphases (Bridoux 2013). The 
George W. Bush administration was the most overtly committed to democratic regime 
changes across the world through its ‘Freedom Agenda’, but also the one that ironically 
ended up undermining the democracy promotion agenda owing to the justification of the 
war in Iraq on democratisation grounds and its double standards on liberal rights at 
home and in the War on Terror (Carothers 2006, 63–65). This led Bush’s successor, 
Obama, to scale back the universalist pretensions in favour of a more dialogical but still 
‘inspirational’ promotion of Western-style ‘freedom’ (Jackson 2016). Through both 
symbolic rankings and material support, democracy promoters worked to make 
democracy (or polyarchy) an international norm. 
 Another process by which democracy became elevated to an expectation for a fully 
‘normal’ state was its endorsement by an increasing number of international 
organisations, whether as a condition for membership or a principle that members 
should aspire to. Organisations such as the Organisation for American States (OAS), 
 
39 See https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world (accessed 14 July 2019). 
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African Union and even the UN took steps towards recognising democracy as a value for 
its members to aspire to. However, particularly in the UN’s case disagreements over 
definitions, persistent criticisms of democracy promotion as a Western/Global North 
imposition, and enduring commitments to non-interference in internal affairs above all 
else – what Gerry Simpson (2001) dubs ‘[UN] Charter liberalism’ – meant that no 
consensus was reached as to what democracy entailed in practice (Bowden and 
Charlesworth 2009, 92–99). Nevertheless, the UN did become involved with election 
monitoring through its Electoral Assistance Division, through which member states could 
request help with organising elections, and ‘acted to restore democratic governance 
through the use of force’ in places such as Haiti, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Angola (G. 
Simpson 2001, 558; see also Hurrell 2007, 151–52).40 Even an international financial 
institution like the World Bank, which had previously focused narrowly on economic 
structural adjustment (more on which below), started to include ‘good governance’ 
metrics as part of its conditions for lending, although ‘democracy’ as such was not 
referred to and the ‘core values’ of the agenda were more inspired by human rights 
(Guilhot 2005, 210–15). On a global level, this process was relatively mixed, meaning the 
norm may be called relatively ‘thin’ globally. 
The processes were thicker in the Euro-Atlantic context, where democracy in its 
liberal definition became institutionalised through several international organisations. 
The Statute of the Council of Europe had already in 1949 referred to the principles of 
‘individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law’ as the ‘basis for all genuine 
democracy’ and made membership conditional on their acceptance (Council of Europe 
1949). The same year, 12 West European and North American states signed the North 
Atlantic Treaty establishing NATO, which committed its signatories to ‘safeguard the 
freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of 
democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law’ (NATO n.d.). To this day, NATO defines 
itself as an alliance that ‘promotes democratic values’ (NATO n.d.). In 1990, the heads of 
participating states of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), 
soon to become the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and 
including all the states of the rapidly disintegrating communist bloc, adopted the ‘Charter 
of Paris for A New Europe’. This committed them to ‘a new era of democracy, peace and 
 
40 See https://dppa.un.org/en/elections for the UN’s current work on elections (accessed 14 July 2019). 
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unity’, and defined ‘democratic government [as] based on the will of the people, 
expressed regularly through free and fair elections’ (CSCE 1990).41 Two years later, in the 
Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), the soon-to-be EU member states 
committed themselves to democracy in their domestic governance and the development 
and consolidation of democracy in their (still embryonic) common foreign and security 
policy, and in 1993, the so-called Copenhagen Criteria stipulated democratic governance 
as a condition for EU membership (Treaty on European Union 1992; European 
Commission 1993). Over the subsequent decades, election monitors from the Council of 
Europe and the OSCE regularly monitored elections across the Euro-Atlantic space and 
provided assessments of each state’s democratic performance, while conditionality as 
part of the EU’s enlargement process imposed a particular vision of liberal, market-based 
democratic governance on the new formerly communist members from Central and 
Eastern Europe (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Grabbe 2006; 2014; for a recent 
collection of critical takes on the process, see Neuman 2019). This normative ‘thickness’ 
and institutionalisation of electoral democracy in Europe is of crucial relevance to this 
study, given its focus on largely intra-European Russian-Western relations. While 
globally, states were able to remain undemocratic more easily, the pressures to 
democratise within the institutional architecture of Europe were stronger. In order to be 
considered a normal European state, a state had to be democratic, defined primarily as 
having regular free and fair, competitive elections where the losing side agreed to honour 
the result. 
 Democracy was not limited to how a state should organise itself internally. States 
were also increasingly expected to welcome and even to work for democratic 
developments elsewhere, as seen for example in the EU’s stated commitment to the 
spread of democratic consolidation. This was the logical consequence of the ‘concern with 
the beneficial effect of democracy’ central to the post-Cold War order and the resultant 
‘programme for encouraging its extension’ represented by, inter alia, US democracy 
promotion and EU conditionality (Clark 2001, 224). It was not enough for a government 
to be democratic at home, it should also be democratic abroad by welcoming and even 
encouraging democratic developments in other countries, for example through 
 
41 The Charter also committed the states to establish an ‘Office for Free Elections’ in Warsaw, which would 
eventually become the OSCE’s election monitoring arm and all-round human rights watchdog, the Office 
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). 
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supporting the work of civil society organisations committed to democracy promotion. 
Befriending or propping up undemocratic leaders or regimes was increasingly frowned 
upon, at least in theory. Concerns about ‘autocracy promotion’ periodically emerged, 
although as Lucan Way (2016, 64–65) argues, its impact was often overblown and 
authoritarian powers tended to be less concerned about spreading authoritarianism per 
se and more interested in their own ‘narrow economic and geopolitical interests’ (a 
criticism that could of course also be levied at the ‘democracy’ promoters, and often was). 
 A failure to live up to dominant democratic standards both in domestic and foreign 
policy would thus make a state discreditable, subject to diffuse stigmatisation in the sense 
of being deficient in relation to the dominant expectations of ‘normality’. These standards 
were certainly never followed in full by any state, Western or otherwise, and criticism of 
democratic ‘slippage’ in the Western core increased greatly after the turn of the 
millennium (Cooley 2015). As with the other norms identified below, a failure to live up 
to democratic standards would not automatically lead to direct stigmatisation – this 
would be dependent on actors mobilising stigmatisation processes directly against a 
state.  
 
II – Human Rights 
Abiding by certain fundamental human rights was another expectation of a fully ‘normal’ 
state in the post-Cold War period, both globally and in Europe (albeit again with a thicker 
and more embedded institutional set-up in the latter and some other regions). Human 
rights and democracy were often treated as two inseparable sides of the same coin, both 
in institutional structures (for example in the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights, ODIHR) and discursively, despite the fact that the two concepts are 
potentially at odds – human rights in theory qualify democracy by constraining the demos 
from doing certain things to its individual members (Hurrell 2007, 158–59). 
Nevertheless, the right to take part in the government of one’s own country through 
‘periodic and genuine elections’ was enshrined as a human right in article 21 of the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reinforced in article 25 of the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, demonstrating the close 
entanglement of the two concepts (United Nations 1948; 1966). This section details the 
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mechanisms and processes that made protecting the rights of its citizens an increasingly 
dominant norm of international society. 
A defining feature of human rights as an international norm was its increasing 
legalisation and institutionalisation through international organisations and treaties, 
starting long before the end of the Cold War. Despite the scepticism of the major powers 
and after pressure in particular from Latin American states and NGOs, human rights 
language became a key feature of the 1945 United Nations Charter, with seven references 
to ‘human rights’ and the member states’ determination ‘to reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights’ as the Charter’s second point (United Nations 1945; Sikkink 2017, 69–73; 
Morsink 1999). At the UN level this was followed up with the 1948 Universal Declaration, 
the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD, championed by Jamaica and other newly independent Global 
South states) and the 1966 covenants on civil and political rights (ICCPR) and economic, 
social and cultural rights (ICESCR), which entered into force in 1976 and expanded and 
gave international legal force to the principles of the 1948 declaration (Sikkink 2017, 
106–8, 119). By 2014 a total of 18 international human rights treaties (including optional 
protocols) had been completed under UN auspices, covering violence against women, 
torture, children’s rights, etc.42 From ICERD onwards, the inclusion of a treaty body that 
monitored compliance became standard, albeit usually without any judicial or legal 
powers (Sikkink 2017, 107–8). While ratification levels for all the 18 treaties and 
protocols varied, ratification of the two core covenants grew steadily to 172 (ICCPR) and 
169 (ICESCR) states, respectively, demonstrating the increasing normalisation and peer 
pressure to conform.43 Figure 3.1 shows how the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s coincided with an increase in ratifications, indicating a consolidation 
around principles of human rights. However, this was not just owing to former 
communist and newly independent states ‘joining up’ – the US only ratified the ICCPR in 
 
42 For a full overview, see https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx, 
and for an interactive overview of ratifications, see http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (both accessed 14 July 
2019). See Sikkink (2017, 204) for a graph showing ratification of six ‘core’ treaties including the two 
covenants. 
43 At the time of writing, of the nine core treaties, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child had the 
most ratifications with 196 (the US being the only non-state party, having only signed) and the 1990 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families 
the least with 54, demonstrating the contested scope of human rights. 
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1992, the Clinton administration fulfilling the Carter administration’s signature from 15 
years previously (the US has yet to ratify the ICESCR).44 
Figure 3.1 – Ratifications of the international human rights covenants, 1968-2018 
 
Source: Database of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) http://untreaty.un.org/ola. 
 
Beyond the global level, there were regional variations in the thickness of the 
institutional human rights ecology. The two geographical areas with the densest set of 
institutions were Europe and the Americas. The latter was the first to issue a declaration 
of human rights, the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man that 
preceded the UDHR by several months. Despite patchy progress over the next decades, 
by the late 1980s both an American Commission, Convention and Court of Human Rights 
had been established (Sikkink 2017, 74–77, 114–19). The member states of the Council 
of Europe, which in addition to democracy had established ‘the further realisation of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms’ as one of its founding objectives and thus 
conditions for membership (Council of Europe 1949), were the first to create a legally 
 
44 In John Meyer’s (2009, 49) argument, the fact that states sign up to these treaties despite the most 
powerful state in the world’s ambivalence about them is a crucial point against realist conceptions of 
actorhood and power in international relations – ‘it is difficult to say the Americans make a third world 
country sign treaties the Americans themselves do not sign’. However, his conclusion from this that the 
process is more voluntary than often assumed does not necessarily follow – for example, stigmas can 
operate to discipline states into conforming without necessarily being backed by overt material power. 
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binding human rights treaty, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which 
entered into force in 1953 and established the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
as an unprecedented enforcement mechanism (for a history of the negotiations, see A. W. 
B. Simpson 2001). The institutional bite of the Council’s mechanisms became clear in 
1967 when Greece withdrew from the organisation under threat of being excluded owing 
to human rights abuses under its new military junta (Sikkink 2017, 122–23). Meanwhile, 
the conclusion of the Helsinki Accords at the Conference for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe in 1975 between 35 European states from both sides of the East/West divide 
provided an added impetus for human rights across the Euro-Atlantic area. While both 
sides initially thought the commitments to human rights in the Accords would be 
secondary to the mutual recognition of the post-World War II borders in Europe, they 
established a precedent that allowed NGOs in countries across the communist bloc (the 
so-called ‘Helsinki committees’) to increasingly hold their governments to account for 
human rights abuses and contributed to the gradual unravelling of the Cold War and the 
communist bloc (Thomas 2001; Morgan 2018). 
As with democracy, the end of the Cold War intensified, spread and deepened the 
institutional architecture promoting human rights as an expectation of state behaviour, 
especially in Europe. One by one, the former communist countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe joined the Council of Europe, submitting to the jurisdiction of the ECtHR. From 
1998, individuals could bring claims against their state directly to the ECtHR, reflecting 
the increasing move towards the individualisation of international human rights justice. 
In the 1990 Charter of Paris, the CSCE states committed themselves to the ‘protection and 
promotion’ of ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’ as ‘the first responsibility of 
government’ (CSCE 1990, 3). As with democracy, the EU’s founding document committed 
its members to ‘respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ and its criteria for 
expansion stated that new members must have achieved ‘stability of institutions 
guaranteeing … human rights and respect for and protection of minorities’ (Treaty on 
European Union 1992; European Commission 1993). The revival of minority rights as a 
distinct category of rights was also reflected in the CSCE’s appointment of a High 
Commissioner on National Minorities in 1992 (Hurrell 2007, 144). Through the 1990s 
and 2000s, the EU accession process of the post-communist states of Central and Eastern 
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Europe required them to adopt extensive human rights legislation, despite ongoing 
controversies over implementation. 
Another defining feature of the rapidly evolving human rights regime in the post-
Cold War period was the increasing focus on individual responsibility and accountability 
for human rights abuses, especially but not exclusively war crimes and genocide. The 
establishment of the ad hoc UN tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda 
(ICTR) as well as the International Criminal Court (ICC), along with such events as the 
arrest of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet in the UK in 1998 and his subsequent 
trial in Chile over numerous human rights abuses, all contributed to a trend from state 
accountability towards individual accountability (Hurrell 2007, 147–48; Sikkink 2017, 
133–34). This ‘justice cascade’ (Sikkink 2011) still had a statist dimension, in that it 
increased the expectations on states to investigate and prosecute their own worst human 
rights offenders so that international tribunals would not step in, but the trend was 
towards qualifying state sovereignty and diplomatic immunity in cases of grave human 
rights abuses. The process was far from complete, particularly given the reluctance of 
important states like the US, Russia and China to sign and/or ratify the Rome Statute 
establishing the ICC and the continued criticism of the Court, primarily from African 
states, for its exclusive focus on the Global South (on the ICC’s emergence and early 
existence, see e.g. Bosco 2014; Bower 2019; Stahn 2015; De Vos, Kendall, and Stahn 
2015). However, it contributed to a growing individual-level stigma around human rights 
abuses and evasion of prosecution (c.f. Mégret 2014), as well as a state-level stigma for 
non-prosecution. 
Where NGOs played only a relatively central role in democracy promotion, when 
it came to human rights their involvement was crucial. They gathered, produced and 
disseminated information and knowledge about human rights abuses, mobilised shame 
to pressure governments, acted as conduits for external assistance and were a 
‘transmission belt for changes in attitudes and values’ in the broader social context 
(Hurrell 2007, 148). As will be seen in Chapter 5, these roles all contributed towards the 
stigmatisation of human rights abusers. Human rights NGOs and transnational advocacy 
networks were thus the archetypal ‘norm entrepreneurs’ defined by Finnemore and 
Sikkink (1998). Given the many linkages between human rights and democracy in 
practice, many NGOs worked explicitly in both areas (e.g. Freedom House), but several 
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also had a more narrow focus on particular human rights issues, for example Amnesty 
International’s original focus on prisoners of conscience and work against the death 
penalty or Human Rights Watch’s origins as Helsinki Watch, founded in 1978 to monitor 
compliance with the Helsinki Accords in the Soviet Union (Hopgood 2000; Neier 2012, 
186–232). Both international (INGOs) and national NGOs working on human rights 
proliferated through the latter half of the 20th century, forming a vital part of the advocacy 
networks increasing pressure on governments of all stripes to defend human rights 
(Sikkink 2017, 154–55). These organisations played key roles particularly in the labelling 
part of the stigmatisation process. 
Despite the growing dominance of human rights in the post-Cold War period, the 
norm as a whole and the practices embodying it remained contested on several levels. 
This was not a clear-cut story of ‘the West’ promoting liberal tolerance and rights against 
the ignorance of ‘the Rest’. While many Asian governments insisted on the special status 
of ‘Asian values’ in the 1990s against the supposedly imperialist practices of Western 
human rights promotion, Jensen (2016), Sikkink (2017) and others have convincingly 
shown that the modern human rights regime developed through contested processes that 
owed as much to Latin American legal advocacy and post-colonial states’ push for racial 
equality as to ‘Western’ thought. In practice, Western states were often ready to ride 
roughshod over human rights principles in the name of a greater good, most notably the 
US during the ‘War on Terror’, in which its supposed commitment to the 1984 Convention 
against Torture was severely undermined in the name of national security (see e.g. 
McKeown 2009; Kutz 2014; Schmidt and Sikkink 2019). Overall, the US’s ratification of 
only five of the 18 core human rights treaties listed by the UN showed the leading 
Western state’s ambivalent relationship with parts of the human rights regime, despite 
its declared promotion of civil and political rights under the guise of ‘freedom and 
democracy’.  
The division between civil and political rights on the one hand and economic and 
social rights on the other embodied in the ICCPR and ICESCR was one dividing line in the 
ongoing contestation of human rights’ scope. However, the explicit adoption of economic 
and social rights by organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch in the late 1990s-early 2000s was one of many factors undermining this (see e.g. 
Roth 2004; M. Robinson 2004). As Hurrell (2007, 144) notes, the old civil/political-
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economic/social divide was increasingly superseded by claims to a ‘third generation’ of 
rights (including to ‘development, peace, clean environment, cultural identity’) that 
brought attention to structures of oppression. Moreover, even among ‘Western’ or 
‘developed’ states there were controversies over the scope of civil and political rights – 
while the death penalty was effectively outlawed in Europe by Protocols 6 (in force since 
1985) and 13 (since 2003) of the ECHR, it was still practised in several US states and 
Japan (see e.g. Neumayer 2008 for a discussion of the spread of abolition). This led the 
ECtHR to rule in 1989 that extraditing those at risk of the death penalty to the US would 
be a breach of the prohibition on torture.45 Areas like LGBT rights were likewise 
ambiguous, characterised by late recognition even in supposedly progressive, liberal 
states, with their embrace and promotion by the US and others criticised as 
‘homonationalism’ – the idea of tolerance for LGBT people as yet another standard of 
‘civilisation’ disqualifying intolerant states from full sovereignty – and ‘pinkwashing’ by 
academics and activists (Puar 2007; 2013). This highlights the link between human rights 
and interventionism, the potential for human rights abuses to qualify the dominant norm 
of non-aggression, which will be explored in more detail in the next section.  
In addition to their close conceptual and practical links with democracy and 
troubled relationship to intervention, human rights were the object of criticism arguing 
that they went hand-in-hand with a particular individualistic form of neoliberal 
capitalism. For example, Samuel Moyn (2018; see also 2010) has argued that in their 
minimalist form focused on individuals’ rights to sufficiency, economic and social rights 
do not challenge the persistent structural inequalities of the globalised economy. In 
Kathryn McNeilly’s (2016, 271) summary, the critique has been that the ‘subject of liberal 
human rights is a bounded individual who possesses their life, liberty and security as 
property which should be protected from external interferences, in doing so reflecting 
the wider imperatives of a capitalist economy’. The extent of the ‘affinity’ between human 
rights and neoliberalism is disputed. For example, Sikkink (2017, 38–48) argues that such 
a critique relies on a confusion of human rights as a whole with US and UK human rights 
policies and, as a consequence, ignores both the many struggles against neoliberalism in 
 
45 See https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/death-penalty (accessed 14 July 2019). By 2006 all Council of 
Europe member states except Russia had ratified Protocol 6 (outlawing the death penalty in peacetime), 
and by 2014 all except Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia had ratified Protocol 13 (outlawing it in all 
circumstances). However, Russia had a moratorium on capital punishment in effect since 1996 (see Light 
and Kovalev 2013 for a discussion of the Council of Europe’s influence on Russia in this matter). 
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the name of human rights and the fact that the focus on civil and political rights in the 
1970s onwards was because of the nature of the repression faced at the time, notably in 
communist Eastern Europe. Sikkink is surely right that human rights are not inherently 
neoliberal just because some human rights movements in contexts of state repression 
have also advocated market reform. However, it is also clear that the dominant human 
rights norms in the post-Cold War period were at the very least compatible with the 
spread of liberal capitalism. 
In sum, despite the contested scope of human rights, the expectation of a ‘normal’ 
state in post-Cold War international society was that it upheld the basic rights of its 
population. The stigma attached to human rights violations was growing and was 
becoming increasingly individualised, with state leaders no longer beyond the reach of 
international humanitarian law. 
 
III – Non-aggression 
The third dominant norm concerning state behaviour in the post-Cold War order was the 
imperative not to act aggressively against other states. Unlike democracy and human 
rights, which first and foremost referred to the internal governance of a state, the norm 
of non-aggression by its very definition concerned inter-state relationships. Moreover, 
while democracy and human rights as concepts were more towards the constitutive side 
of the constitutive/regulative norm spectrum, non-aggression was more of a regulative 
norm following logically from the constitutive principles of the sovereign equality and 
territorial integrity of states that formed the basis for the UN system. Indeed, the most 
basic expression of the norm is encapsulated in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which 
states that ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state’ (United 
Nations 1945). However, like democracy, human rights and indeed capitalism, exactly 
what constituted aggression was a contested issue, with states and international lawyers 
engaged in ongoing debates over its precise definition and the extent of criminalisation. 
These debates were closely entangled politically with questions of intervention in 
general, including humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect. This 
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section briefly charts the processes through which aggression – but not intervention per 
se – became a discreditable behaviour for states. 
 Attempts to prohibit the use of armed force between states and make peaceful 
resolution of conflicts the norm proliferated throughout the 20th century. Article 10 of the 
League of Nations Covenant called on all members to ‘respect and preserve as against 
external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence’ of all 
other members, but stopped short of outlawing war (‘The Covenant of the League of 
Nations’ n.d.; see also Sellars 2016 on the attempts to charge Kaiser Wilhelm II with 
aggression after WWI). That was done, in theory, by the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact or the 
‘General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy’ 
(McDougall 2013, 2). The Nuremburg and Tokyo Tribunals following World War II then 
– controversially, given the lack of legal precedent – tried German and Japanese officials 
for ‘crimes against peace’, defined as the ‘planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a 
war of aggression’, which subsequently became part of customary international law 
(McDougall 2016, quote from 53). The UN Charter, in addition to prohibiting the ‘use or 
threat of force’, declared that one of the UN’s purposes was to suppress ‘acts of 
aggression’, giving the Security Council the right to ‘determine the existence’ of such an 
act and therefore to define what it meant in practice (United Nations 1945). The meaning 
of the different terms (‘war of aggression’, ‘act of aggression’, ‘use or threat of force’) were 
not fully resolved or clarified in the years that followed, and given developments like the 
onset of the Cold War, several states maintained their right to use force in certain 
situations (McDougall 2013, 3–5). The most comprehensive definition of aggression to 
date, albeit one that still ‘masked deep divisions of opinion’ (McDougall 2013, 6), was 
adopted by consensus by the UN General Assembly in 1974: ‘Aggression is the use of 
armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of 
the United Nations, as set out in this Definition’ (United Nations 1974).46 This language 
shows the close entanglement of the concepts of sovereignty, territoriality and 
independence with the concept of aggression, and the various developments clearly 
 
46 The definition included several illustrative examples of what might constitute aggression, such as 
invasion, bombardment, blockade of ports, the use of one state’s armed forces within another’s territory, 
etc. 
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indicate a gradual process towards the stigmatisation of aggression and/or aggressors, 
despite continued contestation over its proper meaning and scope. 
 The process towards individualisation and criminalisation that was affecting the 
broader human rights regime also came to affect aggression, with the eventual inclusion 
of a ‘crime of aggression’ in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This 
only happened at the first Review Conference for the statute, in Kampala in 2010, after 
the parties had not been able to reach agreement in Rome in 1998 (see McDougall 2013, 
6–32 for a brief history of the process; and Kress and Barriga 2016 for a collection of 
commentaries). Article 8 bis of the Statute drew on the various terms in circulation to 
define a ‘crime of aggression’ as ‘the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a 
person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military 
action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, 
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations’. It defined an ‘act of 
aggression’ as ‘the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another State’, and listed a series of illustrative acts 
that, ‘regardless of a declaration of war’ would qualify as an act of aggression 
(International Criminal Court 2011, 9). Thus, although the 2010 amendments were not 
due to take full effect until after the time period under investigation here (2017), by the 
end of this period the act of aggression by individual state leaders was not only 
stigmatised and prohibited under various treaties and customary international law, but 
criminalised. 
 It is important to distinguish the stigma attached to aggression from the broader 
debates about intervention. Intervention per se was not stigmatised, despite the 
constitutive role of mutually recognised sovereignty in the order and the push from both 
postcolonial states and groupings such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 
Africa) for their ‘right to non-intervention’ over the past decades (Lawson and Tardelli 
2013, 1239–40). Under the post-Cold War order, intervention or the use of force could 
still be permitted in at least three instances: self-defence against aggression; with 
permission from the UN Security Council in its capacity as guardian of ‘international 
peace and security’; and, most controversially, for humanitarian purposes. These three 
instances are discussed in more detail below. Each of these forms of intervention and/or 
the use of force could be legitimate depending on circumstance. The aim for an 
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intervener, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, was thus to avoid having an 
intervention labelled as illegitimate and being stigmatised as an aggressor, by 
successfully framing the intervention in legitimate terms. 
 The first two instances of legitimate intervention – self-defence and Security 
Council-endorsed use of force – are summed up in theory in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
The Chapter authorises the Security Council to ‘determine the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’ (article 39) and details the various 
measures, up to and including the use of armed force, the Council may call upon UN 
members to take to restore the peace (articles 41 and 42) (United Nations 1945). The 
long-standing right to self-defence is reiterated in article 51, which states that ‘Nothing 
in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations’ (United 
Nations 1945). The Security Council’s role indicates the enduring great power 
management aspects of contemporary international order, where such a role comes with 
the price of deciding when an intervention is appropriate and frequently contributing 
heavily to the material and human costs of interventions (Lawson and Tardelli 2013, 
1242–43). The collectivism embedded in the UN Charter regime also goes to the core of 
what Clark (2001, 206) argued was the key security component of the post-Cold War 
order: a ‘collectivist’ approach to security. This collectivism was aligned with the 
dominant norm of non-aggression and intended to uphold it. Thus, to avoid potential 
stigmatisation, any use of force by a state should be shown to be defensive, and preferably 
to be undertaken as part of a wider collective. Clark (2001, 209–10) identified the 1990-
91 Gulf War as key to the establishment of this order, the prototype that subsequent war 
should follow to comply: it ‘stood for the delegitimation of any use of force not sanctioned 
by the victorious Cold War coalition, while also promoting the collectivisation of the use 
of force to deter resort to it’. Not every subsequent intervention was as clear-cut, 
however, as will be seen in Chapter 6, and most – from NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 
1998-99 to Russia’s in Ukraine in 2014 and several states’ in Syria since 2011 – involved 
a symbolic struggle to define the intervention as legitimate and/or legal. In practice, then, 
the theory of the UN Charter was not always clear-cut, but it set the ground rules. 
 The most controversial aspect of intervention in the post-Cold War era was the 
practice of humanitarian intervention, closely entangled with the emergent concept of 
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the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). As the international human rights regime expanded 
and solidified and (civil and international) wars in the Balkans, Rwanda and elsewhere 
involved war crimes, ethnic cleansing and even genocide, so debates surrounding the 
need to protect populations from such human rights abuses accelerated through the 
1990s and 2000s, both in academic and policy making circles.47 There was a tendency in 
many of these debates to speak of humanitarian intervention as a ‘subject without a 
history’ (Simms and Trim 2011a, 2), a novel outcome of the post-Cold War victory for 
human rights and liberalism. This was mistaken – as much academic literature has 
shown, the principle and/or practice of some form of humanitarian intervention have 
long histories, and the tension between domestic and international authority over the 
protection of individuals, be they foreign nationals, ethnic minorities or all citizens, is 
nothing new (see e.g. Bass 2008; Orford 2011; Simms and Trim 2011b; Wheeler 2000).  
Despite the often exaggerated novelty, the relatively successful attempts to 
consolidate, institutionalise and legalise (under international law) a responsibility on all 
states to protect their populations from so-called ‘atrocity crimes’ (Dieng and Welsh 
2015) and the right for other states to intervene if this responsibility was not upheld, 
represented a growing stigmatisation of such crimes and legitimation of intervention to 
avert them. The principle of the Responsibility to Protect, the core aspect of these 
attempts, was first proposed in a 2001 report by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (established by the UN General Assembly in 2000), 
and was formally adopted by the General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit 
(International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001; UN General 
Assembly 2005).48 The World Summit resolution stated that ‘[e]ach individual state has 
the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity’, and noted states’ preparedness to ‘take collective action’ 
‘through the Security Council’ in cases where ‘peaceful means [had been] inadequate and 
 
47 The literature on humanitarian intervention is too vast to do full justice to here. For a selective sample, 
see Deng et al. (1996); Wheeler (2000); Chesterman (2001); Holzgrefe and Keohane (2003); Welsh (2004); 
Orford (2011); Simms and Trim (2011b); Weiss (2016). UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s April 1999 speech 
at the Chicago Economic Club, available at 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/154/26026.html (accessed 10 July 2019), is 
widely cited as the most prominent expression by a state leader of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
(in Blair’s actual words a ‘doctrine of international community’). 
48 See https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/key-documents.shtml for all relevant UN documents 
on the Responsibility to Protect (accessed 14 July 2019). 
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national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’ (UN General Assembly 2005, 30). 
Subsequent practice was patchy. While special UN advisers Adama Dieng and Jennifer 
Welsh, writing in 2015, noted a growing embeddedness of the principle in resolutions 
passed by the UN and regional organisations as well as an increasing number of states 
signing up to support implementation, they also noted ongoing, unanswered atrocities in 
‘the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Democratic 
Republic of North Korea, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen’ 
(Dieng and Welsh 2015, 124, 128). Conflicting interests usually prevented states from 
agreeing on when and where the Responsibility to Protect should be applied, with the 
2011 intervention in Libya remaining the only use of force authorised by the Security 
Council with reference to human protection ‘against the wishes of a functioning state’ 
(Lawson and Tardelli 2013, 1243). This patchy practice notwithstanding, the slowly 
growing consensus around the principle provided an emergent source of stigmatisation 
to partner that of committing human rights atrocities, whether at home or abroad, namely 
opposing intervention to prevent atrocities. Any state either blocking intervention 
(which was the prerogative of the P5 members of the Security Council, including Russia) 
or in other ways working against or refusing to commit to it were potentially 
discreditable as ‘deviant’ against the new, emergent ‘normal’ of R2P. 
 The dominant order thus tolerated the use of force by states, but only use of force 
that could be shown to be non-aggressive, i.e. undertaken in self-defence against an act of 
aggression, authorised by the UN Security Council, and/or undertaken to prevent atrocity 
crimes under the auspices of humanitarian intervention/Responsibility to Protect. A fully 
‘normal’ state would refrain from any non-aggressive action, and any state using force 
faced an imperative to successfully frame this action as legitimate in one of the three 
ways. Any use of force successfully labelled aggressive would expose a state to potential 
stigmatisation. 
 
IV – Capitalism 
The fourth norm for a fully ‘normal’ state to follow in post-Cold War international society 
was that of capitalism. A commitment to organising one’s economy based on capitalist, 
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market-based principles and an openness to trade became a norm both in the sense of an 
expected behaviour and in the sense that most states did in fact organise their economies 
in such a way, albeit to varying degrees. As highlighted by Buzan and Lawson (2014, 72), 
for much of the twentieth century a key geopolitical question was ‘Capitalism or not?’, 
owing to the presence of the state socialist alternative, while in the post-Cold War period 
‘...the core ideological question in world politics has [instead] been: “What kind of 
capitalism best delivers stable prosperity?”’. Even the centre of the communist world, 
Russia, became capitalist (not to mention China), albeit still with discreditable features 
that will be discussed in Chapter 7. This section discusses the dominant, primarily liberal 
capitalist features of post-Cold War international relations as well as the mechanisms and 
institutions that put pressure on states to conform to the liberal capitalist norm.  
 As with democracy and its many adjectives, so capitalism comes in different 
shapes and forms. There were competing versions of capitalism even within the Western 
capitalist ‘core’, from the neoliberal emphasis on a state as small as possible allowing the 
market to be fully ‘free’, to a more social version concerned with state regulation of 
markets in the interest of social justice and equality. As was the case in the extreme with 
the communist/capitalist dichotomy, perhaps the most central axis of distinction was the 
level of state planning and intervention in the economy. The ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
literature distinguishes between ‘liberal market economies’ and ‘coordinated market 
economies’, with the latter having greater levels of state-driven planning (e.g. Hall and 
Soskice 2001). Bruno Amable (2003) identified five versions of ‘modern’ capitalism – 
market-based, social-democratic, Continental European, Mediterranean, and Asian. 
Adding the political governance structure in which capitalism is embedded nationally 
into the mix, Buzan and Lawson (2014, 72) propose an ideal-type of four forms of 
capitalism: liberal democratic, social democratic, competitive authoritarian and state 
bureaucratic. As indicated in particular by Amable’s geographically-denominated 
versions of capitalism, debates over exactly how to be capitalist were ongoing even within 
the West, with the EU and US representing different traditions and the EU itself internally 
divided. This was not just a matter of theoretical debate: since 1995, the US and EU have 
opened at least 55 disputes against each other at the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
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over issues ranging from bananas to steel to copyright.49 Even with the collapse of the 
communist alternative, then, capitalism remained, as always in its history, a contested 
concept and form both in theory and practice. 
In spite of this diversity, certain dominant features were common to almost all the 
different states that the above variations and ideal types were based on. Capitalist states 
organised their economies based on ‘market logics’, took part in ‘global regimes 
governing trade, production and finance’ and, in a departure from previous ideas of 
political economy, sought ‘to formally distinguish distinct realms of politics and 
economics’ (Buzan and Lawson 2014, 75). This conception distinguished economics as a 
separate, non-ideological and technocratic sphere distinct from the inherently ideological 
world of politics, and was the underlying condition for complaints from businessmen and 
politicians alike about ‘political interference’ in the face of proposals for increased 
regulation or taxes, and the imperative for governments of maintaining a ‘good business 
climate’ (Harvey 2005, 71–72). Private rather than state enterprise should be the 
cornerstone of economic activity, with the state’s role primarily to facilitate private 
enterprise and relatively unfettered market mechanisms through ensuring ‘strong 
individual private property rights, the rule of law, and the institutions of freely 
functioning markets and free trade’ (Harvey 2005, 64). As a default position, politics 
should be subordinated to economics (and/or business and/or finance). As a result, 
despite continued variation the ‘ideological bandwidth’ of acceptable forms of capitalism 
was becoming ‘increasingly narrow’ (Buzan and Lawson 2014, 72). 
The ideological and theoretical basis for this narrowing bandwidth can be traced 
to the increasing dominance of neoliberal and/or ‘ordoliberal’50 economic thinking in 
policy-making circles in both Western states and international financial institutions in 
the 1970s and 1980s. These terms do not denote monolithic schools of thought – Mark 
Blyth (2002; 2013; see also Harvey 2005) has shown how the roots of what is often 
lumped together as ‘neoliberal’ economic thinking has several different intellectual 
 
49 See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/find_dispu_cases_e.htm (accessed 26 August 
2019). 
50 From German ‘ordnung’ (order), emphasising the importance of rules and strong independent state 
institutions because governments seeking re-election cannot be trusted to make sound economic decisions. 
Note the subtle difference from neoliberalism, which in theory wants neither a strong state nor 
government, but in practice needs a relatively strong state to create and protect the ‘free’ market. 
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sources. Moreover, while the education of neoliberal economists at places like the 
University of Chicago and Harvard and their promotion through the ranks of institutions 
like the US Treasury, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in the 1970s 
helps explain the dominance of neoliberal thinking on the western side of the Atlantic 
(see e.g. Chwieroth 2007; 2010; Peet 2009), the ordoliberal design of EU financial 
institutions like the European Central Bank and European Monetary Union can be traced 
to the particular influence of Germany and German ordoliberal ideas on their formation 
(Blyth 2013, 141–43; see also Bonefeld 2012; 2017). The dominance of both these 
intellectual traditions and the resultant promotion of neoliberal and ordoliberal 
economic principles as the only way by which to achieve economic prosperity, are 
excellent examples of how the viewpoints of the most powerful come to be seen as 
‘normal’ – Bourdieu’s ‘symbolic violence’, Gramsci’s ‘common sense’. They both take 
theories based on the very specific economic experiences and histories of states (mainly 
the US, UK and Germany) and generalise them into universally applicable policy 
recommendations. For example, because the US and UK were able to industrialise and 
prosper with a fairly small state, everyone should be able to, irrespective of time and 
place (Blyth 2013, 134–43). Moreover, the actual historical experiences of these 
countries often do not match the theories – the US and UK became rich through 
protectionism, not free trade, but in Ha-Joon Chang’s (2007, 15–16) words, ‘[t]he history 
of capitalism has been so totally re-written that many people in the rich world do not 
perceive the historical double standards involved in recommending free trade and free 
market to developing countries’. 
The institutional mechanisms through which states were pressured to conform to 
a broadly neo-/ordoliberal version of capitalism (and potentially stigmatised if they did 
not) varied. For developing countries globally, including the former Soviet states, the role 
of the trio of international financial institutions – the IMF, World Bank and, from 1995, 
the WTO – was central. Highly controversial, the institutions have been dubbed both an 
‘unholy trinity’ (Peet 2009), ‘bad samaritans’ (Chang 2007) and, more neutrally, the 
‘globalizers’ (Woods 2006), reflecting their role in processes of globalisation and opening 
up economies, for better or worse. Successive US governments used their powerful 
position within the organisations to push certain agendas (Woods 2006, 4), and they and 
the institutions were at the vanguard of promoting what was dubbed the ‘Washington 
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Consensus’, a set of economic policy recommendations summed up in the mantra 
‘stabilize, privatize, liberalize’: ‘get your macro balances in order [stabilize], take the state 
out of business [privatize], give markets free rein [liberalize]’ (Rodrik 2006, 973; also 
called the ‘holy trinity’ of stabilisation, privatisation and liberalisation, see Rutland 2013, 
338).51 The IMF and the World Bank promoted stabilisation and privatisation as 
conditions for loans – so-called ‘structural adjustment programs’ that governments had 
to complete in order to continue to borrow – while the WTO had trade liberalisation as 
its core mission and required member states to commit to ‘free trade’ by reducing tariffs 
and opening up their economies (Peet 2009). 
Conditionality was never a completely successful process. As Ngaire Woods (2006, 
4) argues, the institutions (and/or their most powerful members) often had strong 
political and bureaucratic incentives to keep lending even when borrowing states were 
less than diligent in carrying out reforms. A consequence of this patchy implementation 
was that the IMF in particular tended not to assume responsibility for failures, i.e. 
instances where the prescribed economic medicine did not have the desired effect of 
promoting growth, often blaming governments for not doing the reforms properly 
instead. The World Bank was more ready to admit to failings, but it is unclear how much 
either institution substantially changed practices as a result (Blyth 2013, 164; Peet 2009, 
31–32; Woods 2006, 3). Despite the uneven implementation, the institutions’ promotion 
of a particular form of capitalism as the ‘right’ kind contributed greatly to the 
establishment of liberal capitalism as the ‘norm’ that states should aspire to. Aside from 
direct conditionality, this also happened through regular reports on the state of states’ 
economies, and rankings such as the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ index, which since 
2001 has rated and ranked the regulative environment in states worldwide based on its 
friendliness to business.52 
An additional and crucial institutional promoter of liberal capitalism in the 
European context was the European Union. As noted above, the EU’s conditions for its 
new member states frequently had less to do with democracy than it had to do with 
 
51 The ‘Consensus’ was originally a set of 10 policies drawn up by development economist John Williamson 
in 1989 as a summary of the supposedly new orthodoxy in development economics, replacing the more 
statist policies that had dominated in Latin America previously (Blyth 2013, 161). See Williamson (2004) 
for his own reflections on the ‘strange’ and unintended history of the term. 
52 See https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/doingbusiness (accessed 13 July 2019). 
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another of the Copenhagen Criteria – the requirement of a ‘functioning market economy’ 
(European Commission 1993) or, in practice, the adoption of the EU’s regulative acquis 
communautaire (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 661). In the process, there was a 
tendency towards universalising a particular experience, where the acquis was taken to 
denote ‘best practice’ regardless of whether its provisions actually suited the situation in 
the candidate countries (Grzymala-Busse and Innes 2003, 71; Grabbe 2006, 107). Again, 
as with IMF or World Bank conditionality, the actual results were not uniform (see e.g. 
Bohle 2018). But the promotion of capitalism, EU-style, as the only way to organise an 
economy efficiently contributed to the sense that a ‘normal’ European state was a 
capitalist market economy integrated into the EU’s single market. 
NGOs and other civil society actors were not nearly as active in relation to 
capitalism as to democracy and human rights, albeit with some notable exceptions. 
Closest to the dominant neoliberal vision of capitalism were institutions like the US-based 
Heritage Foundation, which together with The Wall Street Journal produced an Index of 
Economic Freedom from 1995 onwards to match Freedom House’s Freedom in the 
World.53 However, the most prominent think tank globally working on a capitalism-
related issue was Berlin-based Transparency International, with its annual Corruption 
Perceptions Index ranking countries as more or less corrupt and multiple other 
publications exposing corruption around the world.54 The potential stigma of 
corruption’s place within the dominant capitalist norm was more implicit than explicit 
and somewhat ambiguous, relating also to other core norms like democracy. 
Organisations like Transparency International almost certainly would not see themselves 
as upholders of a capitalist order – its ‘normal’ was rather a transparent and rules-based 
order where the resources lost to corruption benefitted society as a whole, as much a 
democratic and human rights-based society as a capitalist one. Moreover, aspects of 
neoliberal capitalism, such as the liberalisation of capital flows, clearly helps to enable 
corruption by making it easier to move and hide money, including through the supposed 
bastions of neoliberalism such as the US and UK (e.g. Bullough 2018). Still, corruption 
almost by definition involves a circumvention of the supposedly neutral ‘rules’ of a liberal 
capitalist order and a distortion of free-market principles, and thus is a mark against a 
 
53 See https://www.heritage.org/index/ (accessed 13 July 2019). 
54 See https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publications (accessed 13 July 2019). 
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‘healthy business climate’, with business decisions made based on corruption ratings and 
rankings. While not explicitly a part of either the Doing Business or Index of Economic 
Freedom rankings, then, corruption would clearly affect several of the categories in these 
rankings, from getting construction permits and enforcing contracts (Doing Business) to 
property rights and government integrity (Index of Economic Freedom). Reducing 
corruption would thus be a means of approaching ‘normal’ status for a state in the post-
Cold War international society by achieving more favourable assessments of one’s 
capitalist (and democratic) credentials. 
The 2008 global financial crisis and its aftermath rocked liberal capitalism’s 
dominance but did not overthrow it (for a comprehensive history of the aftermath, see 
Tooze 2018). As noted in the previous chapter, states like Brazil and South Korea were 
able to resist and transform the policy stigma around controls on capital inflows 
(Chwieroth 2015), and several states, including Russia, did react to the crisis by 
intervening strongly to keep their economies afloat (Tooze 2018, 223–25). However, neo- 
and/or ordoliberal policies soon reasserted themselves as the expected norm, especially 
in the European context, whether through the US Federal Reserve’s condition for its post-
crisis credit swap lines with other central banks that a country had to have been ‘well-
managed with “prudent” policies’ (which was used to exclude East European countries, 
pushing them towards the IMF instead) or through the German-led insistence on 
austerity politics in the Eurozone, backed up theoretically by public choice economists 
claiming – on dubious evidence – that cuts would lead to growth (Tooze 2018, 220–21; 
Blyth 2013, 165–67). While regulation of the largest multinational banks was stepped up 
through the Third Basel Accord in November 2010, requiring the banks to gradually 
increase their liquidity to avoid another crisis, the changes were ‘by no means radical’, 
owing to a mix of lobbying by the banks and unwillingness by particularly European 
governments to adopt stronger measures (Tooze 2018, 311–15). As protest movements 
such as Occupy Wall Street fizzled out, the system as a whole went unchallenged and 
‘normal’ states were still expected to be good capitalists, albeit with a little more leeway 
for regulation. This continuation of ‘business as usual’ and the imposition of socially 
painful austerity measures on top of the economic disruption already caused by the 2008 
crisis in turn contributed to the growth across the West of populist movements of both 
right and left, several of which advocate ‘neo-protectionism’ as a ‘bulwark against 
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globalization’ (Lawson 2019, 242–45). The most important instance of populist-
protectionist political success globally, the election of Donald Trump on his platform of 
‘America First’, marks the end of the period under investigation in this study. As such, 
while the current trend may be towards greater acceptance of a more protectionist form 
of capitalism and thus a transformation of that particular policy stigma, for most of the 
period under analysis here protectionism was a discreditable offence. 
 The point is not that all economic policy in the world had become (neo)liberal and 
capitalist, but that the tenets of neo-/ordoliberal capitalism had become dominant 
internationally (with a more socially oriented capitalism as a close second). Any state 
breaking with these tenets, for example by engaging in protectionist measures, openly 
manipulating economic relations for political ends, or ‘interfering’ in domestic markets 
through e.g. expropriation, nationalisation or punitive tax measures, would be 
discreditable, in the sense of possessing a potential stigma. The move from discreditable 
to discredited would depend on a successful process of stigmatisation. But the shared 
normative background that would make stigmatisation possible was present.  
 
Conclusion 
Before moving on to examine Russia’s stigmatisation and stigma management in relation 
to each of the four norms covered here, two overall issues are worth pointing out about 
the norms, one pertaining to their individual, voluntarist nature and one to the 
interlinked relationships between them. 
First, democratic governance, human rights protection, non-aggression and 
capitalist economic policy are all practices that governments can, in theory, freely choose 
to follow. As noted in Chapter 2, this voluntarism, however voluntary it really is in 
practice, is a core feature of contemporary mechanisms of social stratification and 
closure, and forms a central part of dominant Western actors’ defence against accusations 
of neo-imperialism – no-one is forcing anyone to be democratic or follow human rights, 
it is a choice (c.f. Keene 2013). The closure mechanism is individualist rather than 
collectivist, based on credentials and behaviours that anyone can, in theory, achieve – a 
formerly authoritarian, repressive state can become democratic and human rights-
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promoting, a former socialist state can become capitalist, etc. (see Naylor 2019 on closure 
mechanisms). This reflects the evolution of international society and politics through the 
20th century and the discrediting of overtly collectivist forms of ordering. In the post-
decolonisation era, ‘tribal’ stigmas of race, nation or religion lost their legitimacy as 
official ordering principles of international society (Zarakol 2010, chapter 2). While 
racism and xenophobia clearly had not disappeared, stigmatisation based on attributes 
such as race or religion would be less likely to succeed in the post-Cold War period owing 
to the discrediting of openly racist ideas (until reversals in recent years). Instead, the 
insider/outsider dynamic was sustained through norms about behaviour that anyone 
could in principle meet. Stigmatisation would now be likely to occur over what Goffman 
(1963, 13–14) called ‘blemishes of character’ or ‘radical political behaviour’, deviations 
from the ‘normality’ of peaceful democracy, human rights and capitalism.  
As also noted in Chapter 2, this formal voluntarism should not hide the continued 
existence and deep effect of stigmas like race and class on international relations. The 
above sections have made clear that all four norms are essentially contested, meaning 
their designation onto a state of affairs in the real world is always a contentious process 
of symbolic struggle – what counts as democratic, human rights-promoting, non-
aggressive or capitalist is a political question infused with power. In such processes, old 
stereotypes die hard, and new systems of differentiation often divide the world much like 
old systems of differentiation, as any colour-coded map of the world based on the indexes 
covered in this chapter visually shows.55 As will be seen in relation to Russia over the 
coming chapters, old stigmas have a tendency to stick, raising the bar for being accepted 
as ‘normal’ and giving ‘normals’ a ready-made stereotype to which to attribute any ‘lapse’ 
in behaviour (c.f. Goffman 1963, 19–20). 
 Second, the norms are interlinked, in that they work cumulatively, even if the 
relationships between them are not straightforward. As noted in the introduction to this 
chapter, a fully ‘unblushing’ state is both democratic, human rights-abiding, peaceful and 
capitalist – the absence of any one characteristic is potentially discrediting, two doubly 
so, etc. Beyond such simple addition, however, as discussed in passing throughout the 
 
55 See, for example, Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2018 map at https://freedomhouse.org/report-
types/freedom-world (accessed 14 July 2019), painting the white, industrialised West (and, admittedly, a 
handful of Asian and African countries) in a ‘free’ green and most of Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Russia 
in a ‘not free’ purple. 
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chapter, the norms were often taken to be mutually reinforcing, all part of a broad 
package. It was not just democracy that should be spread but ‘market democracy’, and 
this spread would also help the spread of human rights (because market democracies 
abide by human rights) and peace (because democracies are more peaceful than 
authoritarian states, at least in relations with each other, and free trade also contributes 
to peace). Such thinking was widespread in Western states, both in policy and academic 
circles, which often reinforced each other. The classic example was the Democratic Peace 
Theory’s impact on the democracy promotion agenda of US governments. If democracies 
really were non-aggressive, at least against each other, then what better way of spreading 
peace than promoting democracy?56 The perceived links between free trade and peace 
also ran deep, whether in the EU’s self-understanding of having prevented new war in 
Europe through trade liberalisation or in the WTO’s claim that one of 10 benefits of its 
rules-based system was ‘a more peaceful world’ (Peet 2009, 191–92). None of these 
claims were without merit in isolation, but they did tend to smooth over potential 
conflicts or nuances, such as democracies being just as aggressive against authoritarian 
states, the above-noted constraints placed on democracy by human rights, etc.  
A substantial and quite fundamental conflict is between capitalism and 
democracy. As noted by Blyth (2013, 141–60) and Harvey (2005, 65–70), neo- and 
ordoliberals were deeply suspicious of democratic control over the economy, favouring 
instead technocratic rule by elites conforming to economic orthodoxy and the strict 
separation of politics and economics. In Blyth’s (2013, 141) words, referring to the 
pressure on Greece and Italy to implement austerity measures in 2011, ‘if that meant 
deposing a few democratically elected governments, then so be it’. This was more in line 
with Robinson’s (1996; 2013) polyarchy promotion – empowering elites friendly to 
transnational capital. This is highly relevant for a case like Russia, as will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 7 – in one analyst’s view, Russia’s post-Soviet history has been all 
about domestic and international forces teaming up to safeguard capitalism, if necessary 
at the expense of democracy (Wood 2018). When in conflict, then, capitalism has tended 
to trump democracy, even if a commitment to (electoral) democracy has remained. This 
is despite the best efforts of a range of protest and/or political movements that have 
 
56 For classic Democratic Peace texts, see e.g. Doyle (1983) and Russett (1993). For a critical discussion and 
overview of the debates, see e.g. Gat (2005), and for an analysis of how the theory influenced policy, see 
Ish-Shalom (2006). 
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sought to reverse the hierarchy, from the broad anti-globalisation movement of the 1990s 
and 2000s to post-2008 crisis movements like Occupy Wall Street, Podemos, Syriza, 
Bernie Sanders’ campaign for the 2016 US Democratic Party nomination, etc.57 Combined 
with the populist-protectionist trend noted above, such movements may be contributing 
to an ongoing shift towards a ‘new normal’ in the relationship between democracy and 
capitalism, particularly the neoliberal, globalised form of capitalism, and thus the 
establishment of new stigmas. However, the fact that the separate movements have very 
different ideas about what that relationship should be means what this new normal might 
be or become is not yet clear. 
In conclusion, this issue brings attention to the question of hierarchies between 
the norms. Was either of the four more fundamental to a state being accepted as ‘normal’ 
in the post-Cold War world? Did either carry more potential for stigmatisation? These 
questions will be returned to in the Conclusion, considering the analysis of the four 
following chapters, which analyse each of the norms in turn.  
 
57 An important point about these movements is that they have, broadly speaking, dropped the idea of 
‘systemic transformation’ that characterised revolutionary movements of the past (Lawson 2019, 226–34). 
They are working to redress the balance between democracy and capitalism, not to completely overthrow 
the latter in favour of a centrally planned economy. What they see as stigmatisable is not capitalism per se 
but particular forms of rampantly unequal capitalism. 
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Chapter 4 
Democracy 
 
This chapter charts the stigmatisation of Russia by Western actors over its democratic 
credentials, both domestically, as brought out primarily in reactions to the country’s 
heavily ‘managed’ elections, and internationally, as seen in disputes over the democratic 
credentials of the ‘colour revolutions’ of the early 2000s and the 2013-14 ‘Euromaidan’ 
revolution in Ukraine, as well as Russia’s evolving stigma management strategy. It 
proceeds in three sections. First, the focus is on stigmatisation over Russia’s domestic 
democratic credentials. Given the dominant view of free and fair elections as the litmus 
test of democracy, the section focuses on the developing labelling by election monitors 
and Western officials of Russia as a façade democracy owing to its deficient elections. The 
second section looks at stigmatisation over democracy internationally, focusing on the 
fall-out over the colour revolutions of the early 2000s and the initial phase of the 2013-
14 Ukraine crisis, in which the symbolic conflict was mainly over whether the Ukrainian 
government or protesters represented the nation’s democratic will. The third section 
charts Russia’s stigma management approach, with a particular emphasis on the stigma-
rejecting, counter-stigmatising doctrine of ‘sovereign democracy’.  
 
I – Domestic democracy: from ‘transitionology’ to ‘back to the USSR’ 
This section traces the development of Russia’s constitution as an undemocratic, semi-
authoritarian state through international assessments of its elections and other 
democratic credentials from the 1990s to the 2012 presidential election. Particular 
attention is paid to the different forms of power wielded by election monitors, who had a 
high degree of credibility as far as assessing democratic procedures go but only 
productive power, and Western state officials, who had more direct forms of power by 
which to effect status loss and thereby full stigmatisation. 
 
The turbulent 1990s and ‘transitionology’ 
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The 1990s was a turbulent decade in Russian politics. New political institutions were 
constructed almost from scratch following the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991 
and the discrediting of both its institutions and leading ideology. The methods used to 
build a more democratic Russia were not always obviously democratic. The most 
prominent example was President Boris Yeltsin’s use of military force to resolve a stand-
off with his own parliament during the constitutional crisis of September-October 1993 
(Treisman 2011, 54). The constitution pushed through by Yeltsin following the forceful 
dissolution of parliament ensured a formal separation of powers between the executive, 
legislature and judiciary, but swung the balance of power strongly towards the 
presidency from the legislature, making the president ‘slightly stronger than his French 
or American counterpart’ (Treisman 2011, 55). Following elections to the new 
parliament, the Duma, in 1993 and 1995 Yeltsin still had to deal with a majority 
opposition coalition of the Communist Party (KPRF) and the nationalist Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDPR). His re-election as president in summer 1996, beating KPRF 
leader Gennady Zyuganov by 54.4% to 40.7% in the second round, was won by shattering 
the limits on election spending, using relationships with TV channel-owning businessmen 
to ensure positive news coverage, and frustrating Zyuganov’s campaign at every turn 
using the state’s administrative resources (Treisman 2011, 60–61).58 In Sergey 
Prozorov’s (2009, 40, 47) words, both the 1990s and 2000s were characterised by the 
‘deactivation of [democratic] politics’ in Russia: whereas under Putin and Medvedev in 
the 2000s this took the form of a ‘sterile technocratic administration’, under Yeltsin it was 
a ‘”mediatic” spectacle’, where the leader failed to establish a ‘meaningful socio-political 
order of his own’ but simultaneously prevented all other political forces from doing so. 
However, in the 1990s international actors usually gave the Russian leadership 
the benefit of the doubt as the direction of travel was perceived to be right and the 
alternative much worse. Russia was considered a country in transition from communism 
to democracy, with Yeltsin in the driving seat. While his main opposition remained 
Zyuganov and the Communists, he could count on the support of Western leaders. 
American advisers worked closely with Yeltsin’s team during the 1996 presidential 
election, and despite his obvious flaws, Yeltsin was considered to be a democrat at heart. 
Responding to his sudden resignation on New Year’s Eve 1999, US President Bill Clinton 
 
58 Yeltsin had at one point drafted a decree cancelling the election due to fears that he would lose. 
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told the press that he liked Yeltsin ‘because I think he genuinely deplored communism 
[and] believed that democracy was the best system’ (W. J. Clinton 1999b). Even in the 
election observation reports from the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (ODIHR) for the December 1999 Duma election and March 2000 
presidential election, Yeltsin was personally singled out as having ‘forged’ Russia’s 
‘transitional period’ (OSCE/ODIHR 2000a, 1; 2000b, 2).  
As a result of this dominant ‘transitionology’59 paradigm (Monaghan 2016) and 
the fear of reversal, there was less stigmatisation of Russia for its democratic credentials 
in the 1990s than could perhaps have been expected, except for its rhetorical separation 
from the more ‘developed’ democracies and the stigma attached to its recent Soviet, 
undemocratic past. The Western reactions to the 1999-2000 election cycle illustrate this 
well.60 The ODIHR reports describe both elections as ‘benchmarks’; the Duma election for 
Russia’s ‘advancement toward representative democracy’, the presidential election for 
the ‘ongoing evolution of [Russia’s] emergence as a representative democracy’ 
(OSCE/ODIHR 2000a, 1; 2000b, 2; emphasis added). The shortcomings in Russia’s 
electoral process were ‘symptomatic of an established democracy incomplete in its 
transition’, which was blamed primarily on its unfortunate past: ‘Given the rapidity with 
which [Russia] has emerged from its Soviet past, the problems encountered are not totally 
surprising’; ‘…where lingering weaknesses exist [in the electoral process], they tend to 
reflect an environment in which the vestiges of Soviet style thinking remain’ (OSCE/ODIHR 
2000a, 4; 2000b, 5; emphasis added). American assessments concurred: State 
Department Deputy Spokesman James Foley described the elections as ‘key milestones in 
Russia’s post-communist development’, part of a process of ‘movement away from the 
very long undemocratic past’ (U.S. Department of State 1999; emphasis added).61 The 
‘milestone’ metaphor was repeated by both Foley and President Clinton following the 
 
59 Alternatively, ‘transitology’ or the ‘transition paradigm’, the term used for the academic field of study 
focused on transitions from authoritarian rule – implicitly or explicitly usually with the assumption of the 
transition being towards democracy (see Carothers 2002 for a critical review). 
60 The election cycle consisted of the 19 December 1999 Duma election and the 26 March 2000 presidential 
election, brought forward from June after Yeltsin’s resignation, in which acting president Putin was elected 
with 53.4% of the vote in the first round. The Duma election saw KPRF and LDPR lose seats to new, broadly 
centrist blocs including the government-supporting Unity (Edinstvo). 
61 Foley also observed that the new Duma may be ‘less ideological and also more pragmatic than its 
predecessor’ – another indication that at the time, being non-communist was more important to the US 
than being strictly democratic (U.S. Department of State 1999). 
123 
 
presidential election: ‘Sunday’s vote was an important milestone in the development of a 
democratic Russia’ (quote from W. J. Clinton 2000a; U.S. Department of State 2000). 
These assessments illustrate two important points from a stigmatisation 
perspective. First, they demonstrate both ‘normal’ state actors’ and nominally impartial 
observers’ use of a teleological metaphor where democratisation is equated to a 
progressive process, with the implication that states can be separated according to their 
progress along the path towards the telos of democracy, defined broadly speaking as an 
electoral-parliamentary, Western-style democracy. This opens two potential sources of 
stigmatisation that can be seized on to enforce ‘normal’ behaviour: one is simply being 
less democratic than other states, behind in the process but still going in the right 
direction; the second is regression, moving backwards on the path away from the 
democratic telos. The 1990s Russian experience was broadly assessed by international 
actors as an example of the former dynamic – moving in the right direction, but not quite 
there yet. This involved a certain level of diffuse stigmatisation, in the form of being 
separated rhetorically from the more developed democracies and constantly reminded 
of the need to continue to develop. However, in terms of more direct stigmatisation 
involving targeted separation and status loss, the reverse was true. Russia was admitted 
to the Council of Europe in 1996 and the G7 (to form the G8) in 1998,62 at Clinton’s 
insistence against ‘naysayers’ (Treisman 2011, 333), and signed a Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU and a Founding Act on Mutual Relations, 
Cooperation and Security with NATO the same year, both increasing Russian-Western 
contacts and enhancing Russia’s international status. This further substantiates the 
tempering effect of ‘transitionology’ on stigmatisation. 
The second point is the importance of the past for the present, the continued 
relevance of past attributes for contemporary relations and potential stigmatisation. The 
relevance of Goffman’s (1963, 19–20) point that when a blemish is corrected it may still 
linger can be seen in both the OSCE monitors’ explicit reference to Russia’s Soviet past as 
an explanation for the persistence of undemocratic practices, and Foley’s contrasting of 
the current, imperfect Russian democracy with its ‘very long undemocratic past’. The 
stigma of being ex-Soviet still lingered 10 years on, much like the stigma of Nazism has 
 
62 Notably, this only applied to the ‘political 8’ – pressure from the US Treasury meant Russia was not 
allowed entry into the economic side of the G7 (Naylor 2019, 127). I come back to this in Chapter 7. 
124 
 
lingered for Germany despite its ‘normalisation’ (Adler-Nissen 2014b). The fact that 
Soviet-style communism was considered the very antithesis of the 1945-1989 liberal 
international order (and to some extent its extension post-1989 as well), the ‘other’ 
against which the order had largely defined itself, made this attribute potent in terms of 
potential stigmatisation and likely to be invoked by the order’s defenders. 
 
The 2003-04 election cycle: gradual increase in direct stigmatisation 
The 2003-04 Russian election cycle contributed crucially to the eventual stigmatisation 
of Russia as undemocratic. The December 2003 parliamentary election and March 2004 
presidential election consolidated President Putin’s power at the top of Russian politics. 
The government-aligned new ‘party of power’, United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya), won 
37.57% of the popular vote and 223 of 450 Duma seats in December, and Putin was re-
elected in March with 71.9% of the vote in the first round.63 The cycle marked a turning 
point in external assessments of Russian elections and Russian reactions to these. In 
Thomas Ambrosio’s (2009, 54) words, until 2003 election monitors had ‘effectively given 
the Kremlin a pass on several questionable elections’, in large part due to the perception 
of movement in the right direction. This changed in 2003, with a gradual increase of 
stigmatisation centred on Russia’s democratic credentials. Nonetheless, owing to the 
geopolitical priorities of the US at the time, primarily keeping Russia onside in the 
ongoing War on Terror, the primary stigmatisers at this stage remained election 
monitors, whose power to implement status loss was limited. 
 The election monitors’ assessment of the elections again employed the metaphor 
of democratisation as a teleological process, but this time Russia was adjudged as moving 
backwards. In an OSCE press release following the Duma election, the special co-
ordinator for the short-term observers, Bruce George MP, stated that despite a 
‘technically correct’ conduct of election day proceedings, the ‘main impression of the 
overall electoral process is of regression in the democratization process in Russia’ (OSCE 
2003, emphasis added). The primary shortcomings from the observers’ perspective were 
 
63 United Russia was formed in 2001-02 as a unification of Unity (mentioned above) and the Fatherland – 
All Russia bloc. As with all Russian elections since 1991, the official results should be taken with a big pinch 
of salt. 
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the excessive use of the state’s administrative resources, including state television, in 
support of United Russia and the denial of equal access to other parties (OSCE/ODIHR 
2004a). In 1999-2000 shortcomings had been linked to the ‘Soviet past’; now explicit and 
implicit links were made to the Russian authorities generally and Putin particularly. The 
ODIHR monitors’ preliminary statement on the Duma election noted that it was the first 
to be held with Putin as president, and that the failure to meet international standards 
and enforce domestic legislation was a ‘worrisome development that calls into question 
Russia’s fundamental willingness to meet’ international standards (OSCE/ODIHR 2003, 
1). From a stigmatisation perspective, this focus on willingness demonstrated the move 
towards behaviour rather than essential characteristics as key to international society – 
all states could be democratic and follow democratic norms if only their governments 
were willing. The final report noted that the sub-standard election was ‘viewed as an 
important indicator of the course of democratic development under Mr. Putin’s 
presidency’, reinforcing both the teleological metaphor of democratisation and the 
positioning of Putin as a contributor to the backward movement (OSCE/ODIHR 2004a, 
3). In stark contrast to the democrat Yeltsin, Putin was being identified with the 
regression of democratic norms. 
 A new form of language entered the OSCE/ODIHR assessments in this cycle: 
qualifying adjectives separating Russia from ‘genuine’ democracies. In the press release 
mentioned above, head of the Council of Europe’s parliamentary delegation David 
Atkinson MP criticised ‘unfair practices’ benefitting ‘one party’ (United Russia), adding: 
‘Real political competition and choice … are indispensable elements in a true democratic 
election process’ (OSCE 2003, emphasis added). In both the preliminary statement and 
final report assessing the March presidential election, the electoral process was described 
as not reflecting ‘principles necessary for a healthy democratic’ process or election; 
‘essential elements’ of OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and standards for 
democracy were lacking, including a ‘vibrant political discourse and meaningful 
pluralism’ (OSCE/ODIHR 2004c, 1; 2004b, 1, emphasis added). An OSCE press release the 
day after the presidential election said that while it was administered well it ‘lacked 
elements of a ‘genuine democratic contest’, including ‘a dearth of meaningful debate and 
genuine pluralism’ (OSCE 2004a, emphasis added). There was ‘technically’ a democratic 
process in Russia, but it was not healthy, meaningful, vibrant, true, real or genuine. 
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The actors that would have had the power to impose a status loss on Russia 
concurred with the monitors’ assessment but did not appear interested in pursuing the 
matter further. When pressed for a comment on the Duma election, both the White House 
and State Department spokespeople said the US shared the election observers’ concerns 
and had communicated these to Russia, and emphasised the importance of the new Duma 
continuing democratic reforms (McClellan 2003; U.S. Department of State 2003c). The 
harshest criticism from the US came in January 2004, in between the two elections, from 
Secretary of State Colin Powell. To coincide with a trip to Moscow, Powell published an 
op-ed in Russian newspaper Izvestiya in which he praised the country’s progress and 
voiced American support for Russia’s democratic future, but warned that recent 
(unspecified) developments had given the US ‘pause’: ‘Russia’s democratic system seems 
not yet to have found the essential balance among the executive, legislative and judicial 
branches of government. ... We hope that Russia’s path to mature democracy and 
prosperity is cleared soon of all obstacles’ (Powell 2004a, emphasis added). The echoing 
of the ODIHR’s labelling and separating language was clear: Russia was democratic but 
not mature, and could achieve maturity if only it removed obstacles, implying the Russian 
leadership’s responsibility. However, in his public appearances in Moscow, including a 
press briefing with Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Powell downplayed the criticism 
(Powell 2004b; 2004c; 2004d). Powell also criticised the March presidential election, 
albeit in an interview on Fox News and therefore mainly to a domestic audience, making 
explicit the need for Russia to do more work to become fully accepted internationally: ‘I 
don't think democracy is in trouble in Russia. But Russians have to understand that to 
have full democracy of the kind that the international community will recognize, you've 
got to let candidates have all access to the media that the president has’ (Powell 2004e).64 
President George W. Bush, who as recently as September 2003 had praised Putin’s ‘vision 
for Russia’ as ‘a country in which democracy and freedom and the rule of law thrive’ (Bush 
2003), remained silent throughout. 
 
64 It is worth nothing Powell’s use of the term ‘international community’ and its connotation of a smaller, 
more tight-knit and normatively ‘thicker’ group than ‘society’, making for a supposedly more coherent 
‘audience of normals’ and a setting in which stigmatisation would be more likely to occur because of the 
supposed strength of community norms. As will be seen below, other leaders including Tony Blair and 
Barack Obama also used the term similarly. See e.g. Kritsiotis (2002), Addis (2009), McEntee-Antalianis 
(2011) and Rao (2011) for analyses of how the concept has been imagined and constituted over time. 
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Despite the caution of Western officials, the sum of the adjectives and 
characteristics employed by ODIHR was the emergent labelling of Russia as a deficient 
democracy – at best a façade democracy, at worst a quasi-authoritarian state – and its 
(rhetorical) separation from ‘real’ democracies. The fact that the assessments were given 
by the most authoritative election monitoring outfit around lent them substantial 
credibility, even if the monitors themselves had no power to follow up their labelling and 
separation with the imposition of status loss, except in so far as being labelled a non-
democracy by ODIHR in itself leads to a loss of status – they had productive but not 
compulsory power. However, Russia’s democratic credibility soon suffered another 
setback, as President Putin responded to the devastating September 2004 terrorist attack 
on a school in the North Caucasus city of Beslan by announcing sweeping reforms aimed 
at strengthening central power over the regions, including the abolishing of gubernatorial 
elections and giving the president the right to appoint governors (for discussions of this 
reform within the wider question of democracy in Russia’s regions, see e.g. Ross 2005; 
Sharafutdinova 2007). As Treisman (2011, 351) notes, by itself having appointed regional 
executives is hardly incompatible with democracy (Portugal, Bulgaria, Estonia and 
Lithuania all do). However, in the context of the broader direction of travel in Russia in 
2004, the move was cast as deeply undemocratic. 
 
The 2007-08 election cycle 
The period from 2003-04 to the 2007-08 Russian election cycle saw a steady decline in 
Russian-Western relations overall. The controversies of the 2003 Iraq War (which Russia 
opposed) and the colour revolutions (more on which below) were fresh in memory. In 
addition, tensions grew over issues including the implications of NATO and EU 
enlargement (by definition a democratic move in the EU’s self-understanding) to the east 
in 2004 and 2007, Western support for regional initiatives like the GUAM (Georgia, 
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, 
Russia’s cut-off of gas to Ukraine in January 2006 and NATO members’ linking of their 
ratification of the Adapted Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty to Russia’s full 
withdrawal of troops from Georgia and Moldova (in 2007, Russia suspended its 
ratification of the Adapted CFE in protest). With less perceived need for Russian support 
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after the Iraq invasion and emboldened by the democratic success of the colour 
revolutions, American officials more freely extolled the virtues of spreading freedom and 
democracy in Russia’s immediate neighbourhood and Russia itself. At a summit of Baltic 
and Black Sea states (excluding Russia) in Lithuania in May 2006, Vice President Dick 
Cheney (2006) equated the ‘spread of democracy’ with ‘an unfolding of history’, and 
criticised the Russian government for ‘seeking to reverse the [democratic] gains of the 
past decade’: ‘Russia has a choice to make’.  
It was in this context that the 2007-08 Russian elections arrived, in which the 
labelling and stereotyping of Russia as undemocratic increased substantially. In the 2 
December 2007 Duma election, United Russia established a constitutional majority with 
315 of 450 seats, and in the 2 March 2008 presidential election, Putin’s anointed 
successor, Dmitry Medvedev, won in the first round with 71.2% of the vote – two heavily 
managed and extremely favourable results for the powers that be. One of the most 
notable things about the elections were the absence of an election observation mission 
from the OSCE/ODIHR. Since the observer missions’ critical assessments of the 2003-04 
elections, Russia had been at loggerheads with ODIHR, allying itself with other post-
Soviet OSCE member states to consistently criticise it for ‘double standards’ and lacking 
or lenient assessments of elections in countries ‘West of Vienna’ (where the OSCE is 
based), and demanding reforms that would increase the political control of OSCE member 
states over the Office’s activities (Ambrosio 2009, 54–61; Hutcheson 2011). In the run-
up to the 2007-08 elections, disagreements over the size and nature of the ODIHR’s 
proposed observation mission culminated in the Office calling off the mission less than 
three weeks before the Duma election. It cited Russia’s delayed invitation, 
‘unprecedented restrictions’ and the denial of entry visas, and concluded that ‘the 
authorities of the Russian Federation remain unwilling to receive ODIHR observers in a 
timely and co-operative manner’ (OSCE/ODIHR 2007; see also Hutcheson 2011, 691–93). 
A small joint observation mission from the OSCE’s and Council of Europe’s parliamentary 
assemblies (OSCE PA and PACE) did observe the election, concluding that it was ‘not fair’, 
‘failed to meet many OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and standards for 
democratic elections’ and ‘took place in an atmosphere which seriously limited political 
competition and with frequent abuse of administrative resources’; ‘there was not a level 
playing field in Russia in 2007’ (PACE/OSCE PA/Nordic Council 2007). Gone were the 
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qualifying adjectives of the ODIHR report four years prior describing Russian elections as 
not ‘genuinely’ democratic: this time the election was unambiguously labelled a sham. 
A similar dynamic played out before the March 2008 presidential election. Already 
at loggerheads, the ODIHR and Russian officials failed to reach agreement on an 
appropriate mission and ODIHR again chose to stay away rather than send a suboptimal 
team, leaving a 22-member PACE observer mission as the only predominantly Western 
observers. It concluded that the election process was still neither free, fair nor reflective 
of democratic principles. While acknowledging that the outcome may have been similar 
even if voting day flaws had been addressed, the broader problem was the obstacles for 
candidates to register and the unequal access to institutions, most notably the mass 
media. As a result, it argued, the ‘democratic potential’ of the electorate had ‘not [been] 
tapped’, and called on Medvedev to ‘have sufficient confidence in his own country and his 
own democracy’ to welcome more observers in future (PACE 2008). In the words of the 
mission head, Andreas Gross from Switzerland, the election was ‘still not free and still not 
fair’ (Harding 2008).65 
As before, however, these institutions primarily wielded productive power, 
contributing to the constitution of Russia as undemocratic. They could not institute any 
formal separation or status loss, except in so far as ODIHR’s decision not to be associated 
with what it deemed a sub-standard democratic process may in itself include some 
amount of reduced status. The reactions of those who could – American and European 
officials – were mixed. When prompted by a journalist, President Bush said he had 
expressed his ‘sincere’ concern about the Duma election to Putin directly, and State 
Department spokesperson Tom Casey twice referred to the president’s remarks and 
deferred to the ‘more detailed assessment’ of the OSCE and the EU (Bush 2007; U.S. 
Department of State 2007a; 2007b). At the weekly meeting of the OSCE Permanent 
Council (PC), the US delegation gave a detailed statement of the many alleged breaches of 
good electoral practice and called on Russia to cooperate with the ODIHR (OSCE 2007b). 
 
65 Gross’s words were in response to a question from Guardian journalist Luke Harding, who in his report 
noted that the PACE statement was less critical than had been expected. It is very likely that the PACE group 
felt under pressure to be more conciliatory, in particular considering that the pro-Kremlin youth group 
Nashi had sued it and the OSCE for libel following the Duma election assessment and been awarded 
damages by a Russian regional court – a particularly legalistic form of stigma rejection and counter-
stigmatisation. 
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The Portuguese EU presidency issued a short statement along similar lines, reiterated at 
the same PC meeting (OSCE 2007a). Other European officials, mostly foreign ministers or 
ministries, overwhelmingly called for investigations of allegations of fraud, with German 
deputy government spokesperson Thomas Steg going furthest in labelling: ‘Russia was 
no democracy and Russia is no democracy’ (Reuters 2007a; 2007b). This was a much 
harsher statement than anything coming from the more cautious foreign minister, Frank-
Walter Steinmeier, or the silent chancellor, Angela Merkel. 
Despite instances of harshly critical statements in the OSCE PC during the conflict 
over ODIHR’s monitoring mission for the presidential election, the mixed Western tone 
was replicated after Medvedev’s victory in March 2008. Despite Medvedev’s close links 
to Putin and United Russia and his authoritarian-style scale of victory, a note of cautious 
optimism was present in statements from both the US and EU after the election. When 
pressed by journalists, US government officials referred to their previously stated 
concerns about the electoral process as a whole but deferred to observers to provide clear 
judgments as to whether the election was ‘free and fair’ (see e.g. Johndroe 2008; Perino 
2008). At the OSCE PC, the US noted that Medvedev would be Russia’s next president 
(without offering the usual congratulations), expressed concerns about the electoral 
process but noted positively Medvedev’s stated commitment to improving the rule of law, 
combating corruption and supporting independent media, encouraging him to act on 
these promises (OSCE 2008a). The Slovenian EU presidency did congratulate Medvedev, 
and similarly expressed hope that his promises of political and social reforms would be 
implemented, while also expressing disappointment that a ‘truly’ competitive election 
had not taken place, in a return to the qualifying adjectives of the 2003-04 cycle (OSCE 
2008b).  
In addition to assorted geopolitical reasons for going easy on the Russians – the 
UN Security Council voted through a third round of sanctions against Iran over its nuclear 
weapons programme on 4 March 2008 with Russian support – the more cautious note 
also reflected a hope that Medvedev would genuinely turn out to push Russia in a more 
democratic or at least ‘liberal’ direction (despite the continued presence of Putin as prime 
minister). However misplaced these hopes were in hindsight, at the time they contributed 
to the somewhat less stigmatising tone than could otherwise have been expected after 
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two such one-sided and manifestly ‘managed’ elections.66 The ‘reset’ in Russian-American 
relations from 2009 under the new Obama administration, with new Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton in the driving seat, was in part enabled by the presence of a superficially 
more ‘liberal’ person in the Kremlin, despite his lack of democratic credentials and the 
fallout from the Georgia war in August 2008 (to be covered in more detail in Chapter 6). 
But despite this, as well as a turn to a more ‘inspirational’ democracy promotion strategy 
under Obama than under Bush (Jackson 2016), the underlying labelling and stereotyping 
of Russia as undemocratic persisted, and resurfaced with full force in 2011. 
 
2011-12 elections: Back to the USSR? 
The hopes of those who thought Medvedev might provide a genuine break with the Putin 
period were dashed when, at the United Russia party congress on 24 September 2011, 
Medvedev recommended Putin as the party’s candidate for the presidency in the March 
2012 election. Medvedev himself would lead United Russia’s party list in the December 
2011 Duma elections and eventually become Putin’s prime minister. Known as the 
‘castling’ move and amounting to a ‘constitutional coup’ (Sakwa 2014c, 111–33), with 
presidential terms extended to six years under Medvedev Russia was potentially facing 
another 12 years of Putin’s leadership. In Masha Gessen’s words, this was the moment 
when Russia was transformed ‘back to the USSR’ (2012, chap. 11). However, the sheer 
audacity of the move, allied to the growing unpopularity of United Russia (dubbed the 
‘party of crooks and thieves’ by opposition politician Alexei Navalny), complicated the 
‘management’ of the election cycle. In the 4 December 2011 Duma election, United Russia 
officially received 49.32% of the vote and 238 of 450 seats, a significant downturn from 
2007 and only achieved due to widespread fraud (Sakwa 2014c, 116–19). Regular 
protests numbering in the tens of thousands soon broke out in Moscow, St Petersburg 
and other cities, prompting Medvedev to offer a series of electoral reforms in his address 
 
66 The tendency to keep looking for signs that Medvedev was going to break with Putin and take Russia in 
a more liberal direction blinded Western analysis for a long time after the election; see Monaghan (2016, 
41–48). For a more sympathetic view of Medvedev’s achievements, see Sakwa (2014c, chaps 5–6), and for 
a withering assessment of Medvedev the politician and the Russian intelligentsia’s misplaced hopes in him, 
see Gessen (2012, 263–70), not to mention Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation’s 2017 
documentary video ‘Don’t Call Him Dimon’ about Medvedev’s alleged corrupt practices, available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrwlk7_GF9g&t=441s (accessed 16 July 2019). 
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to the nation on 22 December, including the re-introduction of gubernatorial elections (a 
promise that eventually ended up not being delivered – see Blakkisrud (2015)). Faced 
with a country showing signs of crisis at several levels and the possibility of needing to 
fight a presidential election run-off against a potentially unifying opposition candidate, 
Putin offered voters a political programme of sorts, eventually winning the 4 March 2012 
election in the first round with 63.6% of the vote. This was the lowest winning result since 
2000, achieved with less fraud than in the parliamentary election though as always with 
the full weight of the state administrative apparatus and national media behind him 
(Sakwa 2014c, 134–58). A tightening of the screws followed, with a crackdown on 
protests against Putin’s inauguration in Moscow on 4 May and further coercive measures 
enacted in the following months (Sakwa 2014c, 159–89). 
 In a change from four years earlier, OSCE/ODIHR observers did monitor the 
elections, albeit in smaller numbers than they would have liked and still facing 
administrative frustrations. Their reports contributed to the continued constitution of 
Russia as a façade democracy. Noting that the Duma elections had been ‘marked by the 
convergence of the State and the governing party’ and had lacked ‘a level playing field’, 
the 5 December preliminary report also returned in parts to the ‘adjective’ approach of 
2003-04: there was some political competition in Russia, but it was ‘narrowed’ by the 
denial of registration to parties and was not ‘fair’ – the campaign ‘lacked vibrancy’ 
(OSCE/ODIHR 2011, 1–2). The presidential election was similarly assessed as lacking 
‘genuine’ competition – ‘the conditions for the campaign were clearly skewed in favour 
of one candidate’ (OSCE/ODIHR/OSCE PA/PACE 2012). Without naming him directly, the 
monitors thus undermined Putin’s democratic legitimacy. 
 American officials this time were more direct in their criticism, with the official 
discourse taking a turn towards open stigmatisation of the Russian authorities and an 
attempt to separate them from the ‘Russian people’. The most high-profile example was 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s speech to the OSCE Ministerial Council in Vilnius on 6 
December 2011. Echoing critical comments made to the press at a meeting in Bonn the 
day before (H. Clinton 2011a), Clinton used the annual summit’s plenary session, 
surrounded by other foreign ministers and representatives, to denounce the Duma 
election as ‘neither free nor fair’, voice the US’s ‘serious concerns’ about the conduct of 
the elections and harassment of independent Russian observers, and ‘commend those 
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Russian citizens who participated constructively in the electoral process’. In sum, 
affirming the universality of democratic values: ‘The Russian people, like people 
everywhere, deserve the right to have their voices heard and their votes counted. And 
that means they deserve fair, free, transparent elections and leaders who are accountable 
to them’ (H. Clinton 2011b). Talking to the press after NATO and NATO-Russia meetings 
in Brussels two days later, Clinton reiterated the message: 
…the United States and many others around the world have a strong 
commitment to democracy and human rights. It’s part of who we are. It’s 
our values. … we are supportive of the rights and aspirations of the Russian 
people to be able to make progress and to realize a better future for 
themselves, and we hope to see that unfold in the years ahead. (H. Clinton 
2011c) 
A similar statement was issued by the State Department after the presidential election, in 
which the United States congratulated ‘the Russian people on the completion of the 
Presidential elections’ and said it looked forward to working with ‘the President-elect’ 
Putin (Nuland 2012).67 The sum of these statements appears to be an attempt to include 
the Russian people in the democratic ‘audience of normals’ along with the US ‘and many 
others around the world’, against the undemocratic and unaccountable Russian 
leadership. 
 By 2012, then, Putin’s Russia had been thoroughly constituted as undemocratic by 
both Western state actors and election monitors. From a cautious optimism in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, via the qualifying adjectives of 2003-04, assessments had arrived 
at the direct labelling of 2007-08 (albeit with the caution over Medvedev) and 2011-12. 
To summarise and visualise the downward drift and show the assessment of another 
relevant actor in the stigmatisation process, the NGO Freedom House, Chart 4.1 shows 
Russia’s declining score for democracy in its Nations in Transit reports, monitoring the 
democratic development of the post-communist states. From a ‘transitional/hybrid 
regime’ in 2003, the year scores were introduced, its score declined to a ‘semi-
 
67 See Herszenhorn and Myers (2012) for a contemporary analysis of the divisions within the US policy 
establishment on which line to take about the election and the influence of the upcoming US presidential 
election on this. 
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consolidated authoritarian regime’ from 2004-08 and a ‘consolidated authoritarian 
regime’ since. 
 
 
Chart 4.1 – Russia’s democracy score on Freedom House’s Nations in Transit report, 2003-16. 1 = most 
democratic, 7 = most authoritarian. 
 
Source: Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit. 
 
II – International democracy: from the Colour Revolutions to the Ukraine crisis 
As noted in Chapter 3’s discussion of the democratic norm, to be a fully normal 
democratic state one should both be democratic at home and support democracy abroad. 
Failure to support democracy, or active support for opponents of democracy, was 
discreditable behaviour. This section traces the diffuse and direct stigmatisation of Russia 
over its opposition to what Western actors deemed were democratic developments 
outside of Russia itself. Primary focus is on developments in the ‘shared neighbourhood’ 
of the EU and Russia, where the electoral ‘colour’ revolutions and the 2013-14 events in 
Ukraine provided particular flashpoints. 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
135 
 
 
Stigmatisation by implication: The colour revolutions 
The events that more than any shaped regional debates about democracy in the early-to-
mid 2000s were the so-called colour revolutions that followed contested elections in the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 2000, Georgia 2003 and Ukraine 2004. In each case, 
largely non-violent protests against fraudulent elections succeeded in overturning the 
results and forcing out the countries’ existing political leadership in the process. The 
revolutions were hailed by Western actors as democratising events and involved 
stigmatisation of the leaderships being overthrown (and the opposite for their 
successors). However, the stigmatisation of Russia, which particularly in Ukraine had 
provided support for the ‘non-democratic’ side, was less direct. What occurred instead 
was something like ‘stigmatisation by implication’ – the welcoming of the newly 
democratic states into the Western fold while Russia remained kept at arm’s length and 
criticised for the same shortcomings as the ousted leaderships. This contributed to the 
emergence of a more active stigma rejection and counter-stigmatisation approach from 
the Russian leadership, namely the development of the ‘sovereign democracy’ doctrine – 
the idea that each state’s path to democracy was unique and should be respected as its 
sovereign, democratic right. This will be analysed in more detail in the next section. 
 The stigmatisation dynamics varied from episode to episode. Yugoslavia, under 
the leadership of Slobodan Milošević, was already stigmatised over its role in the July 
1995 Srebrenica massacre during the Balkan Wars and its persecution of Kosovar 
Albanians domestically: the US and EU had both imposed economic sanctions before the 
NATO bombing campaign in 1998-99, and the country was excluded from such regional 
initiatives as the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (established in 1999), enforcing 
both separation and status loss.68 When Milošević was declared the winner of the 24 
September 2000 presidential election amid widespread suspicion of fraud, the opposition 
took to the streets to protest. Western actors supported the protests and promised the 
de-stigmatisation of the country: ‘…if the will of the people is respected, the doors to 
Europe and the world will be open again to [Yugoslavia]. We will take steps with our allies 
 
68 It was also not yet a member of international organisations like the UN and the OSCE, owing to its claim 
to be the sole successor state to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It was duly admitted to both 
after dropping the claim shortly after Milosevic’s overthrow. 
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to lift economic sanctions’ (W. J. Clinton 2000b; see also 2000c; Siewert 2000). Within 
three months after Milošević was forced out and a new government established, several 
sanctions were lifted (in Clinton’s words due to the ‘victory of freedom’), Yugoslavia was 
admitted to the Stability Pact, the OSCE and the UN, and the US, France, Germany and the 
UK established formal diplomatic relations; in a joint statement, the US and EU 
emphasised means of accelerating the country’s integration into the ‘Euro-Atlantic 
mainstream’ (W. J. Clinton 2000e; 2000f; 2000g; United States and the European Union 
2000). Thus, a pariah status appeared to be reversed in record time and Yugoslavia 
welcomed as an aspirant ‘normal’ country, owing to its embrace of democratic 
principles.69 
 In Georgia and Ukraine, the dynamic was different. Neither were stigmatised in 
the manner of Milošević’s Yugoslavia, but both were coming under public pressure from 
the US and others to democratise. President Bush had sent former secretary of state 
James Baker to Georgia in July 2003 to urge President Eduard Shevardnadze publicly to 
ensure a free and fair 2 November 2003 parliamentary election, and the US provided 
generous funding for both civil society organisations and election monitors in the country 
in ‘its most consistent and serious attempt ever in any ex-Soviet republic to secure fair 
and free balloting’ (Fairbanks 2004, 114–15). When the final results of the election were 
announced on 20 November, declaring victory for government-friendly parties amid 
mounting evidence of electoral violations and negative assessments by ODIHR observers, 
the State Department declared itself ‘deeply disappointed’, accusing the Central Election 
Commission and government of manipulating the results ‘to ignore the will of the people’ 
(U.S. Department of State 2003a). When Shevardnadze resigned on 23 November after 
large-scale protests, it offered US support for ‘a democratic Georgia’ and for the 
opposition leaders’ efforts to ensure the ‘integrity of Georgia’s democracy’ (U.S. 
Department of State 2003b). The new president after elections in January, Mikheil 
Saakashvili, was received by Bush in Washington, D.C., in February 2004 and Georgia 
became a close US ally under his presidency. 
 Ukraine followed a similar pattern. Large sums of money were spent by the US and 
other Western organisations supporting civil society groups in the country ahead of the 
 
69 Though ongoing disagreements over the status of Kosovo hindered full recognition of ‘normality’ for 
several years yet. 
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November 2004 presidential election. Before the 21 November second-round run-off, 
contested between incumbent prime minister Viktor Yanukovych, who advocated closer 
relations with Russia, and the pro-EU opposition candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, the 
White House issued a statement criticising the first round of voting for having failed to 
meet the ‘basic test’ of giving the people the choice to ‘freely’ elect their president ‘without 
intimidation or fear’. Ukraine was also warned about its potential status loss or status 
deprivation if it failed to meet democratic standards: ‘The United States supports 
Ukraine's aspirations to join the Euro-Atlantic community, a community which requires 
a commitment to shared values. If the election fails to meet democratic standards, 
Ukraine's aspirations would suffer’ (Bush 2004). Similar statements came from 
representatives of the EU, which after its expansion eastwards in May 2004 and the 
launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003 had started to take a more 
active interest in Ukraine (Maass 2017, 85).  
The second round was initially declared as a narrow victory for Yanukovych, with 
strong criticism from the OSCE/ODIHR observers, and large crowds of pro-Yushchenko 
protesters started to gather on Kyiv’s Independence Square. In reaction, US Secretary of 
State Colin Powell re-iterated the threat of status loss: ‘It is time for Ukrainian leaders to 
decide whether they are on the side of democracy or not… If the Ukrainian Government 
does not act immediately and responsibly, there will be consequences … for Ukraine’s 
hopes for Euro-Atlantic integration’ (Powell 2004f). EU representatives similarly rejected 
the election’s credibility and warned Ukraine of its potential status loss: both High 
Representative Javier Solana and Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner told the 
European Parliament that the ‘quality’ of the EU’s relationship with Ukraine would 
depend on the ‘quality of [Ukraine’s] democracy’ (Solana 2004; Ferrero-Waldner 2004a; 
see also Council of the European Union 2004a; Maass 2017, 89). On 3 December, amid 
ongoing mediation by European officials, Ukraine’s Supreme Court declared the second-
round election invalid and (surprisingly) ordered a re-run of the second round only on 
26 December, an outcome welcomed by EU, US and Council of Europe officials (Pifer 
2007, 34). However, the EU kept up the pressure: when presenting the first ENP Action 
Plans on 9 December 2004, Ferrero-Waldner noted that implementation of Ukraine’s 
plan was dependent on ‘free and fair Presidential elections in accordance with OSCE 
standards’ being held (Ferrero-Waldner 2004b). When Yushchenko won the re-run and 
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the election was given a clean bill of health by observers, Powell spoke of ‘an historic 
moment for democracy in Ukraine’, bringing the country ‘substantially closer to meeting 
international democratic standards’ (Powell 2004h). Yushchenko was duly received in 
both Washington and Brussels within months and hailed by President Bush as ‘the 
courageous leader of a free Ukraine’ and ‘an inspiration to all who love liberty’ (Bush 
2005). 
In each of these episodes, a mix of the institutional power of actors like US and EU 
leaders and the productive power of actors like the election observers combined to 
enforce democratic norms by threatening the (new or continued) stigmatisation of those 
who would not follow them. Actors were denied democratic credibility, separated from 
an invoked ‘audience of normals’ (the Euro-Atlantic Community, the EU) and threatened 
with status loss unless discreditable behaviour was changed. Stigmatisation processes in 
these episodes primarily occurred in relations between Western actors and the 
governments of the states in question – Yugoslavia, Georgia and Ukraine. However, given 
stigmatisation’s logic of separation between ‘normals’ and ‘deviants’, any actor siding 
with the deviants or otherwise opposing the spread of democracy would be at risk of 
stigmatisation too. This became increasingly the case with Russia as the revolutions 
rolled on, although its involvement was still largely of the indirect, diffuse kind, ‘by 
implication’. 
 Yugoslavia’s ‘Bulldozer Revolution’ passed without direct stigmatisation of Russia, 
although seeds of its counter-stigmatising discourse can be found in some of Russia’s 
reactions. Given the recent controversy over the 1998-99 Kosovo War and Russia’s close 
relationship with Yugoslavia, there was concern in the West about what position Moscow 
would take, as indicated by journalists’ persistent questions to Western leaders about the 
Russian position. Despite this concern, US leaders stressed good contacts with the 
Russians throughout the crisis (Siewert 2000; W. J. Clinton 2000d).  
 Direct stigmatisation of Russia was absent also during events in Georgia, despite 
the Russian leadership being far more active than in Yugoslavia. As protests started on 
21 November 2003, the Russian foreign ministry issued a statement acknowledging that 
there had been ‘irregularities’ in the parliamentary election but calling for the mistakes 
to be corrected ‘within the law’ and warning that ‘those who are prompting 
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unconstitutional actions, including from abroad, should realize that the full responsibility 
for possible grave consequences’ would be theirs (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2003a). Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov travelled to Tbilisi to mediate between 
Shevardnadze and the opposition, taking a much more government-friendly line than US 
leaders (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003b). Despite this, there was limited 
criticism of Russian conduct by Western officials. 
 By the time of Ukraine in 2004 this was gradually changing, though direct 
stigmatisation still did not occur. Rather than playing ‘go-between’ as in Georgia, this time 
the Russian government had openly supported Yanukovych, including through assistance 
from the Kremlin’s ‘political technologists’ and two high-profile visits from Putin during 
the election campaign (Charap and Colton 2017, 71). Putin also congratulated 
Yanukovych on his victory before the official results were out and called the election 
‘transparent’, putting Russia squarely in opposition to both the assessments of 
OSCE/ODIHR and the US and EU interpretation of events (Maass 2017, 90). However, 
even this did not lead to direct stigmatisation of Russia by either the US or EU. US officials 
emphasised the need for Ukrainians to democratically elect the new president free from 
outside interference (clearly implying Russia), but Bush, Powell and other spokespeople 
repeatedly stressed their ‘good’ contacts or relationship with the Russians and did not 
directly criticise Russian conduct even when invited by journalists to do so (Pifer 2007, 
38). EU officials likewise openly disagreed with Russia but did not threaten separation or 
status loss for its opposition to democracy: the EU-Russia Summit on 25 November 2004 
laid bare the differences in opinion, but a press release was still agreed that emphasised 
areas of co-operation in the relationship and mentioned merely an ‘exchange of views’ on 
Ukraine (Council of the European Union 2004b). Russia and Belarus were implicitly 
chastised for their refusal to support a common statement on Ukraine at the 6-7 
December OSCE Ministerial Council in Sofia: in its statement in the final document, the 
EU ‘deplore[d] very much’ the inability to find consensus but did not name names (OSCE 
2004b). The most stigmatising statement about Russia from a Western official in this 
episode was Powell’s (2004g) speech to the same Ministerial Council, in which he 
emphasised the interest of the ‘OSCE community’ in a ‘democratic process’ in Ukraine 
before immediately singling out Russia and Belarus as states in which the ‘unfulfilled 
promises of democracy’ was a cause for concern, noting in particular ‘freedom of the 
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press and the rule of law’ in Russia. However, even during this tense international stand-
off about democracy in Ukraine, the most directly stigmatising language still concerned 
Russia’s domestic democratic credentials rather than its international conduct. 
 The stigmatisation over Russia’s position in Ukraine and the other colour 
revolutions was thus mostly by implication. The stigmatisation of the Yugoslavian, 
Georgian and Ukrainian governments for trying to thwart the democratic will of their 
people gave a clear example to the Russian leadership of what could happen should they 
do the same, at a time when Russia’s own identity as a democratising state was being 
increasingly called into question by dominant international actors. 
 
Ukraine 2013-14: Pro-democracy vs anti-democracy 
Between the colour revolutions and the 2013-14 Ukraine crisis, the most notable 
international democracy episode pitting Western interpretations of events against 
Russia’s was the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’, with electoral revolutions spreading through North 
Africa and the Middle East. Again, Russia’s position of support for regimes such as Bashar 
al-Assad’s in Syria and generally negative, counter-revolutionary stance singled it out as 
discreditable by implication given the democratic interpretation given to these events in 
the West, at least before democracy started to provide undesirable governments (see e.g. 
Dannreuther 2015 on Russia’s view of events and how it contributed to Russian-Western 
tensions). However, the most direct stigmatisation over Russia’s international 
democratic credentials occurred over Ukraine in 2013-14, during the first phase of what 
became known as the Ukraine crisis. The trigger for the crisis was President Viktor 
Yanukovych’s 21 November 2013 announcement of his decision to suspend negotiations 
for the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, a deal negotiated under the auspices of the 
EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative. This partnership, in the EU’s view, ‘aims at building a 
common area of shared democracy, prosperity, stability and increased cooperation’ 
(European External Action Service 2016) between the EU and its eastern neighbours, 
though crucially without these becoming EU members. The Association Agreement was 
opposed by Russia, which had lobbied hard for Ukraine to instead join its alternative 
regional integration project, the soon-to-be-established Eurasian Economic Union. 
141 
 
Following Yanukovych’s announcement, Western reactions were of 
disappointment in Ukraine’s decision (with Russia’s encouragement) against democracy 
and prosperity. According to the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, Catherine Ashton (2013), the decision was ‘a disappointment not only for 
the EU but, we believe, for the people of Ukraine’. The signing of the agreement would 
have ‘sent a clear signal to investors [and] international financial institutions that Ukraine 
is serious about its modernisation pledge’, and the people of Ukraine ‘would have been 
the main beneficiaries of the agreement through the enhanced freedom and prosperity 
[it] would have brought about’. The US, through State Department Spokesperson Jen 
Psaki (2013), was similarly disappointed: ‘The EU has offered Ukraine an historic 
opportunity to cement a European future for its people and demonstrate to international 
financial institutions and investors its unwavering commitment to democratic reform. 
We stand with the vast majority of Ukrainians who want to see this future for their 
country’. Neither statement mentioned Russia directly, but the baseline for the 
subsequent separation was set: not only did the Association Agreement and the EU 
represent democracy and prosperity, as per the stated aims of the Eastern Partnership 
and the EU’s self-understanding, but this was the Ukrainian people’s democratic choice, 
being frustrated by its government. Opposition to this view of things would be anti-
democratic. 
 Russia was quickly identified as the primary force behind the frustration of the 
Ukrainian people’s democratic will. In a joint statement on 25 November, the presidents 
of the European Council and Commission, Herman Van Rompuy and José Manuel Barroso, 
expressed their conviction that the Association Agreement offered ‘...the best possible 
support for Ukraine’s economic situation, reform course and modernisation’ and was an 
‘opportunity to accompany our [the EU’s and Russia’s] common neighbours towards 
modern, prosperous and rule-based democracies’ (Barroso and Van Rompuy 2013). They 
referred to the ‘pressure’ Ukraine was under, emphasised that the EU would never ‘force’ 
Ukraine into anything and appropriated the nascent protests against Yanukovych’s 
decision in Ukraine for their cause: ‘Ukrainian citizens have again shown these last days 
that they fully understand and embrace the historic nature of the European association’. 
Underlining the ‘win-win’ nature of the Association Agreement, the presidents ‘strongly 
disapprove[d] of the Russian position and actions’ and were ready to ‘clarify’ to Russia 
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the ‘mutual beneficial impact of increased trade and exchanges with our neighbours’. In 
sum, if the Russians would only understand the universal benefits of democracy and free 
markets, EU-style, and stop standing in their way, there would be no need for this 
unpleasantness. 
 EU representatives’ framing of Russia as anti-democratic continued through the 
winter as protests in Ukraine ebbed and flowed towards their climax in February 2014. 
In his statement at the 29 November Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, where the 
Association Agreement was to have been signed, Barroso (2013) said: ‘We know how 
much the Ukrainian people ... aspire to be recognised as members of the democratic 
community of nations of Europe’, thereby also putting Europe squarely in the democratic 
camp. Hinting at Russia’s opposition, he said the Association Agreement and Eastern 
Partnership were not directed ‘against someone’ but were ‘a process for something; … for 
democracy, for stability and for prosperity. … I don’t believe someone should be against 
democracy, against stability or against prosperity’. Van Rompuy reportedly said Russia’s 
attempts to influence its neighbours’ ‘sovereign choice’ was in breach of its OSCE 
commitments, and speaking to the press after the event Barroso stated that ‘the times of 
limited sovereignty are over in Europe’, implying Russia’s opposition to the Ukrainian 
people’s (rather than its government’s) sovereign choice (Rettman 2013). In their 
comments after the 28 January 2014 EU-Russia Summit, the two presidents continued in 
the same vein. Van Rompuy (2014a) re-emphasised the ‘win-win’ nature of the Eastern 
Partnership and called for the avoidance of ‘misunderstandings’. Barroso (2014a), 
meanwhile, underlined the Partnership’s centrality to the integration of the continent, 
which must be built on ‘respect for sovereign decisions, democratic societies and open 
markets’, and its positive role in making ‘our neighbourhood more prosperous … 
something that can only benefit our other partners, and certainly will not harm Russia’. 
 The US president, Barack Obama, remained supportive of what by definition was 
considered pro-democratic, peaceful protests but did not engage in direct criticism of 
Russia. This started to change on 19 February, as the worst violence was under way in 
Kyiv. At a meeting with the Canadian and Mexican presidents Obama was asked by an 
Associated Press reporter to comment on Russia’s involvement in Ukraine and Syria, 
implying similarities between the two regimes and Russian support for them. In 
response, he stated that Ukraine was a case of a government, ‘supported by Russia, where 
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the people obviously have a very different view and vision for their country’ (Obama 
2014a). The Ukrainian people were expressing their aspiration to enjoy ‘basic freedoms’ 
and ‘fundamental rights’ such as ‘fair and free elections’, and he hoped there would come 
a time where ‘Russia will recognize that over the long term they should be on board with 
those values’ (Obama 2014a). Fundamentally, the Ukraine situation was about ‘whether 
or not the people of Ukraine can determine their own destiny’, and Obama had told 
Yanukovych that he should ‘recognize the spirit of the Ukrainian people and work with 
that, as opposed to trying to repress it’ (Obama 2014b). The phrasing of the Ukrainian 
people determining their own destiny or future would become a standard reference in 
Obama’s statements about Ukraine over the next month, establishing both the people’s 
(and in time the new government’s) democratic credentials and the US’s support for these 
(e.g. Obama 2014b; 2014c; 2014f; 2014h). 
 The inclusion of the protesters and political opposition as part of a democratic, 
pro-European ‘us’ separated from an anti-democratic ‘them’ including Russia and the 
Yanukovych regime meant that the revolutionary seizure of power in February 2014 was 
assessed as a positive, democratic event by Western actors, and the new government 
imbued with democratic legitimacy. This was visible at subsequent milestone events. On 
21 March, when the new Ukrainian government and the EU signed the political part of 
the Association Agreement, Van Rompuy praised the democratic nature of events: 
[The signing] recognises the aspirations of the people of Ukraine to live in 
a country governed by values, by democracy and the rule of law, where all 
citizens have a stake in national prosperity. And the popular yearning for a 
decent life as a nation, for a European way of life. Last November, the 
refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union created 
a popular uprising, a political and cultural shift. We pay tribute to those 
who gave their life for freedom, and we support all those who today are 
striving to build an open and inclusive Ukraine. (Van Rompuy 2014b) 
 
Thus, even before the Ukraine crisis developed further into an altercation over the 
norm of non-aggression owing to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, a clear separation and 
emergent stigmatisation was already established over another core international norm, 
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namely democracy. Russia was guilty of standing in the way of democracy, freedom and 
prosperity. 
 
III – Russian stigma management: stigma rejection and counter-stigmatisation 
This section analyses Russian stigma management in relation to democracy. It first traces 
the evolution of the leadership’s complete rejection of its stigmatisation as undemocratic 
by election monitors and other actors. Then, special attention is paid to the concept of 
‘sovereign democracy’ and its mix of stigma rejection and counter-stigmatising elements. 
Finally, the counter-stigmatising response of criticising Western states and monitors for 
their own democratic faults and ‘undemocratic’ domination of international affairs is 
analysed. 
 
Stigma rejection at home  
During the 1990s and early 2000s, Russian leaders themselves generally accepted the 
more diffuse stigma of backwardness in relation to democratic development and sought 
to ‘normalise’. This was particularly true of Yeltsin and his reformers, but also of Putin, at 
least early on and on a rhetorical level. In his presidential inauguration speech on 7 May 
2000, Putin used the same metaphorical language as his American counterpart Clinton, 
identifying the election as a historic moment on Russia’s journey on the ‘road to a free 
society’ and asserting the need to keep moving in the right direction: 
Today truly is a historic day; … for the first time in Russia’s history, power 
is being transferred in the most democratic and simplest way, by the will 
of the people, legally and peacefully. … We have proved that Russia is 
becoming a modern democratic state. … The construction of a democratic 
state is far from complete, but many things have been achieved. We must 
guard what we have gained, we must protect and promote democracy… 
(Putin 2000a) 
However, this stigma acceptance would soon give way to stigma rejection as direct 
stigmatisation of Russia’s democratic credentials developed. 
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The 2003-04 election cycle provided the foundation for the Russian leadership’s 
subsequent stigma management approach with regard to democracy and democratic 
norms. Even if the ODIHR election observers by themselves lacked the power to ‘fully’ 
stigmatise Russia, Russian actors reacted furiously to their criticisms of the elections, 
denying all charges. At the weekly meeting of the OSCE PC following the Duma election, 
after the US, EU and Canadian delegations had expressed their concern based on the 
observers’ preliminary report, Russian ambassador Alexander Alexeyev simultaneously 
rejected any suggestion of discreditable behaviour and turned the accusations back on 
the observers and Western states. Referring to the preliminary report’s questioning of 
Russia’s ‘desire [willingness]’ to follow democratic standards, Alexeyev fumed: 
That statement is unacceptable, it is politically motivated and has no 
foundation beneath it. It casts an unwarranted doubt upon the historical 
choice made by Russia's people and leadership, including in the past 
elections, to follow steadfastly the course of democratic development. 
(Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003c) 
He went on to castigate the ‘glaring manifestation of double standards’ in the assessment 
of elections, the ‘selective and biased’ approaches of the US, EU and Canada, and provided 
examples of criticisms from reports on British and American elections that had ‘not once’ 
been raised in the Council, where the talk was ‘constantly about Russia, Ukraine, 
Azerbaijan, Armenia and the Central Asian states only’ (Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2003c). From a stigma management perspective, two things stand out here. The 
first is stigma rejection: Russia’s people and leadership have made a choice for democracy 
and are following the course ‘steadfastly’. The second is counter-stigmatisation: the 
observers’ objectivity and neutrality are called into question (the statement is ‘politically 
motivated’), as is the democratic credibility of other states. This twin approach was 
repeated by Putin himself following the March presidential election, with emphasis on 
the counter-stigmatising tu quoque tactic (Ambrosio 2009).70 At a press conference the 
day after the vote, in response to a question about whether he had seen comments by US 
officials about the election, he noted: ‘…some people see a mote in their neighbour’s eye 
but fail to see a beam in their own. … We were all taken aback four years ago at the way 
 
70 Tu quoque – Latin for ‘you also’/’you, too’, a term for responding to an accusation by calling out the 
accuser’s own record instead of dealing with the substance of the claim. 
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the electoral system in the United States ran into problems’ (Putin 2004a).71 The official 
discourse was solidifying around a combined stigma rejecting and counter-stigmatising 
approach. 
The same was the case in 2007-08. The attempt to limit ODIHR’s monitoring of the 
election can itself be read as an attempt to prevent any discreditable behaviour from 
becoming publicly known (albeit in the process engaging in the even more discreditable 
behaviour of preventing the transparent monitoring of your elections). The official 
Russian reaction to the few monitors’ assessment and Western criticisms remained one 
of stigma rejection, as encapsulated in a 3 December foreign ministry statement 
providing ‘information’ and ‘commentary’ on international observers’ assessment of the 
election. The ministry noted how observers from the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) had assessed the election as 
‘free, open and fair, in full accordance with … the generally adopted approaches toward 
democratic elections’ and claimed that several PACE/OSCE PA observers had ‘spoke[n] 
similarly in media interviews’ (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007).72 It then 
castigated the PACE/OSCE PA observers for their ‘slogans not supported by any factual 
material’ and ‘random judgments’, arguing that their ‘theses about a “fusion of the state 
and political parties”’ had more to do with dynamics in their own countries, as ‘in many 
western countries … the government is formed by a party that has won in parliamentary 
elections’. Finally, it dealt with each of the observers’ other accusations – biased media 
coverage, the high threshold for entering parliament, etc. – in turn, concluding that ‘these 
norms of our laws are consistent with the present stage and requirements of democratic 
consolidation in Russia’. That these statements fundamentally misunderstood and/or 
wilfully misrepresented the division of state, government and parliament in most 
Western countries was beside the point. Understood as part of a stigma rejection 
discourse they formed part of a purposeful attempt for Russia to ‘pass’ as democratic, 
albeit a democracy at a certain ‘stage’ of development. Interestingly, this was an example 
 
71 This refers to the alleged irregularities during the 2000 US presidential election won by George W. Bush 
against Al Gore. 
72 The establishment and funding of the CIS election monitoring arm from 2002 can be interpreted as a vital 
component of a broader, purposeful stigma rejection and/or evasion strategy on Russia’s behalf – the 
monitors have reached separate conclusions to the ODIHR in every election in the post-Soviet space except 
the 2010 Ukrainian presidential election, providing an alternative institutional assessment that 
governments can draw on as evidence of their democratic legitimacy, however illegitimate it may seem to 
Western eyes. See Cooley (2015). 
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of a stigmatised actor simultaneously insisting on its democratic credentials and ‘owning’ 
its position in a temporal-teleological hierarchy of democratic consolidation. 
In 2011-12, the Russian leadership’s reaction to open criticism from the likes of 
Hillary Clinton was a doubling down on the stigma-rejecting and counter-stigmatising 
discourse. In an address to the Russian people on the eve of the Duma election, Medvedev 
(at this stage both president and top of United Russia’s party list, in a perfect example of 
the fusion of state and party the ODIHR raised concerns about) had praised the ‘fair and 
free competition’ of the election campaign, praised elections as ‘the highest manifestation 
of democracy’ and ‘our citizens’ direct and free participation in elections’ as ‘one of 
Russia’s indisputable achievements of these last decades’ (Medvedev 2011a). After an 8 
December meeting with Czech president Václav Klaus, Medvedev responded to a 
journalist’s question about the elections by first appropriating the ongoing 
demonstrations as ‘an exercise in democracy’ (albeit one that ‘must be held strictly in 
designated areas and in accordance with Russian law’), and second by focusing on how 
despite criticisms, ‘nearly all observers came to the common conclusion that the elections 
were well organised’ (Medvedev 2011b). In widely reported comments from a meeting 
with members of the recently formed Popular Front that exemplify the intensified 
counter-stigmatising official discourse, Putin directly blamed Clinton and the State 
Department for instigating the protests in Moscow and elsewhere: ‘She set the tone for 
some of our political figures …, she sent a signal. They heard the signal and with the 
support of the State Department, they began their active work’ (Putin 2011). Moving on 
to questions of foreign financing of civil society activities, Putin said the investment of 
‘foreign money’ into political activities ‘should give us pause’: ‘injecting foreign money in 
electoral processes is particularly abhorrent. This is simply inadmissible. … we must 
develop forms of protecting our sovereignty, protecting ourselves from outside 
interference’. The tone was thus set for Putin’s third presidential period, which would be 
characterised by an increasingly marked anti-Americanism in the official discourse and 
the targeting of NGOs receiving foreign funding as ‘foreign agents’, more on which in 
Chapter 5. 
The dominant approach of the Russian leadership throughout the 2000s and 
2010s was thus one of stigma rejection, insisting variously that Russian elections had 
been conducted according to democratic best practice and/or that any deficiencies were 
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due to being at a particular stage of democratic development. Both of these themes came 
together in the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’. 
 
‘Sovereign democracy’ as stigma management 
The concept of ‘sovereign democracy’ is usually attributed to Vladislav Surkov, one of the 
Kremlin’s foremost ‘political technologists’ of the mid-2000s, who coined the term in 
2006. Its status as an official slogan or ideology of the Russian government was always 
unclear. Viacheslav Morozov (2008, 154–55) points out that neither Putin nor other top 
officials tended to use the term themselves, although its constitutive elements featured 
heavily in their speeches: an emphasis on Russia’s and other states’ right to choose their 
own path of democratic development, free from interference or pressure by the 
universalist policies of the US and/or EU; a focus on legality and ‘democratic laws’ as a 
core part of democratic development; and a call for the ‘democratisation’ of international 
affairs to counter the hegemonic power of Western actors. These elements encompassed 
a dual stigma management approach. On the one hand, stigma was rejected through an 
attempted pluralisation of definitions of democracy, an insistence on the democratic 
credibility of both Russia and other states. On the other, Western actors were counter-
stigmatised as undemocratic owing to their perceived ‘meddling’ in the internal 
(democratic) affairs of others and their ‘undemocratic’ domination of international 
affairs. 
 The full fruition of this discourse can be traced to the colour revolutions period. 
Elements were present already in Russian responses to events in Yugoslavia, during 
which Putin declared Russia’s ‘fundamental belief … that only the people of Yugoslavia 
themselves should determine their own destiny, their future without outside 
interference’ (Putin 2000b). On the face of it, this was entirely consistent with support 
for democracy, although it was almost certainly intended as a kick against the open 
Western support for the opposition and would form the basis for subsequent counter-
stigmatisation. Putin also stressed the need to stay within the country’s laws and end its 
international isolation, without linking this to the need for democratic practices, 
implicitly accusing Western states of unjustifiably stigmatising Yugoslavia. In the 
aftermath of events, in an interview with French newspaper Le Figaro, he stressed that 
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the ‘process of democratic transformation’ gave ‘hope that stability will come’ to 
Yugoslavia, welcomed the lifting of sanctions and noted NATO countries’ ‘particular 
responsibility to make good the material damage inflicted’ in 1999 (Putin 2000c) He also 
called for the establishment of a ‘multi-polar’ world order ‘based on collective solution of 
key problems, supremacy of the law and sweeping democratisation of international 
relations’ (Putin 2000c). This combination of support for democracy (albeit with a strong 
emphasis on legality), thereby undermining any attempt to stigmatise, and highlighting 
of Western transgressions, thereby counter-stigmatising, would develop more fully in 
subsequent episodes. However, in Georgia in 2003 the Russian reaction was mixed – 
Putin’s reaction to Shevardnadze’s resignation was phlegmatic, calling it expected and 
blaming it on Shevardnadze’s own manifold political mistakes, although he also 
emphasised that Shevardnadze ‘was never a dictator’ and that Russia felt ‘a legitimate 
concern at the way pressure was used to help bring about this changeover’ (Putin 2003). 
This ‘pressure’ had clearly come from the West, specifically the United States. 
It was during and after the 2004 events in Ukraine that counter-stigmatisation 
moved centre-stage. At a meeting with the Portuguese prime minister on 23 November 
2004, Putin argued that Ukraine ‘does not need to be taught [about democracy]’ and 
criticised EU foreign ministers and OSCE observers for casting doubt on the election 
result (Putin 2004b). When answering journalists’ questions during a visit to Turkey on 
6 December, two days after the Ukrainian Supreme Court had ruled that the election 
should be re-run, Putin highlighted Western colonialism, the Cold War division of 
Germany and the 1999 Kosovo War in a highly counter-stigmatising statement: 
What worries me with regard to the situation in Ukraine is that democracy 
is one of the absolute values in the modern world but it is also something 
very complicated. … I would not like for Europe to be divided as Germany 
was into east and west, into first and second class people. I don’t want 
a situation where you would have first class people able to live according 
to stable and democratic laws, while second class people get told by well-
intentioned gentlemen in pith helmets what political course to follow. 
And if the ungrateful natives object, they will get punished by having 
bombs dropped on their heads, as in Belgrade. (Putin 2004c) 
The counter-stigmatising message was clear: actors with a history of bombing ‘ungrateful 
natives’, whether in Belgrade or further afield, had no right to lecture others on 
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democracy, and by doing so they were taking the world back to a past of colonialism, 
division and strife. In an echo of the stigmatising Western discourse’s metaphor of 
democratisation as progress and any anti-democratic behaviour as a regression in time, 
the counter-stigmatising Russian labelling of Western actions as colonialism through the 
thinly veiled reference to British colonialist headgear (pith helmets) similarly drew on 
time and untimeliness. 
 Two particular stigmatising tropes that became prominent in the Russian 
discourse around this time were how Western actors were creating new ‘dividing lines’ 
in Europe and were guilty of ‘double standards’ in their assessment of democratic 
pedigree. The former encapsulated the argument present in Putin’s comments above that 
by dividing European countries into ‘first- and second-class people’ on the basis of their 
democratic credentials, the US and EU were breaking with the post-Cold War vision of a 
united Europe. The latter accused the same actors of applying different standards to their 
own allies and friends than to Russia and states like Ukraine and Georgia. The two tropes 
featured together in Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement at the 2004 OSCE Sofia 
Ministerial Council during the Orange Revolution. Lavrov lamented the ‘double 
standards’ that were eroding the OSCE’s ‘comparative advantages’, i.e. its broad, inclusive 
membership, and disuniting rather than uniting states.73 He called on the OSCE to ‘work 
to prevent new dividing lines from appearing in our continent’ and criticised the 
‘increasingly ruinous practice of “double standards” in the assessment of election 
processes’ (Lavrov 2004). Later in the month, three days before the re-run of the 
Ukrainian presidential election, Putin brought up ‘double standards’ at a press conference 
with Russian and foreign journalists, sarcastically comparing the complaints about 
Ukraine’s election with the democratic credibility given to elections in Afghanistan, Iraq 
and Kosovo: ‘Kosovo also had elections. Over two hundred thousand Serbs fled their 
homes and were unable to take part in the elections – and that is okay, the elections were 
democratic. Perfect!’ (Putin 2004d).74 In his Sofia statement, Lavrov referenced similar 
 
73 Russia had for a long time talked up the OSCE, featuring participating states from across North America 
and Eurasia, as the basis for a new European security architecture, an alternative to what it saw as the 
exclusivity of NATO and the EU. See Godzimirski (2009). 
74 Putin was referring to Serbs who left Kosovo for Serbia and Montenegro in 1999, fearing retribution from 
Kosovo Albanians after the ethnic cleansing of the latter by Yugoslav forces. The International Crisis Group 
(2001, 13) estimated their number at around 170,000, but also showed how this led to a Western 
preoccupation with securing Serb participation in the 2001 Kosovo parliamentary election. 
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argumentation from two statements issued by the Russia-dominated Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) bloc in the OSCE context in July and September 2004, indicating 
that the negative assessments of the 2003-04 Russian election cycle and potentially the 
Rose Revolution had already pushed the Russian discourse in this direction. 
 The statement that most forcefully established the stigma rejection part of the 
sovereign democracy discourse was Putin’s April 2005 annual address to Russia’s 
legislature, the Federal Assembly. Widely known as the speech in which Putin called the 
Soviet Union’s collapse ‘a major geopolitical disaster of the century’, the speech is 
generally considered to have spelled out the core ideas of sovereign democracy, albeit 
without actually using the term (Putin 2005; Morozov 2008, 158–59).75 Indeed, the 
words ‘sovereign’ (suverenniy) or ‘sovereignty’ (suverenitet) were used only four times in 
the address, whereas the words ‘democracy’ (demokratiya) and ‘democratic’ 
(demokraticheskiy) were used 23 times and ‘freedom’ (svoboda) or ‘free’ (svobodniy) 31 
times. Putin identified the development of a ‘free and democratic state’ as the 
government’s ‘main political and ideological goal’. But two caveats were emphasised 
throughout: that Russia had chosen and would choose its own route to democracy with 
due consideration of its own unique circumstances, and that democracy could not be 
separated from law and order: 
The creation of an effective legal and political system is an essential 
condition for developing democracy in our country. But developing 
democratic procedures should not come at the cost of law and order, 
the stability that we worked so hard to achieve, or the continued pursuit 
of our chosen economic course. The democratic road we have chosen is 
independent in nature, a road along which we move ahead, all the while 
taking into account our own specific internal circumstances. But we must 
and we shall move forward, basing our action on the laws 
and on the guarantees our constitution provides. (Putin 2005) 
Like Western actors, Putin used the progressive metaphor of democracy as a road, but a 
road that Russia and the Russian people had chosen independently. ‘As a sovereign 
 
75 ‘A major…’ is a quote from the official English translation of Putin’s address. There has been much debate 
about whether he said or meant ‘the greatest’ rather than ‘a major’ (the fact that the simple superlative 
krupneyshiy rather than the compound superlative samiy krupneyshiy was used indicates the latter but is 
ambiguous), and, perhaps more importantly, whether the quote indicated a desire to re-establish the Soviet 
Union or an equivalent Russian regional hegemony. 
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nation, Russia can and will decide for itself the timeframe and conditions for its progress 
along this road’ (Putin 2005). 
 In another example of stigma rejection, Putin re-iterated Russia’s identity as a 
European nation, linking this to democracy and other normative ideals: 
Above all else Russia was, is and will … be a major European power. … 
the ideals of freedom, human rights, justice and democracy have for many 
centuries been our society's determining values. For three centuries, we – 
together with the other European nations – passed hand in hand through 
reforms of Enlightenment, the difficulties of emerging parliamentarism, 
municipal and judiciary branches, and the establishment of similar legal 
systems. Step by step, we moved together toward recognizing 
and extending human rights, toward universal and equal suffrage, toward 
understanding the need to look after the weak and the impoverished, 
toward women's emancipation, and other social gains. I repeat we did this 
together, sometimes behind and sometimes ahead of European standards. 
(Putin 2005)  
As analysed extensively by Iver Neumann (2016), Vladimir Baranovsky (2000) and 
others, the concept or idea of ‘Europe’ has played a central part in Russian identity 
formation, with distinct discourses on Russia’s place within Europe and the nature of 
Europe as either a beacon to learn from or a rotten entity to separate oneself from 
constantly competing. Here, Putin placed himself somewhere in the middle: Russia did 
not need to copy Europe because it had lived through the historical process along with 
the other European nations. 
Without specifically mentioning Western criticisms, Putin’s speech was a clear 
statement of stigma rejection: Russia is democratic – indeed it has chosen the path of 
democracy actively – and European, and should be recognised as part of a broader family 
of nations, but it is democratic in its own, sovereign way. In the face of increasing criticism 
of Russia’s democratic credentials, his response was to assert and defend Russia’s 
democratic identity, rather than to openly embrace authoritarianism or another 
alternative political identity. The 2005 address focused specifically on the domestic, 
stigma rejecting part of this identity negotiation. There was little mention of international 
affairs or counter-stigmatisation of the West.  
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The main counter-stigmatising speech focusing on the West’s ‘undemocratic’ 
domination of international affairs was Putin’s infamous February 2007 Munich Security 
Conference speech. Lamenting the supposedly ‘unipolar world’, Putin argued that such a 
world ‘has nothing in common with democracy. Because … democracy is the power 
of the majority in light of the interests and opinions of the minority. Incidentally, [we] 
are constantly being taught about democracy. But for some reason those who teach us do 
not want to learn themselves’ (Putin 2007). Casting Russia as part of a silent majority 
being ‘taught’ by the dominant minority (i.e. the US) recalls Goffman’s original conception 
of ‘out-group alignment’, although as noted by Zarakol (2010, chap. 5), in practice Russia 
had been reluctant to fully embrace its supposed outgroup allies in the BRICS and other 
forums, instead seeking respect (if not recognition) from Western actors (this has 
changed somewhat post-2014; see e.g. Salzman 2019). Either way, the 2005 and 2007 
speeches together represent the stigma-rejecting and counter-stigmatising approach of 
the Russian president in response to accusations of democratic deficiencies. These two 
themes would come out in force again during the Ukraine crisis, as the Russian leadership 
responded furiously to accusations of undemocratic conduct. 
 
The Ukraine crisis: The West as promoters of an armed coup 
The day after EU presidents Barroso and Van Rompuy’s 25 November 2013 joint 
statement blaming Russia for Yanukovych’s about-turn on the Association Agreement, 
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a reply rejecting the EU’s narrative on every 
point, encapsulating what would be the repeated Russian response over the coming 
months. It ‘noted’ the presidents’ disapproval of Russian actions and expressed its 
puzzlement and disappointment at this ‘and other statements made by European 
politicians and EU leaders of late’, which were ‘evidently caused by an aspiration to make 
Russia responsible for the problems in Ukrainian society due to the policy of explicit 
pressure used by the European Union against Ukraine’ (Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2013). The EU had tried hard to make Ukraine sign the Association Agreement ‘by 
any means’, thereby interfering ‘in the internal affairs of a sovereign country’. Russia had 
merely warned Ukraine about the economic consequences of the agreement, which 
would have included ‘many years of economic disarray, de-industrialisation, the ruining 
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of farms and, as a consequence, the growth of unemployment and a reduction in the level 
of life of the population’. The EU was thus not only anti-democratic, interfering in the 
internal affairs of other countries, but anti-prosperity, being disingenuous about its role 
in promoting democracy, stability and prosperity. 
 The same rejection of any discreditable behaviour and harsh criticism of Western 
practices became the Russian mantra through the winter of 2013-14. When challenged 
about Russia’s $15 billion loan to Ukraine by Russian and foreign journalists on 19 
December and again after the EU-Russia Summit on 28 January, Putin dismissed 
suggestions of having applied pressure on Ukraine – ‘[n]o one was trying to strangle 
anyone here’ – and repeated criticisms of the Association Agreement – ‘[l]ook at what is 
written in it: open the markets, get no money, introduce European trade and technical 
regulations. That means the production sector has to be shut down, and agriculture will 
not develop. …this is very clearly tilting Ukraine towards becoming Europe’s agricultural 
appendage’ (Putin 2013c; 2014a).76  
As the Maidan protests developed in Kyiv, Russia sought to highlight the radical, 
anti-democratic political leanings of some of the protesters, the atmosphere of illegality 
and disorder, and Western politicians’ encouragement of the protesters, rather than the 
Yanukovych governments heavy-handed response. The foreign ministry chastised the 
Ukrainian opposition for not abiding by its supposed commitment to ‘democracy and 
European values’ and accused the US of attempting to impose a ‘western vector’ on 
Ukraine and ‘dictating to the authorities of a sovereign country, what they should do’ 
(Lukashevich 2014a; Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014a). As the worst violence 
developed on 18-20 February and Western actors moved quickly to blame the 
government, Russian actors in increasingly frequent and angry statements instead 
blamed protesters and the West. The foreign ministry called the events a ‘direct result of 
the connivance policy by those Western politicians and European structures which have 
been turning a blind eye to aggressive actions of radical forces in Ukraine’, and expressed 
outrage at the lack of reaction from both opposition leaders conniving in a ‘brown’ (i.e. 
fascist) revolution while ‘hiding behind democratic slogans about commitment to 
democracy and European values’ and European actors, ‘who refuse to admit that the 
 
76 The $15 billion loan was announced a few weeks after Yanukovych’s decision and almost certainly 
influenced it. 
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opposition is responsible for the actions of radical forces’ (Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2014b; 2014c). From a tour of Middle Eastern countries, Foreign Minister Sergey 
Lavrov described the situation as an attempted coup d’état by ‘extremists’ and spoke of 
the responsibility of the West: ‘Representatives of European countries and the United 
States have been present in Ukraine, during the last three months, almost every day. What 
did they do in their contacts with the government and the opposition?’ (Lavrov 2014a; 
see also 2014b). In phone calls with German chancellor Angela Merkel and British prime 
minister David Cameron, Putin blamed ‘extremists’ and ‘terrorists’ for the events in 
Ukraine and called on the West to drop its ‘accusatory attitude’ towards the Yanukovych 
government (kremlin.ru 2014a; 2014b). 
The Russian position remained constant after the seizure of power on 22-23 
February. A 24 February Foreign Ministry statement listed several concerns, including 
the parliament’s reliance on nothing but ‘revolutionary appropriateness’ in passing laws 
counter to human rights, the non-observance of the 21 February government-opposition 
agreement for an orderly transition negotiated after mediation by EU foreign ministers, 
as well as the violent acts of militants and national radicals. The West’s reaction was 
particularly disappointing:  
We are forced to note that some of our western partners are not concerned 
about the fate of Ukraine, but rather their own unilateral geopolitical 
considerations. There are no principles assessments of criminal actions of 
extremists, including their Neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic manifestations. All 
the more so, such actions are intentionally or unintentionally promoted. 
(Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014d) 
Putin initially remained quiet following the takeover of power except for a 27 February 
instruction to the Russian government to continue contacts with ‘partners in Kiev’ and 
‘examine’ a call from ‘Crimean regional authorities for humanitarian aid’ (kremlin.ru 
2014c). However, in a 4 March press conference dedicated exclusively to Ukraine, he laid 
out the Russian position in terms both rejecting any stigma for itself and framing the West 
as anti-democratic: 
There can only be one assessment: this was an anti-constitutional takeover, 
an armed seizure of power. Does anyone question this? Nobody does. … Are 
the current authorities legitimate? The Parliament is partially, but all the 
others are not. The current Acting President is definitely not legitimate. 
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There is only one legitimate President, from a legal standpoint. … We see 
the rampage of reactionary forces, nationalist and anti-Semitic forces going 
on in certain parts of Ukraine, including Kiev. … Is this democracy? Is this 
some manifestation of democracy? … [W]hat motivates our partners? They 
supported an unconstitutional armed take-over, declared these people 
legitimate and are trying to support them. (Putin 2014b) 
 
 Thus, the basic separation was drawn on both sides separating the un/anti-
democratic ‘them’ from ‘us’. What by Western actors was framed as a democratic uprising 
against a corrupt and increasingly illegitimate government was for Russia an 
unconstitutional armed coup executed by reactionary extremists. For the West, Russia’s 
support for the Yanukovych government and opposition to the democratic uprising put 
it on stigmatisable ground, although this was not yet enough to seek to implement status 
loss. In response, Russia built its own case for (counter-) stigmatisation, openly 
separating itself from the meddling West, which was not only undemocratically 
interfering in Ukraine’s sovereign choices but also promoting some unsavoury 
undemocratic forces. 
 
Conclusion 
By 2014, the Russian leadership was thoroughly labelled and stereotyped as 
undemocratic both in its domestic and international conduct, separated rhetorically from 
Western democratic actors like the US and EU and also aspiring democratic states like 
Ukraine. The status loss emanating from this particular process is harder to gauge, as the 
processes were gradual, and there appeared to be little outright exclusion based 
exclusively on Russia’s democratic credentials. One example may have been the inability 
of the EU and Russia to renew the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement after its 
expiry in 2007, but as noted by Hiski Haukkala (2015), this was equally owing to a 
difference in worldviews and the Russian leadership not being interested in what the EU 
was offering as to any principled exclusion stance by the EU. Nevertheless, Russia’s 
gradual stigmatisation as authoritarian mattered in that it provided an additional stigma 
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to those that would accumulate over the 2000s and a background against which to read 
all Russian behaviour. 
 Russia’s stigma management as regards democracy also provides a microcosm of 
its overall efforts to deal with its various stigmas. The stigma-rejecting tactic of ‘deny, 
deny, deny’, increasingly laced with a counter-stigmatising rhetoric of painting the US, EU 
and other Western actors as ‘morally degenerate’ (Haukkala 2015, 31–32; I. B. Neumann 
2016) would characterise also the Russian approach to dealing with accusations of 
human rights abuses, as discussed in the next chapter. However, it is notable that a 
concept like ‘sovereign democracy’ was not a wholesale rejection of democracy as such – 
while rejecting the specific ‘liberal’ version of democracy as not suitable for Russia owing 
to its particular stage of development, Russian leaders did pay lip service to the concept 
itself, which speaks to its hegemonic position. As noted by Morozov (2008, 156), given 
that much of Putin’s domestic legitimacy rested on his establishment of ‘stability’ as 
compared to the chaotic period of ‘democracy’ under Yeltsin in the 1990s, the fact that he 
and his team tried to ‘save Russia’s democratic reputation by playing with the slogan of 
“sovereign democracy” … must tell us something about the structures of power in today’s 
world, which turn “democracy” into a norm and make any deviations subject to 
punishment’. This indicates the fruitfulness of the stigma lens – it allows us to see how 
actors work to avoid the consequences of deviance. 
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Chapter 5 
Human Rights 
 
This chapter analyses stigmatisation and stigma management processes in relations 
concerning human rights. It traces the evolving Western stigmatisation of Russia as well 
as Russia’s developing reaction in relation to three cases: the wars in Chechnya and 
Russia’s breaches of international humanitarian law as well as ongoing human rights 
abuses in the republic; Russia’s observation of civil and political rights, particularly media 
freedoms, the right to protest and the work of non-governmental organisations (NGOs); 
and finally controversies over LGBT rights and women’s rights in connection with 
Russia’s turn towards an espousal of ‘traditional values’, in itself a counter-stigmatising 
move which in turn created more stigmatisation from the West. In conclusion, some 
tentative theoretical conclusions are drawn, focusing on the disjuncture between 
‘observable’ stigmatisation and the reaction of the stigmatised, as well as the need for a 
transnational lens to capture the full dynamics of stigmatisation internationally. 
 
I – Chechnya 
Much of Russia’s discreditability (though not necessarily actual discrediting) as far as 
human rights goes can be summed up in one word: Chechnya. The North Caucasus 
republic, part of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic within the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) pre-1991 and de jure an autonomous republic 
within the Russian Federation since the USSR’s collapse, was the scene of two bloody 
wars between Russian armed forces and Chechen separatists, first from 1994-96 and 
again from 1999-2000 (the end of the military phase of operations, with an ongoing 
armed insurgency and counter-insurgency operations). The wars were huge blots on 
Russia’s international image, with a combined civilian death toll in the tens if not 
hundreds of thousands. Several thousand Russian soldiers also died, in large part due to 
bad planning and military incompetence (see e.g. Treisman 2011, 294–95). Despite the 
authorities’ efforts to limit any critical reporting, particularly during the second war, 
journalists and activists documented numerous war crimes and human rights abuses by 
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both sides.77 This productive power process continued through the 2000s and 2010s, 
with journalists and activists continuing to document the human rights abuses 
perpetrated under the Kremlin-backed local rule of President Akhmad Kadyrov (from 
2003 until his assassination in 2004) and his son, Ramzan Kadyrov (from 2004). Some, 
like investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya and activist Natalya Estemirova from 
human rights organisation Memorial, were murdered because of their work, contributing 
to Russia’s slide in human rights and press freedom rankings.78 An additional source of 
discreditability was the rising number of cases brought against Russia at the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) after its ratification of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) in 1998, the first wave of which were related to human rights 
abuses in Chechnya during the second war (Mälksoo 2015, 159–67; see also Mälksoo and 
Benedek 2017). 
The causes and consequences of the Chechen wars were many and complex.79 The 
first war has been described as both ‘a war of national liberation, a war initiated by 
criminal bandits, and a clash of civilizations: it was as much a military campaign as it was 
an information war, and explanations were as varied as they were outlandish’ (Forsberg 
and Herd 2005, 458). The second war, launched the month after he became prime 
minister in 1999, did much to help the relatively unknown Putin build and consolidate a 
popular public image, and has for this and assorted reasons been the subject of several 
conspiracy theories since.80 Both in December 1994 and September 1999 there were 
putatively good reasons for the Russian authorities to reimpose a degree of central 
control over Chechnya – the security situation in the republic was at both times 
 
77 See Gessen (2012, 145–51) for a first-hand account of the military’s restrictions on reporting in the 
second war, and Ostrovsky (2015, 280–81) and Wilhelmsen (2016) for further analysis, including of how 
the mainstream Russian media discourse was overwhelmingly pro-war. 
78 It has never been fully established who ordered neither Politkovskaya’s 2006 murder, although five 
Chechen men were convicted of the killing in 2014, nor Estemirova’s in 2009. As Masha Gessen noted in 
2012 about Politkovskaya’s murder, reflecting on the perils of being a tireless (and at times unpleasant) 
investigative journalist critical of both the Russian government and its Chechnya policy: ‘Who could have 
done it? Anyone’ (Gessen 2012, 219). 
79 For detailed accounts and analyses of the wars, see e.g. Lieven (1998), German (2003), Politkovskaya 
(2003); for a highly original world systems theory-inspired analysis, see Derluguian (2004). 
80 Aside from the straightforward theory that the war was launched to build Putin’s image as a strongman 
leader, suspicions centre on a series of bombing attacks against apartment blocks across Russia in the lead-
up to the war. Officially, these were carried out by Chechen terrorists, but allegations that the security 
services themselves executed them to justify the war are rife. See particularly the book Blowing up Russia 
by former FSB agent Alexander Litvinenko, assassinated in London in 2006, and historian Yuri Felshtinsky 
(2007). 
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deteriorating, with kidnappings and terrorist attacks spreading to neighbouring regions. 
In 1999, the trigger for invasion was an incursion by Chechen forces into the 
neighbouring republic of Dagestan. However, the ‘way force was used’ by Russian forces 
was unjustifiable (Treisman 2011, 296, emphasis in original), particularly once initial 
hopes of quickly overwhelming separatist forces ended in predictable fashion and 
indiscriminate shelling of urban areas ensued, with the Chechen capital, Grozny, reduced 
to rubble and the civilian death toll high (see e.g. Gessen 2012, 146). When the 
circumstances of the case additionally lent themselves well to a ‘romantic’ version of 
events pitting the ‘ancient nation of Muslim mountain dwellers, the Chechens’ against the 
brutal Russian colonisers, a view that ‘inform[ed] much [Western] press coverage’ 
(Treisman 2011, 262) and thereby constituted Russia as a human rights violator in 
Western media discourse, the stage should have been set for a clear-cut case of 
stigmatisation. Instead, a mixed bag occurred. 
 The first war did delay elements of the relationship building between the newly 
established EU and Russia, with some degree of separation and concurrent status loss. 
Both EU and US leaders accepted the basic premise of Russia’s need to maintain its 
territorial integrity and therefore neither framed the issue as a case of decolonisation or 
national self-determination nor recognised Chechnya as a sovereign state (despite its 
1993 declaration of independence). Instead, they focused on human rights violations, 
issuing progressively stronger criticisms of Russian forces’ conduct and insisting on an 
end to fighting and a political solution (see e.g. Forsberg and Herd 2005, 459–60; W. J. 
Clinton 1994; 1995; W. J. Clinton and Kohl 1995). In early 1995, the EU decided to 
postpone ratification of the EU-Russia Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA), 
signed in June 1994, citing Russian violations of humanitarian norms in Chechnya. This 
example of separation was the ‘strongest demonstration of [the EU’s] determination to 
enforce its normative agenda’, and yet was far from a clear-cut case as both bilateral 
programmes and the dispersing of technical aid funds continued (Forsberg and Herd 
2005, 460). An interim treaty was signed in July 1995 as the European Commission noted 
some progress in Russia’s Chechen policy, and following the cessation of hostilities in 
1996-97 the PCA was ratified by the EU and eventually came into force in December 1997 
(Forsberg and Herd 2005, 460–61). Russia’s admission to the Council of Europe in 
February 1996, meanwhile, preceded the final ceasefire and peace treaty by around six 
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months. The war was not enough of a stigma for the Council states to keep Russia out – 
despite much debate and a consensus that the country did not objectively meet the 
criteria for membership (yet), the side that argued it was better to include Russia to 
further push its development in a positive direction won out (Mälksoo 2017, 3–5). The 
most hard-line actor was the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), 
which suspended the Russian accession procedure in February 1995 only to allow it to 
proceed a year later (Leach 2017, 257–60). 
 Western leaders justified their relative leniency by citing the need to not rock the 
boat on Russia’s democratic transition, illustrating the power of ‘transitionology’ 
(Monaghan 2016) highlighted in the previous chapter, or what Lauri Mälksoo (2017, 3–
5) dubs the West’s mission civilisatrice. While security concerns about the territorial 
integrity of Russia were also important in Western decision making, public 
pronouncements focused on President Yeltsin’s indispensability to Russia’s 
democratisation process (Forsberg and Herd 2005, 459). When asked on the day Russian 
troops attacked Chechnya in December 1994 whether this and other Russian moves 
called into doubt Russia’s reliability as a strategic partner, President Clinton was 
unequivocal: ‘No. And I’d like to say why. They don’t because Russia is still a democracy. 
Russia is still pursuing economic reform’ (W. J. Clinton 1994). Two months later, in 
February 1995, both Clinton and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl spoke in similar terms, 
with Kohl invoking the same temporal dimension identified in the previous chapter, 
hinting at what would happen should Western states cut off ties with Yeltsin’s 
government: ‘I’m absolutely sure, absolutely convinced that if we were to push the forces 
of reform and the President into a corner, isolate them … this will immediately bring us 
back to the old, bad structures of the past’ (W. J. Clinton and Kohl 1995, emphasis added). 
Thus, while the use of force in Chechnya was condemned repeatedly, there were only 
tentative steps towards any kind of separation from or stigmatisation of Russia – the 
state’s continued progress along the road to democracy (and, notably, economic reform) 
was deemed more important than its questionable attitude towards and record on human 
rights. 
 Evidence of stigmatising processes during the second war was equally ambiguous, 
revealing not only the tension between Western strategic and normative concerns but 
also the challenge involved in constructing and maintaining a united ‘audience of 
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normals’. There were clear divisions between EU states about what approach to take. 
Germany, Italy and particularly France emerged as the harshest critics of Russia’s 
policies. The three countries issued an independent statement expressing concern on 29 
September 1999, to the surprise of the Finnish EU presidency, and in an example of 
physical separation German foreign minister Joschka Fischer cancelled his participation 
in a meeting on the Northern Dimension (a joint EU-Russia-Norway-Iceland policy), citing 
Russia’s ‘ill-conceived’ Chechnya policy (Forsberg and Herd 2005, 462–63). As other 
foreign ministers followed suit, Finland (the hosts) remained the only EU representative 
at the meeting. Indeed, Finnish leaders were among the actors advocating continued 
engagement with Russia over isolation – others included the High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, and British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair, who stated his scepticism against sanctions during his visit to St Petersburg in 
March 2000 (Forsberg and Herd 2005, 462–64; Zygar 2016, 16). Meanwhile across the 
Atlantic, US leaders maintained a similar line of emphasising Russia’s right to defend its 
territorial integrity and fight terrorism, while at the same time (and with increasing 
frequency as the violence escalated) condemning any indiscriminate use of violence and 
calling for a political solution (see e.g. S. Berger, Grossman, and Hill 1999; W. J. Clinton 
1999a). 
 The most forceful and united stigmatising front by Western actors over Chechnya 
came in December 1999, as the Russian ultimatum to the population of Grozny to ‘leave 
the city or face annihilation’ coincided with the 10-11 December European Council 
meeting (Forsberg and Herd 2005, 463). Pressed to act, EU leaders adopted the 
‘Declaration on Chechnya’, condemning ‘the intense bombardments of Chechen cities, the 
threat levelled at the residents of Grozny and the ultimatum set by the Russian military 
commanders, as well as the treatment of the internally displaced persons as totally 
unacceptable’ (European Council 1999). The declaration recognised Russia’s right to 
‘preserve its territorial integrity’ and to ‘fight terrorism’ but said Russia’s ‘behaviour 
[was] in contradiction with the basic principles of humanitarian law, the commitments of 
Russia as made within the OSCE and its obligations as a member of the Council of Europe’ 
and called on Russia to end its ‘disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force against 
the Chechen population’. Invoking the same spatio-temporal dimension seen in the 
chapter on democracy and implicitly linking the humanitarian violations to questions of 
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modernity and democracy, EU leaders reiterated that ‘the Union has constantly expressed 
its willingness to accompany Russia in its transition towards a modern and democratic 
state’ (European Council 1999). A similarly worded joint US-EU declaration was issued 
after a summit on 17 December, six days after the expiration of the ultimatum deadline 
(United States and the European Union 1999). The EU statement had threatened 
sanctions if Russia failed to comply, including the suspension of parts of the PCA, a review 
of the EU’s Common Strategy on Russia and the redirection of technical aid funding 
towards humanitarian assistance. A limited selection of these measures was indeed 
introduced with effect from February 2000, but these were lifted in June the same year 
following the end of active hostilities, despite continued verbal criticism of Russia’s 
behaviour using what Forsberg and Herd (2005, 465) characterise as the ‘usual phrases’: 
‘condemnation of the use of disproportionate and indiscriminate force’, ‘independent 
investigations of human rights violations’, etc. In the Council of Europe, PACE was again 
the most hard-line actor, suspending the Russian delegation’s voting rights in April 2000 
while asking the Council of Ministers to suspend Russia’s membership of the Council 
completely, something it refused to do – voting rights were then re-instated in January 
2001 (Leach 2017, 257–60). 
 The criticism also continued in global forums like the UN, demonstrating the even 
greater difficulty of assembling an ‘audience of normals’ on a larger scale. Three 
resolutions on Chechnya were tabled in the UN Commission on Human Rights between 
April 2000 and April 2002, each following a report by the High Commissioner on Human 
Rights and at least the last two sponsored by the EU (UN Human Rights Commission 2000; 
BBC News 2001; Kirby 2002). The first resolution, adopted while EU sanctions were still 
in place in April 2000, expressed ‘grave concern’ about the continued violence and human 
rights abuses, including ‘disproportionate and indiscriminate’ use of Russian military 
force, called upon Russia to investigate and requested it to educate its military about 
‘basic principles of human rights and international humanitarian law’. The resolution 
passed by a roll-call vote of 25 votes to 7, with a full 19 abstentions in the 53-member 
commission (UN Human Rights Commission 2000).81 This indicates that even in an 
 
81 This official record leaves two votes unaccounted for. A roll-call vote should technically have a list of 
countries, but this is absent in the official document. Almost certainly, the majority of supporters will have 
come from the 10 ‘Western European and other’ states (including at this point the US and Canada) and 
Western allies in the other regional categories such as Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Japan, etc. 
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apparently clear-cut case of human rights violations, getting support for a relatively mild-
worded critique was a challenge. 
The second, April 2001 resolution adopted stronger language despite the fact that 
it was adopted almost a year after EU sanctions had been lifted and in between two EU-
Russia summits where Chechnya was kept in the background (Forsberg and Herd 2005, 
466). The resolution ‘strongly condemn[ed] the continued use of disproportionate and 
indiscriminate force by Russian military forces, federal servicemen and State agents, 
including attacks against civilians and other breaches of international law as well as 
serious violations of human rights, such as forced disappearances, extrajudicial, summary 
and arbitrary executions’ (UN Human Rights Commission 2001). However, 
foreshadowing the post-9/11 US/EU increased acceptance of the Russian version of 
events in Chechnya, Chechen ‘terrorist activities and attacks’ were also condemned, as 
opposed to merely expressions of ‘grave concern’ over ‘attacks against civilians’ in the 
2000 resolution. The resolution passed in a roll-call vote by 22 votes to 12, again with 19 
abstentions, indicating a slowly dwindling ‘audience of normals’ in support of criticising 
either Russia specifically or internal human rights abuses generally.82 This slow 
dwindling tipped the balance a year later, when in April 2002 a similar EU-sponsored 
resolution was narrowly defeated by 16 votes to 15, with 22 abstentions (Kirby 2002). 
The difference between April 2001 and April 2002 were the events of 11 September 
2001, the US’s invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 and burgeoning talk of a potential 
war in Iraq.  
Just as 9/11 transformed world politics, it ‘transformed the context of the Chechen 
war’ (Forsberg and Herd 2005, 467) and the success of Russia’s stigma management 
approach. Throughout the Chechen wars, Russian leaders had rejected any discreditable 
behaviour in relation to Chechnya, insisting that the conflict was an internal issue of no 
concern to anyone else, that no (serious) human rights abuses had ever taken place, 
and/or that it was fighting ‘terrorists’ and therefore was doing the international 
community a favour. Statements frequently also included a dose of counter-
stigmatisation, as when Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Ivanov stated in May 2001 that 
 
82 Supporters of the resolution included EU states, US, Canada, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia – the presence of 
the last two indicating that even the commitment of the supporting ‘stigmatising coalition’ to human rights 
was somewhat skin-deep. Opponents included Russia, India, China and Nigeria (BBC News 2001). 
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‘These [EU] amateurs on the Chechen issue should occupy themselves with Macedonia, 
where the [EU] is about to get its own Chechnya’ (quoted in Forsberg and Herd 2005, 
467). The terrorism argument was particularly prevalent in the second war, as Moscow 
allied itself with Chechnya’s chief mufti, Akhmad Kadyrov, and labelled all oppositional 
Chechen forces, some of which were indeed affiliated with Al-Qaeda, ‘terrorist’ (Zygar 
2016, 34). Chechnya was also thoroughly ‘securitised’ in the domestic Russian discourse, 
becoming a symbol for the potential disintegration of Russia as a whole, which justified 
extraordinary measures and made the war and its brutality ‘possible’ in spite of any 
concerns about human rights (Wilhelmsen 2016). Before 9/11, this approach did not 
resonate with Western leaders or international opinion. As Mikhail Zygar recounts, ‘when 
Putin told Western colleagues about his war on terror, they listened attentively, nodded, 
and said they would do what they could do to assist’, but then did nothing, leading to 
growing Russian resentment (2016, 34). After 9/11, the tune changed somewhat. Putin 
was, famously, the first leader to call President Bush after the attacks, and two weeks later 
Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov told US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice 
‘Chechnya and Afghanistan are branches of the same tree’, expressing support for the US 
operation in the latter (Zygar 2016, 34–35; Ivanov quoted in Forsberg and Herd 2005, 
467). As the US launched its ‘Global War on Terror’ and sought political and logistical 
support for its interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Russian and American 
discursive contexts aligned, leading to a ‘sudden, if temporary, decline in the number of 
open critiques of the situation in Chechnya’ (Gilligan 2010, 178). Even European leaders 
who in other contexts were highly sceptical of American policy called for (more or less 
cautious) reassessments of Russia’s Chechnya policy, and human rights abuses in 
Chechnya disappeared off the regular bilateral EU-Russia agenda despite the continued 
criticism and documentation by media and activists (Forsberg and Herd 2005, 468–72). 
In autumn 2002, a curious case of ‘reverse separation’ compared to the normal power 
relationship occurred when Putin refused to attend an EU-Russia summit in Denmark 
because the country would not extradite the Chechen leader Akhmed Zakayev; instead of 
standing its ground, the EU moved the meeting to Brussels (Forsberg and Herd 2005, 
469). 
In sum, elements of stigmatisation did occur in Russian-Western relations over 
the two Chechen wars, but it appears premature to speak of ‘full’ stigmatisation, for three 
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reasons. First, Western moves were hesitant as well as quickly and easily reversed, 
including the delayed PCA in the 1990s and the selective sanctions in 2000. Second, the 
‘audience of normals’ was never unified, with splits both within the EU, between the EU 
and US (after 9/11) and no broader international consensus (as shown by the UNCHR 
votes). Third and related, other normative and/or strategic concerns tended to overrule 
the potential human rights stigmatisation when in direct conflict, notably the concern to 
maintain Russia’s ‘fragile democracy’ in the 1990s or the ‘international struggle against 
terrorism’ in the early 2000s. Western leaders never completely gave up mentioning the 
need for human rights investigations, freedom and democracy in Chechnya (e.g. Bush 
2003), but their concerns were not enough to engender full-on stigmatisation. 
Meanwhile, the Russian reaction, here as in the case of democracy, was a complete stigma 
rejection, insisting on the normality of their conduct and (through the tight control of 
media access in the second war) seeking to prevent any information that could lead to 
their discrediting from reaching the public sphere. 
 
II – Freedom of expression and association 
Increasing restrictions on freedom of expression and protest, the tightening of state 
control over media institutions and civil society organisations, as well as regular 
instances of physical attacks against individual journalists and human rights activists 
(several leading to deaths) were all persistent sources of labelling and status loss for the 
Russian government. Russian and international NGOs, international organisations and 
Western governments all criticised, more or less consistently, the excesses of the Putin 
and Medvedev administrations’ attempt to monopolise administrative resources and 
marginalise alternative sources of power. However, by itself this discreditable behaviour 
was not enough to cause sustained separation by Western governments. The instances 
that caused the most sustained criticism were those where violations of civil rights 
coincided with more broadly discreditable behaviour, for example when protests against 
alleged election fraud were suppressed. Russia’s reaction to stigmatisation in these areas 
mostly followed the well-trodden stigma rejection path, as well as the tu 
quoque/‘whataboutist’ counter-stigmatising tactic of pointing out discreditable 
behaviour in Western countries. There were several prongs to the government’s strategy, 
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including the legal and administrative efforts to manage the electoral process and 
marginalise the political opposition described in the previous chapter, the Yukos affair 
(which will be examined in Chapter 7) and three elements that will be dealt with here: 
increased state control over the media, increased restrictions and crackdowns on 
protests, and increased restrictions on the activities of non-governmental organisations, 
particularly foreign ones or those receiving foreign funding (Greene 2014, 84–87).  
 The examples of discreditable behaviour in these areas were multiple and are 
covered in detail elsewhere, but a brief summary of key cases is warranted. Soon after 
Putin’s election in 2000, the media mogul Vladimir Gusinsky’s Media Most Group 
company was raided and Gusinsky arrested on tax fraud charges. Gusinsky was released 
and left Russia, while his TV station NTV, which had been critical of both Chechen wars, 
satirised Putin in a popular puppet show and openly questioned the FSB’s potential role 
in the September 1999 apartment block bombings, was gradually taken over by the state-
owned gas company Gazprom. The government also moved to assert control over Russian 
Public Television (ORT, in which it owned a 51% stake) from Putin’s one-time champion 
Boris Berezovsky (who also left Russia after selling his shares to fellow oligarch Roman 
Abramovich) after the channel’s critical coverage of Putin’s handling of the August 2000 
Kursk submarine disaster (Ostrovsky 2015, 292–302; Zygar 2016, 25–40). These moves 
marked the beginning of a growing increase in state control over mass media, particularly 
television, used to control information and promote the government’s own view of 
affairs, as well as the use of tax and extremism laws and unofficial pressure to shut down 
or harass independent news outlets (Schönfeld 2012, 251–54). This was accompanied by 
physical harassment and killings of journalists, particularly those working for critical, 
independent outlets like Novaya Gazeta and/or reporting on the situation in Chechnya. 
The US-based NGO Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) recorded 26 journalists killed 
in Russia from 2000-16 (compared to 30 from 1992-99), while domestic organisations 
put the number far higher (Schönfeld 2012, 254–56).83 High-profile cases included the 
detention of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reporter Andrey Babitsky by security 
forces in Chechnya in January-February 2000, and the above-mentioned killings of 
Novaya Gazeta-affiliated Politkovskaya and Estemirova (Gessen 2012, 32–36). Not all 
these cases were necessarily ordered or conducted by the government or even state 
 
83 www.cpj.org (accessed 3 August 2018). 
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representatives, but the lack of investigations and low conviction rates implicated the 
state heavily in the overall environment. 
 The picture was similar for NGOs and activists. Like independent news outlets, 
NGOs were subject to inspections and other harassment such as tax raids or accusations 
of ‘extremist’ activity. In summer 2004, a new law on protests was introduced that 
severely restricted the ability to hold protests in city centres and gave authorities wide 
discretion to refuse permissions, and in 2006 legal restrictions on NGO activities were 
passed that gave the government increased powers to deny registration to any 
organisations deemed a threat to Russia’s sovereignty or national interests and obliged 
NGOs to provide detailed reports of all projects and their funding to the government 
(Robertson 2009, 450–51; McAuley 2015, 153). These measures were escalated in May-
July 2012, when the fines for engaging in unsanctioned protests were upped significantly 
and the law requiring all foreign NGOs and those receiving any funding from abroad to 
register as ‘foreign agents’ were introduced (Skibo 2017). In 2015, the ante was upped 
again as legal changes were introduced that allowed prosecutors to declare organisations 
‘undesirable’ and thereby ban them from operating in Russia – by the end of 2016 six 
organisations had been categorised as such, including the National Endowment for 
Democracy, the Open Society Foundation and the International Republican Institute.84 In 
addition to these legal restrictions, both official and unofficial protests were frequently 
cracked down on through detentions, arrests and legal cases against protest leaders, 
increasingly so since 2011-12 when political protests against electoral fraud and Putin’s 
return to the presidency took off. The most notable case was the violent crackdown on 
the ‘March of Millions’ protest in Moscow’s Bolotnaya Square on 6 May 2012 against 
Putin’s inauguration. Several hundred protesters were detained, dozens were injured in 
fighting with police, and more than 30 people were subsequently charged with inciting a 
‘mass riot’ and/or violence against the police and convicted in a ‘slow drip of arrests, 
trials and sentences [that] created a pervasive sense of fear’ – the last verdict was not 
handed down until December 2015 (Greene and Robertson 2019, 23–26, quote from 25). 
 
84 See details of the legislation and list of organisations at The International Center for Non-Profit Law’s 
Civic Freedom Monitor website, http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/russia.html (accessed 20 July 
2019). 
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 One of the most notable aspects of stigmatising practices in relation to Russia’s 
record on freedom of expression and assembly and on civil and political rights more 
broadly was the central role played by non-state actors. A wide range of international and 
domestic NGOs monitored, documented and publicised human rights abuses, shamed the 
Russian government for its poor record and lobbied Western governments and 
international organisations to put pressure on Russia to improve. Within the 
conceptualisation of stigmatisation adopted here, such activities contribute heavily to the 
labelling and status loss components of the process, albeit with the caveat of these actors’ 
primarily productive power. The consistently poor and worsening placement of Russia 
on NGO rankings such as Freedom House’s Freedom in the World (see Chart 5.1) or 
Freedom of the Press and Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index 
contributed towards the knowledge production of Russia as an increasingly ‘not free’ 
state (in Freedom House’s parlance). Regular critical reports and press releases from 
high-profile human rights organisations like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch 
and Russia’s own Memorial provided a consistent source of evidence of discreditable 
behaviour related to the above-mentioned areas as well as other issues like persistent 
torture and disappearances in Chechnya and the North Caucasus.  
Chart 5.1 – Russia’s aggregate score on Freedom House’s Freedom in the World index, 2003-2016. 
100 = entirely free, 0 = entirely unfree. 
 
Source: ‘Aggregate Category and Subcategory Scores, 2003-2019’, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world. 
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These forms of stigmatising practices were highly intentional and strategic on 
behalf of the organisations involved. They broadly conformed to the ‘norm entrepreneur’ 
and/or ‘shaming’ logics identified by mainstream constructivist IR scholarship (e.g. 
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; 
2013; Friman 2015), with a clear purpose of effecting change in a positive direction, be 
that towards increasing human rights compliance in the case of e.g. Amnesty or towards 
the more nebulous concept of ‘freedom’ in the case of Freedom House. As with an election 
being deemed neither free nor fair by the OSCE/ODIHR, the very fact of being labelled as 
a human rights-abusing government or ‘not free’ state by the likes of Amnesty and 
Freedom House was and is a contributing source of status loss for states, even if the 
organisations lack the institutional or coercive power to back it up (and to protect 
themselves against a counter-stigmatising backlash). This can be seen from the Russian 
government’s strong pushback against human rights NGOs’ assessments of and activities 
in Russia, seeking to pass as normal by repressing, delegitimising and (counter-) 
stigmatising the NGOs in question. 
 A second key part of the stigmatising process on the human rights front was the 
stream of cases and judgments against Russia at the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) in Strasbourg after its accession to the Council of Europe in 1996 and to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1998. As mentioned above, the first 
wave of these cases related to human rights abuses during the second war in Chechnya – 
at least 260 judgments finding violations had been issued by the ECtHR in connection 
with the conflict by the end of 2016 (Leach 2017, 255–56). But there were also numerous 
judgments relating to human rights breaches more generally. Russia was among the 
ECtHR’s ‘”bad boys” both qualitatively and quantitatively: cases against it [were] 
numerous and many of them concern[ed] violations of core rights’, with a high degree of 
repetitive violations (Mälksoo 2017, 6). At the end of 2016, the number of pending cases 
against it at the Court was the fourth highest by country – 7,821, behind Ukraine, Turkey 
and Hungary (Council of Europe 2017, 192–93).85 From the Court’s establishment in 
 
85 Russia’s statistics look better when population size is considered. The number of allocated cases per 
capita in 2016 was 0.38, compared to the ECtHR average of 0.64. Still, as Mälksoo notes, the issue is 
qualitative as well as quantitative, and the downward trend in allocated cases (from a high of 14,309 
total/1.01 per capita in 2010) was probably more due to the Court becoming more restrictive about 
admitting cases, the increasingly anti-ECtHR rhetoric within Russia and intimidation of those considering 
bringing claims, than to any improvement in the human rights environment (Provost 2015). 
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1959 until the end of 2016, Russia ranked second for the number of judgments against it 
that had found at least one violation of the ECHR (1,834, behind Turkey on 2,889), and 
first for judgments relating to articles such as the right to life (270), prohibition of torture 
(50), inhuman or degrading treatment (612) and the right to liberty and security (816) 
(Council of Europe 2017, 202–3).86 Compared to this, the number of judgments relating 
to freedom of expression (31) and assembly/association (20) were few, but they still 
made Russia the fourth- and second-worst violator of these rights, respectively. 
 Two things are worth noting about the stigmatising effects of ECtHR rulings. The 
first is that despite its legal and highly respected status, its power was primarily 
productive, i.e. its continued judgments against Russia served mainly to constitute the 
state and its government as a discreditable actor. The Court’s judgments regularly require 
states to provide compensation when found guilty of violations, but the sums are usually 
relatively small from a state perspective and it has no real coercive power to enforce its 
rulings if a state refuses to comply. This does not make the status loss as a result of being 
identified as a serial violator of the ECHR any less real, but it does mean that there is 
usually no tangible pressure for states to comply beyond their leaders’ concern for their 
reputation (Schönfeld 2012, 264). The second thing is that the Court’s rulings did not just 
touch on human rights in a narrow sense but frequently emphasised the importance of 
for example freedom of expression to the broader good of a democratic society, 
demonstrating the mutually constitutive relationship between human rights and 
democracy in the dominant normative order. For example, in the 2007 case of Dyuldin 
and Kislov vs. Russia, the Court emphasised the importance of freedom of the press and 
thereby ‘free political debate’ for the very ‘concept of a democratic society’ (Schönfeld 
2012, 268–69). The Court also frequently either explicitly or implicitly addressed issues 
linked to norms like capitalism and non-aggression, demonstrating the mutual 
constitution of the dominant norms. For example, its 2014 judgment in the case of Yukos 
vs. Russia awarding the oil company’s shareholders €1.866 billion in compensation was 
a damning indictment of the Russian government’s respect for the property rights central 
to liberal capitalism, and its 2004 ruling in the Ilascu vs. Moldova and Russia case 
 
86 This should be seen in the context of Russia only ratifying the ECHR in 1998 (vs. Turkey in 1954), 
although pre-1998 the ECtHR was not a full-time institution, and changes that allowed individuals to bring 
claims to it from 1999 onwards significantly increased the number of cases. 
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implicated Russia as a direct party to the Moldovan-Transnistrian conflict and de facto 
sovereign over separatist Transnistria, against Russian insistence to the contrary. 
 In addition to the ECtHR, two other international institutions whose productive 
power contributed to Russia’s discrediting are worth mentioning. First, the Council of 
Europe’s Venice Commission (technically the European Commission for Democracy 
through Law), which provides legal advice to member states. The Commission issued 18 
opinions on Russian laws or legal amendments between 2003 and 2015 (often at the 
request of other Council of Europe bodies such as the Parliamentary Assembly), including 
Chechnya’s draft constitution, several election-related laws, the law on combating 
extremist activity and the law on public demonstrations.87 The Commission’s opinions 
were as a rule negative, pointing out shortcomings and necessary improvements. In its 
opinion on the 2012 amendments to the 2004 law on demonstrations, the Commission 
employed the same temporal language that has been identified as a stigmatising trope 
throughout this study: the amendments represented ‘a step backward for the protection 
of freedom of assembly’ in Russia (Venice Commission 2013). The second noteworthy 
actor was the OSCE’s Representative on Freedom of the Media, tasked with ensuring the 
maintenance of media freedoms across the OSCE. Along with other OSCE institutions like 
the ODIHR, the Representative regularly issued critical opinions of the media situation in 
Russia, contributing to the overall process of labelling from non-state actors and 
international organisations (Schönfeld 2012, 256). 
 In contrast to this consistent process of discrediting, state-to-state practices of 
stigmatisation between Western state actors and Russia over civil and political rights was 
patchy, at least until Putin’s return to the presidency in 2011-12. The human rights 
situation in Russia, whether linked to Chechnya, media freedoms or the right to protest, 
was always present in inter-governmental discussions as a topic of dialogue and criticism. 
However, as is often the case when states are involved, security issues and economic 
interests often meant that ‘softer’ issues like human rights were relegated in importance 
– rarely would Russia’s discreditable human rights situation be the number one issue on 
the agenda or on its own be the explicit cause for instances of separation like cancelled 
meetings or summits. For example, in June 2000, the month after the first raid on Media 
 
87 For a full list, see the Commission’s website at 
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/documents/by_opinion.aspx?lang=EN (accessed 8 August 2018). 
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Most’s offices, President Clinton visited Russia for his first summit with President Putin 
and signed agreements relating to the reduction of nuclear weapons and information 
sharing, while stressing the importance of an independent media and expressing 
confidence that Putin was capable of maintaining ‘freedom and the rule of law’ (W. J. 
Clinton and Putin 2000).88 A year later, following the completion of Gazprom’s aggressive 
takeover of NTV in April 2001, President Bush met Putin at the G8 Summit and noted 
‘Chechnya and … media relations’ as areas of ‘differences’ between the two countries 
before praising Putin as ‘… an honest, straightforward man who loves his country [and] 
family. We share a lot of values. I view him as a remarkable leader’ (Bush and Putin 
2001).89 As noted above, the post-9/11 War on Terror temporarily muted American 
criticisms of Russian human rights abuses, and also severely undermined the US’s (and 
its allies’) claim to moral legitimacy and/or superiority concerning human rights. Even 
President Obama’s less compromised administration chose initially to pursue better 
relations with Russia through its infamous ‘reset’, focusing on co-operation on security 
issues despite the worsening human rights situation in Russia. Similarly, in Europe, both 
the EU and individual European states continued co-operation and trade with Moscow 
despite growing concerns about human rights abuses, as evidenced by the 2003 
establishment of the four ‘common spaces’ and the 2005 adoption of roadmaps for these, 
although by this time Russian-EU relations were running out of steam (Haukkala 2015, 
30–31).  
 
Russia’s stigma management: denial and counter-stigmatisation 
As with its reaction to being stigmatised as undemocratic and to criticisms of its Chechnya 
policy, the Russian government’s response to criticism over its human rights abuses more 
broadly consisted of a mixture of stigma rejection and, increasingly, of counter-
stigmatisation of both state and non-state actors. However, the picture was not uniform, 
and its counter-stigmatisation approach developed and became more aggressive over 
time, contributing to a spiral of more stigmatisation. 
 
88 Privately, Clinton was not so sure of this. See Talbott (2018). 
89 See Zygar (2016, 18–19) for details of how Putin prepared for the meeting with Bush, playing up to his 
religious views. 
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 Russian authorities did in various ways and at various times either explicitly or 
implicitly acknowledge that human rights violations occurred in the country. For 
example, despite its increasingly hostile rhetoric towards the ECtHR and its intimidation 
of prospective claimants (a clear attempt at hiding discreditable behaviour), the Russian 
government generally paid out compensation in ECtHR cases, with notable exceptions 
such as Yukos and Ilascu (Mälksoo 2017, 5–6). A human rights 
commissioner/ombudsman office was established in 1997 and continued to operate, 
although a survey cited in its own annual report for 2014 in which only 7% of 
respondents said they would turn to the office if their human rights were violated (as 
opposed to 23% who would turn to the president and 24% to ‘nobody’) indicates limited 
visibility and effectiveness (High Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian 
Federation 2015, 16). The government’s approach to explicitly acknowledging human 
rights abuses can be summed up by a note from the foreign ministry’s Information and 
Press Department in June 2006, responding to a report by the ‘US human rights group 
Freedom House … on how “bad” things are with democracy in Russia’ (the note also 
singled out the State Department and Human Rights Watch as fellow producers of ‘an 
endless stream of “compromising material” [that] is being churned out against Russia’): 
‘The technique for preparing such material is simple. They ferret out individual facts of 
violations, which, of course, can be found in any country and at any time. Then they make 
generalizations, and the isolated facts become “dominating tendencies”’ (Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006). In other words, of course there are human rights 
violations in Russia – where are there not? – but not more than in any other country. 
 The statement on Freedom House is also notable for another reason. It highlights 
the close attention paid by the Russian government to NGO assessments of the country 
and the blurring of the lines between state and non-state actors that formed the central 
part of its counter-stigmatising approach against such organisations. That the foreign 
ministry would find it necessary or beneficial to publicly respond to a critical report by 
an NGO itself indicates some of the power exercised by these non-state actors and their 
relevance for a study of stigmatisation in international society. The statement went on to 
state that Freedom House ‘receives US government grants’ as well as money from 
‘powerful public organizations’ with government subsidies and noting how it was headed 
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by a former CIA director, calling it a ‘battleworthy unit’ and linking its rankings of 
democracies to the new US National Security Strategy (the ‘Bush Doctrine’):  
Perhaps, all this should not be taken so seriously but for one important 
circumstance. In the new strategy for US national security Russian-
American interstate relations are made directly contingent upon how 
Washington appraises our “behavior” in the field of democracy and human 
rights. … why these continuous exercises in denigrating Russia? Probably, 
somebody needs them at present. Somebody wants to keep pressure on us, 
using from force of habit human rights themes as in the time of the Soviet 
Union. Scheme tried and tested, running smoothly. Why invent something 
new? (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006) 
In effect, the foreign ministry labelled Freedom House as an agent of the American 
government and therefore neither objective nor to be trusted. By extension, this was the 
case for any NGO receiving funding from the American government (or other Western 
government) and providing support for or assessments of human rights and democracy 
in Russia. The immediate background to all of this was the colour revolutions, in which 
the stigmatisation of incumbent regimes as undemocratic had contributed to their 
removal. While a fairly straightforward explanation for why these laws were enacted can 
thus be made focusing on the Russian government’s regime security, the measures’ 
symbolic nature suggests a counter-stigmatising logic where the democratic legitimacy 
of such revolutions was being targeted. 
This counter-stigmatising logic already underpinned the 2005-6 legislation 
restricting the activity of NGOs deemed a threat to Russian national security and came to 
full fruition with the ‘foreign agent’ law of 2012 and the ‘undesirable organisations’ law 
of 2015. Such labels would be highly stigmatising in almost any context and Russia was 
not the only government to use them,90 but the term ‘foreign agent’ carried a particular 
negative resonance in the country during the Soviet period. The government took clear 
steps to ensure compliance: after many civil society organisations initially ignored the 
law, it launched a series of inspections that forced them to register, applying a liberal 
interpretation of what constituted ‘political activity’ in the process (Skibo 2017).91 The 
 
90 The US Foreign Agents Registration Act was passed in 1938 and is still in force – in 2017 the Russian TV 
channel RT was registered. 
91 For example, in September 2016 the Levada Center, a highly respected independent polling institute, was 
placed on the register because conducting sociological surveys was deemed to constitute political activity. 
See Gessen (2017, 472, 481). 
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application of the foreign agent label to an organisation was made publicly available, both 
through a series of television exposés and through the practical requirements of the law. 
For example, the register of ‘foreign agents’ was available online on the Ministry of 
Justice’s website, and all organisations registered as such were required to mark their 
publicly available documents as ‘published by a foreign agent’ (Skibo 2017).92 These laws 
thus indicated a clear government strategy to not only cripple NGOs’ operations through 
administrative hurdles but to publicly stigmatise them in the eyes of the Russian 
population and thereby to delegitimise these organisations’ own stigmatisation of the 
government. A Levada Center poll of 1,600 people conducted in December 2016 indicated 
the success, albeit limited, of this strategy: a clear majority of those who had heard about 
the law held negative views about both ‘foreign agents’ and foreign funding of non-profit 
organisations. However, 73% of those polled had never heard about it.93 Nevertheless, 
the ‘counter-audience of normals’ targeted by the Russian government in this case 
appears clearly to have been the Russian domestic population rather than some 
international or transnational audience. 
While it is safe to assume that the labelling of civil society organisations as foreign 
agents had a stigmatising impact on the organisations in the domestic Russian context, 
internationally the Russian government’s increasingly aggressive counter-stigmatisation 
tactics only led to a step up in condemnation. This condemnation was also increasingly 
fuelled by another strand of Russian policy, namely its increasingly conservative and 
repressive stance on gender and sexuality, including LGBT rights. 
 
III – ‘Sovereign morality’ as counter-stigmatisation 
As noted briefly in Chapter 3, the position of gender rights, particularly LGBT rights, 
within the dominant normative order was more ambiguous than that of more widely 
accepted rights like the right to vote or protest, given the relatively recent 
decriminalisations of homosexuality even in some Western countries and the continuing 
 
92 See the register at http://unro.minjust.ru/NKOForeignAgent.aspx (accessed 9 August 2018). In 2015, 
legal changes made it possible for organisations to be removed from the register, but the most common 
reason for being removed is either liquidation or self-liquidation. 
93 https://www.levada.ru/en/2017/03/20/foreign-agent/ (accessed 9 August 2018). 
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debates over same-sex couples’ right to marry, adopt, serve in the military, etc. The ECtHR 
had an evolving position on LGBT rights, only treating it as a full-fledged discrimination 
issue from the late 1990s and not recognising same-sex marriage as a fundamental right 
as late as the 2000s owing to the lack of consensus across the Council of Europe member 
states (Bartenev 2017, 327–30). Women’s rights were a similarly mixed area, despite 
these and gender equality often being held up as particularly ‘Western’ traits by 
supporters and opponents alike (Towns 2009). While gender equality formed a 
fundamental part of the post-1945 human rights norm on paper, its practical 
implementation was slow, and there was no consensus even within or among Western 
states over key issues such as the rights to abortion and divorce. In spite of, or perhaps 
precisely because of this ambiguity, the area of LGBT and gender rights would form part 
of the most sustained and successful Russian counter-stigmatisation tactic. 
Russia decriminalised homosexuality in 1993 and equalised the age of consent for 
same-sex intercourse in 1997, but discrimination against LGBT people persisted (see 
Healey 2017 for a history of homophobia in Russia). LGBT activists’ application to hold a 
gay pride parade in Moscow in 2006 was turned down by the mayor’s office and a 
demonstration against the ban by a few dozen activists was marred by violence from anti-
LGBT protesters. A similar pattern of authorities refusing permission to the parades and 
violence against demonstrators continued over the next five years, until in 2012, 
Moscow’s mayoral office banned all gay pride parades in the city for a period of 100 years. 
In 2010, the ECtHR’s judgment in Alekseyev vs. Russia ruled that the continuous banning 
of pride parades violated the ECHR articles on freedom of association, effective remedy 
and discrimination (Bartenev 2017, 331–32). The Russian government had argued in its 
unsuccessful defence that the holding of pride parades would have a morally detrimental 
impact on children.94 This foreshadowed the federal law adopted in June 2013 outlawing 
the promotion of ‘non-traditional sexual relationships’ as an acceptable social norm to 
minors (under-18s), dubbed the ‘gay propaganda law’ in the West.95 The law specifically 
mentioned pride parades as an example of the kind of activity it outlawed, but as with the 
 
94 The Court argued that there was no ‘scientific evidence or sociological data’ to support this, something 
Bartenev (2017, 331–35) calls a ‘mistake’ as it implied that if such evidence did exist the banning could be 
lawful. Unsurprisingly, a government-supported research project was then launched in Russia to provide 
the scientific basis for this position – a stigma removal attempt. 
95 The law followed similar legislation in several Russian regions, starting with Ryazan as early as 2006 and 
then 13 more from 2011-14, including St. Petersburg (Bartenev 2017, 335–36). 
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ambiguous definition of ‘political activity’ under the various NGO laws, the terminology 
was so vague that almost any mention of non-heterosexual relationships in the presence 
of people under 18 could constitute a crime. 
The 2013 law formed part of a wider series of policy moves and symbolic actions 
apparently geared towards constituting the Russian government as a defender of 
‘traditional family values’ against the corrosive influence of Western-style gender rights 
(the law’s full name was the federal law ‘for the Purpose of Protecting Children from 
Information Advocating for a Denial of Traditional Family Values’). The targets of these 
moves were both LGBT people, feminist activists and other advocates of allegedly ‘non-
traditional’ gender norms. The example that gained most prominence internationally was 
the trial of and harsh sentences (two years in a penal colony) handed down to three 
members of the feminist punk rock group Pussy Riot in August 2012 for staging a ‘punk 
prayer’ in Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in February 2012 in protest against 
Putin’s presidential bid, calling on the Virgin Mary to ‘exorcise Putin’ and ‘become a 
feminist’ (Sperling 2015, 233–34). In its judgment, the court noted that ‘feminism is 
incompatible with social relations in Russia that are historically based on a religious 
worldview’ (Sharafutdinova 2014, 616). But forerunners setting the scene for this harsh 
ruling were many – for example, throughout the 2000s, the government had implemented 
increasingly pro-natalist policies to address the country’s falling birth-rate, such as 
restrictions on abortion in 2003 and 2011 and the institution of an official award and 
medal for raising large families (the ‘Order of Parental Glory’) as well as a ‘maternity 
capital’ programme in 2007-08 (Sperling 2015, 149–50, 255–57). In Cai Wilkinson’s 
(2018, 105–8) words, the link between Pussy Riot, the gay propaganda law and the 
broader traditional values agenda was the development of a ‘hypermasculine’ Russian 
state under Putin, performing hegemonic masculinity by protecting its ‘damsel in 
distress’ Mother Russia from the ‘Unholy Queer Peril’ of ‘feminism, unnatural gender 
roles and secular Western decadence’.  
The portrayal of Western countries as dens of sin and sexual deviancy can be 
summed up neatly in the increasing prevalence of the term ‘Gayropa’ to denote Europe in 
state-supported media discourse since Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012 (Riabov 
and Riabova 2014; Foxall 2017). But similar language was also present in official 
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discourse, for example in Putin’s comments to the Valdai discussion club in September 
2013:  
We can see how many of the Euro-Atlantic countries are actually rejecting 
their roots, including the Christian values that constitute the basis 
of Western civilisation. They are denying moral principles and all 
traditional identities: national, cultural, religious and even sexual. They are 
implementing policies that equate large families with same-sex 
partnerships, belief in God with the belief in Satan. The excesses of political 
correctness have reached the point where people are seriously talking 
about registering political parties whose aim is to promote paedophilia. 
People in many European countries are embarrassed or afraid to talk 
about their religious affiliations. Holidays are abolished or even called 
something different; their essence is hidden away, as is their moral 
foundation. And people are aggressively trying to export this model all 
over the world. I am convinced that this opens a direct path to degradation 
and primitivism, resulting in a profound demographic and moral crisis. 
(Putin 2013a)96 
In addition to labelling them as morally wrong, Putin portrayed the ‘aggressive export’ of 
Western values as fundamentally undemocratic. In his address to the Federal Assembly 
in December 2013, he accused the liberal West of seeking to foist its ‘neutered and barren’ 
culture of tolerance upon Russia and others, going on to invoke an ever-growing 
‘audience of normals’ against such imposition:  
Today, many nations are revising their moral values and ethical norms, 
eroding ethnic traditions and differences between peoples and cultures. 
Society is now required not only to recognise everyone’s right 
to the freedom of consciousness, political views and privacy, but also 
to accept without question the equality of good and evil, strange as it 
seems, concepts that are opposite in meaning. This destruction 
of traditional values from above not only leads to negative consequences 
for society, but is also essentially anti-democratic, since it is carried out 
on the basis of abstract, speculative ideas, contrary to the will 
of the majority, which does not accept the changes occurring 
or the proposed revision of values. We know that there are more and more 
 
96 The gendering of the demographic situation highlighted by Wilkinson and Sperling is front and centre 
here, as is the homophobic linking of homosexuality and paedophilia. When asked about whether gay 
athletes would be welcome at the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, Putin responded ‘as long as they stay away 
from the children’ (Sperling 2015, 299). 
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people in the world who support our position on defending traditional 
values… (Putin 2013b) 
Echoing the temporal/teleological metaphors used by Western officials, Putin 
acknowledged that this position was ‘conservative’, but invoked the Russian philosopher 
Nikolai Berdyaev’s words to argue that ‘the point of conservatism is not that it prevents 
movement forward and upward, but that it prevents movement backward 
and downward, into chaotic darkness and a return to a primitive state’ (Putin 2013b). 
The two statements’ invocation of a silent majority (‘People in many European countries 
are embarrassed’; ‘more and more people in the world support us’) opposed to and 
stigmatised by an unaccountable elite (‘the destruction of traditional values from above’) 
is a classic simultaneous stigma rejection and counter-stigmatisation move. For Putin and 
his government, it carried a dual domestic and international purpose: domestically, 
emphasising traditional values shored up his popularity with the conservative, older and 
often rural population and positioned him as an opponent of the ‘liberal metropolitan 
elite’ in Moscow, while internationally, such a conservative agenda aligned Russia with 
other opponents not just of Western power but of liberal human rights norms as a whole. 
The promotion internationally of ‘traditional values’ as a normative system for 
other states and governments to rally behind and subvert their own stigmatisation within 
the dominant order predated Putin’s return to the presidency. A repeated practice was 
the promotion in the UN Human Rights Council of resolutions on ‘promoting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms through a better understanding of traditional values of 
humankind’. Three such resolutions co-sponsored by Russia (a member of the Council 
from 2006-16) were passed in 2009, 2011 and 2012, respectively. Each time, a majority 
of between 24 and 26 states including Russia and other primarily eastern and southern 
states supported the resolutions against a minority of 14-15 mostly Western states and a 
mixed bag of abstentions (6-7).97 These resolutions were not directly critical of 
established human rights norms – each resolution paid lip-service to the universal and 
indivisible nature of the Universal Declaration. However, they sought to establish that ‘all 
 
97 As an illustration, the 2012 resolution was supported by Angola, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
China, Congo, Cuba, Djibouti, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malaysia, 
Maldives, Mauritania, Philippines, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Thailand and Uganda, and opposed 
by Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Mauritius, Mexico, Norway, 
Poland, Romania, Spain, Switzerland and the US. Benin, Chile, Guatemala, Nigeria, Peru, Moldova and 
Uruguay abstained. 
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cultures and civilizations in their traditions, customs, religions and beliefs share a 
common set of values that belong to humankind in its entirety’ and that had ‘made an 
important contribution to the development of human rights norms’. The 2009 resolution 
called for a workshop to discuss such values, which was duly held in October 2010 (UN 
Human Rights Council 2009; 2010). The 2011 resolution singled out ‘dignity, freedom 
and responsibility’ as three particularly important such values and requested that the 
Council’s Advisory Committee ‘prepare a study on how a better understanding and 
appreciation of [these values] can contribute to the promotion and protection of human 
rights’ (UN Human Rights Council 2011). The 2012 resolution took this one step further 
by requesting that the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights gather information from 
states and other stakeholders ‘on best practices in the application of traditional values’ 
(UN Human Rights Council 2012).  
The stigma management approach encapsulated in these resolutions was thus 
twofold: stigma rejection, through an attempt to establish that ‘traditional values’ were 
in fact just as universal as human rights and indeed constitutive of them, and attempted 
counter-stigmatisation, in that the exercise in collecting information was almost certainly 
intended to ‘reveal’ the non-protection of ‘traditional values’ in Western states and 
thereby label them. In the event, Russia did not even submit any information on ‘best 
practices’ itself (though other supporters such as Qatar did), while the EU delivered a 
stinging rebuke of the whole exercise and several human rights organisations, including 
the Russian LGBT Union, submitted detailed take-downs of the concept.98 The promotion 
of similar resolutions in the Human Rights Council continued: in June 2014, Russia, China 
and a group of similarly inclined states sponsored and passed a resolution entitled 
‘Protection of the family’, reaffirming the family as ‘the natural and fundamental group of 
society’. A year later, a more substantive resolution affirming the family’s contribution ‘to 
the realization of the right to an adequate standard of living for its members’ was passed 
by a similar group of states, again against the opposition of most Western states on the 
council (UN Human Rights Council 2014; 2015). 
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova (2014) has dubbed the conservative turn in Russian policy 
since 2012 a move from sovereign democracy to ‘sovereign morality’, and emphasised 
 
98 See submissions at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/TraditionalValues.aspx (accessed 16 
August 2018). 
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the international resonance of this originally domestic agenda. In her words, ‘[w]hat was 
initially a domestic strategy turned into an internationally oriented discourse, as Putin 
took upon himself the mantle of the champion of conservative values worldwide’ (2014, 
616; see also Laruelle 2016). The UN initiatives listed above were only part of the story: 
Russia’s new positioning not only gave it natural allies in other governments opposed to 
gender equality, LGBT rights or the broader liberal rights agenda, but also conservative, 
nativist movements within the West opposed to the ‘liberal social policies and 
multiculturalism’ of their elites (I. B. Neumann 2016, 175). The well-publicised close 
relations between the Kremlin and France’s Front National were only one instance of 
several connections between the Russian government and far-right parties across 
Europe, involving underhand funding based on ideological affinity and shared strategic 
goals (Shekhovtsov 2017). In the same way that such parties positioned themselves 
domestically as the ‘true’ protectors of ‘real’ European (usually Christian, frequently 
national) values to reject or evade the stigmas of racism, intolerance and backwardness, 
Russia’s government positioned itself as the leader of a silent majority of ‘normals’ 
against the ‘deviant’ liberal West.  
 
Conclusion 
There are some interesting tentative conclusions to be drawn from the above analysis. 
First, the interrelations and close connections between the norms investigated here are 
clear from the way Russia reacted to its growing stigmatisation as broadly undemocratic 
not by defending the alternative political organisation or value system of 
‘authoritarianism’ but by doubling down on ‘conservatism’ and ‘traditional values’, 
thereby focusing primarily on the ‘liberal’ part of Western ‘liberal democracy’ (as well as 
its alien nature, symbolised in the ‘foreign agent’ law). The notable thing is that state-to-
state stigmatisation of Russia over the kinds of human rights encapsulated in the 
‘traditional values’ agenda – LGBT rights, gender equality, reproductive rights – was not 
particularly pronounced prior to 2012. This changed subsequently, with both the Pussy 
Riot trial and the gay propaganda law becoming central themes in Western criticisms of 
Russia’s direction under Putin, albeit still primarily on the NGO level. For example, while 
several Western heads of state or government stayed away from the opening ceremony 
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of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics and the US had a subtle dig at Russia by nominating 
openly gay athletes for their opening and closing ceremony delegation, human rights 
and/or LGBT rights were not explicitly cited as a reason for this highly symbolic display 
of separation (Goldstein 2013).99 But rather than being a case of Russia’s classic tu quoque 
tactic, whereby Russian leaders by default pointed their fingers straight back at Western 
countries’ own faults whenever criticised, this was a deeper, more fundamental counter-
stigmatising approach where the whole ‘Western’ value system was being rejected. 
Russia portrayed itself as the ‘true’ Europe against the decadent, liberal version further 
west (I. B. Neumann 2016, 169–78). 
Theoretically and methodologically, this points to some important dynamics and 
questions. Primarily, there appears to be no clear relationship between the observable 
existence or not of a successful (sociological) stigma imposition and the (psychological) 
reaction or experience of the stigmatised. To an outside observer, Russia was not 
particularly stigmatised for its supposed ‘traditional values’ pre-2012, yet this was the 
area that was most furiously asserted as being under attack by the Russian government. 
This may of course have been a purely strategic calculation and not down to any actual 
feeling of being stigmatised on the part of the Russian leadership. Even so, the relative 
success of this ‘sovereign morality’ discourse both domestically and internationally 
points to a deeper unease within and without Russia about the ‘liberal’ side of the liberal 
democratic order. 
Second and relatedly, the high involvement of non-state actors in the 
stigmatisation processes surrounding human rights and the close attention paid to their 
activities by states like Russia points to the need for a transnational approach to 
stigmatisation. By focusing only on inter-state dynamics, it is possible to lose sight of the 
important productive roles played by NGOs and international institutions like the 
European Court of Human Rights. Moreover, we lose sight of transnational processes like 
the Russian government’s support for and co-operation with ideologically like-minded 
actors both at government and opposition level across Europe and the world.  As such, 
audiences and counter-audiences of ‘normals’ and ‘stigmatised’ in international relations 
 
99 The US did not send either a president, vice-president, first lady or former president to the ceremony for 
the first time since 2000. The German president and chancellor, UK prime minister, Canadian prime 
minister and French president also declined to attend, citing various innocuous reasons. 
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do not just consist of states. When the Russian government identified itself with the ‘out-
group’ of ‘illiberals’ who supported traditional values, gender roles, etc., they were not 
just building an alliance of states but of anyone who subscribed to these ideas, just like 
Western governments did when they sought to include the ‘Russian people’ in their own 
(democratic) audience of normals against the ‘abnormal’ Russian government. 
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Chapter 6 
Non-aggression 
 
This chapter analyses stigmatisation processes in relation to perhaps the most 
fundamental norm of the international society of states non-aggression. As argued in 
Chapter 3, forcefully violating another state’s ‘territorial integrity or political 
independence’, as stated in article 2(4) of the UN Charter, was a clear and well-
established taboo for states, legally enshrined both in treaties and customary 
international law since at least 1945. As interventions across state borders nevertheless 
continued to be a core feature of international relations, the challenge for any would-be 
intervening state wanting to avoid the potential stigma of aggression was to either hide 
any dubious intervention from the world, to seek authorisation from the UN Security 
Council owing to a threat to international peace and security, or to successfully frame an 
intervention in such a way as to be consistent with one of the established or emergent 
and still contested exceptions to the general rule, primarily peacekeeping, humanitarian 
intervention/the Responsibility to Protect, or at least a notional promotion of the general 
principles of democracy or human rights. 
 This chapter proceeds in three sections. In the first, Russian-Western interactions 
in relation to the series of Western interventions in the late 1990s and early 2000s – 
Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq – are analysed from a stigma perspective. While none of the 
interventions involved full stigmatisation from either side, each in their own way affected 
the normative stability and legitimacy of future stigmatisation attempts. Second, the 
tentative but uncompleted steps towards the stigmatisation of Russia as aggressive in 
connection with the 2008 war in Georgia are analysed. Third, the fulfilment of Russia’s 
stigmatisation over aggression in the response to its annexation of Crimea is analysed. In 
each of these sections, the evolving Russian stigma management is also considered. 
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I – From Kosovo to Iraq: shifting norms 
The Western interventions in Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) each 
provided crucial turning points both in the developing normative framework on the use 
of force and in relations between Russia and Western powers. Russian acquiescence and 
even support for the Afghanistan intervention came during the brief period of US-Russian 
(and, to a lesser extent, Russian-European) normative and strategic convergence around 
the need to combat international terrorism in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks 
in the US. This was bookended by the more conflictual relations over the Kosovo and Iraq 
interventions, both of which Russia strongly opposed. However, while there were 
elements of stigmatisation such as labelling and separation involved, particularly in the 
case of Kosovo, neither case resulted in complete stigmatisation either of the Western 
interveners (as aggressors) or Russia (as opposer of the values the interveners claimed 
to be upholding), with no sufficient audiences of normals mobilised or separation or 
status loss enacted in support. 
 
Kosovo 
Operation Allied Force (OAF), NATO’s March-June 1999 bombing campaign against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) to stop the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanians by 
FRY government forces during their ongoing conflict with the separatist Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA), was worrying to the Russian political leadership for several 
reasons. Strategically, as NATO’s first operation outside of its member states’ territory 
and in Russia’s former sphere of influence in the Balkans, it provided clear evidence of 
the post-Cold War shift in balance of power in Europe. The intervention side-lined forums 
in which Russia played a part, including the UN Security Council (in large part because of 
Russia’s threatened veto), and showed the ultimate failure of negotiations Russia had 
sought to maintain for the previous year and a half, leaving it as an ‘affronted bystander’ 
(Allison 2013, 51; Averre 2009, 577). That the intervention was against the ‘fraternal’ 
Slav nation of Serbia (FRY’s main constituent republic) provided fuel to ethnic nationalist 
forces in Russia, who were pushing the government to take a tough stance despite 
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Russia’s diminished capabilities (particularly so soon after the 1998 Russian financial 
crisis). Normatively, the emerging concept of humanitarian intervention, used by leaders 
such as Tony Blair to justify the NATO campaign, and its solidarist implications in Russian 
eyes undermined the pluralist principle of non-intervention and set a potential precedent 
for similar involvement in Chechnya. At the same time, too strong an opposition to the 
Western action risked excluding Russia from future negotiations about Kosovo’s status 
and isolating the country at a particularly vulnerable time economically (Allison 2013, 
50–55). Seeking a balance between these different concerns, the Russian leadership 
paired heated rhetoric, in which NATO’s actions were labelled both ‘genocide’ and ‘neo-
colonialism’ by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, with ‘relatively restrained diplomatic 
measures’ of separation, including for example the recall of Russia’s chief military 
representative to NATO and suspension of Russia’s participation in NATO’s Partnership 
for Peace programme (Averre 2009, 579–82). In perhaps the most immediate of 
separation acts covered in this study, when he was informed about the start of the NATO 
operation by US Vice President Al Gore while on a private plane on his way to meetings 
in Washington, Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov ordered the plane to turn 
around and immediately return to Moscow (Broder 1999). 
In addition to such bilateral separation, the Russian government sought to label 
NATO’s action as a violation of international law and norms on the use of force and to 
mobilise an international ‘audience of normals’ behind this. On 26 March 1999, two days 
after the start of OAF, the UN Security Council met to vote on a resolution drafted by 
Russia and Belarus and co-sponsored by India that categorised NATO’s ‘unilateral use of 
force’ as a ‘flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter’ and a ‘threat to international 
peace and security’ (UN Security Council 1999b). The resolution was defeated by 12 votes 
to three.100 In their statements before and after the vote, opponents of the resolution 
(both NATO members and others) emphasised the dire humanitarian situation in Kosovo, 
the intransigence of the Milošević government (often referred to as such rather than as 
the ‘Yugoslav’ government, indicating the personal stigma increasingly attached to 
Milošević), and the fact that the military intervention was a last resort (UN Security 
Council 1999a). The level of opposition to the resolution ‘offered a degree of tentative 
 
100 China, Namibia and Russia voted for; Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Canada, France, Gabon, Gambia, 
Malaysia, Netherlands, Slovenia, the UK and US against. 
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support for [NATO’s] combined justifications for OAF’ (Allison 2013, 53). The absence of 
a united stigmatising ‘audience of normals’ was illustrated by the divergent language 
even of the resolution’s supporters. Russia spoke of NATO’s ‘aggressive military action’, 
‘military aggression’ and a ‘virus of lawlessness’ (language echoed by Belarus, Cuba and 
FRY itself), and invoked the Rio Group, the CIS Council of Defence Ministers and the Non-
Aligned Movement as fellow opposers (UN Security Council 1999a, 5–6).101 However, 
China and India were more guarded in their statements, not explicitly using the word 
aggression and focusing primarily on the need to halt violence and restore the authority 
of the Security Council (UN Security Council 1999a, 9, 15–16). China’s opposition to the 
NATO action grew exponentially six weeks later after the inadvertent bombing of the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade, but at this point Russia had decided to instead work with 
Western states to find a political solution, as indicated by an agreement in principle 
reached at the G8 foreign ministers’ meeting on 6 May 1999 that formed the basis for UN 
Security Council Resolution 1244 adopted on 10 June with China abstaining (Allison 
2013, 54). 
There are some tentative conclusions to draw from the Kosovo intervention about 
the role of stigmatisation processes both in the evolving normative order concerning the 
use of force and in Russian-Western relations. First, the stigma of aggression could be 
avoided if an intervention could be successfully framed as a necessary and proportionate 
response to grave human rights abuses (as would be debated at length in subsequent 
debates on humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect). This relativizing 
of the stigma against the use of force had several unintended consequences, including, 
according to Russian analysts, making the Russian leadership less worried about using 
force in Chechnya, by both lifting a ‘taboo’ on using military force to resolve ethnic 
problems and giving Russia a potent tu quoque argument against NATO criticism of its 
imminent second Chechen campaign (Averre 2009, 585). Second, at this stage, neither 
Russia nor Western powers were interested in pushing the normative conflict into active, 
sustained stigmatisation territory, despite Russia’s view of OAF as a flagrant violation of 
international law and Western views of Russia as directly or indirectly supporting 
Milošević’s human rights abuses. For the Russian leadership, too much was at stake – 
 
101 According to Allison (2013, 54–55), the CIS defence ministers actually failed to adopt a Belarus-
proposed resolution condemning ‘NATO aggression against Yugoslavia’; each of its leaders interpreted the 
NATO intervention in ways favourable to their own political goals. 
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negotiations on the adapted Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty and on an IMF 
assistance programme were ongoing (Averre 2009, 582–84). For the West, the 
aforementioned commitment to helping Russia’s transition to democracy, particularly in 
the face of the communist/nationalist challenge in the upcoming 1999 parliamentary 
election, militated against rocking the boat. 
 
Afghanistan: brief, mutual stigmatisation of ‘terrorists’ 
As noted in the chapter on human rights, for a brief period following 9/11 and President 
Bush’s declaration of his ‘War on Terror’, the normative outlook of the Russian and 
Western, particularly American, governments converged around a mutual stigmatisation 
of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorists’, mainly of the Islamist jihadi kind. Thus, Russia supported 
the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to oust the Taliban from power in 
Afghanistan, despite concerns about the potential impact on the broader security 
situation and American influence in Central Asia. Drawing on Moscow’s existing 
representation of Chechnya as a ‘key transnational terrorist-inspired conflict’ (rather 
than one about separatism or secession), Putin framed Afghanistan explicitly as ‘a 
continuation of the anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya’ (Allison 2013, 91–92). While 
this was further than Western politicians were willing to go and critical official voices 
remained, further information on links between al-Qaeda and Chechen rebels led 
Western leaders, particularly Bush, to accept Chechnya as a counter-terrorism case 
(Allison 2013, 93–94). 9/11 thus led to a brief lull in stigmatisation dynamics in Russian-
Western relations. 
 The Afghanistan intervention was important from a stigmatisation perspective in 
demonstrating another potential way of avoiding the stigma of aggression (or, in the case 
of domestic use of force, human rights abuses): by successfully framing an intervention 
as a response to, or as aimed at combating, terrorism (particularly 
international/transnational terrorism). ‘Terrorism’ or ‘terrorist’ was and remains itself a 
stigma, a mark reducing its bearer(s) to something less than full humanity and singling 
them out for separation, status loss and other extraordinary measures such as rendition 
or even summary execution (see e.g. Patel 2012; Zarakol 2011). The contentious point, as 
will be seen below in both Russian and Western justifications for interventions, comes 
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when defining who or what counts as terrorist or terrorism. During the Kosovo war, 
Russia had designated the KLA as terrorists, and by extension criticised NATO for 
supporting Islamist extremism (Averre 2009, 582). Afghanistan was thus both indicative 
of a potential rule – the power of the terrorism stigma in trumping other stigmas – and 
was itself an exception of a moment when there was relatively widespread agreement on 
the labelling of a specific group (in this case the Taliban and/or al-Qaeda) as terrorist. 
 
Iraq: the shattering of a fragile consensus 
The invasion of Iraq in March 2003 ‘fractured international society more deeply than any 
other post-Cold War military intervention’ (Allison 2013, 116). In their attempts to 
legitimise the intervention and avoid the stigma of aggression, US leaders and their 
British allies made use of a variety of strategies and tactics, many of which can be 
productively read through a stigmatisation lens, from President Bush’s labelling of Iran, 
Iraq and North Korea as the ‘Axis of Evil’ in January 2002 to the persistent attempts to 
demonstrate the Iraqi government’s alleged possession or pursuit of weapons of mass 
destruction, itself a stigmatisable attribute/behaviour in contemporary international 
relations (Shamai 2015; Tannenwald 2005). Indeed, since its own aggression against 
Kuwait in 1990, Iraq had been one of the more directly stigmatised states in international 
society, the subject of ongoing economic sanctions by the UN Security Council. 
 From a stigmatisation perspective, the lack of any form of consensus, even among 
Western states, about the intervention and accusations of transgression in all directions 
led to what Adler-Nissen (2014b) calls a split between different normative visions of 
international society. As Allison (2013, 94–110) points out, Russian opposition to the 
intervention was both principled and expedient at the same time – while the Russian 
government was relatively sympathetic to the US interpretation of the general principle 
of pre-emption against threats to national security, it did not want this applied to states 
(only to non-state actors like terrorist groups). Moreover, it was sceptical of the selective 
American designation of certain states (which all happened to have decent relations with 
Russia) as ‘rogues’, the bypassing of the UN Security Council and the general 
transformative precedent set by the ex post facto justification of regime change and 
supposed democratisation in Iraq. It was joined in opposition to the intervention by usual 
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suspects such as China but also France and Germany, with three trilateral Russian-
French-German summits through 2003 and another in 2004. However, despite their 
shared ‘heartfelt irritation’ at American arrogance, Putin, Jacques Chirac and Gerhard 
Schröder each also had different levels of ‘cynical self-interest’ driving their opposition 
to war and did not readily align in a common normative front or ‘audience of normals’ 
against Bush and Blair’s ‘coalition of the willing’ (Allison 2013, 114; Zygar 2016, 37). 
Notably, in neither the foreign minister-level UN Security Council meeting on 19 March 
2003 when the invasion was imminent nor in the expanded ambassador-level meeting 
on 26 and 27 March did Russia (or France or Germany) label the invasion an act of 
aggression, unlike several members of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Arab League, 
Cuba and Belarus (UN Security Council 2003a; 2003b). Given the predominant power 
relations, with the world’s most powerful state being accused of aggression, such 
labelling was not accompanied by much separation or status loss. By May 2003 the 
Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1483, following negotiations and 
compromises between its sponsors (Spain, the UK and the US) and opponents of the 
invasion. The resolution lifted sanctions on Iraq and recognised the US and UK as 
‘occupying powers’ and their ‘unified command’ as ‘the Authority’ (UN Security Council 
2003c, 2). This to some extent legitimised the occupation, though Allison (2013, 114) 
points out that the resolution neither condemned nor condoned the intervention itself, 
rather accepting it as a fait accompli and moving on to manage its consequences – either 
way the interveners did not face full, direct stigmatisation from their peers.  
 The legacy of Iraq for subsequent interventions and stigmatisation dynamics in 
Russian-Western relations was nevertheless important. The occupiers’ failure to find any 
evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and subsequent revelations about 
deliberate deception or disinformation by the US and UK governments severely 
undermined their legitimacy both internationally and even domestically. In the UK, 
having supported the war became a stigma of sorts for Labour politicians in intra-party 
politics. Any future attempt by the US or UK to stigmatise others for aggression or 
unnecessary intervention would now be (legitimately) subject to the retort of ‘what about 
Iraq?’. Regarding Russian-Western relations specifically, according to Zygar (2016, 37) 
Iraq ‘permanently changed Putin’s attitude toward the United States’ (and his ‘friend’ 
Blair). Having already been ‘furious’ about what he saw as American duplicity over the 
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prolongation of a temporary airbase in Kyrgyzstan beyond the one year promised at the 
time of the Afghanistan intervention, Putin and the rest of the Russian establishment 
were highly sceptical of the US and UK arguments on Iraq from the beginning given the 
close contacts between Moscow and Baghdad (a legacy from the Cold War). They knew 
Saddam Hussein to be ‘surrounded by corruption but not weapons of mass destruction’ 
(Zygar 2016, 35–36). The American intransigence and seeming deception thus fuelled 
already growing Russian cynicism about the US-led liberal order and anxieties about its 
own power within it, pushing the leadership towards an ‘anti-hegemonic’ position 
(Allison 2013, 118). This would manifest itself in increasingly stigma-rejecting and 
counter-stigmatising positions and a more actively subversive or revisionist stance. 
 
II – Georgia 2008: a deliberate transgression? 
Officially, the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia lasted for a mere five days, from 7 to 
12 August. In Ronald D. Asmus’s words, ‘[by] the standards of modern warfare, it was a 
little war. It was nevertheless a little war that shook the world’ (2010, 4).102 One of the 
main reasons for this was Russia’s breach of what Asmus called the ‘cardinal rule of post-
Cold War European security’: ‘that borders in Europe should never again be changed by 
the force of arms’ (2010, 4). However, despite this apparent clear breach of a well-
established taboo, Russia faced few consequences and little direct stigmatisation, at least 
from its peers. This section considers the reasons for this seeming paradox. 
 While appearing murky at the time owing to limited international media presence 
and knowledge of the region, the basic facts of the conflict have been well established. 
Central to this was the report of the EU’s ‘Independent Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Conflict in Georgia’ (named the ‘Tagliavini Report’ after its lead author, Swiss diplomat 
Heidi Tagliavini), published in September 2009. Over three volumes and 1,129 pages, the 
mission sought to meet its mandate of investigating the ‘origins and course’ of the conflict, 
re-iterating that its task was to establish the ‘facts’, not acting as a ‘tribunal’ (‘Independent 
 
102 Given the overwhelming European focus of Asmus’s reasons for this claim, it would perhaps be more 
accurate to say that the war shook Europe (and North America). 
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International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia Volume I’ 2009, 5, 2). Its 
headline summary of the conflict was as follows:  
On the night of 7 to 8 August 2008, a sustained Georgian artillery attack 
struck the town of Tskhinvali [the capital of the Russian-backed breakaway 
republic of South Ossetia]. Other movements of the Georgian armed forces 
targeting Tskhinvali and the surrounding areas were under way, and soon 
the fighting involved Russian, South Ossetian and Abkhaz military units 
and armed elements. … In a counter-movement, Russian armed forces, 
covered by air strikes and by elements of its Black Sea fleet, penetrated 
deep into Georgia, cutting across the country’s main east-west road, 
reaching the port of Poti and stopping short of Georgia’s capital city, Tbilisi. 
(‘Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in 
Georgia Volume I’ 2009, 10) 
The report also acknowledged that the Georgian attack was ‘only the culminating point 
of a long period of increasing tensions, provocations and incidents’, stretching back 
several years but becoming increasingly intense over the preceding months and weeks 
(‘Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia Volume I’ 
2009, 11). In total, the fighting left around 850 people dead and thousands wounded or 
displaced before a ceasefire was negotiated on 12 August after mediation by French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy on behalf of the European Union and fighting gradually ceased 
over the coming days (‘Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in 
Georgia Volume I’ 2009, 5). Shortly afterwards, on 26 August 2008, Russia’s new 
president, Medvedev, officially recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent 
states after a unanimous motion to that effect had been passed by the Russian Duma 
(Medvedev 2008). Russia’s two main potentially discreditable actions were thus, first, its 
intervention ‘deep into Georgia’ (if not its prior incursions, general support for Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia and clear preparations for an invasion long before the Georgian attack 
– see e.g. Illarionov (2009)) and, second, its recognition of separatist republics as 
independent states, thereby violating Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. 
 The Russian government sought to counter any potential stigmatisation both by 
seeking to control the narrative and information flow about the conflict and by offering a 
series of legal and moral justifications for its actions. Efforts to control the narrative were 
intense on both sides of the conflict, with both the Russian and Georgian governments 
seeking ‘to define for their own peoples, their opponents and the international 
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community … who was the aggressor … and who was the victim’ (Goble 2009, 181). 
Russia was mostly on the offensive in this information war. For example, in one of many 
moves that strongly indicated forward planning, around 50 Russian journalists were 
flown in to Tskhinvali from 2 to 7 August, the day the Georgian offensive began, while 
foreign journalists were denied entry; Russian state television also appeared well-
prepared in disseminating the official Russian message as soon as the war was underway 
(Goble 2009, 183–87; Illarionov 2009, 72–73). On a diplomatic level, Russia seized the 
initiative, calling an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council for the early hours of 
8 August to denounce Georgia’s ‘aggressive actions’ and its ‘treacherous and massive 
attack’ on South Ossetia (UN Security Council 2008a, 2–3).  
Overall, Russia’s defence of its actions centred on three themes: that Georgia (and 
specifically Saakashvili) was the aggressor, that Russia had no choice but to intervene to 
defend the human rights of its citizens (a somewhat warped ‘responsibility to protect’ 
argument), and that the West had no right to criticise given its previous actions in Kosovo 
(which had declared unilateral independence earlier in 2008) and elsewhere (Goble 
2009, 183; Toal 2017, 179–90). Georgia was accused of perpetrating ‘genocide’ against 
the Ossetian population, with wildly exaggerated death tolls initially cited by Russian 
officials (Allison 2013, 157). Overall the Russian discourse, Allison (2013, 151) argues, 
was ‘challenging in its legal jus ad bellum justifications, interesting in its (mis)use of 
humanitarian claims, and unsettling in its support for political secession’. None of 
Russia’s claims held up to international legal scrutiny. Even if a claim can be made that 
Georgia ‘started’ the conflict (in a narrow sense) and it has been well documented that 
the Georgian side also violated international humanitarian law, Russia’s intervention and 
massive use of force was disproportionate to any threat to either its peacekeepers, the 
human rights of Russians and/or Ossetians or Russian territory (which Georgia never 
attacked) (‘Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia 
Volume I’ 2009, 22–26). 
 From a stigma perspective, Russia’s actions in Georgia are interesting in several 
respects. First, regarding stigma management strategies, the focus on controlling 
information to hide evidence of aggression and the persistent framing of Georgia’s 
government as the aggressor was another prime example of a proactive attempt both to 
hide discreditable activity, as with human rights abuses in Chechnya, and to ‘discredit the 
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discreditors’ (Meisenbach 2010). Indeed, by labelling Georgia in general and vilifying 
Saakashvili in particular as a war criminal, seeking to place him ‘beyond the political pale’ 
(Allison 2013, 157), the Russian government was itself engaging in a stigmatisation 
campaign, seeking to mobilise an ‘audience of normals’ both at home and abroad against 
the Georgian government. It clearly recognised the potency of the potential stigma of 
aggression and sought both to avoid it and to label others with it. 
 Second, in the broader scheme of Russian-Western relations and Russia’s 
increasingly explicit counter-hegemonic, counter-stigmatising stance, Georgia 2008 – 
particularly the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states – 
appears as a very deliberate transgression, aimed at unveiling the hypocrisy of the 
‘normals’. Evers (2017, 786) notes how overt and self-conscious violations of 
international norms can be employed strategically by states. In the case of Russia’s 
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the key context was Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008 and its recognition as an 
independent state by an increasing number of states, mostly but not exclusively 
Western.103 Russia had consistently opposed the prospect of Kosovo’s independence 
throughout the years of UN-led mediation and compromise-seeking since the 1998-99 
conflict, out of a mix of geopolitical concern about increased Western influence in the 
Balkans and the precedent both of independence following Western military intervention 
and for the right to secession in general. The recognition of the two separatist republics 
in Georgia did not sit well with this supposedly principled opposition to secession – 
indeed, in February 2008, while condemning recognition of Kosovo as immoral and 
illegal, Putin claimed that ‘nobody was talking about the recognition of Abkhazia or South 
Ossetia’ (Allison 2013, 160). In Medvedev’s statement justifying Russia’s recognition, a 
point was made of claiming that Russia had maintained its call for negotiations between 
the Georgian government and the separatists ‘even after the unilateral proclamation of 
Kosovo’s independence’, showing how the different cases were linked in the Russian view 
(Medvedev 2008). Nevertheless, the statement proceeded to make a case for secession 
by painting Saakashvili as a latter-day Milošević who had ‘opted for genocide to 
 
103 By the time of Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 46 states had recognised Kosovo, 
including 21 of 27 EU members, 22 of 26 NATO members, and other ‘Western’ stalwarts like Australia, 
Costa Rica and Japan. See http://www.beinkosovo.com/countries-that-have-recognized-kosovo-as-an-
independent-state/ (accessed 8 January 2019). 
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accomplish his political objectives’, claimed that after ‘what has happened in [South 
Ossetia] and what has been planned for Abkhazia’ the people of the republics had ‘the 
right to decide their destiny by themselves’, referred to previous referendums in which 
support had been expressed for independence and called on other states to ‘follow 
[Russia’s] example’ in recognising the two de facto states (Medvedev 2008). Kosovo was 
cited as a reason also in a Financial Times article in Medvedev’s name on 27 August 
(Asmus 2010, 211).  
The fact that Russia went to great lengths to portray the recognitions as within 
international law does not make them any less of a transgression. While a ‘remedial 
secession’ argument of the right to secede in the face of gross human rights violations is 
supported by a minority of international lawyers, it has never entered state practice and 
did not fit the facts of the case (Allison 2013, 160–61). The Russian leadership knew it 
was breaking a taboo, but almost certainly chose to do so in part to seek to expose the 
‘double standards’ of the West (in addition to other strategic goals like keeping Georgia 
out of NATO), while at the same time creating as much confusion as possible around the 
facts of the case in order to avoid or evade the stigma that might follow such an act. When 
confronted with criticism, it again resorted to stigma rejection and going on the counter-
attack, for example UN Ambassador Churkin in the Security Council on 26 August:  
I must say that I in particular liked the statement of the Permanent 
Representative of the United States reminding the members of the Security 
Council that States must refrain in their activity from the use or the threat 
of the use of force. I would now like to ask the representative of the United 
States whether he has found the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq yet, 
or is he still looking for them? (UN Security Council 2008b, 17) 
Russia may also have genuinely hoped for other states to join it to create a stigmatising 
coalition against Georgia and an ‘audience of normals’ behind the recognition of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, but neither of those things occurred. The only UN members to have 
joined Russia in recognition by the end of 2016 were Nicaragua (2008), Venezuela and 
Nauru (2009), and Vanuatu and Tuvalu (2011, both since retracted). The foreign 
ministers of the Russia-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) did 
issue a statement in September 2008 condemning Georgia’s ‘aggression’, but all CIS states 
refused to recognise the two separatist republics and most were ‘shocked both by the 
Russian empowerment of separatism and its redrawing of CIS state borders’, which 
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‘overturned a foundational CIS norm’ (Allison 2013, 164–65). Russia’s actions thus 
marked it out as a transgressor also regionally, although even if its fellow CIS members 
had had the inclination to unite and stigmatise Russia, the power imbalance would have 
made this difficult. 
As it was, Russia faced remarkably little direct stigmatisation even internationally 
as a result of its actions in Georgia. While Russia and Georgia each accused each other of 
aggression during the active phase of the conflict, Western states mostly expressed 
concern over the escalation of violence in general and, as Russian forces moved past 
South Ossetia’s borders and into Georgia proper, Russia’s ‘disproportionate’ use of force, 
rather than aggressive actions. In addition to strategic concerns about not wanting to be 
dragged into a confrontation with Russia, a primary reason for this was the perception 
that the Georgian government had started the war with its attack on Tskhinvali, which 
was reinforced by the previously mentioned dominance of the Russian media story in the 
first days of the conflict (Goble 2009). Perceptions of Russian intent started to change as 
the Russian army advanced further, Putin refused to countenance a ceasefire in private 
conversations with presidents Bush and Sarkozy while in Beijing for the Olympic opening 
ceremony on 8 August, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told US Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice during a call on 10 August that Russia wanted Saakashvili to 
resign as a condition for ending the war (Asmus 2010, 182, 189–92). In the US, debates 
raged in the media, within the Bush administration and between presidential candidates 
John McCain and Barack Obama about how hard a line to take, and Vice President Cheney 
briefed the media that he had called Russia’s actions ‘aggression’ in conversations with 
Saakashvili (Toal 2017, 190–95). Still, the ‘interpretation of cause and effect’ that 
President Sarkozy summed up after the war – ‘there was a military intervention by 
Georgian forces, which was an error. The reaction of the Russian army was 
disproportionate’ – closely affected the Western response in general and Sarkozy’s 
ceasefire negotiations, which resulted in an agreement that did not even mention 
Georgia’s territorial integrity (Asmus 2010, 193). In their conclusions from an 
extraordinary meeting on the situation in Georgia held on 1 September, EU leaders 
expressed grave concern about ‘the open conflict that has broken out in Georgia, by the 
resulting violence and by the disproportionate reaction of Russia’, thereby refraining 
from apportioning blame for the initial aggression (Council of the European Union 2008). 
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The threat of separation and of damage to Russian-Western relations was invoked by 
President Bush and Defence Secretary Robert Gates (who also spoke of Russia’s 
‘aggressive posture and actions’) when calling for Russia to abide by the negotiated 
ceasefire, but not in response to the original attack (Asmus 2010, 208; Allison 2013, 156). 
After the fact, the EU’s fact-finding mission’s report, while rejecting Russia’s claims and 
legal justifications also lent some credence to the ‘Georgia started it’ thesis, thereby 
undermining the potential for stigmatising Russia (‘Independent International Fact-
Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia Volume I’ 2009).104  
Reactions to Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were more clear-
cut. The recognitions were widely condemned by other leaders, including President Bush, 
EU leaders, foreign ministers of the other G8 countries and other members of the UN 
Security Council (except China, which was present but did not take the floor at the 
relevant meeting) (Bush 2008; Council of the European Union 2008; Reuters 2008; UN 
Security Council 2008b). However, unlike six years later in the case of Crimea, these 
reactions did not lead to material consequences in the form of suspensions, sanctions or 
other overt separation or status loss. Russia remained a member of the G8, the Russia-
NATO Council continued to operate, and EU-Russia summits were not suspended. The 
question of sanctions was mentioned in the EU but dismissed by French officials (BBC 
News 2008). Less than a year later, in March 2009, the new US presidential 
administration extended a hand to Russia through the ‘reset’, seeking Russian co-
operation on disarmament and NATO supply lines to Afghanistan. Fuelled in part by the 
relatively greater ease of working with the superficially more ‘liberal’ (aka ‘normal’) 
Medvedev, even if Putin still called most shots behind the scenes, the West and 
particularly the US achieved some notable successes that would have been much less 
likely had Russia been ostracised following Georgia, for example the establishment of the 
Northern Distribution Network for NATO troops in Afghanistan with Russian support in 
2009, and the signing of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the 
US and Russia in 2010. While relations soured again with the controversy over NATO’s 
 
104 It should be noted that in 2016, after a preliminary examination, the International Criminal Court 
authorised an investigation into alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity between 1 July and 20 
October 2008. See https://www.icc-cpi.int/georgia for details (accessed 19 December 2019). 
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intervention in Libya in 2011 (Allison 2013, 189–203) and Putin’s return to the 
presidency, the nadir was reached over Ukraine and Crimea in 2014. 
 
III – Ukraine 2014: Russian aggression takes centre stage 
As noted in the Introduction, in his speech during the General Debate of the 69th UN 
General Assembly on 24 September 2014, President Obama juxtaposed the threat of 
Russian aggression with dangerous diseases and terrorism: 
As we gather here, an outbreak of Ebola overwhelms public health systems 
in West Africa and threatens to move rapidly across borders. Russian 
aggression in Europe recalls the days when large nations trampled small 
ones in pursuit of territorial ambition. The brutality of terrorists in Syria 
and Iraq forces us to look into the heart of darkness. … We will impose a 
cost on Russia for aggression, and we will counter falsehoods with the 
truth. And we will call upon others to join us on the right side of history. 
(Obama 2014k) 
The statement is an illustration in microcosm of Link and Phelan’s four components of 
stigmatisation. First, Russia is labelled as aggressive. Second, this label is linked to 
stereotypes of backward and regressive characteristics (‘territorial ambition’, the 
juxtaposition with terrorists and Ebola). Third, ‘we’ (those on the right side of history) 
are separated from ‘them’ (those on the wrong side of history) and the mobilisation of an 
‘audience of normals’ is called for (‘we will call upon others to join us’). Finally, a status 
loss (‘a cost’) is promised for the stigmatised – Russia, but by implication also those others 
who choose to join the Russians on the ‘wrong side of history’. Unlike in 2008, this time 
the threat had already been accompanied by both symbolic and material costs in the form 
of suspensions and sanctions. Of all the episodes covered in this study, none contributed 
more to Russia’s stigmatisation than the 2014 Ukraine crisis, and specifically Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea and support for the insurgency in eastern Ukraine. It was already 
established in Chapter 4 how by the time of Viktor Yanukovych’s downfall in late 
February 2014, Russia had become increasingly discredited as undemocratic by Western 
actors because of its support for the Ukrainian leader. To this undemocratic stigma was 
now added the aggressive one, despite Russian attempts to reject, evade and counter-
stigmatise. 
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 Despite the lack of an official fact-finding mission (as in Georgia) and the quantity 
of mis- and disinformation, the basic facts of the Ukraine case are well established.105 
Soon after Yanukovych fled Kyiv on the weekend of 22-23 February, Russian soldiers 
without insignia from the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol started taking control of public 
buildings in Crimea, holding up the regional parliament at gunpoint and making them 
install a new regional government that soon announced that a referendum would be held 
on whether Crimea should join Russia. Initially scheduled for May, the referendum was 
soon moved forward to 16 March, and official results reported that 96.77% of voters on 
a turnout of 83.1% had supported joining Russia. An accession treaty was duly signed in 
Moscow on 18 March amid much pomp and fanfare. After some small-scale unrest in the 
largely Russian-speaking east of Ukraine in February-March, violence escalated in April 
as groups of armed militants including Russian security agents started occupying 
government buildings in towns across the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (the Donbass) 
and declaring the establishment of the Donetsk and Luhansk ‘people’s republics’, both of 
which held independence referendums on 11 May officially resulting in votes for self-
rule. Russia stopped short of recognising these referendums, instead saying it ‘respected’ 
them. The Ukrainian government launched an ‘Anti-terrorist Operation’ against the 
militants on 16 April, and the conflict descended into a civil war between the covertly 
Russia-backed rebels on the one hand and the Ukrainian army and voluntary militias on 
the other. Flashpoints over the summer of 2014 included a fierce battle for Donetsk 
International Airport in late May; the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 over 
Donetsk region on 17 July (almost certainly by rebels using a Russia-supplied anti-
aircraft missile launcher), killing 298 people; and the counter-offensive by insurgents 
and, almost certainly, regular Russian forces in August that pushed back a Ukrainian 
offensive and more or less established the current borders of the two people’s republics. 
A ceasefire was signed in September 2014 in Minsk under the auspices of the OSCE, and 
another in February 2015 (Minsk II) after continued fighting. By the time of Obama’s 
 
105 As noted in the Introduction, the literature on the Ukraine crisis is substantial, fast-growing and 
polarised. For three collections that provide a variety of perspectives on both the domestic and 
international aspects of the uprising, the crisis and the following conflict, see the edited volumes by Marples 
and Mills (2015) and Pikulicka-Wilczewska and Sakwa (2015), and the articles in the special issue of 
Europe-Asia Studies edited by Averre and Wolczuk (2016). For an eyewitness account from a Ukrainian 
novelist, see Kurkov (2014). 
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General Assembly speech in late September 2014, several thousand had died in the 
fighting, both civilians, militants and soldiers. 
 The annexation of Crimea and Russian support for the rebels in Eastern Ukraine 
sparked the most concerted and sustained stigmatisation of the Russian government by 
Western states since the end of the Cold War. Below, different aspects of this process are 
analysed in turn, starting with the labelling of Russia as aggressive and then moving onto 
stereotyping, separation and status loss, before Russia’s response and stigma 
management tactics are considered. 
 
Labelling: aggression and illegality 
The labelling of Russia as an aggressor started with the military operation in Crimea on 
27-28 February. On 28 February, as military installations and other key infrastructure 
were taken over by what Putin initially claimed were local self-defence forces but would 
later admit included Russian military servicemen, Obama protested: 
...we are now deeply concerned by reports of military movements taken by 
the Russian Federation inside of Ukraine. … It would represent a profound 
interference in matters that must be determined by the Ukrainian people. 
It would be a clear violation of Russia’s commitment to respect the 
independence and sovereignty and borders of Ukraine and of international 
laws. And just days after the world came to Russia for the Olympic Games, 
it would invite the condemnation of nations around the world. And indeed, 
the United States will stand with the international community in affirming 
that there will be costs for any military intervention in Ukraine. (Obama 
2014e) 
Here is both the maintenance of the democratic/anti-democratic separation analysed in 
Chapter 4 (‘matters that must be determined by the Ukrainian people’) and the 
beginnings of a condemnation of Russian aggression and of attempts at building an 
‘audience of normals’ against Russian actions: Russian aggression ‘would invite the 
condemnation of nations around the world’. 
 The criticism, separation and construction of a united front grew quickly, as 
evidence of direct Russian involvement in the Crimean operation mounted and the upper 
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house of the Russian parliament authorised the potential use of force by the Russian 
military on the territory of Ukraine ‘to normalise the situation in the country’ on 1 March. 
At the UN Security Council, an extraordinary session met on 1 March at the request of the 
Ukrainian representative, who called on the Council ‘to do everything possible ... to stop 
aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine’. Western ambassadors lambasted 
Russian actions. US Ambassador Samantha Power accused Russia of violating its 
‘commitment to protecting the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of 
Ukraine’, and maintained the democratic/anti-democratic separation: the Ukrainian 
people’s ‘aspirations’ had to be respected. Gérard Araud of France and Sir Mark Lyall 
Grant of the United Kingdom spoke similarly, though not yet directly accusing Russia; the 
latter noted that the UK ‘condemn[ed] any act of aggression against Ukraine’ (UN Security 
Council 2014a).  
 By 2-3 March, Russia’s actions were openly labelled aggression by Western actors. 
In a 2 March television interview, US Secretary of State Kerry called Russia’s actions ‘an 
incredible act of aggression’ (Kerry 2014). On 2 March, the leaders of the G7 countries 
issued a statement condemning Russia’s ‘clear violation of the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Ukraine’ (G7 Leaders 2014a). In another Security Council meeting on 3 March, 
where Russia sought to legitimise its actions by referring to an alleged request by 
Yanukovych for the help of Russian troops to establish ‘legitimacy, peace, law and order’ 
in Ukraine, US ambassador Power stated: ‘What is happening today is not a human rights 
protection mission or a consensual intervention. What is happening today is a dangerous 
military intervention in Ukraine. It is an act of aggression. It must stop’. France and the 
UK chimed in similarly (UN Security Council 2014b). In Brussels on 3 March, another 
meeting of EU foreign ministers was held that reached the following key conclusion, the 
first time the EU officially labelled Russia as an aggressor:  
The European Union strongly condemns the clear violation of Ukrainian 
sovereignty and territorial integrity by acts of aggression by the Russian 
armed forces as well as the authorisation given by the Federation Council 
of Russia on 1 March for the use of the armed forces on the territory of 
Ukraine. These actions are in clear breach of the UN Charter and the OSCE 
Helsinki Final Act, as well as of Russia's specific commitments to respect 
Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity under the Budapest 
Memorandum of 1994 and the bilateral Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation 
and Partnership of 1997. (Council of the European Union 2014a) 
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Meeting three days later with the new Ukrainian prime minister, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, the 
EU’s heads of state or government endorsed the above conclusion and re-iterated the 
condemnation of Russia’s ‘unprovoked violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial 
integrity’ (European Council 2014b).106 
 As the 16 March referendum on Crimean independence neared and passed, 
followed closely by the 18 March conclusion of accession treaties between Russia, Crimea 
and the city of Sevastopol, the emphasis of the West’s criticism shifted from aggression to 
illegality. In the 6 March statement quoted above, the EU’s heads of state deemed the 
referendum ‘contrary to the Ukrainian Constitution and therefore illegal’ (European 
Council 2014b). On the same day, Obama emphasised that ‘[t]he proposed referendum 
on the future of Crimea would violate the Ukrainian Constitution and violate international 
law’ (Obama 2014e). These positions were re-iterated by US and EU officials over the next 
two weeks (see e.g. Barroso and Van Rompuy 2014a; Ashton 2014; Obama 2014h; 2014i). 
In their joint statement of 16 March, Barroso and Van Rompuy (2014a) summarised the 
Western position straightforwardly: ‘The referendum is illegal and illegitimate and its 
outcome will not be recognised’. In the conclusions to the European Council on 21 March, 
the meeting at which the political part of the Association Agreement with Ukraine was 
signed, the EU’s heads of state ‘strongly condemn[ed] the illegal annexation of Crimea and 
Sevastopol to the Russian Federation’ (European Council 2014a, 13–15). Obama summed 
up Russia’s ‘illegal’, ‘illegitimate’ and ‘dangerous’ choices on 20 March: ‘We’ve seen an 
illegal referendum in Crimea; an illegitimate move by the Russians to annex Crimea; and 
dangerous risks of escalation… These are all choices that the Russian Government has 
made, choices that have been rejected by the international community’ (Obama 2014i). 
Again, Obama was talking not just on behalf of the US but a putative ‘audience of normals’ 
– the ‘international community’.107 
 
Stereotyping – out of time 
 
106 For their part, in their rhetoric Yatsenyuk and other Ukrainian leaders such as President Petro 
Poroshenko, elected in May 2014, repeatedly elevated the stakes of the conflict to a global battle for 
‘freedom’, fitting in with the European and (perhaps especially) American narrative (Toal 2017, 293–95). 
107 Note, as per footnote 64 above, the more tight-knit connotations of ‘community’ as opposed to e.g. 
‘society’. 
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In addition to the labelling of Russia as aggressive, a theme of Western discourse that 
came out in force during the crisis was the linking of Russia’s behaviour to a stereotype 
of being regressive and stuck in the past, on the ‘wrong side of history’ (Obama 2014b). 
This way of talking about Russia is common among many Western observers and senior 
policy makers, and it became particularly prevalent in 2014 (Monaghan 2016, 13–16). As 
noted in Chapter 4 when discussing the Western reaction to Yanukovych’s postponement 
of the EU Association Agreement, it is inextricably linked to Western actors’ tendency to 
identify themselves as agents of good and forces of teleological progress, reducing anyone 
opposed by default to a stereotypical opponent of progress. 
 From the time of the government overthrow and Crimea incursion in late 
February-early March 2014, several Western actors started chastising Russia for 
engaging in outdated practices. The theme was prevalent in the discourse of several 
Western representatives, including Obama, Kerry, Barroso, European Commissioner for 
Enlargement Štefan Füle, UN ambassadors Araud and Lyall Grant, and also made its way 
into collective conclusions of the EU heads of state. The most basic element of these 
discourses was the negative framing of Russian actions as outdated, particularly the 
refrain that this kind of behaviour does not belong in the 21st century. In the above-cited 
2 March interview where he labelled Russian actions as aggression, John Kerry also stated 
that ‘[you] just don’t, in the 21st century, behave in 19th century fashion by invading 
another country on [a] completely trumped up pretext’ (Kerry 2014).108 Echoing Kerry, 
on 3 March Lyall Grant stated in the Security Council that ‘[in] the twenty-first century, 
no country should be acting with such blatant disregard for international law. … This is 
not 1968 or 1956’, recalling the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia and Hungary (UN 
Security Council 2014b, 7; see also 2014e, 6). In its conclusions on Ukraine from its 21 
March 2014 meeting, EU leaders stated: ‘The European Council firmly believes that there 
is no place for the use of force and coercion to change borders in Europe in the 21st 
century’ (European Council 2014a, 15). While the formulation disappeared from 
subsequent EU statements, leading individuals continued to invoke it. Barroso had 
already stated on 12 March in a speech to the European Parliament that ‘[t]he page of last 
 
108 That an American secretary of state seemingly had forgotten about the very much ‘trumped up’ 2003 
invasion of Iraq was of course heavily ironic. To be fair, Kerry could have cited both his own subsequent 
criticism of the Iraq invasion (though he did vote to authorise the use of force as a senator in October 2002) 
and Obama’s opposition to it in his defence. The US of course also did not annex Iraq, although at this point 
(2 March) it was not clear that Russia intended to annex Crimea either (Treisman 2016). 
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century’s history should be turned and not re-written’, and now added that ‘there will be 
consequences for some of the kind of behaviour that we think is simply unacceptable in 
the 21st century’ (Barroso 2014b; 2014c). In their statement on the adoption of new EU 
sanctions against Russia on 29 July, Barroso and Van Rompuy re-iterated the theme: 
‘illegal annexation of territory and deliberate destabilisation of a neighbouring sovereign 
country cannot be accepted in 21st century Europe’ (Barroso and Van Rompuy 2014b). 
Barroso repeated similar formulations again to the media after meeting with Ukrainian 
president Poroshenko on 30 August 2014, after the European Council on the same date, 
and in speeches to the Yalta European Strategy annual meeting on 12 September and at 
Yale Management School on 21 September (Barroso 2014e; 2014f; 2014g).109 Füle, 
whose commission portfolio put him on the ‘frontline’ of EU-Russia relations, repeatedly 
criticised Russia for attempting to turn the Eastern Partnership into a ‘zero-sum game’, a 
‘battle for the creation of past centuries’ spheres of influence’, denouncing such practices 
as obsolete: ‘This is not how politics is conducted in the 21st century’ (quotes from Füle 
2014c; 2014b; see also 2014a; 2014d; 2014e). Other actors were more evocative while 
conveying a similar message, notably French UN ambassador Araud who on 3 March told 
the Security Council: ‘[it] is in fact the voice of the past we just heard. … In short, Russia 
is taking Europe back 40 years. … Russia seems to be returning to its old ghosts, playing 
outmoded roles in an outdated setting on the stage of a bankrupt theatre’ (UN Security 
Council 2014b, 5–6; see also 2014c, 5). 
 The stigma being evoked in these statements is of being out of time, pre-modern. 
There is a parallel here to the types of teleological logic identified in Chapter 4, where 
undemocratic practices were also seen as somehow outdated. Moreover, in some 
statements a spatial logic is also at play, whereby this kind of behaviour is unacceptable 
‘in Europe’, implying (whether intentionally or not) that it might be acceptable elsewhere. 
These unifying stigmatising frames of backwardness and being out of place will be 
returned to in the Conclusion. 
 
 
109 In the speech at Yale, Barroso stated that ‘We could simply not accept this behaviour. This would mean 
the explicit return of spheres of influence or limited sovereignty to the European continent’ (emphasis 
added), echoing Füle’s usual rhetoric of spheres of influence. 
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Separation and status loss: sanctions, suspensions and shaming 
In Link and Phelan’s model, stigmatisation would not be complete without separation 
between the stigmatised and stigmatisers as well as status loss for the stigmatised. This 
stage is closely intertwined with the separation stage: if the stigmatisers are successful in 
separating themselves from the stigmatised as well as creating a robust ‘audience of 
normals’, this may already entail a certain degree of status loss through the stigmatised’s 
loss of social standing. However, status loss can also include more concrete measures 
taken to impose such loss, measures which are usually explicitly justified by the labelling 
and stereotyping already made, thereby reinforcing these. During the Ukraine crisis, 
Western actors separated themselves from and imposed a status loss on Russia in two 
main ways: bilaterally, through sanctions and restrictive measures against Russian 
individuals and sectors of the Russian economy, suspensions of co-operation in various 
formats, and multilaterally, through the shaming of Russia in international forums such 
as the UN. 
 The effect of Russia’s stigmatisation was physically manifest in several awkward 
summit encounters between Western and Russian leaders. While bilateral summits were 
suspended and the G8 discontinued, diplomatic decorum or the reluctance of non-
Western states to take part in the stigmatisation meant there were still occasions where 
leaders had to meet. The first time was the D-Day commemorations in France in June 
2014, where UK Prime Minister David Cameron reportedly refused to shake President 
Putin’s hand, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Putin had a brief, tense conversation 
and President Obama and Putin spoke only briefly in an exchange the White House 
stressed was ‘merely an informal exchange, nothing official’ (Trippe 2014). At the 
November 2014 G20 summit in Brisbane, Western media reported that Putin received a 
‘frosty’ welcome and, after a series of confrontational conversations with Western 
leaders, left the summit early (e.g. Viellaris 2014; Wintour and Doherty 2014). This 
demonstrates Goffman’s (1963, 24–31) point about the uneasiness the ‘normals’ and 
stigmatised are likely to feel in each other’s presence. 
 
Bilateral status loss: sanctions and suspensions 
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The EU and the US both implemented sanctions against Russia through the spring and 
summer of 2014. From an initial focus on the individuals allegedly involved in violating 
Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sanctions broadened to encompass whole sectors of the 
Russian economy. Diplomatic, state-to-state measures also implicated Russia and the 
Russian government. With stigmatisation in mind, it is instructive to investigate the 
public justifications given for these measures, all of which were based on the labels and 
stereotypes identified in the above section. 
 The US’s justifications were based on the anti-democratic and aggressive activities 
of those sanctioned. Executive Order 13660, signed by Obama on 6 March 2014, 
introduced travel bans and asset freezes against several yet unspecified individuals. The 
order argued that the sanctioned individuals’ ‘actions and policies’ contributed to an 
undermining of ‘democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine’, a threat to Ukraine’s 
‘peace, security, stability, sovereignty and territorial integrity’, and the misappropriation 
of Ukrainian assets (Obama 2014d). The same wording was used for Executive Order 
13661, signed on 17 March, after the Crimean referendum, but this time the actor in 
question was ‘the Government of the Russian Federation’ and those sanctioned included 
seven senior Russian officials including Presidential Aide Vladislav Surkov, Deputy Prime 
Minister Dmitry Rogozin and Speaker of the Federation Council Valentina Matviyenko 
(Obama 2014g). The status loss involved was still travel bans and asset freezes only. On 
20 March 2014, in remarks made about the expansion of Executive Order 13661 to apply 
to a further 16 Russian government officials and the signing of Executive Order 13662, 
which opened the possibility for the more severe status loss of sanctioning whole sectors 
of Russia’s economy, Obama elaborated on the reasons for the sanctions using both the 
anti-democratic, aggressive, illegal and ‘outdated’ categories identified above. Russia’s 
actions were ‘illegal’, ‘illegitimate’ and ‘dangerous’, and the ‘principles that govern 
relations between nations in Europe and around the world must be upheld in the 21st 
century’ (Obama 2014i). These justifications remained when the sanctions were 
expanded in April 2014 to include a ban on business transactions in the US by several 
Russian individuals and companies, and in July 2014 when asset freezes and transaction 
bans were expanded to include more banks, defence and energy companies. As Russia 
was still engaging in the same ‘provocations’, the focus was on the sanctions’ continued 
inability to enforce the expected behaviour and the consequent need to ramp them up 
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(Obama 2014j). Speaking on 16 July, Obama said: ‘...what we are expecting is that the 
Russian leadership will see, once again, that its actions in Ukraine have consequences, 
including a weakening Russian economy and increasing diplomatic isolation’ (Obama 
2014j). This made clear both the social status loss and the material costs the sanctions 
were meant to induce. 
 The EU imposed similar sanctions, with similar justifications. On 6 March 2014, 
following the Crimea incursion, EU leaders condemned Russia’s ‘unprovoked violation of 
Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity’ and suspended long ongoing bilateral 
talks with Russia on ‘visa matters’ and a new agreement to replace the expired 1997 EU-
Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (European Council 2014b). On 17 March, 
after the Crimea referendum, EU foreign ministers introduced asset freezes and travel 
bans against 21 individuals ‘responsible for actions which undermine or threaten the 
territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine’, and threatened 
‘additional and far-reaching consequences for relations’ (Council of the European Union 
2014b). The same justifications – including the above-cited reference to ‘the use of force 
and coercion to change borders’ having ‘no place’ in ‘Europe in the 21st century’ – were 
cited on 21 March, after the Crimea annexation, when EU leaders expanded the list of 
individuals subject to asset freezes and travel bans, cancelled the next EU-Russia Summit, 
noted an end to ‘bilateral regular summits [between Russia and EU member states] for 
the time being’ and supported ‘the suspension of negotiations over Russia’s joining the 
OECD [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development] and IEA 
[International Energy Agency]’ (European Council 2014a). When adding further 
individuals to the list in late April and when expanding the sanctions to include 
restrictions on sectoral co-operation, Russian access to EU capital markets, etc., in late 
July, the underlying separation was unchanged but magnified. In Barroso and Van 
Rompuy’s words on 29 July, ‘[the sanctions are] meant as a strong warning: illegal 
annexation of territory and deliberate destabilisation of a neighbouring sovereign 
country cannot be accepted in 21st century Europe’ (Barroso and Van Rompuy 2014b). 
Fitting the characterisation in this study of stigmatisation as a process meant to enforce 
and/or induce norm-abiding behaviour, the EU emphasised how its sanctions ‘were not 
punitive’ (although they were clearly designed to inflict both material and symbolic 
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losses) but ‘designed to bring about a change in policy or activity by the target country, 
entities or individuals’ (European Commission 2014b). 
 The imposition of sanctions was not a straightforward task, despite the 
appearance of unity and purpose. EU and US sanctions were not uniform, with different 
individuals and companies being targeted by the two at various stages. The US was 
reluctant to implement its most hard-hitting sanctions, owing to the ‘extreme fragility in 
the emerging market economies’ at the time and the potential for further instability 
(Tooze 2018, 498–99). Attitudes to sanctions within the EU differed from state to state 
for reasons ranging from respective business communities’ exposure to the Russian 
market to the ideological affinities of individual governments (on the variation in 
sanctions and the political tensions, see e.g. Connolly 2018, 56–68; Tooze 2018, 498–
502). Even France, otherwise a key player in the stigmatisation, was reluctant to give up 
its lucrative sale of two Mistral aircraft carriers to Russia, though it eventually cancelled 
the delivery in September 2014 (BBC News 2014b). This made the EU’s process of 
adopting sanctions slower than that of the US. A key turning point uniting EU leaders 
around stronger sanctions was the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 over 
Donetsk region on 17 July 2014, demonstrating the stigmatising effect of highly affective 
events and the ‘moral indignation’ it brought (Tooze 2018, 502). Reports from an EU 
meeting on sanctions five days after the shootdown noted that the tone of the EU’s 
statement grew harsher as the day went on owing to ‘harrowing accounts’ from the crash 
scene (Borger, Luhn, and Norton-Taylor 2014). 
 
Multilateral status loss: audience-building and shaming 
In addition to the bilateral status loss identified above, Western actors sought to inflict a 
multilateral status loss on Russia in two ways. First, by encouraging other ‘like-minded 
partners’ sharing the values of ‘freedom and democracy’ to implement their own 
sanctions (quote from European Commission 2014a; Barroso 2014d). And second, by 
shaming Russia in multilateral forums including the UN. In both ways, the US and EU 
sought to create and maintain a robust ‘audience of normals’ that would reinforce the 
norms of ‘freedom and democracy’ as they saw them by discrediting Russia. 
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 The easiest of these tasks was building the audience of ‘like-minded’ partners. 
Already on 2 March 2014 the leaders of the G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the UK and the US) decided to suspend Russia from the G8, cancelling their 
participation in the planned June 2014 G8 summit in Sochi (Naylor 2019, 39–40).110 This 
was a marked status loss for Russia, depriving it of membership of one of the most 
exclusive group of states in international society, albeit one that had been subjected to 
increasing criticism for that same exclusivity. The reasons cited were Russia’s ‘clear 
violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine’ and that its actions 
‘contravene the principles and values on which the G-7 and the G-8 operate’ (G7 Leaders 
2014a). The leaders issued several strong-worded statements throughout the following 
months, repeatedly condemning Russia’s ‘illegal annexation’ of Crimea and violation of 
international law, norms and principles (G7 Leaders 2014b; 2014c; 2014d; 2014e; 2014f; 
2014g). Canada and Japan also introduced their own sanctions against Russia, and several 
other states including Albania, Australia, Iceland, Montenegro, Norway and Switzerland 
either implemented their own sanctions or aligned themselves with the EU’s. 
 It was harder to construct a wider ‘audience of normals’ of states at the UN to 
openly condemn Russian actions and provide full force to the attempted stigmatisation. 
Events in Ukraine featured heavily on the UN’s agenda through 2014, with the Security 
Council meeting 18 times to discuss the matter in either open or closed formats from 28 
February to 19 September. The tone of each of the 15 Security Council member states’ 
discourse is instructive in gauging Russia’s stigmatisation in wider international society. 
Apart from China, which adopted a neutral stance throughout calling on all sides to 
remain calm in this very ‘complex’ situation (notable given China’s usual insistence on 
territorial integrity), there were two discernible groups in the Council. The first was the 
Western states, comprising the permanent members France, the UK and the US and the 
non-permanent members Australia, Lithuania and Luxembourg. These six participated 
fully in the stigmatisation of Russia, with Australia and Lithuania often even more vocal 
in explicitly denouncing Moscow as the anti-democratic aggressor than the three 
permanent members. The remaining seven non-permanent members (Argentina, Chad, 
Chile, Jordan, Nigeria, Republic of Korea and Rwanda) took up positions in between that 
 
110 As Naylor points out, technically ‘the G7 neither suspended nor expelled Russia from the G8, but rather 
suspended themselves from the G8’ and went back to meeting as the G7, demonstrating the ‘ambiguity of 
how inclusion works in this club with no explicitly defined membership rules’. 
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of China and the Western countries. While expressing consistent alarm and concern about 
the violence and instability in Ukraine and re-iterating their support for the country’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, these states generally did not openly or explicitly 
blame or stigmatise Russia. Their positions illustrate one of the main limits to successful 
stigmatisation on the international scale: the lack of a sufficiently ‘thick’ common 
expectation of state behaviour worldwide. 
 This limitation became clear in Western states’ attempt to pass a resolution in the 
Security Council on 15 March 2014 in response to events in Ukraine. The draft resolution 
was submitted by 42 states: the 35 EU and/or NATO member states plus Australia, 
Georgia, Japan, Montenegro, New Zealand, Moldova and Ukraine. This showed a clear 
Western bias. Still, in an apparent attempt to garner as many votes as possible, the 
resolution refrained from the stigmatising language so far employed by Western actors 
and did not explicitly mention Russia, focusing instead on obligations to solve disputes 
peacefully and reaffirming all states’ commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, 
independence, unity and territorial integrity within internationally recognised borders 
(UN Security Council 2014d). The resolution was supported in the Council by 13 states. 
China abstained and Russia used its veto power to prevent the resolution from passing. 
In the debate following the vote, the Western states continued in the usual stigmatising 
vein, with both the UK and US talking of Russia’s isolation. In Power’s words, Russia stood 
‘isolated, alone and wrong’ (UN Security Council 2014c, 3–4). In contrast, the seven non-
Western, non-permanent members maintained their support for UN principles such as 
territorial integrity and the peaceful resolution of disputes, but did not criticise Russia 
directly (UN Security Council 2014c, 7–10). The Rwandan representative even criticised 
‘cynical’ calls for isolation (UN Security Council 2014c, 7). 
 The limitation appeared again on a larger scale when a similar resolution came 
before the UN General Assembly on 27 March, nine days after Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea. Resolution 68/262, entitled ‘Territorial Integrity of Ukraine’, again had an 
overwhelmingly Western sponsorship. Canada, Costa Rica, Germany, Lithuania, Poland 
and Ukraine were the original promoters, and a further 42 states joined as sponsors, 
including the remaining sponsors of the failed Security Council resolution, the Marshall 
Islands, Palau, Panama, San Marino and Somalia. The resolution text again did not 
mention Russia directly. Instead, it referred to all states’ obligation to refrain from the 
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use of force and respect others’ territorial integrity, and declared the Crimean 
referendum invalid (UN General Assembly 2014a). With no veto power to stop it, the 
Assembly adopted the resolution by 100 votes to 11, Russia mustering a small group of 
allies in opposition (UN General Assembly 2014b, 17).111 Superficially, this may seem like 
a successful construction of a global ‘audience of normals’ supporting Ukraine’s 
territorial integrity and – implicitly if not explicitly – stigmatising Russia. However, the 
100 votes were again notable for their concentration in the West, as seen from the 
summary in Table 7.1. Perhaps the most notable aspect of the voting record was the 
considerable number of abstentions and absences – 42.5% of UN member states. More 
African and Latin American/Caribbean states abstained than approved, and the 
abstentions included such influential states as the other BRICS (Brazil, China, India and 
South Africa) and even two states that had supported the Security Council resolution – 
Argentina and Rwanda. Among the absentees were Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia 
(the only non-CIS European states that did not support the resolution), Iran and Israel. 
 
Table 6.1 – Voting record by region on UNGA Resolution 68/262 
Region Approve Reject Abstain Absent Total 
Africa 16 2 24 5 47 
Asia-Pacific112 20 1 14 5 40 
CIS 3 3 2 3 11 
Europe/North America 41   2 43 
MENA 7 1 4 7 19 
Latin 
America/Caribbean 
13 4 14 2 33 
 
111 The 11 states were Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea, Russia, Sudan, Syria, 
Venezuela and Zimbabwe. 
112 The Asia-Pacific states included such ‘Western’ stalwarts as Japan, Australia and New Zealand, and five 
Pacific island states. 
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Total 100 11 58 24 193 
% of UN members 51.8% 5.7% 30.1% 12.4% 100% 
 
 The pre- and post-vote debate reflected the divisions already apparent in the 
Security Council and the wider discourse. The Ukrainian acting foreign minister, Andrii 
Deshchytsia, spoke strongly of Russian aggression and invoked the temporal and spatial 
tropes identified above: ‘Many still struggle to grasp the reality that [this] happened in 
Ukraine, in the very heart of Europe … in the twenty-first century’ (UN General Assembly 
2014b, 1–3). He was echoed by the EU representative, Thomas Mayr-Harting, who spoke 
of the need to protect the UN Charter-based international system implemented after the 
‘horrors of the Second World War’ and repeated EU leaders’ recent assertion that ‘there 
is no place in the twenty-first century for the use of force and coercion to change borders 
in Europe or elsewhere’ (UN General Assembly 2014b, 4–5). US ambassador Power 
invoked the existence of a broad, global ‘audience of normals’: ‘We meet today to express 
our collective judgement on the legality of the Russian Federation’s military intervention 
in, and occupation of, Ukraine’s Crimea region. …this draft resolution expresses the desire 
of the international community to see a peaceful outcome… We echo the views expressed 
by all regions of the world these past weeks calling for a de-escalation…’ (UN General 
Assembly 2014b, 5–6). Other Western states supported the strong stigmatisation line, 
while several others spoke in support of the principle of territorial integrity without 
directly criticising Russia.113 In response, Russian ambassador Churkin repeated Russia’s 
stigma rejection line and counter-stigmatisation of the West, accusing EU and US 
representatives of marching with the anti-democratic, anti-government protesters and 
hailing the ‘historic’ role of the Crimean referendum in bringing Crimea back to Russia 
(UN General Assembly 2014b, 3–4).114 
 
113 Of the states that supported the resolution, the following took to the floor: Azerbaijan, Canada, Cape 
Verde, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Iceland, Japan, Libya, Liechtenstein, Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Malaysia, Moldova, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Qatar, Singapore, Thailand and Turkey. 
114 Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea and Venezuela also took the floor in opposition. 
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In addition to the division, which was not unexpected, the most notable aspect 
were the explanations given by various states for their abstention.115 The theme was 
generally one of opposition to meddling in what was still deemed the internal affairs of 
another state, interspersed with more or less thinly veiled criticism of the West’s role in 
the affair. China repeated its detached calls for everyone to show restraint and re-iterated 
its ‘consistent, balanced and impartial’ position, Argentina said it did not want to be 
interpreting Ukrainian laws for Ukrainians, Jamaica called for balance, Ecuador noted the 
‘irresponsible presence of [Western] foreign politicians’ in Kyiv during the protests, 
Botswana pointed to the ‘unconstitutional removal of a democratically elected president’, 
and St. Vincent and the Grenadines complained of the tendency of all major powers to 
impose ‘double standards’, thereby undermining the consistent application of 
international law (UN General Assembly 2014b, 10–11, 15–16, 19–20, 24–25, 26). 
The ambivalence of several UN members to what from a Western perspective was 
a straightforward case of flagrant norm transgression indicates some of the limits to the 
operation of stigmatisation on a global scale, in particular the limited ‘thickness’ of shared 
norms and the fact that norms must always be enforced by someone (in this case Western 
states), opening any instance to suspicions of double standards and the influence of 
historical mistrust. The framing of both the Security Council and the General Assembly 
resolutions to deal exclusively with questions of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, with 
no mention of either Russia, aggression or democracy, indicates that their Western 
drafters doubted whether more directly stigmatising resolutions would have passed as 
easily. Given voting patterns and non-Western states’ justifications for their way of 
voting, this was justified. While it is impossible to establish states’ ‘true’ intentions or 
feelings about the norms in question just from these records, it is fair to assume that even 
several of the 100-strong ‘audience of normals’ that supported the General Assembly 
resolution did so as much owing to instrumental concerns, be they a need to keep the US 
happy or their own separatist problems, as out of any normative commitment to 
Western-style freedom and democracy.116 Their commitment to stigmatising Russia for 
any principled reason is thus doubtful. 
 
115 Of those that abstained, Algeria, Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, China, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Jamaica, 
Kazakhstan, Paraguay, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Uruguay and Vietnam took the floor, 
116 A cursory examination of the voting record throws up several such candidates, including Azerbaijan, 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and even Turkey. 
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Despite this ambivalence, for Russia the passing of the resolution certainly 
represented a defeat and a clear status loss, in the form of reputational damage. In 
counter-stigmatisation terms, the support of 10 states well-known to be in permanent 
opposition to Western dominance under their current governments was an 
underwhelming ‘audience of counter-normals’, and a 13-1-1 defeat in the Security 
Council even more so. In the Euro-Atlantic context, where the dominant order was 
strongest and Russia has traditionally wanted to be treated as an equal partner, the status 
loss was even greater. The resolution thus played its part in the wider stigmatisation of 
Russia. 
 
Russia’s reaction: rejection, counter-stigmatisation and evasion 
As with its previous intervention in Georgia and its reaction to stigmatisation over other 
norms, Russia again pursued a vehement stigma rejection strategy in the case of Ukraine. 
Crimea was framed as a case of prevention of persecution followed by the lawful self-
determination of the Crimean people, and the protests in the east as the legitimate, 
democratic expression of popular concern about the new government’s policies, building 
on the existing, above-mentioned narrative of the radical coup d’état. Added to this were 
further attempts at the counter-stigmatisation of Western actors, who were framed as 
both anti-democratic and aggressive over their support for the Kyiv government’s ‘anti-
terrorist’ operation in eastern Ukraine. In sum, Russia both rejected stigma and sought to 
counter-stigmatise the West over both aggression and breaches of international law.  
 The first key theme of Russia’s response was the rejection of the accusation of 
aggression and breaches of international law. From the very beginning of the Crimea 
operation, Russian actors went to great lengths to emphasise their compliance with 
bilateral agreements. The foreign ministry claimed on 27 February that Russia 
‘rigorously’ observed the Black Sea Fleet agreements, and Putin emphasised in his 18 
March address to the Federal Assembly on Crimea’s accession that Russia had never 
exceeded the troop limits imposed by these agreements as evidence that it could not have 
‘[violated] norms of international law’ (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014e; Putin 
2014c). At a UN Security Council meeting on 3 March, Russian ambassador Churkin 
presented a letter from Yanukovych allegedly requesting the help of Russian armed 
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forces in establishing ‘legitimacy, peace, law and order and stability’ in Ukraine (UN 
Security Council 2014b, 3–4).117 In his Q&A session with journalists on 4 March Putin 
stated that any decision to use armed force in Ukraine would be ‘a legitimate decision in 
full compliance with … international law, since we have the appeal of the legitimate 
President’ (Putin 2014b). In the 18 March speech, Putin addressed the question of 
aggression directly, using yet another justification: ‘They keep talking of some Russian 
intervention in Crimea, some sort of aggression. This is strange to hear. I cannot recall a 
single case in history of an intervention without a single shot being fired and with no 
human casualties’ (Putin 2014c). Rather than violating Ukraine’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, Russia had ‘[helped] create conditions so that the residents of Crimea 
for the first time in history were able to peacefully express their free will regarding their 
own future’ (Putin 2014c). Putin’s address contained a range of arguments for why the 
Crimea annexation was within international law and democratic, drawing on everything 
from national self-determination to the ‘Kosovo precedent’, which Russia had somewhat 
ironically opposed until then (Mälksoo 2015, 173). The accuracy of these arguments is 
not under consideration here – Russia clearly ‘broke the rules’ of modern international 
law (Allison 2014). From a stigmatisation perspective, the important part is Russia’s 
rejection of its stigma but at the same time acceptance of the broader need to be seen to 
operate legally and avoid being labelled aggressive. 
 The flipside of the rejection was an attempt at counter-stigmatising the West for 
being aggressive and breaching international law. This took two forms. The first was a 
rehearsal of old arguments about Western aggression worldwide, the second a direct link 
to ongoing events in Ukraine. The former referred both to actual interventions and the 
West’s ‘aggressive promotion’ of a certain way of life and government. Russian foreign 
ministry spokesman Alexander Lukashevich took a broad sweep on 6 March, both 
accusing the US of fomenting the protests in Ukraine and bringing up previous 
interventions in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Vietnam, Lebanon in 1958, the Dominican Republic 
in 1965, Grenada in 1983, Libya in 1986 and Panama in 1989, emphasising that the 
‘pretext’ of the last five had been to protect US nationals in zones of conflict – exactly what 
he claimed Russia was doing in Crimea (Lukashevich 2014b). Putin rehearsed the themes 
 
117 Since Churkin’s death on 20 February 2017, senior Russian officials have issued contradictory 
statements about the letter’s origin and veracity (Coynash 2017). 
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in his 18 March address, referencing Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and the ‘series 
of controlled “colour” revolutions’ that imposed standards on nations from without:  
Like a mirror, the situation in Ukraine reflects what is going on and what 
has been happening in the world over the past several decades … Our 
western partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be 
guided by international law in their practical policies, but by the rule of the 
gun. … To make this aggression look legitimate, they force the necessary 
resolutions from international organisations, and if for some reason this 
does not work, they simply ignore the UN Security Council and the UN 
overall. (Putin 2014c) 
 
As the new Ukrainian government declared its ‘anti-terrorist operation’ against the 
insurgency in eastern Ukraine in mid-April, Russian representatives attempted to label it 
(and by extension its supportive Western backers) as an aggressor against the civilian 
population. An emergency Security Council meeting was called on 13 April at Russia’s 
initiative, with Ambassador Churkin accusing the ‘Maidan henchmen’ of waging ‘war 
against their own people’ with the backing of their ‘Western sponsors’ (UN Security 
Council 2014e). Following the announced resumption of the operation in late April, the 
Russian foreign ministry issued alarmed statements denouncing the Kyiv authorities’ 
‘irresponsible and aggressive actions’, accusing the US and EU of conniving (Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014g; 2014h). The new Ukrainian government was regularly 
accused of undertaking ‘punitive military operations’ against its own people, aided by 
‘terrorists’ and ‘pro-fascists’ (UN Security Council 2014f), while Russia portrayed its own 
actions as ‘humanitarian’, including the dispatch of several ‘humanitarian convoys’ to the 
conflict zone in Ukraine (e.g. UN Security Council 2014g, 12–13).118 Russia thus sought to 
stigmatise its opponent and ‘despoil’ or prevent the spoiling of its own identity in the 
process. 
 True to the mirroring effect apparent in their stigma-rejecting and counter-
stigmatising response to being called anti-democratic and aggressive, Russian actors also 
engaged in their own temporal stereotyping, repeatedly accusing Western actors of 
engaging in practices of the past. One such example was Putin’s assertion in his 18 March 
 
118 The Ukrainian authorities and international actors suspected that the convoys were in reality carrying 
weapons for the rebels. 
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Crimea speech that ‘the infamous policy of containment, led in the 18th, 19th and 20th 
centuries, continues today’ (Putin 2014c). But the more prevalent theme was accusations 
against the West and the new Ukrainian government of supporting the revival of neo-
Nazism and anti-Semitism in Ukraine. This was particularly prevalent in Russian foreign 
ministry discourse, focused on the participation of the far-right, ‘ultranationalist’ 
Freedom (Svoboda) party first in the opposition movement and then the post-February 
Ukrainian government, and the activities of the militant group Right Sector (Pravy Sektor) 
and other paramilitary groups both in the Maidan protests and the fighting in eastern 
Ukraine. Repeated references were made to the European Parliament’s December 2012 
resolution, which followed Svoboda’s entry into the Ukrainian parliament, calling on 
other parties not to co-operate with it due to its far-right ideology. Again, the veracity of 
the Russian discourse is not the subject of this analysis – there is no doubt that Russia 
overplayed the role played by ultranationalist forces, just as Western actors downplayed 
it (see Walker 2018, 111–31 for a thoughtful account). The relevant point is that this was 
used to label and stereotype the West and create a separation between the West and 
Russia, with the West as the irresponsible, regressive party and Russia the responsible 
progressives remembering the lessons of history and fighting fascism: ‘In the year when 
we celebrated 75 years since the start of the Second World War, we should remember the 
consequences… of playing with Nazis’ (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014f). 
As was seen above in the case of the UN General Assembly resolution, Russia’s 
stigma rejection and counter-stigmatisation did not lead to the construction of any 
substantial ‘audience of counter-normals’ of states beyond the usual suspects, probably 
reflecting both many states’ dismay at Russia’s actions (despite their reluctance to side 
with the West) and the power imbalance between the West and Russia. This power 
imbalance also showed in Russia’s other attempts at imposing a ‘counter-status loss’ on 
the West. This took primarily two forms. First, a mobilisation of other diplomatic 
relationships, notably the other BRICS countries, and second, countersanctions in the 
form of import bans on Western foodstuffs to Russia. 
 In terms of multilateral diplomacy, Russia worked to minimise its isolation by 
seeking to prevent the expansion and solidification of the Western-led audience of 
normals. The most obvious target here were the other BRICS countries, all of which 
abstained on the General Assembly resolution. Brazil’s, China’s, India’s and South Africa’s 
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neutrality and reluctance to participate in the stigmatisation of Russia was further 
evidenced by a March 2014 BRICS statement opposing the suggested exclusion of Russia 
from the upcoming G20 summit in Australia, and at the sixth BRICS Summit in Brazil on 
15-17 July 2014, the first international summit President Putin participated in since 
Russia’s exclusion from the G8 (BRICS Information Centre 2014; AFP 2014). The summit 
declaration included a short reference to Ukraine, tucked away in article 44 of 72, 
expressing the five states’ ‘deep concern’ and calling for a ‘peaceful political solution, in 
full compliance with the UN Charter and universally recognized human rights and 
fundamental freedoms’ (‘Sixth BRICS Summit – Fortaleza Declaration’ 2014). While the 
other BRICS’ neutrality represented a ‘diplomatic win’ for Putin, especially considering 
usual Chinese concerns about territorial integrity, their unwillingness to actively support 
the Russian position on Ukraine or Putin’s proposed measures to prevent ‘sanction 
attacks’ from the US was also notable (Boadle 2014; Sakwa 2014a, 113). Article 27 of the 
Fortaleza Declaration included a passage that could be read as equally critical of both the 
West and Russia: ‘We condemn unilateral military interventions and economic sanctions 
in violation of international law and universally recognized norms of international 
relations’ (‘Sixth BRICS Summit – Fortaleza Declaration’ 2014). The BRICS were thus a 
break on the stigmatisation of Russia, and also helped it to compensate economically for 
the impact of Western sanctions and to provide an alternative source of political 
legitimacy in the face of Western stigmatisation, providing an ‘out-group’ of sorts to 
identify with (Connolly 2018, 74–76; Salzman 2019, 88–117). However, beyond their 
already ambivalent position regarding Western-promoted norms they did not offer active 
support for Russia’s counter-stigmatisation and attempt to impose a status loss on the 
West over its sanctions. 
 On the bilateral level, Russian options were also limited, especially given that 
Western actors had already cut off several bilateral relationships and areas of co-
operation as part of their own sanctions. Russia implemented counter-sanctions against 
US and Canadian officials in March 2014, with the Russian foreign ministry drawing on 
all the above separations to justify the move: ‘the American side continues to blindly 
believe in the effectiveness of such methods, taken from the arsenal of the past, and does 
not want to face the obvious: the people of Crimea, in a democratic way in full accordance 
with international law and UN regulations, voted to join Russia’ (RT International 2014). 
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As part of their stigma rejection, Russian officials also maintained that Russia would not 
engage in tit-for-tat sanctions. This changed after the US and EU’s implementation of 
sector-wide sanctions in July 2014, with a ban announced on 6 August 2014 of food 
imports from countries that had introduced or joined sanctions against Russia. The food 
import ban was clearly a blow to certain parts of the EU agricultural industry, with the 
European Commission implementing targeted emergency support measures (European 
Commission 2015). Creative ways around it were also found, as evidenced by the sudden 
appearance on the Russian market of salmon marked as originating from landlocked 
Belarus and tasting suspiciously like the Norwegian real deal (Gubarevich 2015). More 
broadly, the food ban’s success in imposing a status loss of any sort on the West is 
dubious, showing Russia’s limited power to engage in successful counter-stigmatisation. 
In fact, the ban only fed the Western separation of legal/illegal further, introducing also 
a criticism of Russia’s transgression against good capitalist practice through its 
‘politically motivated’ economic measures: 
The European Union regrets the announcement by the Russian Federation 
of measures which will target imports of food and agricultural products. 
This announcement is clearly politically motivated. … We underline that 
the European Union's restrictive measures [against Russia] are directly 
linked with the illegal annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of Ukraine. 
(European Commission 2014c; see also 2014d) 
In short: they are doing politics; we are doing law. 
 A final element in the Russian stigma management surrounding Ukraine was the 
stigma evasion embodied in the ‘disinformation’ or ‘information warfare’ campaign it 
carried out both online and through more traditional channels. As mentioned above, both 
in the second Chechen war and the 2008 Georgia war, the Russian state had sought to 
tightly control information by either stopping it from coming out or heavily managing the 
media narrative. During the Ukraine crisis and the subsequent conflict, the practice 
became characterised more by information overload. The number of official Russian 
statements through these months was extremely high, particularly from the foreign 
ministry. Multiple statements were often issued in one day, as direct responses to 
statements or actions either by Western or Ukrainian actors or representatives of 
international organisations such as the UN or OSCE accusing Russia of transgressions. 
Moreover, both the internet and Russian state-controlled media like RT and Sputnik were 
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flooded with false information, alternative theories, etc., that sought to pre-emptively 
evade or avoid any stigma linked to direct support for rebels in eastern Ukraine or 
participation of Russian soldiers in the fighting. When evidence was presented 
implicating Russia, the tactic of denial returned, for example in the insistence that 
captured Russian troops had simply been on holiday and showed up in Ukraine ‘by 
accident’ (BBC News 2014a). The evasion tactic became particularly pronounced after 
the downing of flight MH17, with the promotion of theories accusing e.g. Ukrainian forces 
of shooting down the plane (for analysis of the online ‘battle’ over MH17, see e.g. 
Khaldarova and Pantti 2016; Sienkiewicz 2015; Golovchenko, Hartmann, and Adler-
Nissen 2018). Added to the strenuous denials were thus strenuous evasions of 
responsibility for any discreditable activities. 
 
Conclusion 
Of all Russia’s discreditable behaviour in relation to the four norms under investigation 
in this study, its breach of the norm of non-aggression was the behaviour that led to the 
most direct and sustained stigmatisation. This speaks both to the explicit nature of the 
transgression and to the centrality of non-aggression as the enduring cardinal rule of the 
international society of states, despite the many caveats allowing intervention in certain 
cases. Still, even in this clear-cut case of a norm violation, it is notable that the directly 
enforced status loss was less than it could conceivably have been. On the one hand, this 
was due to Western actors’ inability to muster a truly global audience of normals 
condemning Russia, which was itself a result in large part of the West’s own discreditable 
history of breaches. On the other hand, even Western actors were reluctant to pull out 
the really big stops when it came to the sanctions regime – there was no severing of 
diplomatic relations, no wholesale blockade of economic activity. The sanctions were 
‘painful’, but ‘far from decisive’ (Tooze 2018, 499). This speaks both to the relative power 
and size of Russia, making such measures inconvenient if not impossible, and to the 
difficulty of effective economic sanctions in an inter-connected capitalist world economy. 
Blockading small, communist Cuba in the 1960s was doable, doing the same to capitalist 
Russia in the 2010s would be much harder, not least because of the reciprocal economic 
hit it would cause, in particular for European business. 
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 Russia’s stigma management strategy shows evidence of both stigma rejection, 
evasion and counter-stigmatisation. The Russian leadership vehemently denied any 
instance of aggressive behaviour, insisting that everything had been done in full 
compliance with international law and invoking the democratic right of the Crimean 
population to choose their national allegiance, thereby seeking to override any stigma of 
aggression with the legitimacy of democracy. This was added to an evasive 
disinformation campaign seeking to hide any evidence of discreditable behaviour by 
Russian forces, as well as the counter-stigmatisation of both Western actors and the new 
Ukrainian government over both its historical instances of aggression and its operation 
against the rebels in eastern Ukraine. Russia’s insistence on its democratic conduct and 
invocation of the ‘Kosovo principle’ – turning its own long-standing opposition to 
Kosovo’s independence on its head (Mälksoo 2015, 179–82) – constituted more of a 
‘parody’ of the norms in question than a sincere application of them, but parody can be a 
potent form of contestation (Burai 2015).  
By way of epilogue, a year after the worst fighting had subsided in Ukraine, Putin 
made an unsuccessful attempt to counteract Russia’s stigma by forming a new ‘audience 
of normals’ in the form of an international coalition against terrorism. During his speech 
to the UN General Assembly on 28 September 2015, the Russian president first lay the 
blame for the current state of the Middle East and North Africa on those who had 
promoted ‘democratic’ revolutions in the region (i.e. the West), which had resulted only 
in ‘violence, poverty, social disasters and total disregard for human rights’, and then went 
on to call for a ‘genuinely broad international coalition against terrorism’, specifically the 
Islamic State, ‘[s]imilar to the anti-Hitler coalition’ (Putin 2015). The call was always 
going to fall on deaf ears, in large part because of Russia’s stigmatisation over Ukraine 
and its support for the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria (including its blocking of a 
potential referral of Assad to the ICC by the UN Security Council), a support that Putin’s 
call sought to justify. 
Only two days later, Russia started a bombing campaign in Syria that would bring 
even more opprobrium to its door. The campaign targeted not just Islamic State but all 
parts of the anti-Assad opposition forces, in a bid to ‘[soften] up Assad’s enemies’ (Trenin 
2015; Lund 2015). While this tactic forced other international actors involved in the 
conflict to take account of Russia and gave it a central role in the ongoing negotiations 
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between the government and opposition, it also led to further stigmatisation as Russia 
was increasingly accused of the indiscriminate use of force. The height of this came during 
the closing months of the battle of Aleppo in late 2016, when Russian and Syrian forces 
were accused in multiple Western media outlets of destroying the city in the way Russian 
forces had destroyed the Chechen capital Grozny in 1999-2000, demonstrating again the 
potential for stigmas to endure and resurface (e.g. Galeotti 2016; The Economist 2016). 
The reference was taken up by US Secretary of State John Kerry, who also called for the 
Russian and Syrian governments to face war crimes investigations (Mance 2016; Borger 
2016). As Aleppo eventually fell to government forces in December 2016, the outgoing 
US Ambassador to the UN, Samantha Power, threw aside diplomatic language to strongly 
criticise Russia (and Iran) in the Security Council: ‘Are they truly incapable of shame? Is 
there literally nothing that can shame them? Is there no act of barbarism against civilians, 
no execution of a child that gets under their skin or just creeps them out a little bit? Is 
there nothing that they will not lie about or justify?’ (UN Security Council 2016, 7).119 
Thus, while Russia did not face further sanctions for its actions in Syria, largely owing to 
the legal and diplomatic complexities of the situation with Assad still being the official 
government, its foray into the conflict failed to alleviate its stigma as an aggressor. 
 
  
 
119 Power’s statement was covered widely in international news media. See 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-middle-east-38312665/samantha-power-at-un-are-you-truly-
incapable-of-shame for a recording including the Russian ambassador’s angry response, stating that Power 
‘delivered her statement as if she were Mother Theresa’ (accessed 6 November 2018). 
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Chapter 7 
Capitalism 
 
Of the four dominant expectations of ‘normal’ state behaviour analysed in this study, 
capitalism was the one that Russia came closest to fully meet. While its democratic and 
human rights credentials were always in doubt, the Russian economy was, undoubtedly, 
transformed from Soviet-style and centrally planned to a capitalist economy, increasingly 
integrated with the rest of the global economy and open to trade and investment. By 
2016, the sum of imports and exports (a frequent measure of economic openness) was 
51% of GDP – compared to 79% in the EU as a whole but only 28% in the US – and for 
much of the period prior to Western sanctions being introduced in 2014, Russia’s relative 
share of global foreign direct investment was higher than that of many other comparable 
economies, from Brazil to Turkey (Connolly 2018, 49–53). The transformation was not 
easy – it was achieved through ‘substantial and painful’ reforms, particularly the ‘wide-
scale liberalisation and mass privatization’ of the 1990s (Connolly and Hanson 2012, 
489). It was also committed to by successive Russian leaders: while rolling back 
democracy and human rights, as detailed in previous chapters, Putin (and Medvedev) 
made clear his commitment to capitalist economic management, and invoked free market 
principles as arguments against, for example, the grand renationalisation of industries 
and companies privatised in the 1990s (Hopf 2016, 236). Indeed, in one analyst’s 
argument, throughout the 1990s and 2000s the main purpose of Russia’s new ‘system’ 
was to ‘defend capitalism – if necessary at the expense of democracy’ (Wood 2018, 5). 
Unlike the insistence on ‘traditional values’ or the persistent criticism of Western ‘double 
standards’ in foreign policy, Russia’s leaders generally accepted the norm of capitalism, 
at least on a rhetorical level. 
 Despite this substantial turnaround since Soviet times, Russia’s economy 
remained ‘flawed in many respects’ in relation to dominant free-market norms (Connolly 
and Hanson 2012, 498). From substantial state involvement in the economy via a weak 
rule of law manifesting itself in the risk of reiderstvo (raiding) to the high-level corruption 
of government insiders, Russia was less a fully capitalist country than a ‘kleptocracy’ 
(Dawisha 2014), an example of ‘crony capitalism’ (Sharafutdinova 2010) or a ‘hybrid’ or 
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‘limited-access’ system of political economy (Connolly 2018). However, as Mark Galeotti 
(e.g. 2018) has pointed out, Russia’s gangster capitalism was still capitalism, only with 
the state as the largest gang in town. 
This chapter analyses stigmatisation and stigma management in relation to the 
norm of free-market capitalism. The first section considers the context of Russia’s Soviet 
legacy and its persistent status as a capitalist developmental ‘laggard’, leading to diffuse 
stigmatisation. The second section analyses instances of direct stigmatisation. It finds 
that there has been comparatively little direct stigmatisation compared to other norms. 
For example, many of the complications surrounding Russia’s accession to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) were not related to issues of economics but to aggression and 
human rights. The third section analyses Russia’s stigma management, elaborating on the 
claim that, unlike in relation to other norms, Russian leaders mostly pursued a stigma 
acceptance strategy when it came to capitalism, albeit one mixed with the usual dose of 
stigma rejection when related to alleged transgressions such as the Yukos affair. 
 
I – Diffuse stigmatisation: Russia’s ‘arrested development’ 
Russia’s relative economic ‘backwardness’ has been a feature of analysis and a practical 
concern for the country’s leaders for centuries (Gerschenkron 1962). It was a driving 
force behind Peter the Great’s modernising and Europeanising project in the 17th and 18th 
centuries and Stalin’s industrialisation drive in the 1920s and 1930s alike.120 Stalin’s rival 
Trotsky made it a primary cause in his analysis of the Russian Revolution, which he 
argued came about owing to Russia’s combination of ‘archaic and contemporary forms’ 
of economic and social development – a key feature of his theory of ‘uneven and combined 
development’ later taken up by IR theorists (Trotsky 2008; Rosenberg 2016). In 1994, 
Yegor Gaidar, one of the architects of the liberalisation and Westernisation drive under 
Yeltsin, put it this way: ‘[in politics and economics] Russia, for many centuries, has been 
a civilization constantly playing catch-up’ (Gaidar 2003, 24). As the development of a 
market economy seemingly stalled in the post-Soviet period after the initial ‘shock 
 
120 As Stalin put it in 1931: ‘We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make 
good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we shall go under’. See 
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1931/02/04.htm (accessed 15 July 2019). 
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therapy’ of the early 1990s, debates over Russia’s ‘arrested development’ (Etkind 2014) 
re-emerged with force. This section briefly considers the nature of this stigma, the result 
of diffuse processes of developed capitalism becoming ‘normal’ internationally. Russian 
leaders’ reaction to it will be considered in the third section. 
 In global comparative terms, the story of Russia’s backwardness, particularly in 
the contemporary world, can be overblown. Economic and social indicators plummeted 
in the 1990s but recovered in the 2000s. By 2016 Russia was the world’s either 13th (in 
dollar terms) or 6th (in purchasing power parity terms) largest economy and in 2013 the 
8th largest manufacturer in terms of share of global value-added, ahead of the UK 
(Connolly 2018, 49, 39). Already at the end of the first Putin presidency, Shleifer and 
Treisman (2004; 2005) argued that for all its faults, Russia was a ‘normal’ country for its 
kind, more or less comparable to other middle-income countries (for a response, see 
Rosefielde 2005). However, for a country accustomed to seeing itself as a great power 
and comparing itself to the US and the EU’s Western core, Russia’s relative position was 
still poor on several indicators. Even adjusted for standard of living, average per capita 
income in 2016 was 30% of US levels and 65% of the EU average (Connolly 2018, 49). 
Moreover, the composition of the economy was as important as macroeconomic 
indicators in the story of backwardness. On this front, three potentially discreditable 
features stood out in relation to the hegemonic ideals of liberal capitalism and its 
supposed separation of the political and economic spheres: the high level of state 
involvement in the economy, the weak rule of law and high levels of corruption, and the 
over-reliance on (state-controlled) hydrocarbon exports. 
 The insufficient separation between politics and economics was primarily 
manifest in the substantial state involvement in the economy. While a relatively large 
private sector developed in the country after 1991, from 2005-15 the estimated share of 
the state-controlled segment of the economy rose steadily to around 70% (Anderson 
2015, 7–8; Connolly 2018, 38). In Connolly’s analysis, the state operated as a fifth sector 
of the economy, shaping incentives and setting formal rules and regulations (as in most 
capitalist economies), but also owning or indirectly controlling large parts of the 
economy, including those that produced the majority of taxation revenue, trade and 
capital flows. From this position at the ‘apex’ of the system it could use its levers to direct 
resources where it wanted them and ‘subordinate economic activity to wider social, 
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political, and geopolitical objectives’, with the direct and indirect effect of suppressing 
market competition (Connolly 2018, 30, 46).121 On its own, this was not necessarily 
noteworthy. As Connolly (2018, 31) points out, ‘[the] vast majority of countries across 
the world are not well-functioning market economies’. However, the issue was contextual 
and relative – compared to the less state-dominated economies of the West, Russia was 
discreditable, particularly when the direction of travel under Putin was towards greater 
state intervention. 
 The potential for discrediting was compounded by the amount of high-level 
corruption and the weak rule of law, particularly around the protection of private 
property. The two phenomena were closely linked – the weaker and more arbitrary the 
rule of law, the more important are informal networks, bribes and kickbacks. A common 
practice in Russian business throughout the post-Soviet period, hampering the 
development of successful private businesses, was reiderstvo, a practice of the theft and 
relatively prompt resale of companies for large profits that increasingly became done not 
only by private businessmen (ignored or tolerated by the state) but initiated by state 
officials (Sakwa 2012; Connolly 2018, 42–43).122 The money gained from bribes, 
kickbacks, embezzlement or reiderstvo was generally then taken offshore. Capital flight 
totalled around $335 billion from 2005-14, contributing to rampant inequality and 
making Putin and the elite surrounding him very rich (Dawisha 2014, 1–2). Cypriot banks 
and British real estate were among the favoured destinations of Russian money, with 
corruption thus facilitated by Western enablers or what the investigative journalist 
Oliver Bullough (2018) calls ‘Moneyland’ – the globalised offshore economy for the super-
rich. In Dawisha’s (2014, 9) words, ‘globalization’ allowed Russian elites to keep 
‘domestic markets open for predation while minimizing their own personal risk by 
depositing profits in secure offshore accounts’.  
 
121 The other sectors were the globally competitive sector ‘A’, consisting mainly of natural resources, 
agriculture, nuclear power plant production and defence industries; the uncompetitive and domestically 
focused sector ‘B’, relying on direct or indirect subsidies funded by rents from sector ‘A’; the largely 
independent sector ‘C’, including the relatively small number of small and medium-sized businesses 
(SMEs); and the relatively small (by international comparison), bank-centric and state-dominated financial 
sector (Connolly 2018, chapter 3). 
122 As Ledeneva (2013, 188–91) explains, reiderstvo is distinct from Western ‘corporate raiding’, which is 
often ethically dubious but on the whole a legal affair. 
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Globalisation also exposed Russia’s weak rule of law by allowing both commercial 
arbitration and human rights cases to be heard outside the country’s borders: ‘Major 
commercial disputes are now resolved by English law: the ECtHR has been jokingly 
referred to as “Russia’s Supreme Court”’ (Ledeneva 2013, 177). As with the high number 
of ECtHR cases and critical NGO reports in the field of human rights, the number of 
commercial arbitrations and the country’s persistently poor ratings on indexes like 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (see Chart 7.1) provided the 
background knowledge that could be mobilised to stigmatise in the field of capitalism. In 
an increasingly active and direct practice of discrediting, Alexei Navalny and his Anti-
Corruption Foundation would target officials within the governing circle, most 
prominently Dmitry Medvedev, with exposé videos broadcast online revealing the 
officials’ luxurious habits, vastly out of kilter with their official salaries.123 
Chart 7.1 – Russia’s score (left axis, 100 = squeaky clean, 0 = very corrupt) and relative rank (right axis, 0 
= top, 100 = bottom) in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, 1996-2016. 
 
Source: https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi. 
  
A third discrediting characteristic of post-Soviet Russia’s economy was its heavy 
reliance on hydrocarbon exports – the so-called ‘oil curse’. In most years, revenue from 
 
123 See https://fbk.info/english/about/ (accessed 15 July 2019). 
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hydrocarbons (oil, oil products, natural gas and coal) constituted between 55% and 75% 
of total export revenues, and rents from this sector were instrumental both in subsidising 
less competitive sectors of the economy and providing a revenue stream for elite 
corruption – the state expanded its ownership in the sector exponentially under Putin, 
who himself reportedly had shares in both gas company Gazprom and gas and oil 
company Surgutneftegaz (Connolly 2018, 50; Dawisha 2014, 6; Rutland 2013, 357). Such 
a reliance on oil and gas exports could cut both ways from a stigma perspective. As 
Rutland (2013, 333) points out, to market advocates Russia’s increasing reliance on the 
extractive sector would be something ‘to be welcomed as evidence of comparative 
advantage in action’, while to critics it would be ‘a sign of a failure to preserve a balanced, 
diversified economy, capable of sustained growth and social equality’ (not to mention 
evidence of state domination of a key economic sector and an enabling factor for 
corruption). Either way, it provided a reference point that could be mobilised by Western 
politicians to demonstrate Russia’s ‘semi-peripheral’ and therefore backward and 
unimportant position in the world economy, its status as a ‘raw materials appendage’ 
providing the materials for Western (and increasingly Eastern) capitalist entrepreneurs 
(Morozov 2015, 67–102; Rutland 2013, 357–58).124 Examples of such mobilisations 
include US Senator John McCain’s jibe live on CNN in March 2014, during the height of the 
Ukraine crisis, that Russia was ‘a gas station masquerading as a country’125 and President 
Obama’s statement during an interview with The Economist in the same year that ‘Russia 
doesn’t make anything. Immigrants aren’t rushing to Moscow in search of opportunity’ 
(The Economist 2014). The implications were: a) that Russian government concerns 
about events in Ukraine were not legitimate, and b) that even something like the Ukraine 
crisis had to be put in perspective – Russia presented merely ‘regional’ challenges, a 
subtle dig against the country’s sense of self-worth. 
 A final, enduring stigma in relation to Russia’s post-Soviet capitalist development 
was just that – its post-Soviet nature. Its many defects when compared with a well-
 
124 This stigmatising moniker is not without basis in truth: in any given year, ‘natural resources and 
unprocessed raw materials account for around 85 percent of Russia’s total merchandise exports … there 
are very few manufactured product categories in which Russian manufacturers are competitive’ (Connolly 
2018, 38–39). 
125 Recording available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r5LyDd4vQPk (accessed 15 July 2019) – 
McCain went on to say ‘it’s kleptocracy, it’s corruption’, linking the oil and gas dependence to the issues 
above. 
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functioning market economy were frequently put down to its Soviet legacy. This was an 
understandable trope. The country had spent the seven decades prior to the 1990s as the 
embodiment of the antithesis to free-market capitalism, with a centrally planned 
economy and no such thing as private property. The Soviet legacy undoubtedly did affect 
Russia’s transition towards capitalism in multiple ways, although its exact impact is 
contested. The ‘bear traps’ of both bad management and skewed, uncompetitive 
investment (Gaddy and Ickes 2013; see also Gaddy 1996; Gaddy and Ickes 2002) plus the 
fact that the Soviet management class were ‘reluctant capitalists’ (Randall 2001) may 
have hindered capitalist development from a purely free-market perspective.126 But as 
Gaddy and Ickes (2013) also point out, there are structural challenges in Russia such as 
the enormous distances and harsh climate that hamper investment and have nothing to 
do with the Soviet legacy. In her study of the persistence of informal networks – the so-
called sistema – Ledeneva (2013) both acknowledges the Soviet legacy’s role in 
frustrating modernisation (which she defines as closing the gap between the formal and 
informal way of doing things) and points to how such networks persisted partly as a 
rational response to market defects and low levels of trust in state institutions during the 
transitional period. Wood (2018, 57–87) takes this one step further and argues that the 
Soviet past in fact gave a ‘hidden subsidy to the present’, smoothing the path of capitalist 
transition by giving people a minimum of welfare support and weakening trade unions 
and people’s attachment to working class identities, making them put up with more 
hardship than they would have otherwise. Etkind (2014, 158), meanwhile, takes the idea 
that Russia’s ‘arrested development’ is due to Soviet-infused ‘inertia’ or ‘tradition’ to task 
by arguing that ‘[if] Russia is still post-Soviet, it is due to a concerted effort of a narrow 
group [Putin and his circle] that has been actively preventing Russia from becoming a 
productive, law-abiding, European country’. While this acknowledges the stigma of being 
‘post-Soviet’, it puts it down not to an ineffable ‘legacy’ but an active choice of the current 
elite. 
 
II – Direct stigmatisation: The marginality of ‘capitalism’  
 
126 Another aspect that has been invoked by sociologists is the supposedly non-entrepreneurial mentality 
of the Soviet and post-Soviet population, the ‘Homo Sovieticus’ phenomenon. See Gessen (2017) for a 
sympathetic recent use of the term and Sharafutdinova (2019) for a critique. 
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This section analyses direct stigmatisation of Russia over its transgressions against 
capitalist norms. The argument is that capitalist-related defects or transgressions 
primarily sparked direct stigmatisation when they were combined with transgressions 
related to other norms such as human rights or aggression. This is illustrated through 
two examples: the breakup of the oil company Yukos and imprisonment of its CEO, 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky together with the similar Magnitsky case; and Russia’s accession 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
 Before these cases are explored, one example of direct stigmatisation based on 
Russia’s economic backwardness should be mentioned, namely the decision to exclude 
Russia from the economic side of the G8. As noted in Chapter 4, this led to a split between 
the ‘economic 7’ and the ‘political 8’, with Russia excluded from finance ministers’ 
meetings right up until its dismissal from the club in 2014 (Naylor 2019, 127). The reason 
was opposition and scepticism from the G7 countries, particularly the US Treasury, about 
Russia’s economic suitability in a club of advanced industrial nations. As one-time US G7 
Sherpa Robert Fauver put it years later, Russia was an ‘economic basket case’ (quoted in 
Naylor 2019, 127; see also Treisman 2011, 333). While, as seen in previous chapters, the 
perceived political imperative to help Russia along in its transition dictated that it be 
admitted to the political side of the club, its exclusion from the economic side was a direct 
case of separation and stigmatisation based on its insufficient level of economic 
development.127  
 
From Khodorkovsky to Magnitsky: human rights in focus 
The imprisonment of the oil company Yukos’s president, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, on tax 
evasion charges in October 2003, his subsequent sentence to nine years prison in 2005, 
and the breaking up of Yukos and transfer of its assets to state-owned Rosneft, was ‘an 
earthquake that completely changed the balance of power in Russian politics’ (Zygar 
 
127 Another potential case would be Russia’s lack of membership in the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), which it applied to join in 1996 and achieved a membership roadmap 
for in 2007. However, this is not a case of direct exclusion, rather slow progress (at least until the EU called 
for the suspension of accession negotiations during the Ukraine crisis). See 
https://www.oecd.org/russia/therussianfederationandtheoecd.htm (accessed 18 August 2019). 
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2016, 62).128 Khodorkovsky had broken the unwritten bargain that Putin had offered to 
the Russian oligarchs when coming to power: stay out of politics, and the state will stay 
out of your affairs and not question the dubious ways in which your wealth was acquired 
in the 1990s. Yukos was funding a variety of opposition parties and bringing its 
considerable weight to bear against government attempts to tax mineral extraction, and 
Khodorkovsky, estimated as Russia’s richest and the world’s 16th richest man at the time, 
was openly talking about changing the Russian political system from a presidential to a 
parliamentary one. In February 2003, during a televised meeting between Putin and the 
oligarch group the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE), 
Khodorkovsky had criticised Rosneft for corruption and called for the state to do more to 
combat the issue, prompting a seething Putin to make thinly veiled references to 
Khodorkovsky’s and Yukos’s own skeletons in the closet, reportedly telling one of his 
allies that Khodorkovsky had ‘some nerve, preaching to me in front of everyone’ (Zygar 
2016, 53).129 Yukos and its owner were taken out both to remove a political threat, as a 
warning to others – ‘henceforward, no oligarch should think of challenging the power of 
the state’ (Anderson 2015, 8) – and to improve the financial and economic power of 
Putin’s close allies.130 
 The Yukos affair was certainly a blot on Russia’s image as a good capitalist country 
and caused a short-term hit in investor confidence as fears of an all-out renationalisation 
campaign or further state-oligarch conflict were raised in the Western financial press. 
However, by October 2005, the affair had apparently been settled. Khodorkovsky’s was 
sentenced in May that year and the Russian government went on a charm offensive to 
convince investors that Yukos was a one-off. Credit rating agencies showered the country 
with upgrades and investors started returning (Aris 2005).131 As Chart 7.2 shows, net 
foreign direct investment in Russia rose exponentially from 2005 to 2008 before the 
 
128 See e.g. Zygar (2016, 47–63) and Sakwa (2014b) for accounts of the whole affair, and Hoffman (2002, 
100–126) for the background story of how Khodorkovsky made his money. 
129 Like the other oligarchs, Khodorkovsky had initially bought Yukos from the state at a bargain price 
during the so-called ‘loans for shares’ auction in the mid-1990s, during which several state enterprises 
were privatised and sold to banks like Khodorkovsky’s Menatep Bank in order to break the power of 
Communist-sympathetic directors and fund Yeltsin’s re-election campaign against the Communists in 
1996. See e.g. Hoffman (2002) for the story of the oligarchs’ grip on power in the 1990s. 
130 Dawisha (2014, 332) marks the takeover of Yukos as the start of the second phase of what she dubs 
Putin’s ‘kleptocracy’, in which his entourage from St. Petersburg and the security services started their 
establishment of control of key assets of the Russian economy. 
131 See https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/rating (accessed 15 July 2019) for Russia’s credit ratings 
over time. 
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global financial crisis (and the war with Georgia) led to a steep drop, only matched by the 
sanctions-induced plummet over the Ukraine crisis in 2014-15. 
Chart 7.2 – Net FDI inflows, billions of US$, Russia, 1992-2016. 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
Over the coming years, even as cases brought by Yukos shareholders were 
winding their way through international courts and the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe cited Yukos as a prime case of Russia’s ‘legal nihilism’ in 2009 
(Ledeneva 2013, 165), foreign companies and investors were content to engage with the 
company that had taken over most of Yukos’s assets, Rosneft. In 2006, Rosneft was listed 
on the London Stock Exchange, amongst others, in the largest initial public offering (IPO) 
in Russia’s history. While this to a large extent legitimised it as a company, reports at the 
time did suggest that investors were more cautious than might otherwise have been the 
case (e.g. Chung and Ostrovsky 2006). In 2011, just weeks after Khodorkovsky was 
sentenced to a further 13.5 years in prison in a trial labelled ‘deeply flawed and politically 
motivated’ by Amnesty International, British oil company BP (which had bought shares 
in the 2006 IPO) announced a deal to increase its stake in Rosneft and a partnership for 
oil exploration in the Arctic. When the deal collapsed in August 2011 owing to a contract 
dispute between BP and its partners in the separate Russian-British oil venture TNK-BP, 
US oil giant ExxonMobil took BP’s place (it had also struck a deal with Rosneft for 
exploration in the Black Sea in January 2011). Throughout, Yukos shareholders (not 
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including Khodorkovsky, who sold all his shares in 2004) sought to warn BP and other 
companies off co-operation with Rosneft, arguing that the assets were ‘stolen’ in ‘illegal 
auctions, bogus bankruptcy fire sales and expropriations’ (Mason and Ruddick 2011). 
This attempted stigmatisation of Rosneft and the Russian state appears to have 
fallen on deaf ears in the boardrooms of Western oil companies, at least in BP and 
ExxonMobil. This is unsurprising given the companies’ number one priority of their own 
profit margins and desire to get access to Russia’s substantial oil reserves. There is a more 
general point to be made, though, about the difficulty of imposing a stigma in a field and 
context (capitalism, especially Russian post-Soviet capitalism) where the moral lines 
were always murky. While Khodorkovsky and the other oligarchs presented themselves 
as free-market entrepreneurs and, in Khodorkovsky’s case, a liberal philanthropist, it was 
common knowledge that their wealth was at best dubiously earned and at worst 
effectively stolen, including from the state and the taxpayer (D. E. Hoffman 2002, 3–7; 
Wood 2018). Similar to the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the circumstances were enough to 
sow a modicum of doubt that undermined any stigmatisation process. 
Indeed, it is instructive that, over time, the Yukos/Khodorkovsky case became 
increasingly framed as a human rights violation (it was also, from the start, an indicator 
for many of Russia’s democratic backsliding owing to Khodorkovsky’s political 
opposition to Putin). In 2011 and 2013, the ECtHR found that the trial against 
Khodorkovsky and his business partner Platon Lebedev had violated their rights to fair 
treatment but concluded that it could not judge whether the case was politically 
motivated. Amnesty International had no such qualms. Following Khodorkovsky and 
Lebedev’s sentence to a further 13.5 years in prison for money laundering in 2010-11 
(reduced to 12 on appeal and rescinded in practice upon their release in early 2014), the 
human rights NGO declared them prisoners of conscience.132 Yukos shareholders and/or 
former management brought cases against Russia both in the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in the Hague and in the European Court of Human Rights, with both courts 
ordering Russia to pay large sums of damages within a couple of weeks of each other in 
July 2014.133 However, at this point Russia was well on its way to becoming stigmatised 
 
132 See https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/russia-khodorkovsky-and-lebedev-are-prisoners-
conscience (accessed 16 July 2019). 
133 ECtHR: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-145730%22]}. The PCA’s claim was 
overturned by the Hague District Court in April 2016, with the latter accepting Russia’s argument that the 
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over its annexation of Crimea and role in eastern Ukraine, as detailed in the previous 
chapter (the verdicts came just a couple of weeks after flight MH17 was shot down), and 
the added effect of these verdicts is hard to separate (though they certainly would not 
have helped). 
The inefficacy of capitalist transgressions on their own was also evident in the 
tragic case of Sergei Magnitsky. Magnitsky was a tax lawyer working for Hermitage 
Capital Management, a highly successful investment fund headed by British-American 
businessman Bill Browder that became the victim of reiderstvo in the mid-2000s. 
Magnitsky uncovered the details of the scheme, including a tax rebate fraud in which a 
group of Interior Ministry bureaucrats allegedly defrauded the state of around $230 
million, and testified against the officials before he was detained in November 2008 on 
trumped-up charges of having committed the fraud himself. Over the next year he was 
beaten, held in inhuman conditions and denied medical treatment, and eventually died in 
prison in November 2009. Browder subsequently devoted much time and resources to 
lobbying Western lawmakers to punish those responsible for Magnitsky’s death (see 
Browder 2015 for his somewhat sensationalist autobiography, in which he claims to be 
‘Putin’s no. 1 enemy’). The result was the Magnitsky Act, passed by the US Congress in 
November-December 2012, which allowed the US government to sanction individuals it 
held responsible for Magnitsky’s death by denying them entry to the US, freezing any US-
based assets and prohibiting their use of US financial institutions – 18 names were added 
to the list in April 2013 (Trindle 2014).134 This targeted form of ‘smart’ sanctions 
foreshadowed those that would later be applied against individuals deemed responsible 
for Russia’s incursions in Ukraine (Gilligan 2016). 
 This survey of the Khodorkovsky/Yukos and Magnitsky/Hermitage cases indicate 
two things. First, that capitalism-related transgressions only led to the sort of 
opprobrium, separation and status loss required to meaningfully speak of stigmatisation 
when combined with other transgressions, notably in these two cases human rights-
related ones. The theft of Hermitage’s companies, while an additional case of the potential 
 
PCA did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-yukos-ruling-dutch-court-
explainer/27686006.html (both accessed 15 July 2019). 
134 See https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr6156/text (accessed 15 July 2019) for the full text 
of the law, which puts Magnitsky’s death in the context of corruption in Russia, its effect on democratic 
development, and expresses concerns over the Khodorkovsky and Lebedev re-trial. 
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perils of operating in Russia for foreign businesses and a blot on its rule-of-law image, on 
its own would have been very unlikely to morph into the kind of stigmatising measure 
the Magnitsky Act eventually became, just like reactions to the Yukos case were amplified 
by Khodorkovsky’s treatment and elevation to prisoner of conscience status. As with the 
oligarchs, one of the reasons in the Hermitage case would be the compromised victim 
(Hermitage, not Magnitsky). While Browder (2015) insists Hermitage always paid its 
taxes in Russia, he also admits the company sought out those Russian regions with the 
most favourable tax regimes, and it maintains offices in notable tax havens like Guernsey 
and the Cayman Islands.135 This leads to the second point, which is that in the morally 
murky world of international business, stigmatisation may simply have less traction, or 
transgressions may not lead to ostracization as long as there is an overriding profit 
motive involved. This is of course not something that applies only to profit-seeking 
companies – governments also put profit first, as the next section on Russia’s WTO 
accession shows. 
 
WTO accession: aggression and human rights over trade 
Despite a stated commitment to free trade since the earliest post-Soviet days, while 
Russia remained outside the WTO this commitment was always in doubt, as the 
mechanisms by which it could be held to account for breaches of free-trade practices 
were fewer. The failure to join the WTO until 2012 (negotiations were started in 1994 
and completed in 2009, with outstanding issues with Georgia solved in 2011) was indeed 
the ‘most salient blot on [Russia’s] image as a market economy’ (Rutland 2013, 354) – in 
other words, a stigma. However, the most notable thing from a direct stigmatisation 
perspective about Russia’s delayed accession was how the most vocal objections of other 
states were related to issues like aggression and human rights rather than trade per se, 
again showing the higher stigmatising potential of transgressions in these fields – and, 
ultimately, how they did not lead to full-on stigmatisation in the sense of continued 
Russian exclusion. 
 
135 See https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=4486593 for a 
company overview (accessed 16 July 2019). 
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The length and complicated nature of the Russian accession process can in itself 
be seen as stigmatising, particularly when combined with the highly unusual amount of 
detailed attention other states paid to it. As Van der Borght (2015, 329) notes, WTO 
accession remains a largely (power-)political process with few clear legal rules, in 
particular as accession normally relies on the consent of all members. This makes it ripe 
for stigmatisation processes to make their mark as states bring grievances from other 
fields, even if ‘political’ concerns are not meant to impinge on the process (Warner 2014, 
98). Connolly and Hanson (2012, 488–89) argue that the accession process resembled a 
business negotiation rather than a simple adoption of standards, and that the drawn-out 
process was caused by this, combined with the size and importance of Russia and the 
distrust and suspicion of other member states. As an indication, the accession working 
group of ‘interested parties’ was both the largest (40 states initially, 65 by the final stage) 
and most frequently convened ever. Since China’s accession in 2001, Russia was the only 
UN Security Council permanent member state and only member of the G8 (and, later, 
G20) not to be a WTO member. Compared to China’s 15-and-a-half-year accession 
process, Russia’s took almost 18 years, and the working party’s final report on accession 
was more than 600 pages long, compared to 180 for China, which ‘shows the number of 
questions the members had with the idea of Russian accession’ (Warner 2014, 100).136 
Russia did not react well to this onerous process, at several points indicating that given 
its international stature (real, perceived or desired) it considered the scrutiny unworthy 
– a combined rejection of the stigma implied by the scrutiny and counter-stigmatisation 
of those scrutinising it. However, it still sought membership, in a recognition both of the 
status that accession would confer and the potential economic benefits (Van der Borght 
2015, 329–30). 
 The state that most actively opposed Russia’s accession in the latter stages of the 
negotiations was Georgia, owing to the aftermath of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war and 
Russia’s recognition of the two Georgian separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
as independent states. This was not a clear-cut case of stigmatisation over aggression. In 
keeping with the technical, supposedly non-political spirit of WTO negotiations, Georgia’s 
objections were framed around the very real challenges of customs controls at the 
 
136 See https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_russie_e.htm for Russia’s, and 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_chine_e.htm for China’s (both accessed 15 July 2019). 
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contested borders between Abkhazia, Georgia, Russia and South Ossetia, an issue that 
had also plagued Georgia’s own WTO accession (Warner 2014). However, the stigma 
lurking in the background throughout was Russia’s 2008 intervention and subsequent 
recognition of the two separatist states as independent, against the overwhelming 
majority of states worldwide. As noted in the previous chapter though, while the more 
powerful Western states heavily criticised Russia for its recognition of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, the Russo-Georgian war on the whole did not lead to direct stigmatisation 
in the sense of a status loss for Russia. On the subject of economics, specifically Russia’s 
WTO accession, the US and EU were not going to let Georgia dictate terms or make this a 
‘make or break issue’; any Georgian attempts to create an ‘audience of normals’ against 
Russian accession would thus almost certainly have been doomed (Van der Borght 2015, 
340–45). The eventual solution, reached in 2011 after two-and-a-half years of Swiss 
mediation (Georgia cut off diplomatic relations with Russia after the 2008 war), was a 
creative agreement that on paper allowed for customs controls while avoiding the touchy 
issue of the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, even using ‘neutral’ Universal Trade 
Mercator co-ordinates rather than any geographical place names to avoid any geopolitical 
implications (Warner 2014, 98–100). This unblocked negotiations and removed the final 
hurdle for Russia to accede. 
 A further stigma-related issue that arose during the final year of Russia’s accession 
negotiations was human rights-related and pertained to US-Russian relations specifically. 
Under WTO regulations, once Russia joined, the US would have to either repeal the 1974 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which withheld normal trade relations with states that 
refused ‘[their] citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate’ (or, in practice, did not 
uphold human rights as defined by Congress), or ‘graduate’ Russia to the status of normal 
trade relations by ceasing to apply the amendment to it (Van der Borght 2015, 346).137 
The government wanted to repeal the amendment, which led Bill Browder and his 
supporters in Congress to seize the opportunity to finally pass the Magnitsky Act, which 
had previously been lobbied against by the Obama administration owing to its ‘reset’ 
policy with Russia (Trindle 2014). In an eventual quid pro quo, Jackson-Vanik was 
 
137 The amendment was introduced as a way of countering a US-Soviet trade agreement from 1972, and 
thus was from the beginning a stigmatising move against the Soviet Union/Russia (the Soviets repudiated 
the trade agreement in protest), though it had also been applied to other states. The very language of 
‘graduating’ and the linkage between trade and human rights illustrates one of the many ways in which 
hierarchies and stigmas are constructed and upheld through myriad laws, amendments, etc. 
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repealed and the Magnitsky Act passed as part of the same legislative package. The latter 
was acceptable under WTO regulations as it sanctioned individuals rather than a state – 
although the Russian interpretation remained that the Magnitsky Act was an ‘anti-
Russian’ law replacing an ‘anti-Soviet’ one (Sergei Lavrov quoted in Van der Borght 2015, 
348). 
 Russia’s entry into the WTO was thus seen as more important both than its 
violation of a neighbouring state’s sovereignty and its violations of human rights. It was 
allowed to rid itself of the stigma of being outside the WTO – the ‘blot’ on its market 
economy image – despite the developing stigmas of aggressor and human rights violator. 
Whether the Western support for Russia’s accession was due to a continued case of 
‘transitionology’ (WTO membership will encourage economic reform, economic reform 
goes hand-in-hand with democratic consolidation, etc.) or material self-interest in terms 
of obtaining market access for its companies is an open question. In his statement 
welcoming the completion of negotiations, President Obama focused on the benefits of 
‘international access to Russia’s services markets’, increased exports for ‘American 
manufacturers and farmers’ and accountability for Russia to abide by international rules, 
and framed the event as part of the US-Russia reset, ‘based upon the belief that the United 
States and Russia share many common interests, even as we disagree on some issues’ 
(Obama 2011). 
 While Russia’s accession removed a free-market ‘blot’, it also opened it up to the 
potential stigma of not abiding by WTO rules. From its accession in 2012 to the end of 
2016, seven complaints were made against Russia (four by the EU, two by Ukraine and 
one by Japan), including over a recycling fee on motor vehicles meant to protect the 
automotive industry and its ban on agricultural food imports as counter-sanctions during 
the Ukraine crisis.138 As with the number of cases against Russia in the ECtHR, a rapidly 
accumulating number of cases against it at the WTO would counter the positive impact of 
having acceded to the organisation. 
 
 
138 See all disputes at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm (accessed 
15 July 2019). Russia also opened a similar number of disputes. 
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III – Russian stigma management: diffuse acceptance, direct rejection 
This section analyses Russia’s stigma management relating to capitalism. It argues that 
contrary to the norms of democracy, human rights and to some extent non-aggression, 
successive Russian governments in the post-Soviet period accepted the norm of 
capitalism and, directly and indirectly, Russia’s ‘backwardness’ in relation to the norm. 
Russian leaders from Yeltsin to Putin to Medvedev and back to Putin again have all been 
rhetorically committed to capitalism, even neoliberalism (Hopf 2016), and have pursued 
policies to this effect, contributing to the above-mentioned transformation of Russia from 
the planned communist economy of the Soviet Union to the capricious, chaotic but 
relatively open economy of today as described by Connolly (2018). This is not to suggest 
that Russia has been an entirely ‘normal’ capitalist country, for all the reasons discussed 
in section I and II – the gap between theory and practice has clearly left something to be 
desired (Rutland 2013). But it is to say that, in contrast to the case of human rights, where 
the Russian leadership gradually moved towards a rejection of the norm altogether, at 
least in its hegemonic Western interpretation, when it comes to capitalism no such 
counter-stigmatising discourse was embraced, despite ample opportunity. Below, this 
argument is substantiated through a closer look at the evolution of economic policy and, 
importantly, its justifications. 
 Economic policy in the 1990s was characterised by the rapid and painful 
introduction of free market principles, driven by reformers like Gaidar and Anatoly 
Chubais and foreign advisers from institutions like the IMF. Prices and foreign trade were 
liberalised, state assets were sold off in a mass privatisation drive, and legal and 
institutional reforms protecting the right to private property and free movement of goods 
and services were introduced (Treisman 2011, 197–207). The effects for the population 
at large were hardship, with spiralling inflation and increasing poverty rates, although 
the picture was not uniform and standards of living increased in some areas, notably 
European cities and resource-rich regions of Siberia (Treisman 2011, 218–19). Moreover, 
as Treisman notes, reforms were not always the drivers of change – price liberalisation 
and privatisation were already occurring spontaneously in 1991-92, and reforms were 
often trying to bring the process under control (2011, 197–99). Debates persist about the 
extent to which this ‘shock therapy’ introduced ‘actual’ neoliberal capitalism to Russia 
and whether a less painful, gradualist alternative existed. While the neoliberal hegemony 
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of the time certainly pushed reformers and their advisers towards a ‘minimalist 
understanding of institutions and their role in market democracy’ (Morozov 2015, 97–
98), it is almost certainly also true that ‘actual policies … diverged considerably from the 
prevailing neoliberal orthodoxy and were heavily shaped by the self-interest of the 
[policy-making] elites’ (Rutland 2013, 332). Policies were also more ‘gradualist’ and 
pragmatic in practice than often acknowledged. The reformers were politically 
vulnerable, and had to compromise – as Gaidar pointed out, in a democracy you cannot 
simply impose a set of reforms (Treisman 2011, 221–23). Either way, the policies of the 
1990s are a prime example of stigma acceptance – like Russian leaders of history, Yeltsin, 
Gaidar, Chubais and their successors (neither Gaidar nor Chubais lasted long in official 
positions) recognised the stigma of Russia’s ‘backwardness’ and pursued a strategy of 
‘catching up’ by embracing and adopting the prevailing hegemonic order (Worth 2005, 
93–116). Russia was to become ‘normal’ again. 
 This acceptance of capitalism continued under Putin, even despite the 1998 
financial crisis enabled by Russia’s increasing openness to international financial flows. 
The crisis discredited the remaining reformers in government, but did not stop Putin and 
his economic policy team of, principally, Alexei Kudrin (deputy mayor of St Petersburg 
alongside Putin in early 1990s, finance minister from 2000-11, since then an academic 
providing occasional advice to Putin) and German Gref (economic development minister 
2000-07, since then president of Sberbank, the state-owned savings bank) from 
implementing a series of liberal tax reforms in 2000-01, including a 13% flat income tax 
that was praised both by President Bush and the free-market think tank the Heritage 
Foundation (Treisman 2011, 232, 236; Mitchell 2003; Zygar 2016, 20).139  
Whether Putin himself can be described as a capitalist is debatable. In their 
biography of Putin, Hill and Gaddy (2013, 143–66, 144) identify ‘the free marketeer’ as 
one of his six defining identities and note how he appears convinced that Russia must be 
a market economy to survive in the modern world. However, they go on to state that 
Putin’s view of how to win in the market is to be the best at exploiting others’ 
vulnerabilities and greed, and conclude that: ‘Capitalism, in Putin’s understanding, is not 
 
139 Treisman claims that many of the reforms had been planned by Yeltsin’s outgoing team and that some 
were already underway, while Zygar describes Putin instructing his St Petersburg associates Kudrin and 
Gref to draw up reforms. Either way, the substance was an embrace of liberal economics. 
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production, management, and marketing. It is wheeling and dealing. … It is about 
personal connections with regulators. It is finding and using loopholes in the law, or 
creating loopholes. That view, of course, is not entirely wrong. It is simply very one-sided’ 
(2013, 163–64). In this analysis, Putin’s view of capitalism was shaped both by his 
experience of the dog-eat-dog world of 1990s St Petersburg and his ‘case officer’ 
mentality. When he was brought to Moscow by Kudrin and others in the mid-1990s 
despite his dismal record (on any economic performance metric) as deputy mayor for 
international economic relations in St. Petersburg, it was not for his credentials in 
‘developing’ business but in ‘controlling’ it (Hill and Gaddy 2013, 165–66). Along with his 
stated belief in so-called ‘national champions’, companies supporting state interests 
rather than their own profit motives in the most important sectors of the economy, and 
the importance of controlling not just key strategic resources but the means for 
transporting them, this goes some way towards explaining events like the Yukos affair 
and the expansion of state control over the oil sector (and other sectors) pursued under 
Putin (Goldman 2010, 98–99; Hill and Gaddy 2013, 222–28).140 Still, the commitment to 
capitalism and the free market in some form or other remained, not just from Putin but 
even more from his ‘Saint Petersburg economists’ team led by Kudrin (Ledeneva 2013, 
59). Internationally, this was reflected for example in Russia’s continued pursuit of WTO 
accession despite slow progress and its prioritisation of paying its debts to international 
lenders such as the IMF.141 Other areas, such as participation in international investment 
arbitration treaties, were more ambivalent. For example, Russia has never ratified ICSID, 
the most prominent international arbitration convention, despite signing it in 1992 
(Mälksoo 2015, 157–58).  
During Medvedev’s presidency from 2008-12, stigma acceptance became more 
pronounced, albeit still primarily at the rhetorical level rather than in practical policy. 
The period was marked by the heavy economic impact of the global financial crisis. 
Russia’s GDP contracted by 7.8% in 2009, sparking a push for economic modernisation 
 
140 As does, of course, the more straightforward and cynical explanation of corruption and kleptocracy 
advanced by e.g. Dawisha (2014). 
141 Russia paid off the majority of its debt to both the IMF and other international lenders in 2001, helped 
by higher-than-expected oil prices. Before the oil price boon, there were fierce debates in the new 
government about whether to seek debt restructuring or pay up by any means. A public statement from 
Germany that unless the debt was paid, it may oppose Russian membership of the G8, helped swing the 
debate – Putin did not want a further reduction in status. See Zygar (2016, 31–33). 
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in response to the conclusion of many in the ruling elite that the country’s ‘vulnerability 
was caused by its technologically backward and natural resource-oriented economic 
structure’ (Connolly 2015, 36). The most high-profile point of the debates surrounding 
this push was Medvedev’s much-publicised article ‘Russia, Forwards!’ (Rossiya, Vperyod! 
– translated as ‘Go Russia!’ on the official Kremlin website), published online in 
September 2009 by gazeta.ru, ‘the best online media resource at the time’ (Zygar 2016, 
174). 
 At face value, ‘Russia, Forwards!’ was a remarkable piece of stigma acceptance, 
even self-stigmatisation, at least as concerns capitalism and democracy. Medvedev 
opened by describing Russia’s economy as ‘primitive’, spoke of its ‘humiliating 
dependence on raw materials’ and the persistence of the ‘major flaw of the Soviet system: 
[the ignoring of] individual needs’, and identified as Russia’s three major ‘ills’ ‘centuries 
of economic backwardness’, ‘centuries of corruption’ and widespread ‘paternalistic 
attitudes’ (Medvedev 2009a).142 In keeping with his love of gadgets and modern 
technologies, he called for an ‘intelligent economy, creating unique knowledge, exporting 
new technologies and innovative products’. And while the most concrete measures 
proposed related to economic modernisation, Medvedev also called for improved 
democratic institutions, the further development of civil society and lauded modern 
information technologies’ role in providing opportunities ‘for the realisation of 
fundamental political freedoms’, albeit while simultaneously insisting, in an echo of the 
sovereign democracy discourse, that ‘Russian democracy will not merely copy foreign 
models’.143 In a somewhat paradoxical passage, the president insisted both that Russia 
was ‘one of the world’s leading economies’ and that his long-term goal was ‘Russia’s 
modernisation’. Another favourite dictum of Medvedev’s was the fight against ‘legal 
nihilism’, launched in his inauguration speech and becoming something of a mantra. 
However, for all his tough talk he implemented very few substantive reforms, whether 
owing to the constraints of operating in ‘tandem’ with Putin and his own relatively weak 
political position, or his lack of actual reformist intent (Treisman 2011, 139–46).  
 
142 Citations taken from the English version for convenience; see Medvedev (2009b) for the Russian version 
on gazeta.ru. 
143 Moreover, in a stigma-rejecting move relating to aggression, he framed Russia’s intervention in Georgia 
the year before as part of an alleged tradition of protecting small nations (in this case the Ossetians). 
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Medvedev’s modernisation rhetoric and to some extent practice echoed the 
above-mentioned instances through history of Russian leaders playing catch-up with the 
West (N. Robinson 2013, 6; David and Romanova 2015; Flenley 2015). However, this 
time, in addition to concluding a ‘Partnership for Modernisation’ agreement with the EU 
in 2010, Russia also concluded ‘a very dense web of memoranda and declarations on 
modernisation’, including with states like South Korea and China, indicating that the West 
was no longer the only model. Besides, the Russians saw modernisation very much as a 
two-way, mutually beneficial process (David and Romanova 2015, 5). Moreover, despite 
Medvedev waxing lyrical about democracy (only to then extend the presidential term 
limit to six years), modernisation was primarily conceived in economic terms by both him 
and even more his prime minister, predecessor and successor, Putin, who upon his return 
to the presidency in 2012 spoke instead of ‘new industrialisation’ but also acknowledged 
the dependence on natural resources and high levels of corruption (Zygar 2016, 174–75; 
David and Romanova 2015, 5–6; Connolly 2015, 36). Since 2012, efforts at reform, such 
as the government-endorsed Strategiya-2020 strategy for socio-economic development 
until 2020, published in 2013, focused almost exclusively on the economic sphere, with 
proposals such as the resumption of privatisation and infrastructure improvements 
(Connolly 2015, 36). Thus, despite Medvedev’s rhetorical flourishes during his 
presidency, the stigma acceptance in practice pertained primarily to economic and 
technological matters, a trend strengthened with Putin’s return. 
 One of the strategies adopted by the leadership upon Putin’s return to the 
presidency was to improve the image of Russia’s business environment by adopting 
reforms that would push it up the World Bank’s flagship Doing Business ranking. As can 
be seen from Chart 7.3, the measures were highly effective, even if Russia fell short of its 
aim of entering the top 20 by the 2019 report (bne Intellinews 2018).  
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Chart 7.3 – Russia’s rank (0 = top) on the World Bank’s Doing Business rankings from the 2006 report (the 
first that ranked countries) to the 2019 report. 
 
Source: World Bank Doing Business. 
This sort of manipulation can be dismissed as window dressing, and the World Bank itself 
acknowledged that Russia and other countries like India were to some extent ‘gaming the 
system’ (Donnan, Foy, and Stacey 2017). But seen from a stigma perspective it is another 
example of the Russian leadership recognising a potential mark against it and working to 
‘despoil’ its identity within the dominant system, rather than by positing some form of 
alternative value system whereby it should be judged. It thus exemplifies a stigma 
acceptance strategy, albeit a superficial one, almost certainly lacking any deep acceptance 
of liberal capitalism as such. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued two things. First, the stigmatisation of Russia in the field of 
capitalism was primarily diffuse, born of its structural position in the capitalist world 
economy, rather than direct. The latter form of stigmatisation occurred primarily when 
capitalist transgressions intersected with transgressions from other fields, including 
human rights and aggression. Second, Russia’s stigma management strategy relating to 
capitalism was largely one of stigma acceptance rather than stigma rejection or counter-
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stigmatisation. By and large, Russian leaders accepted that the country was insufficiently 
economically developed and identified more capitalism, broadly understood, as the 
solution to this problem. 
Categorising Russia’s relationship with capitalism under Putin and Medvedev as 
one of stigma acceptance is not meant to suggest that Russia has become a model 
capitalist state (whatever such a state would look like). Clearly, it is not, as evidenced by 
the weak rule of law, corruption, the personalistic, informal governing style of Putin and 
his entourage and the dubious commitment to ‘playing by the rules’ internationally. 
However, it is notable that unlike in the case of democracy or human rights, where stigma 
rejection and counter-stigmatisation were the dominant modes of stigma management, 
the Russian leadership by and large embraced capitalism as the legitimate economic 
model. There were no attempts to re-instate socialism or communism, no alternative 
model advanced in the mould of ‘traditional values’, and no counter-stigmatisation of 
Western states as having lost their capitalist souls, despite a general grievance with the 
way the 2008-09 financial crisis spread from the US to severely affect also Russia after 
several years of responsible macroeconomic policies (Treisman 2011, 146–50).  
The reasons for this are varied. On the one hand, it indicates the strongly 
hegemonic position of capitalism, stronger than that of democracy, human rights or 
perhaps even non-aggression. There was, in Margaret Thatcher’s words, no alternative, 
even after the catastrophic events of 2008-9. For Russian leaders like Putin and 
Medvedev, this was doubly so given their direct experience of a centrally planned 
economy – Putin’s oft-alleged pining for the Soviet Union certainly did not include a 
desire to re-instate socialism. On the other hand, the acceptance was also, of course, in 
large part driven by the opportunities presented by the globalised capitalist economy for 
personal enrichment. The leadership had vested material interests in the continuation of 
Russia as a capitalist economy. 
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Conclusion 
Does Stigmatisation Make the World Hang Together? 
 
This study has analysed processes of stigmatisation between Russia and the West in the 
post-Cold War period with respect to four core norms of international society. It has made 
two critical contributions, one theoretical and one empirical. 
 First, it has shown how processes of stigmatisation and stigma management are a 
central part of the ongoing contestation of the norms of international society. Against 
substantialist accounts of international society as a bounded entity and of norms as 
‘things’ detailed in Chapter 1, it has joined other critical accounts to demonstrate how 
international society is a relational, dynamic, unfolding process shaped by interactions in 
and through time of entities-in-motion, be they states or a variety of non-state or 
international actors. Norms like democracy, human rights, non-aggression and capitalism 
are not free-floating essences but continually contested symbolic forms shaped by the 
labelling, stereotyping, separation and status loss imposed by actors on other actors and 
the latter’s reactions to such stigmatisation. The structuring effect of norms is constantly 
shaped and reshaped through interactions, and these interactions are simultaneously 
about the contestation of the identity of actors involved. When Western actors label 
Russian elections undemocratic or Russian foreign policy actions aggressive, they are 
simultaneously reinforcing the ‘normal’ of democracy or non-aggression and marking 
Russia out as a deviant against which the norm is defined. A focus on stigmatisation thus 
shows how norms and identities are negotiated, contested, reinforced or undermined 
through interaction.  
Moreover, unlike the often benign view of society and norms also highlighted in 
Chapter 1, a focus on stigmatisation lays bare the power processes involved in these 
interactions. Stigmatisation is infused with power: the production of certain attributes 
and behaviours as ‘normal’ and others as ‘deviant’ is a process of social control, albeit not 
a totalising one. The study has shown how these power processes vary between ‘direct’ 
and ‘diffuse’. Stigmatisation can thus be both a direct political project, with actors seeking 
to reinforce or establish power relations and norms by marking certain actors and 
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behaviours as beyond the pale, as with Western actors after Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea, and a diffuse process whereby multiple ongoing interactions have the effect of 
marking certain actors and attributes as inferior, as with Russia’s ‘arrested’ capitalist 
development. While successful stigmatisation relies on a power differential between the 
‘audience of normals’ and the stigmatised, stigmatisation is not merely something done 
by the ‘powerful’ to the ‘weak’. It takes power to stigmatise, but power is always 
relational, never absolute, and dominant norms can be subverted and contested by 
stigmatised actors or groups to turn their stigma around, as seen in the examples of Cuba, 
Libya and others mentioned in this study, as well as multiple ‘out-groups’ through history. 
The Russian state’s ‘traditional values’ campaign is an example of this dynamic: even if it 
tramples on weaker actors in its own population, it comes from a position of weakness in 
the overall power relationship between itself and the West. Stigmatisation and stigma 
management thus involves a dynamic, unfolding, relational power-infused process of 
interactions. 
Second, empirically this study has provided an innovative interpretation of the 
past three decades of Russian-Western relations that addresses the three issues 
highlighted in the Introduction: polarisation as well as a need for theoretically inspired 
and interactional analysis. It eschewed the polarisation and ‘blame game’ of much recent 
work to provide a critical analysis that situates the recent deterioration of relations 
within the broader picture of the ongoing negotiation of international norms. Rather than 
locating ‘fault’, it showed how the direct and diffuse stigmatisation of Russia within the 
dominant normative structures of international society and its attempts to manage its 
(sometimes established, sometimes emergent) stigmas through strategies of rejection, 
evasion and counter-stigmatisation have contributed constitutively to the impasse in 
relations. It also provided a theoretical reading that both relates Russian-Western 
relations to fundamental social processes underpinning international society and 
provides a lens that can serve to aid comparison with other cases of stigmatisation. 
Finally, it provided a relational analysis that goes against the tendency to focus on one 
‘side’ or the other and to treat them as substantialist entities with static attributes, 
defined by such characteristics as ‘authoritarian’ or ‘democratic’, ‘liberal’ or ‘post-Soviet’. 
The analysis sheds new light on several aspects of Russian-Western relations. For 
example, the stigma lens shows how seemingly separate Russian actions and strategies 
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can all be read as variations of stigma management, attempts to avoid the consequences 
of deviance or stigma: from the stigma-rejecting insistence on Russia’s democratic nature 
encapsulated in ‘sovereign democracy’, via the stigma-evading online information 
campaigns surrounding the Ukraine conflict, to the counter-stigmatising campaign of 
‘traditional values’ and ‘sovereign morality’. At the same time, it demonstrates how the 
seemingly benign Western promotion of democracy, human rights, etc., is as much a 
power-laden process of stigmatisation as it is a rational, deliberative process of 
socialisation, and how the Western ‘audience of normals’ varies from norm to norm. 
Ultimately, rather than a tale of two fundamentally incompatible entities butting against 
each other, the analysis provides a tale of a two entities-in-motion engaged in a dynamic, 
unfolding process from which they both in part derive their identities and through which 
they negotiate and contest the norms of their broader social setting, namely international 
society. 
This conclusion does two things. First, the next section builds from a summary of 
the empirics of the previous four chapters to discuss what the different levels and kinds 
of stigmatisation and stigma management can tell us about hierarchies between the 
different norms. This section also discusses cross-cutting stigmatising frames such as 
temporal frames centred on notions of modernity and progress as well as the increasing 
rejection of liberalism in Russia’s stigma management strategies. Second, the final section 
considers whether stigmatisation in Russian-Western relations has ‘made the world hang 
together’ (c.f. Zarakol 2014). It argues that, owing to the relational interplay between 
relatively weak stigma imposition and successful stigma management strategies, 
stigmatisation in post-Cold War Russian-Western relations has increasingly been failing 
in its purpose either of enlisting ‘support for [international] society among those who are 
not supported by it’ (Goffman 1963, 164) or of keeping people ‘down’, ‘in’ or ‘out’ (Phelan, 
Link, and Dovidio 2008). While Russia’s pariah status has grown in the West over its 
breaches of democratic, human rights and non-aggression norms, this has neither 
induced a change in Russian behaviour nor strengthened the norms in question. The 
section also brings the analysis forward by considering the impact of the election of 
Donald Trump as US president on stigmatisation in Russian-Western relations. 
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I – Cross-cutting frames and themes 
Table 8.1 summarises variation in stigmatisation and stigma management across the 
different norms analysed in this study. This section goes beyond this summary to identify 
cross-cutting stigmatising frames and themes that emerge from the analysis in the 
preceding chapters. The first is the issue of hierarchies between the different norms. The 
second is the centrality of temporal frames, including the persistent linking of 
discreditable behaviour to the past and desirable, ‘normal’ characteristics to conceptions 
of being ‘modern’, and the centrality of rejections of liberalism in Russia’s stigma 
management. 
 
Table 8.1 – Summary of stigmatisation and stigma management processes 
Norm Nature of 
stigmatisation 
Audience of 
normals 
Stigma 
management 
Audience of 
‘counter’-
normals 
Democracy 
Increasingly 
direct labelling 
and 
stereotyping as 
authoritarian 
and 
undemocratic, 
but limited 
separation and 
status loss. 
Mostly 
Western: 
OSCE/EU/CoE/
US. Election 
monitors 
central. 
Stigma 
rejection mixed 
with counter-
stigmatisation. 
‘Sovereign 
democracy’ 
plus critique of 
‘undemocratic’ 
international 
relations. 
‘Sovereign 
democracy’ 
mostly for 
domestic 
purposes. No 
concerted 
‘counter-
audience’ 
around 
‘undemocratic’ 
international 
relations. 
Human 
Rights 
 
Increasingly 
direct labelling 
over Chechnya, 
civil and 
political rights 
and LGBT 
issues. Some 
Mostly 
Western, but 
very 
transnational 
and non-state, 
including NGOs, 
international 
courts, etc. 
Stigma 
rejection and 
increasingly 
active counter-
stigmatisation, 
targeted at 
liberal values – 
Transnational 
audience 
focused on 
‘traditional 
values’/against 
liberalism. Both 
domestic 
population, 
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separation over 
Chechnya. 
‘sovereign 
morality’. 
‘illiberal’ states 
and actors 
within West. 
Non-
aggression 
Direct 
stigmatisation 
over Crimea 
and Ukraine, 
albeit not as 
intense as it 
could have 
been. 
More global 
than above, but 
still primarily 
Western. 
Stigma 
rejection, 
evasion and 
counter-
stigmatisation 
of West. 
Attempt to use 
democratic 
norm and 
information 
control to evade 
stigma. 
Very small, 
mostly 
consisting of 
anti-Western 
stalwarts. But 
managed to 
keep partners 
like the other 
BRICS neutral. 
Capitalism 
Mostly diffuse. 
Direct mainly 
when mixed 
with other 
transgressions, 
against human 
rights/non-
aggression. 
Little direct 
stigmatisation, 
thus not one 
‘audience’. G7 
comes closest. 
Stigma 
acceptance 
(and rejection 
of any 
transgressions). 
However, an 
orientation 
towards ‘state 
capitalism’ in 
practice. 
Little counter-
stigmatisation, 
so no ‘counter-
audience’. 
 
 
Hierarchies: which norm is most normal? 
Chapter 3 presented the four norms or ‘norm clusters’ analysed here as part of a broader 
package of what it meant to be a ‘normal’ state in post-Cold War international society. 
The norms were presented as interlinked and as broadly reinforcing of each other, at 
least as seen by practitioners, despite several tensions between democracy and 
capitalism, democracy and human rights, etc. However, the analysis of subsequent 
chapters, as summarised above, indicates various hierarchies between the norms in 
practice. 
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 The first thing that stands out is the relative lack of stigmatisation over, and 
Russia’s relative acceptance of, capitalism. As noted in the conclusion to Chapter 7, this 
indicates capitalism’s strongly hegemonic position in the post-Cold War period, stronger 
than democracy or human rights, even if the former came close to rivalling it, as indicated 
by the Putin government’s insistence on its (sovereign) democratic nature. Economic 
globalisation and the spread and institutionalisation of neo-/ordoliberal ideas of 
economic management led to a strong ‘common sense’ regarding the question of how to 
organise a state economically. While this took a hit with the 2008 global financial crisis, 
with some old stigmas overturned, it still persisted as the dominant view. And while 
Russia’s capitalism was relatively statist (not to mention corrupt), it was still 
recognisably capitalism and seen as such by its leaders. 
 The second notable thing is that the most intense and direct stigmatisation of 
Russia occurred over its breach of the non-aggression norm in Ukraine. This is not in itself 
surprising: the transgression was flagrant (even more so than six years earlier in Georgia) 
and violated perhaps the most constitutive of norms in the current international society, 
namely the territorial integrity of states. But it does speak exactly to the enduring 
importance of this ‘pluralist’ and state-centred norm despite the increasing importance 
of ‘solidarist’, human rights and democracy-related norms. At the same time, the 
comparatively weak stigmatisation compared to what could have occurred, for example 
the complete severing of diplomatic relations or military intervention to restore Crimea 
to Ukraine, indicates the contingency of stigmatisation in modern international relations. 
It also shows the difficulty of uniting an ‘audience of normals’ against an actor as powerful 
as Russia and over an issue where the stigmatisers themselves had a highly discreditable 
history of breaches, laying themselves open to accusations of hypocrisy. 
 The fact that the most active counter-stigmatising parts of Russia’s stigma 
management occurred in relation to human rights indicates the norm’s enduring position 
as the least well embedded expectation of ‘normal’ state behaviour. In part, this comes 
back to the highly contested scope of human rights and its relatively weak embedding 
even in states like the US, as highlighted in Chapter 3. Despite the extensive international 
legal human rights regime and the well-established stigma around certain egregious 
abuses like genocide and war crimes, issues like gender and LGBT rights that became the 
focus of Russia’s counter-stigmatisation campaign remain deeply disputed. As noted in 
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the conclusion to Chapter 5, the fact that Russia was not particularly stigmatised in this 
area prior to Russia itself making it the central plank of its stigma management strategy 
also points to the absence of any direct relationship between the observable existence of 
a successful stigma imposition and the reaction or experience of the stigmatised. 
Moreover, the rejection of ‘liberal’ values went deeper than Russia’s usual tu quoque tactic 
of pointing the finger back at Western failures, representing instead a deeper rejection of 
the whole ‘Western’ value system. This points to a deeper rejection of ‘liberalism’ that 
will be considered below. 
 Overall, the study points to a hierarchy of norms in contemporary international 
society, with non-aggression, capitalism and democracy (the last two represented in the 
fusion of ‘market democracy’) sitting above human rights as hegemonic expectations of 
‘normal’ state behaviour or organisation (despite patchy implementation worldwide). 
Potential changes to this hierarchy will be considered in the next section. But first the 
cross-cutting frames of temporal stigmatising tropes and Russia’s rejection of liberalism 
will be considered. 
 
Cross-cutting frames: temporal tropes and liberalism 
A notable cross-cutting theme that emerges from the analysis is the enduring centrality 
of temporal tropes and teleological thinking to stigmatisation on the international scale. 
Despite the discrediting of formal ‘standards of civilisation’ where civilisation is seen as 
a higher and more temporally advanced stage of development, temporality and teleology 
have lived on as organising principles through categorisations such as ‘developed’ and 
‘underdeveloped’ (Zarakol 2010). What is striking about both the stigmatising language 
and some of the instances of stigma management seen in the preceding chapters is the 
endurance of such tropes as ‘modern’ and ‘advanced’ long into the 21st century, 
demonstrating the continued salience of temporal politics.144 
 
144 On the politics of time in international relations and the centrality of temporal distinctions to processes 
of ‘othering’, see e.g. Hutchings (2008) and the recent special issue of Millennium, including the 
contributions by Hutchings (2018), Chamon (2018), Hom (2018), Neumann (2018) and Younis (2018). 
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 The dominance of temporal frames can be seen in how both sides of the 
stigmatisation process employed them. On the one hand, Russia was stigmatised for being 
out of time (and, sometimes, out of place) and engaging in practices of the past, with 
Western actors expressing a willingness to ‘help’ it on its way towards modernity. On the 
other, Russian leaders shot back with temporal tropes of their own, such as accusing 
Western leaders of re-running the Cold War. At times, they accepted their own 
‘backwardness’, notably in regards to capitalism but also as part of the doctrine of 
sovereign democracy, with Putin’s emphasis on Russia travelling along the same path as 
everyone else but in its own time, at its own tempo. Only in the case of human rights and 
the ‘traditional values’ agenda did Russian leaders seek to take the stigma of being 
‘backward-looking’ and turn it into a positive attribute, trying to counter-stigmatise the 
supposedly ‘modern’ West as an immoral and decadent den of iniquity. 
 Temporal frames thus become linked to desirable or undesirable characteristics, 
providing efficient stigmatising tropes such as ‘this kind of behaviour does not belong in 
the 21st century’ (Kerry 2014). This kind of discourse draws on a long tradition of 
temporal ‘othering’, what Johannes Fabian (2014) calls the ‘denial of coevalness’ that 
characterises both the Western anthropological field and other intellectual traditions. 
Central to this thinking is the idea of liberalism as progress and hence of the idea of the 
liberal order as a progressive force – liberal democracy, liberal human rights, liberal 
capitalism, liberal norms pushing history along and spreading civility. In Helge Jordheim 
and Einar Wigen’s (2018) terms, ‘progress’ has been the ‘synchronising’ concept behind 
the spread of liberal ideas. The part of this dynamic that has been highlighted in this study 
is how non-liberal behaviours become stigmatised as being out of time and regressive. 
The above leads attention to another cross-cutting frame, namely Russia’s 
increasing rejection and counter-stigmatisation of liberalism. This was explicit in the 
cases of democracy and human rights and implicit in the embrace of a statist version of 
capitalism. For while sovereign democracy as a concept and the general management of 
the democratic process was still claimed as ‘democratic’ by the Russian leadership, the 
insistence on Russia’s democratic right to choose its own path of development was an 
invocation of what Gerry Simpson (2001) calls ‘Charter liberalism’: the more pluralist 
form of liberalism that insists on a state’s right to choose, as compared to an ‘anti-
pluralist’ kind insisting on the universal validity of specifically liberal values. Sovereign 
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democracy was claimed to be democratic, but not liberal democratic. The anti-liberal 
argument became more prominent in the explicit rejection of liberal human rights from 
the late 2000s onwards. This trend is in line with broader trends and the ‘dis-embedding’ 
(c.f. Ruggie 1982) of certain forms of liberalism since the 1990s, both as a result of an 
increasing rejection by states like Russia and processes such as the relative undermining 
of liberal interventionism by the Iraq War and of liberal capitalism by the 2008 financial 
crisis. While it is beyond the scope of this study to consider the full extent of the debates 
around the ‘crisis’ of the liberal order,145 the next section discusses one aspect of these 
debates: whether the process of stigmatisation is increasingly failing when it comes to 
constructing a stigma around illiberal practices. 
 
II – The failing of stigmatisation? The waning of the illiberal taboo 
Evoking John Ruggie’s (1998) question of ‘what makes the world hang together?’, Zarakol 
(2014) argues that stigmatisation, rather than socialisation, has been the key ingredient 
holding the modern world together. Rather than the benign spread of norms through 
persuasion and argumentation, she argues, the stigmatisation of non-Western attributes 
and practices as inferior and backward, and the internalisation by non-Western leaders 
of these stigmas, serves what Goffman identifies as the general purpose of stigmatisation: 
enlisting support for society from those not supported by it. This final section considers 
whether this has been the case in Russian-Western relations since the Cold War, asking 
whether the stigmatisation both of Russia and the illiberal attributes and behaviours it 
has come to represent is increasingly failing. 
 Despite the seemingly solid stigmatisation of Russia as undemocratic, aggressive, 
an abuser of human rights and all-round illiberal actor, when considering the purposes 
of stigmatisation proposed by Goffman and more recent scholarship, it is clear that this 
process did not lead to greater support for the norms of international society, either from 
Russia or, increasingly, from other states. Indeed, Russia’s increasingly open rejection of 
liberal norms, particularly gender and LGBT rights but also the specifically ‘liberal’ 
 
145 For exemplary literature, see particularly G. John Ikenberry’s work (e.g. 2011; 2018), as well as Acharya 
(e.g. 2014), and a recent special issue of International Affairs including the contributions by Duncombe and 
Dunne (2018), Edinger (2018), Jahn (2018), Norrlof (2018), Parmar (2018) and Stokes (2018). 
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versions of democracy and capitalism, was a contributing factor in the growing trend 
against such norms internationally, forming part of a burgeoning transnational ‘counter-
audience’ against the promotion of liberal norms that included governments like Viktor 
Orbán’s in Hungary and far-right parties in several Western states. In this way, the 
normative cohesion of international society was called into question, with a dwindling 
‘audience of normals’ on the side of liberal norms and a waning taboo around illiberal 
practices. 
 The idea of ‘failure’ should not be taken as conclusive or complete. If, as noted in 
previous chapters, relational processes of stigmatisation in some sense never fully 
‘succeed’, they also never fully ‘fail’. Rather, just as we can think of processes of ordering 
rather than a substantive order, we should conceive of stigmatisation processes 
succeeding or failing in relative terms. What gradually occurred through the 2000s and 
into the 2010s was that the stigmatisation of Russia increasingly failed to bring about 
norm enforcement, domination or separation. A more assertive Russia openly flouted 
liberal norms and reached out to fellow travellers both beyond and within the supposed 
Western ‘core’ of normals, in which increasing numbers of people had also started to 
question the prevailing ‘normality’. Direct stigmatisation including material sanctions 
following the annexation of Crimea led neither to a change in behaviour nor to sustained 
diplomatic or economic isolation of Russia. It was both able to turn to non-Western 
countries, and within a couple of years summits with Western countries started to re-
occur, notably after the election of Trump as US president. 
 The reasons for this ongoing failure are many. On the one hand, the direct 
stigmatisation of Russia was for most of the period quite patchy. Only with the annexation 
of Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine was a sustained sanctions regime 
implemented and diplomatic contacts deprioritised by Western states and institutions. 
Even then, the ‘audience of normals’ was mostly Western, and as noted above, sanctions 
were relatively mild compared to what could have been implemented, such as whole 
trade embargoes or the severing of diplomatic relations (there is an argument that ‘smart’ 
sanctions targeting individuals may bite harder with the relevant people, but this is 
questionable in today’s globalised world where it is hard to pin down a person’s assets). 
At various stages throughout the post-Cold War period, strategic considerations, material 
interests and/or a lack of actual commitment to the norms in question precluded 
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powerful Western actors from engaging in the full-spectrum, direct stigmatisation of 
Russia for its various transgressions.  
Of course, the size and importance of Russia mattered. Stigmatisation requires 
power and can itself be a source of power. But power is relative, and while Russia’s claim 
to great power status was waning and the power imbalance between itself and the West 
was substantial, it was still a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council. From the doldrums of the 1990s, it restored some of its economic and military 
power in the 2000s and 2010s, despite the shock of the 2008 financial crisis, subsequent 
oil price volatility and the impact of sanctions from 2014. Stigmatising such a state into 
compliance would always be a difficult proposition, although as the examples of the US’s 
futile stigmatisation of Cuba and Libya’s inversion of its UN sanctions in the 1990s show, 
material power imbalances are not the be-all and end-all of stigmatisation processes. 
Stigmatisation is above all a discursive and symbolic process, in which the outcome of the 
interplay between the stronger and weaker actors is not a given. This brings the focus 
onto the role of stigma management strategies. 
 In the dynamic process of stigmatisation and stigma management, both sides of 
the interaction are important in influencing the process towards success or failure. On a 
superficial level, it is clear that a strategy such as stigma acceptance or recognition is 
more likely to lead to norm enforcement. If an actor accepts their stigma and seeks to 
normalise, it strengthens the normative fabric of society. Similarly, if an actor either 
rejects their stigma or counter-stigmatises the ‘normals’, this will sow doubts about 
normative cohesion. However, such moves may also have the effect of strengthening the 
‘in-group’ if the reaction of enough actors to the stigma rejection or counter-
stigmatisation is to side with the initial stigmatisers and shun the transgressor(s). In 
Russia’s case, its increasingly active stigma rejection and counter-stigmatisation 
strategies through the 2000s and 2010s had a dual effect. On the one hand, they brought 
more opprobrium. For example, its (counter-) stigmatisation campaign against foreign 
NGOs and its attempt to evade the stigma of having enabled the downing of flight MH17 
caused more condemnation, particularly from broadly liberal Western actors. On the 
other hand, its ‘sovereign morality’ line and general critique of Western domination of 
international relations brought it in line with like-minded transnational audiences, 
providing fuel to an existing and growing backlash against Western dominance and 
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liberal norms. While it provided added clout to this audience, it did not invent it – the 
growing influence and success of ‘illiberals’ both within and beyond the West was itself a 
sign of the increasing failure of the stigmatisation of illiberal behaviours and attributes 
and the success of the counter-stigmatising narratives employed against ‘liberal elites’.  
 Alongside the sometimes-lacking stigmatisation and successful stigma 
management, another reason for the waning effectiveness of stigmatisation over norms 
like the four investigated here was the multiple ‘own goals’ either committed by Western 
actors or resulting from macro-level events in the West.146 From the war in Iraq’s impact 
both on the norm of non-aggression and the democracy promotion agenda, via the 
relativizing of human rights in the name of ‘security’ in the War on Terror, to the 2008 
financial crisis’ impact on the legitimacy of neoliberal capitalism (in theory if not fully in 
practice), Western actors had a far from unblemished record from which to stigmatise. 
While this did not stop them doing so, it limited their ability to mobilise an audience 
beyond much of the Western core, as evidenced in the General Assembly debates on the 
resolution to uphold Ukrainian territorial integrity in March 2014 and the relatively 
Western-centric participation in sanctions against Russia. This points to how 
discreditable behaviour by would-be stigmatisers creates its own fragility. As Goffman 
(1963, 161) notes, ‘in imputing identities to individuals, discreditable or not, the wider 
social setting and its inhabitants have in a way compromised themselves, they have set 
themselves up to be proven the fool’. Or, in the case of similar discreditable behaviour 
being traced to themselves, the hypocrite. 
 A final reason for the waning of the stigma of being ‘illiberal’ is the affective 
attractiveness of breaking taboos. As for example Cara Daggett (2018) has argued in 
relation to ‘petro-masculine’ climate change deniers in the US (see also Etkind 2014 on 
Russian ‘petro-machismo’), there can be an element of ‘desire’ involved in breaking with 
the hegemonic ‘reason’ of the scientific consensus. Similarly, alt-right activists tap into a 
long-standing tradition of framing themselves as transgressive truth-tellers against the 
‘politically correct’ liberal consensus. In short, transgression can be ‘cool’, something 
evidenced by centuries of stigmatised out-groups and sub-cultures turning their 
ostracizing from mainstream society into emblems of pride. In Russia’s case, the support 
 
146 My thanks to Taras Kuzio for the idea of a stigma ‘own goal’, though his example was the annexation of 
Crimea. 
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for Putin by elements of the far right across Europe and North America has similar 
origins: a fascination with the Russian president’s supposedly ‘strong’ leadership and 
tough-talking breach of ‘taboos’ like the opposition to gender rights. For the audience at 
home, the identification of the Russian state’s international behaviour with that of a 
‘trickster’ sticking it to and relativizing the established norms of morality and proper 
conduct (Morozov, Kurowska, and Reshetnikov 2018), similar to Woland/Satan and his 
entourage in The Master and Margarita from this study’s epigraph, also holds a strong 
appeal in large parts of the population. The Russian leadership has been able to draw 
social capital both at home and abroad from its transgressive behaviour. 
 Since 2016, the Russians have been helped in this endeavour by the increased 
legitimacy given to the trash-talking breaking of taboos by President Trump. The election 
of Trump has been a gift to Russia’s stigma management, albeit one qualified by the 
increasing opprobrium around its meddling in the election.147 Russia’s involvement has 
been seized upon by Trump’s opponents as a source of stigma and sanctions have been 
locked in by Congress for that reason. The framing of the president specifically as a 
Russian stooge (rather than a corrupt and unprincipled man who would take money and 
information from anyone offering) and the comparative lack of scrutiny of other 
corporate or state lobbying interests says a lot about the growing stigmatisation of all 
things Russian in liberal Western discourse. But the president’s willingness to re-
establish summits with his Russian counterpart and even advocate for Russia’s 
readmission to the G7, as well as his demonstrable lack of commitment to liberal 
principles and American normative leadership, have weakened the unity of the ‘audience 
of normals’ stigmatising Russia. In fact, Trump’s association with the broader, ‘illiberal’ 
transnational coalition that Putin’s ‘traditional values’ agenda has played up to in many 
ways puts the American and Russian presidents on the same side. While a detailed 
analysis of the period post-2016 is beyond the scope of this study, it is clear that Trump’s 
presidency has fundamentally shifted the dynamic of the stigmatisation process not just 
vis-à-vis Russia, but also other stigmatised states like North Korea (and, in the opposite 
 
147 That Russia in various ways sought to influence the election in Trump’s favour (or in Hillary Clinton’s 
disfavour, probably with the expectation she would still win) is by now well established, even if the actual 
impact of these attempts cannot be verified. These attempts, and the general tactic of sowing mischief and 
discord in other elections, can themselves be read as instances of stigma management, both diffusely in the 
attempts to discredit democratic processes and thus drag down standards, and directly when aimed at 
helping politicians who would likely ease the stigmatisation of Russia. 
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direction, Iran). Moreover, his election despite his many transgressions is itself an 
indication of the increasing failure of illiberal taboos. 
 For a concerned defender of liberal norms like democracy and human rights, if 
stigmatisation is failing, what is to be done? Should one stigmatise Russia and other like-
minded illiberals? Depending on one’s commitment to a liberal democratic society and a 
broadly rules-based international order, the answer to that question may be a clear ‘yes’ 
on a normative level. But it is also in part a futile question. As noted throughout this study, 
stigmatisation dynamics often occur unintentionally, as a result of the combination of 
broader processes of labelling, stereotyping, discrimination and status loss. The answer, 
then, is to be more reflective about the fact that norm politics involve stigmatisation to a 
far greater degree than socialisation, and that while, as Zarakol argues, stigmatisation can 
hold the world together, it can also make it fall apart when the process weakens and 
actors seek to manage their stigmas in more confrontational ways. In Goffman’s parlance, 
actors may go to great lengths to manage their ‘spoiled’ identities, including by seeking 
to tear down the norms that spoil them.  
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